No such thing as a safe hover in IMC. Even IFR helicopters with an auto-hover system bolted on to a 4-axis AFCS is not for hovering in IMC. And IFR helicopters have a minimum speed for IMC limitation in the RFM, typically about 50 knots. Hovering is a visual manoeuvre, usually done with reference to the ground.

What colour is granite on that system?

I'm assuming everyone else noted the tragic irony with the description that the pilot had "high experience"?

When a tragic event like this appearsto have “pilot” decisions / actions as a contributory factor it makes all pilots think hard. It is a natural human reaction to seek explanations that allow one to find comfort; “that can’thappen to me because…. “ In this case,any CPL or ATPL holder can grab the straw of “PPL” or “rich business man”because they are neither, so it won’t happen to them.

It is clear from the records that accidents for which the investigating authority has concluded that “pilot” decisions / actions were a contributory factor happen to pilots of all levels of qualification, training,currency and recency. Therefore a focuson the pilot license type is delusional; that response actually denies the possibility to learn from the tragedy, and so hope to reduce the risk of futurereoccurrence.



The common factor in accidents where pilot decisions /actions is a contributory factor is just that; the pilot made poor decisions and / or took the wrong actions. Typically that happened not once but several times. Looking at one CPL, experienced, current-piloted accident flight :the weather was poor (but he lifted), the client said “don’t bother” (but he went), overhead the destination he aborted due to weather and could have gone home, but instead chose to drop through a “sucker hole” to divert, he could have hovered, noisily, awaiting landing permission but chose to orbit, went IMC and then CFIT. How many options to “do something different”?



As others have said, experience / currency /recency are useful IF they lead to better decision making; to keep you out of the situations where your experience might be required to get you out of trouble. So it is about the mindset of the pilot, and having the sense, and the strength of mind, to stay on the ground, chose a more appropriate route, or simply to put it in a field before you run-out of VFR.

One way to reduce the possibilities of this happening is to raise the WX limits for VFR flight to something actually workable. 1000 feet and 5 Km would be a good start.

Actually should do over 4000ft in the U.K. (Nil wind etc.)

So do we know if they actually coasted out into Caernarfon Bay and then turned back or if they just crashed originally heading west? Ceiling in the bay (Aberdaron report) was 600 ft amsl (300 ft agl).

DB, Never a more sensible statement written on pprune.

DB .... You have got to be joking . I only get probably 10 days a year as good as that .
We all know that low cloud base and poor viz can be dangerous but equally it can be perfectly safe ( with ref to CFIT ) . 4-500 ft with 2-3 k viz is no problem if you just slow right down and keep a minimum forward visual distance . If that reduces to 1 k then stop ! More rules will do nothing to help . How many people get taught how to fly safely in deteriorating weather ? . When is time to say no more ?
Some of us were lucky and have flown with mentors but most are just let loose with their licence to learn their by their mistakes . Inadvertent IMC means you were going too fast . Even when faced with an oncoming fog bank you still have time to turn or land if you are going slow enough . It is no different to driving in fog and being able to stop within the distance you can see . You would never attemp a VFR flight at that height in the hills , so he was either intentionally IFR or went inadvertently IFR and was climbing to MSA . I can't see any alternative .

There was no reason not to take a safer route - either of the low level routes take hardly any longer and they're much safer.

But...it could have been something else, eg medical emergency, technical problem. Just because the weather is marginal it doesn't mean these things don't happen.

Have we ruled out mechanical failure?

Mechanical failure is very rare and even more so just at the moment you are next to a mountain peak in very bad weather with no viz ...

I think when CFIT is mentioned in this case it is not meant that the Helicopter was necessarily under Control when it impacted. LoC is a highly probable scenario in the given case.
When losing ground reference in the given circumstances in mountaineous terrain and below MSA there is a 50/50 choice between keeping airspeed up trying to maintain Control and risking hitting of Cumulu Granitus horizontally or slowing down and loosing control hitting Cumulu Granitus vertically. Which one was chosen in this case we will find out when the report comes out.
The probability that it was something completely different what caused this accident is probably low single digit.

The additional rule that DB suggested would not have prevented this flight from launching - those conditions were met at that time.


Additional rules are neither necessary, nor would they be effective; anyone entering IMC (without rating / aircraft / etc) is breaking so many "rules" already, and non of those prevented / saved them.


This is all about having a safety culture and mindset. It used to be called "airmanship".

Yes, I agree. If you stick with the rules as they are now, apply prudent airmanship for VFR category flights to remain in VMC, then inadvertent IMC leading to an accident just shouldn't happen. If you're flying below the MSA you need to be able to see far enough around you, at an appropriate speed, to avoid flying into something that would ruin your day. There should always be a plan B option, divert or turn around. And if plan B fails, then plan C should be self-evident. Land at the nearest suitable landing site and wait it out. Especially when flying in the mountains you need to leave yourself a wide margin for plans B and C. And plans B and C should always be considered together, because once plan B fails it might be too late to start thinking about plan C if the only suitable place to land has just disappeared into the weather. It really is difficult for me to comprehend doing anything else.

I did not say that my proposed rule would save all of them. However, when faced with the prime causal factor of an accident being Flight in poor WX leading to inadvertent IMC, increased the margin between the cloud and the ground and being able to see obstacles ahead in good time, is for me, a no brainier.

Nigelh clearly identifies the commercial pressure to fly VFR in quite frankly, dangerous conditions to all but the most experienced pilots.

People need protecting from their inherent potential to behave stupidly or make poor decisions. Like it or not, in aviation, that requires rules.

COCIS is an invitation to an early bath for most pilots.

In addition, as a community or aviators, the unique capability of the helicopter to land almost anywhere, means these recurring accidents demonstrates we are in capable of exercising that option when the WX is deteriorating or flying towards high ground. In some sense it makes us all look pathetic. The only way to improve chances is to increase the margin for error.

#raisethelimits.

At last . Three sensible posts on the trot . Rules have never been the answer alone .
How many of you break speed limits ? Flying below minima is the similar . Driving fast on a wet road becomes dangerous if you do not have the required skill / training . No one can say that 120 mph on an open road driven by an experienced racing driver is inherently dangerous . The rules are there to cover bad drivers in crap cars as well .... And of course should be obeyed .Hence they are so low . Well a pilot with relatively low hours but all of them low level , often in bad viz ( say crop spraying, power line etc ) will be safer in these marginal conditions than a high hour pilot flying A to B in good conditions ( I am not including IFR pilots in this ).
If you have lived , like I do , on the side of a big hill in Yorkshire you will either become used to flying in poor viz or you will give up flying .
My advice to anybody would be don't fly in bad weather and deteriorating viz ...... But if you don't accept that then go and fly with someone with real experience. Fly into the worst weather he is happy to go into and do a precautionary landing in a field . I know many pilots who have almost never done this ..... That means they are either very cautious ( good ) , very good a predicting the weather ( good )
Or they always make it there come what may ( bad ) . I land in fields approx 5-6 times a year at least . Sometimes just for 20 mins . Time to rethink , check weather , change plan B , C . Landing should always be an easy option when you start to tense up .
Ps. I had not seen DB post and do not endorse it . Make the rules 10,000ft and 10k if you like it will make NO difference. I think you are one of the few that don't get it crab . We need change I agree , but in training and available equipment to make flights safer . You and your type with your rules have failed totally and have just reduced the number of people flying due to onerous rules and costs . Time to think again .

So the solution to pilots breaking existing rules is........ another rule, which magically they will not break


Sorry, but I don't have that faith in blind rulemaking.


I have lifted in conditions below your proposed rule, safely and without incident. But then, I wasn't in mountains or flying into mountains. And on-route, I have set the machine down when weather was deteriorating; whilst still VFR.


Why propose a limit that in many cases is unnecessary, and in any case would not actually save anyone when the weather deteriorates on-route?




{Edit: I was typing when Nigel posted. For me, aviation rules are there to be obeyed, not pushed, and never broken]

Great sentiment John but I don't believe totally accurate. how can you accurately measure distance for viz or one minute be 700agl but a small hill makes you momentarily 450 agl ? Let's just agree that more rules will not save lives and try something new .... It can't be any worse than what we have now . Look at the monumental improval in fixed wing safety which came with the IMC , which a lot of people, especially the professionals, hated . We need a game changer like that for our community .

Nigel - not quite sure how or where I have advocated any change in rules other than to insist on more training for post-ppl pilots in exactly the manner you suggest.

Don't forget I have spent much of my life teaching pilots how to fly safely in far worse weather than many will ever venture into - I know it is ALL about training and education.

Personally I would be happy to fly with anyone who wanted to improve their weather appreciation/decision making but getting the right conditions to do that safely is often difficult.

Before we kept fuel at Shenington, I used to fly over to Enstone on a regular basis in the Supercub tow plane. And departing after refueling one afternoon in good VFR, Enstone Traffic asked me to have a look for a helicopter that had stopped talking to him, just to see if they were OK.

It had landed in a field to the west, and the folks were walking round and waving so I told Enstone there seemed to be no obvious problem. Perhaps they were practicing field landing. We do that a lot, in gliders. When driving the car round the countryside, keep an eye on the state of the crops; what looks like a good field from altitude may be 5 feet heigh in Maize! most cultivated fields will make a decent landing site. Rocks not so good.

Apparently according to several media reports, the flight to Dublin was a surprise for a niece which could put what happened under a slightly different light

If true, and the trip was a surprise and therefore a last minute decision, that could be why planning was not quite as thorough as would normally be done...such as maybe not being quite so well organised in respect to weather en-route and so forth

Not just pilots have made quick, spur of the moment decisions that have not worked out well for a variety of reasons...maybe this is one such occasion and its ended tragically

alphanumeric, I'm with you all the way here.

I don't think a change in the VFR criteria will really change anything.

This needs to be tackled at the training end of things. Under EASA it's mandatory that Threat and Error Management is taught and practised at all levels of training and operation.

Within the fixed wing ab initio field I find there is a paucity of training with respect to how to check and interpret the weather information and then make a considered decision as to whether it's prudent to launch and which route options to consider.

Whilst TAFs are part of the big picture they are specific to a location whereas the F215 gives the big picture.

Sorry Crab ..... It was DB !! I think on this particular subject we are on the same side . In a completely fair non pc world you would have a higher speed limit for a qualified driver driving a modern tech car . Why should he be bound by the rules for someone with no talent ,ability or training driving a clapped out old car with poor breaks and worn tyres ??? Well the current rules for vfr are , in my opinion , possibly too low for some pilots of low ability and experience . So maybe we have different rules depending on your commitment to get the required training ?
If you only want to fly for fun on sunny days then that is fine , but if you need to fly on other days when the weather is unpredictable maybe you should do a full course of poor weather flying . This would teach you how to plan a diversion in both directions ( right or left of track ) . How to assess what the changes are in distance of viz . What height do you expect to be able to maintain . Do you have power to reduce speed to below transission if necessary to do a vertical landing ( worst case ) . Which direction do you approach wires and masts from and which way would your turn be if you decide to turn . When do you land . And lastly I still believe that an actual flight into cloud with you at the controls would hammer home the fact that you are totally unprepared and in qualified to climb to MSA .....realise that this is not really an option for the average pilot . Get to that position and you are already done for barring a big dollop of luck .
There is always the option to spend hours and hours training for ifr and then keeping in practice but very few ppl,s have the time or opportunity to do this .
So how do we start a change ? How many of you have flown into full IMC yourselves ( without rating but maybe with a rated pilot ) . Trust me it is not like flying with a hood on which is dead simple , and when low level getting glimpses of ground it is much harder than flying straight and level into a cloud at 2000 ft !!! It is totally different and I suspect most non current ppl,s would keep it together for less than 30 Sec . First time I did personally I just froze and I couldn't even change the frequencies as my brain was so overloaded . Thankfully I had a very amused and very calm mate sitting next to me . Every pilot who admits he has even just a 1% chance of making a mistake and flying into worse weather than he expected should do this . Personally I would make it part of the syllabus just like Engine off . ( but inadvertent ifr is more likely nowadays !!!!)

Doesn't make sense. Any pilot checks weather in mountains, no matter what. You just don't cross Snowdonia without checking, however spur of the moment your decision. Even if you didn't check, and realised it was getting worse as you were flying, it's very easy to head north or west to the coast and safety at almost any time. You can even turn back first and then do that. Doesn't really make sense at all.

A question for the experienced pilots out there. With the occasional mention of what about a "technical glitch" on this thread.

As well as considering changes in weather etc. When planning a flight do you always consider the possibility of a LASAP event?

If so does this thought process go so far to include any other specific failures, or just the generic need to reach the ground safely?

Early days and it is Pprune....

I was first on scene in the police helicopter when we found the wreckage of a FW that had stoofed just shy of the summit in this vicinity in Snowdon. The driver had bought the farm but there was one survivor who we airlifted to hospital. He recalled much later on stating that the pilot had worked out his MSA based on the leg he should have taken but was 'put off' by the bad weather in the area and deviated slightly but still used the MSA he had planned on. He hit just shy of the summit by 200 feet - CFIT.

I suspect (based on experience) that when the words PPL holder and IMC are thrown into the mix - it eventually forms the last two holes in the swiss cheese model.
Pilots who go inadvertent IMC who DO NOT have a current IMC rating WITH recent currency, are committing potential suicide.
If he was current and qualified - it could well have been miscalc of MSA / heading, or of course the rare issue of mechanical problem(s).
My money is on inadvertent IMC with a PPL attached.

RiP guys.

Next...........................:sad:

Light fixed wing, too. As I can attest. Better to land in a field than press on when it's looking increasingly bad. Not easy to make that 'land' decision though; the temptation to 'just keep pressing on pressing on' is very strong.

Not so much in helicopters, because it's so easy to take off again. You can land, wait for the wx to improve, and then carry on. Though in Snowdonia that might be in a few days rather than a couple of hours!

Believed to be a family christening (said on local TV)

I dont think you can read this, as your speculative stance can be looked at another way.

Why would someone say a few days in advance to someone else in the family we might come, but don't tell her yet, don't actually make it a promise?

See what the weather is like on the day?

... because there are a few on this board (I exclude myself) who are more knowledgeable and experienced than some of the idiots paraded in front of some of the media.

If I was flying fare-paying passengers, I would be diligent with my planning and be prepared to say no.

If I was flying my wife, niece and other family members I would take even more care, not less.

A straight line route through the mountains in poor weather with a long sea crossing (any of them wearing lifejackets or immersion suits?) at the limits of range with few viable diversions is poor airmanship whichever way you cut it.

Dclbydalpha - a LASAP emergency IFR with cloud down to 2 or 300' beneath you is something you just have to hope doesn't happen to you. Consider it by all means but there is likely to be little you can do faced with a choice between continued flight with a serious emergency or an unplanned descent through cloud over ground you can't see into a situation where you might not get VMC below anyway.

Pray for a gap in the clouds or getting over the sea quickly.

It reminds me of the helicopter crash into a crane in Vauxhall, London, in 2013. There are plenty of times when one shouldn't take off and tell off anyone who contradicts. (viz Buddy Holly).

Crab . I agree totally with what you say . A low level route to the coast where I am told the cloud base was 600ft AMSL would have been the only potential way to have a chance of staying within common sense . It also would give you an easy option of landing to get fuel and more weather info .
Coming onto the current training requirements do you have any ideas to get people more aware and more capable?

Downwind .... That accident was so different in every way and not relevant. There was no reason why he should not have taken off . The weather was clear above cloud and he was a current IFR pilot in an IFR machine . He could easily have flown back to base but decided to go into Battersea at last minute .

You may well be right but I recall severe criticism at the time. Sometimes the pilot is under pressure and needs an external agency to ground the flight for him (or her).

I agree that while Form 215 gives the big picture, but local mountain weather is unpredictable. But the Valley TAF should have been a red flag, again an actual from London Information again would have been another red flag.

I agree we could do better in the way we teach how to check and interpret the weather, but to add to that what alternative plans were in place. The accident report on G-BIIJ, a CFIT accident in Tryfan, was two young men flying to Blackpool for a stag weekend, it was suggested an instructor checked the weather, and I got the impression that meant the flight was possible. But the decision on weather was down to the PiC. Had I been the instructor based on the weather, I would authorise it on the basis that they had a plan b and c, if the weather bad. For example, diverting and hiring a car.

In respect of the recent accident aircraft in Wales, just wondered if he briefed the passengers and relatives, something like "because of the weather, I can not be sure we can complete the route, so plan b will be divert to Livepool airport, catch a ferry or flight, plan c, land at one of two hotels near Bala with heliports, I've checked they have HOTAC, and we can have a nice meal and resume the next day'. That way the passengers have no false expectations and PIC is under no pressure. How simple is that.

Regarding regulation G-LBAL accident in Norfolk, a company aircraft was to fly from a country house in Norfolk to Northern Ireland, under regulations the weather conditions were such that, if they were departing from a licenced airport, let say Norwich. the fog was below minima for a departure, yet oddly as this was country house there was no regulation as to minima. The sensible thing would have to applied the same visibility minima in an ops manual, based on the captains estimate of visibility, not least as there were fewer external refences. I find it interesting that some CEO's are too tight fisted to operate under an AOC, it is a much safer way to operate even though under regulations it not required. I also am amazed that rich or poweful people could pressurise or bully their pilot.

From the AAIB report, there are various CRM issues. Firstly assertiveness, the captain warned the CEO's PA that fog was forcasted so they needed to depart on time, the co-pliot states why dont you speak the CEO directly, CEO delays departure, by this time co-pilot expresses his concerns as fog is forming, and states to the captain, that if he had his overnight case, he would have words directly with the CEO. Aircraft departs and four are killed, two pilots, CEO and the PA I presume.

Oddly, before before the loss of G-CBAL, the same company lost G-HAUG, again non AOC, three pilots killed during a DIY GPS. The CEO did not learn that an AOC, might be the way forward, as AOC operations are externally checked.

Come on correct info please.....

It was G-LBAL not G-CBAL thats a PA-28 at Redhill :ugh:

Nigel, short of giving out our phone numbers and imploring those about to make trips in bad weather to call us and run it past someone who might note the flaws in their cunning plan - no.

In the military you have an authoriser for every sortie who you run your intended plan past and they will consider your currency, fitness for flight and host of other things. That clearly won't work in GA but phoning a friend might help.