I have corrected my post to G-LBAL

I don't think that's insensitive, but more to the point:

Q: why would anyone operate a half-million quid aircraft with no ADSB-out?

A: to save the price of a couple of hours flight time? :ugh:

But ADS-B is no good low level countrywide for ad hoc helicopter operations ..... Satellite tracking is more reliable ..... showing you instantly track, position, speed and altitude.

"Aviation in itself is not inherently dangerous. But to an even greater degree
than the sea, it is terribly unforgiving of any carelessness, incapacity or neglect."

— Captain A. G. Lamplugh, British Aviation Insurance Group, London. 1930's

I was given a picture with the statement above by my father when I started my aviation career at PPL level & have never forgotten it since & never will..

Crash site was at circa 2300ft. Terrain safe 25nm MSA for Cranfield is 2200ft and Oxford 2300ft . . . .

Nahh he wouldn't have; would he ??

Fred

ADS B Out is not necessarily cheap it depends at what level you want to participate and what equipment is already fitted.

Satellite tracking is not always that reliable. You are relying on data going through various gateways.

Location of Crash Site
 

If the photo on BBC news is correct...

Five Snowdonia helicopter victims' bodies recovered - BBC News

The location of the crash site is here...

https://www.google.co.uk/maps/@52.82...!3m1!1e3?hl=en

The view is looking North.

Is that really your personal experience of ADSB-out?

Mine (albeit in a simple bushplane) is quite the opposite: i.e. that extended squitter with SIL 10^-7 ensures scarily accurate FR24 tracking in upland Britain well below the height at which en-route compliance with the common rules of the air would not be assured.

As for the cost of ES, it should be around 1 AMU unless the rest of the stuff in the panel is 15 year old junk.

I think it will be a lot sooner than that, usually 1 year, no?

It is not as simple as that. Looking at my log book I have around 300 hours of flying across Wales VFR.

Most were direct line Cardiff to Valley. None were ever flown direct line.

The weather and terrain is the killer for experieneced low level pilots.

The combination of very poor visibility and turbulance is not an easy combination to cope with if you have never flown over remote mountains.

Try it at night and you really push your luck.

Been there done it and never again.

The specifics of this tragic accident will, one hopes, become more fully understood. But one reason, I believe, why many pilots who may well start with a Plan B (C, etc) in mind, but do not implement them when indicated, is that they have kept the alternative plans to themselves and have not communicated them to passengers (who, if non-pilots, are generally entirely innocent of flight safety considerations). Once airborne, the pressure to keep going just that further mile, to look for the gap in the cloud or the lifting in visibility, can then become intense, for fear of disappointing the companions on board. We've all been there.

A method I have used over the years in both private and small commercial operations (FW light twins and turboprops) to offer some degree of self-immunisation from this temptation, is to "pre-disappoint" the passengers during the safety briefing. Or better, when discussing the intended flight some hours or days beforehand.

The spiel goes something like: "Folks, we are planning to fly to X and arrive by Y time, however in aviation there can be a number of reasons why it might become unsafe to continue and I may decide to divert, or even return to base, and we need to consider these before we go. They can include weather deteriorating below safe limits, suspected mechanical problems, if I or a passenger were to become unwell, or other possible contingencies. If any of these were to arise then the plan would be [divert to A, return to B, go by road, have dinner, etc etc]. It's unlikely any of these will occur but if they do, my decision will be final on these alternative plans. No flight is important enough to press on in such circumstances. Is everyone happy with that arrangement?"

I've never once given this briefing where all concerned didn't nod vigorously in agreement. Having committed to it, they have pre-approved and absorbed your contingent decision, should it become necessary, to divert from the original plan. Putting some gentle frighteners on them focuses their minds a bit further. (Call that TEM, if you like).

Should the need then subsequently arise to turn to plan B, etc., they will now be GLAD the pilot is doing so, rather than disappointed. More important she or he is relieved of a large element of internal pressure: that crushing reluctance to share the bad news while peering into an increasingly worrisome scene ahead. It's already been told, and the pilot can concentrate without distraction on getting safely to the alternate.

On a related topic:

"Safety Altitude" often gets discussed in incidents such as this. Over the years I have heard students and private flyers (and even some professionals) describe safety altitude for VFR flights as all or any of:

- A height you must stay above if you accidentally fly into cloud
- A height below which you must fly extra-carefully if the cloud base forces you below it.
- A height the school or company recommends you keep above unless you're a super-special pilot.
- A useful idea for students but something you can exercise discretion over when you get more qualified.

It is, of course, none of these things. It is a height at or above which, if you are forced to descend to it by deteriorating cloud base or visibility, then you MUST divert or return to better conditions. This is another decision which it is essential to "pre-make" in the pilot's mind long before it is forced upon them.

Instructors or pilots discussing this concept with students or fellow-flyers would to well to ensure it is thoroughly understood and internalised as a trigger to action.

To me that seems unnecessarily restrictive for VFR. To me it's sensible to say, you can be below the MSA if you are clear of cloud and have sufficient visibility to see and avoid obstacles, whilst maintaining a safe height above ground. When you can't be below the MSA is when you can't see where you're going.

juustanotherflyer,

I like your "pre disappointment" approach. Do you mind if I blag it and your spiel to use in TEM training?

Just another, that is pure gold, the pre-briefing of a possible disappointment.
When I told a companion that we might have to rent a car to get to Austin, and he said "can't you get another weather report?"
I said "I am tired, weather is dangerous, and we might end up dead, which would be bad for our image!"

He immediately agreed to rent a car instead of continuing into horrible weather. It rained over Christmas for five days, and even the airlines had to divert!

The police released this image yesterday, showing where it came down:

https://pbs.twimg.com/media/C8QwlA-WAAER_6R.jpg

https://goo.gl/maps/PQVs9fTPTLG2 or 52.840320, -3.993511

It crashed just below the summit (on the eastern ridge) of Rhinog Fawr, with Llyn Cwmhosan below it. The helicopter will have been flying from R to L in the photo.

Streetmap.co.uk - Map of 52.840320, -3.993511 shows just how inaccessible the location is.

Which is, even by the standard of PPRUNE, potentially misleading. :)

The Minimum Sector Altitude (MSA) is the lowest altitude which may be used which will provide a minimum clearance of 300 m (1 000 ft) above all objects located in the area contained within a sector of a circle of 46 km (25 NM) radius centred on a radio aid to navigation.

As such, MSA is about as relevant to contact flying in remote mountain areas as the rest of the information on a Dutch instrument approach chart.

If confusing MSA with the "minimum safe altitude" as defined, for instance, by 14 CFR 19.119 or the British rules of the air, that's a statutory requirement to maintain 500 ft separation from any person, vessel, vehicle or structure in remote areas.

That brought back memories of IF trg under the hood all those years ago!

"A peek is worth thousand scans!"

And limited panel UPs on a Chipmunk...:eek:

During my 2 years as a 'spotter' at EGNX, in the early 1970s, there was a C337 based there, G-ATNY.

About 10 years later a pile of AAIB reports appeared in our crew-room at EGCC, including one involving that a/c.

Fixed-wing as opposed to rotary-wing, yes, but I wonder how many similarities there are with this tragic event?

https://assets.publishing.service.go...979_G-ATNY.pdf

I think this lower level of magnification at http://www.streetmap.co.uk/map.srf?x...earchp=ids.srf shows rather better where the site actually is in relation to the coast and the height of the actual mountain/ridge crashed in to.

It would also be interesting to know what altitude they were travelling at during most of the rest of the journey from Luton and what effort they made to fly higher when flying over terrain chock full with mountains as high as 1085m.

If determined to make the trip in such adverse weather conditions its also hard to see why they wouldn't have flown over lower terrain and north of but close to the North Wales coast, although even then there is a long and dangerous ridge of mountains up to 1064m high just south of Llanfairfechan. But as the Twin Squirrell is capable of flying at up to 3,400m was there any good reason for them to be flying this low in this area. Of course I expect weather and lack of visibility at higher altitudes no doubt came in to the equation. Or was lack of fuel to take a more circuitous route with this amount of adult passengers and luggage also potentially a factor?

>It would also be interesting to know what altitude they were travelling at during most of the rest of the journey from Luton and what effort they made to fly higher when flying over terrain chock full with mountains as high as 1085m.<

For what it may be worth, my BaseStation log shows the aircraft at 2700ft between 1227 and 1253. At that altitude my site is probably line of sight to the Rhinog area at 1090MHz.

On the first day of the search operation, cloud cover was down to 300m or so. Visibility was said to be around 10 feet.

Sad that on a 'professional' forum the pilot is being blamed for flying too low in poor visibility, with little evidence. He may have been 1000 feet above the highest mountain and experienced a catastrophic mechanical fault or taken ill. It's no so long ago that the entire rotor came off of a helicopter. Had they been in poor visibility and the wreckage not found would the same presumptions have been posted?

No because they weren't over high ground and in an MCC full IFR machine.

Great post, justanotherflyer. I call it 'setting expectations' and it applies to situations outside aviation as well. Your description:

" Once airborne, the pressure to keep going just that further mile, to look for the gap in the cloud or the lifting in visibility, can then become intense, for fear of disappointing the companions on board. We've all been there."

Is exactly what I meant by that 'land' decision being a difficult one, and the temptation to 'press on pressing on' is very strong.

That may well be the case. However, Information regarding the circumstances and looking at past incidents in similar circumstances tells us that the probability of this being due to catastrophic mechanical failure is very, very low (realistically <5%). The fact that it hit barely underneath the summit of that ridge also points in a clear direction.
Professional Pilots stated that they would consider this flight on this route, weather and time of the day challenging even in a much better equipped bigger Helicopter and this coming from Military / SAR Pilots gives me a clear idea what that means for a PPL in a rather small helicopter with limited equipment to deal with such an environment.
Chances are 1 + 1 = 2.

MSA is the minimum altitude to fly at when flying IFR. From a legal point of view one has to comply with the Minimum Height Rule which is 1,000 ft above the highest point within 5 nm of the aircraft. (With certain specific exceptions). Flying IFR assumes the aircraft is suitably equipped and the pilot has the appropriate instrument qualification. Also operators might specify higher criteria that the Min Ht Rule in their manuals for a variety of reasons. You also have to ask how accurately you can pinpoint position. To allow for errors you might look 10 miles either side of track (and beyond track) to find the highest point on that leg of the route.

Flying VFR you may fly below MSA. However it's a good idea to calculate a minimum VFR altitude. The idea behind this is to have a preplanned "If I can't maintain this altitude then I'm turning back or diverting". You would also use this figure before flight when studying the Met F215 etc to make a go/no go decision or electing to fly a different route clear of higher terrain.

This hopefully prevents pilots from ploughing into bad weather and then carrying on until they create a problem for themselves. To arrive at the Min VFR Alt look at terrain and obstacles en route and then ask yourself "How low do I want to be to the ground?". This figure may well vary depending upon the individual pilot's experience. Ask yourself "Do I really want to be flying below 1,500 - 2,000 feet above ground level?"

All the above is notwithstanding the low flying regs with respect to congested areas etc.

NB As has been stated previously we don't know the cause of this accident and my comments are not intended to pre judge the results of the investigation.

Trouble is, it's far too easy to look at the clouds on the top of the hills and then get funneled down the valleys where you can still see and maintain your 500' agl - right up to the point where the valley floor is gradually climbing and you turn a corner into a dead-end (sometimes sadly, literally) with no escape route except a turnback towards the high ground of the valley sides.

It is a possibility but, as already mentioned, a very remote one.

Without a CVFDR, there will only be the radar trace and any information that can be gleaned from the electronics on board - GPS, ipads, mobile phones etc.

N-Jacko, thanks you are correct, of course it's not MSA. I'll have to blame the late night hours for that one.

Really what I was referring to is the concept of "safety altitude" as calculated by VFR flyers for x-country navigation. I have amended my post in view of your valuable correction.

BTW I am not making assumptions about the contributing factors in this particular accident, which have yet to be determined.

Typically safety altitude might be deemed as 1000 feet over the highest en-route elevation (or 2000 feet over hilly terrain).

My point is that when I have queried more than one student or pilot over the years about what that idea means, the response has been in effect "don't go any lower than safety altitude if in bad visibility". More or less taking it as akin to the IFR concepts of MSA or MORA. That way of thinking is sure to lead to hazard.

What I emphasise to students is that safety altitude is the minimum height above terrain that offers some sort of useful margin of choice for visual manouvering should wx deteriorate. If cloud or reducing vis. force you down to your calculated safety altitude, then for the sensible pilot there is no choice but to change course, you simply can't proceed.

Occasionally I've kept mum and let a student keep going a bit further to see what happens. It's not a pretty sight as the wheel gets gripped tighter and the pilot leans forward in the seat straining to see what's coming, while the altimeter inches downwards. Accidental flight into IMC becomes a real possibility. One chap was thrilled to see blue skies in a distant gap and flew right into a wide deep valley ahead. Moments later we were boxed in visually. It took my changing to IFR and flying out on top to get us home - flying by himself a difficult precautionary landing would have been necessary. The guy was sweating bullets, and vowed "never again!" a dozen times.

Anyway in summary a proper understanding of safety altitude, plus a resolute automatic decision to alter course towards clearer skies if you can't maintain VFR above it, are essential parts of a safe VFR mindset.

addendum: folks, kindly note I am writing from a FW perspective. I appreciate this is a rotary forum.

Please, be my guest. I use it for the very same purpose myself.

Are we still talking about helicopters
 

2000ft above hilly terrain for a VFR helicopter?

Hi PhilJ,

As noted in my original post, my background is in FW flying. If helicopter practices are typically different, then please adjust accordingly.

Notorious for doing the unexpected?
 

I know what you mean, but isn't a bit of a contradiction in terms?

No, not really. Best to be avoided.

No, why? Maybe in some countries, but in general, no. But in general I would assume that even private owner/PPL would have accumulated a few hours while working his way up from piston to turbine to twin...

Looking at the UK visual flight rules in section 4, outside controlled airspace, how long has this helicopter provision been in effect?

https://www.bfgc.co.uk/VFR_Guide.pdf

At least 4 decades to my certain knowledge. Quite probably more?

This is the fundamental difference between helicopters and fixed wing. It can be, and frequently is, perfectly safe to fly in weather so marginal that ONLY entry into IMC prevents flight in accordance with VFR! Not the case in a fixed wing!!

The underlying principle is that the ONLY back up is an immediate IFR climb above safety altitude, or an immediate landing. If one is unable due icing, or unqualified, to confidently conduct BOTH an IFR climb, and subsequent instrument recovery to a suitable diversion, then ONLY an immediate landing remains!

However, if at the same time, the terrain over which you are flying is not suitable for a landing, then your options have disappeared. Tragically the result is then inevitable.

I say again. I have no idea what the cause of this accident was. It's simply too early to say. Unless there are recorders onboard the aircraft we may never know with any certainty. Investigators may just have to collect what physical evidence there is, and make an informed guess. Very, very sad for those left behind, but a distinctly possible outcome.

4468
I don't agree with that, what about flying on, low and slow (30 kts) in sight of the surface until finding somewhere suitable to land?

Flight up to MSA. I am not sure if either the pilot was qualified for IFR or if the aircraft was IFR capable, in the event of the weather, there would have been multiple opportunities to land on level playing fields or school grounds from Welshpool, Bala and beyond. Based on the impact on Rhinog Fawr, and the weather, it seems unlikely the aircraft was still under VFR.

Chopjock - have you tried hovertaxiing in limited visibility, in the pissing rain in the mountains? You are certainly not VFR! if your viz is less than 1000m then you are either in cloud or in fog - take your pick.

The answer is to have turned back earlier or landed when there was an option.

Spot on Crab................

This is what I don't understand about this incident. The weather conditions were so bad on Wednesday/Thursday that the initial search operation on foot had to be suspended to prevent injury/death of the mountain rescue team members. If it was that bad on foot on a big and rocky mountain, trying to fly across it blind is puzzling.