SASLess - Only reason I didnt shoot any pics on the way down south was because it was a transit flight. Bunch of bags stacked in the cabin as well as all the maintainers and other flightcrew. Wasnt an air to air shoot or anything else. Jen was in one of the crewies seats and I was in the other. I ended up doing bunch of other air to air shoots when we were in Dip Flat.

Blackhawk9 - All the mil loadmasters I have got to fly with, either Kiwi, Aussie or American have been awesome. Yes there are rules and we abide by them. If I am shooting air to air then always have a harness on and secured in. Keeps everyone happy :)

I think they mean 220 troops, 22 pilots and 11 loadmasters!

Or a Chinook 5 ship...........

Belgium wants to sell 4 of the NH90 TTH
Buy 1 additional NH90 NFH
and 15 AH 145.
NFH to be moved from SAR to frigates only.

Who will do the SAR??
I guess outsourcing NHV

Scramble

but if 1 of a 5 ship gets downed 20% of your force is gone… if 1 of the 11 gets downed less than 10% is lost. But clearly you need a bigger LZ 😉

Yep, because all militaries want a huge number of aircraft to deliver small numbers of troops, just in case. Makes complete sense - are you an AH employee?

No…. But it is an NH90 thread and you throw in a comment regarding (the great) Chinook. I also gave you the “😉“ so don’t take it too seriously. 😄

You mean like this? ;) Where serious troop lift all started.


https://cimg5.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune....e39016bbb1.jpg

That is an awesome picture Megan, but it was 50-60 years ago. Recent conflicts have been less aircraft doing more - pity, in some way when you see images like that.

New maritime helicopters for Norway
 

It was announced today that the government proposes to buy six MH-60R Seahawks for the coastguard. Three slots on the production line have been obtained from the US Navy for early deliveries in 2025 and the remaining three will be delivered within 2027.
Helicopters for the ASW role would also be of the same type, but the need is to be further evaluated before a final decision.

A couple of interesting quotes from the new president of manufacturer NH Industries Alex Aloccio in the latest issue of Helicopter International.

I would say that on an active deployment 70/80 is poor in this situation. These aircraft would have top priority for spares and support.
When the Gazelle was deployed in N.I in the mid 70's serviceability which was not great in Germany rose rapidly to the high 90's.
This was an aircraft in it's second year of squadron service. The operational aircraft were backed up by a complete aircraft supplied as a christmas tree.
and highest priority for spares.
This brings us to the second quote.

Still in its service entry phase. First aircraft were delivered to the Germans in 2006.
17 years in service and it's still in it's entry phase, amazing.

Never mind the quality feel the width!!!

Availability is fine, but if you are not attaining it through reliability and maintainability you are going to need A1 spares and rotables repair support, backed up by deep, deep pockets.

At the moment it seems NH 90 isn't doing the spares and repair bit well, so the deep pockets are not yet needed.
N

https://www.janes.com/defence-news/n...satisfaction20 MARCH 2023

Airbus to take lessons from NH90 retrofits to ensure future upgrades do not impact availability and customer satisfaction

by Gareth Jennings

NH90 retrofits being carried out at Airbus' Marignane facility in southern France. The NHI consortium intends to learn the lessons of the IOC to FOC upgrade process to ensure that adverse effects on availability do not happen with future efforts. (Janes/Gareth Jennings)

Airbus accepts that it must learn the lessons of the previous retrofit efforts that adversely affected the NHIndustries (NHI) NH90 helicopter programme, as it prepares to roll out further block enhancements in the coming years.

Speaking at the handover of the 500th NH90 to the international programme on 17 March, Matthieu Louvot, Airbus Helicopters executive vice-president, said that the NHI consortium that also includes Leonardo Helicopters and Fokker Aerostructures could not afford to repeat the same mistakes of the ongoing initial operating capability (IOC) to full operating capability (FOC) retrofits that have severely impacted fleet availability rates for some customers.

“We have to take lessons from the IOC to FOC retrofits,” Louvot said at the company's Marignane facility, where NH90 retrofits are taking place. “For [Software Release] SR2 and SR3 [to follow], there will be a different set up in terms of spare parts management, and the organisation will be stronger. We have already proposed SR3 lead times to customers.”

With 14 international customers signed up to the programme and 597 NH90 helicopters ordered, Louvot's comments came in the same week that Norway announced it has selected the Lockheed Martin MH-60R Seahawk to replace its NH90s. Australia had previously announced it was axing its MRH-90 Taipans, while Sweden and Belgium have both suggested they may do the same.

While the reasons for each country's decision vary, poor availability caused in large part to aircraft being withdrawn from service for lengthy retrofits has been an almost universal concern.

Helionix is from Elbit
FlytX is from Thales.
the French forces are paranoid, they prefer to use French avionics rather than Israeli, who knows why …
.

Helionix is not just the hardware but the also the philosophy and know how of an effective cockpit. While the display just the display.
Main reason for the Thales is to buy french for french.

I guess this is recognition that they do have a problem? Some might suggest that the acquisition price is somewhat irrelevant if the platform fails to perform its mission, and the operating costs might consume any variation in acquisition price or fleet size?
https://www.janes.com/defence-news/n...s-at-no-cost21 MARCH 2023

NHI offers to fix Norway's NH90 issues ‘at no cost'

by Gareth Jennings



Despite Norway saying it is axing its NH90 programme in favour of the MH-60R Seahawk, NHI says that it will fix the outstanding problems at no cost to the country. (Royal Norwegian Air Force)

NHIndustries (NHI) has offered to fix for free the issues that have caused Norway to cancel its NH90 helicopter programme, a senior official told Janes and other defence media on 17 March.

Speaking at the handover of the 500th NH90 to the international programme in Marignane, southern France, NHI president Axel Aloccio said the consortium that comprises Airbus Helicopters, Leonardo Helicopters, and Fokker Aerostructures was still trying to address the problems that had caused Norway to cancel the NH90 in favour of the Lockheed Martin MH-60R Seahawk.

“We continue to discuss with Norway. We have offered to fix all of the technical issues at no cost to them, and to increase support with more man-hours,” Aloccio said. “The cost of the recent MH-60R contract [NOK12 billion (USD1.12 billion) for six helicopters] puts the NH90 offer into perspective, I think [Norway paid NOK5 billion for 14 NH90 helicopters]. Also, it would cost EUR3–4 billion (USD3.2–4.2 billion) to change from the NH90 in terms of training, tooling, infrastructure, etc,” he added.

Aloccio's comments came in the same week that the Norwegian Ministry of Defence (MoD) said it had selected the MH-60R to replace the NH90 that was grounded in June 2022.

This is an interesting counter-view on the actions taken with the Australian fleet, and a potentially identifiable source of some of the logistical issues. It is an interesting comparison between the experience of New Zealand and Australia, which has been discussed here in detail, but doesn't fully recognize the dissatisfaction expressed by other operators outside Australia, which is also discussed here.

https://asiapacificdefencereporter.c...nce-logistics/

Helicopters-There is nothing wrong with Tiger and Taipan – the problem is Defence logistics

An Australian Army MRH90 Taipan helicopter from 6th Aviation Regiment conducts reconnaissance at Shepparton, Victoria. Credit: CoA / Carolyn Barnett
By
Kym Bergmann / Canberra
-
28/02/2023
513
68
https://asiapacificdefencereporter.c...s-2-scaled.jpg





This startling conclusion is the culmination of several years of effort to find out why Australia has had disproportionate problems keeping our 22 Tiger Armed Reconnaissance Helicopters (ARH) and 47 Taipan Multi-Role Helicopters (MRH) flying. Other countries have nowhere near the same level of difficulty as has been experienced here.

Just about all the blame has been heaped on the manufacturer Airbus Helicopters and both classes are being retired and replaced about 20 years ahead of schedule. All the helicopters have plenty of structural life remaining. Instead, we will spend an extra $10 billion dollars on 29 Apache AH-64E attack helicopters and 40 UH-60M Blackhawks. Added to this is mix are 12 MH-60R Seahawks to replace the RAN’s six MHRs at a cost of $1.4 billion.
https://asiapacificdefencereporter.c...s-1-scaled.jpgHMAS Anzac’s MH-60R helicopter launches from HMAS Adelaide’s flight deck to assist in a hellfire missile firing with Australian Army ARH Tiger helicopters during Indo-Pacific Endeavour 2022.To put it more bluntly, all this might be based on an incorrect premise – namely that the ARH and MRH fleets are chronically unreliable because of spare parts shortages, and they therefore must be retired in the national interest. This is not correct, with the major culprit being the Defence / CASG support process – a major element of which is a software package called CAMM2. It looks as if this is at the heart of the problem and not the helicopters themselves.

Many readers will be surprised because of the repeated vitriol directed at the MRH and ARH for more than a decade – some of it seemingly orchestrated – that has created the false impression that the helicopters are unreliable. Everyone has piled on – politicians of all backgrounds; large sections of the media; think tanks; and Defence itself. Airbus has not publicly defended itself – and wanted nothing to do with this article – which might be a combination of management fatigue battling the Australian system and having bigger fish to fry in the shape of bids such as JP 9102 for communications satellites.

This article should have been written five years ago when it might have made a difference to the series of decisions leading to the recent Apache and Blackhawk purchases. However, getting detailed information from Defence has been impossible and events such as Senate Estimates have only provided fragments of disconnected data.

Some retired Army staff who know what has been going on remain loyal to their former service and while confirming facts about CAMM2 will not go on the record. Additionally, few people are interested in the detail of Defence logistics when it is much easier to blame the French in general and Airbus Helicopters in particular.

Today, both the ARH and MRH fleets have an availability rate of about 70%. This is likely to be better than most – if not all – RAAF platforms and for the future Apache and Blackhawk fleets. The 30% of time when they are unavailable is not necessarily because of a problem but instead they are offline for routine, preventative maintenance. This is standard on complex machines such as military aircraft – and it takes up an unavoidable chunk of time.

However, getting to this 70% figure has involved a struggle going back at least a decade, much of which has involved discussions between the manufacturer and CASG about streamlining support processes. The reality is that there have always been plenty of spare parts available. What has stopped them getting from the warehouse to multiple workshops has been burdensome bureaucracy caused mainly by outdated Defence software.

Consider the case of New Zealand. Their air force operates eight MRHs almost identical to Australia’s – and they could not be happier, flying a reliable modern helicopter with one of the highest usage rates of the global fleet. The contrast with Australia is stark and worth examining. How can one customer have no problems with maintenance – yet the other is retiring its fleet 20 years early?

New Zealand has all their helicopters at one facility; Australia’s are scattered across five bases. They have a streamlined approach to logistics with a single point of contact and modern, interconnected data bases. The difference with Australia was illustrated during Talisman Sabre in 2019 when the Australian MRH fleet was grounded because of a tail rotor issue – but the New Zealanders were able to keep flying theirs because they had already installed the fix according to the OEM’s recommendations well in advance of the exercise.

Instead, the Australian CAMM-2 (Computer Aided Maintenance Management) system was fielded in 2005 to address deficiencies in CAMM-1, which was an earlier attempt to digitise logistics. Very few organisations continue to use a logistics software package from 20 years ago – certainly none in the commercial world – and CAMM-2 has been described as labour intensive and costly to maintain.

It was designed to support military aircraft – though it is not being universally applied, with exceptions including the RAAF C-17 fleet with software from the manufacturer, Boeing, via the USAF. The F-35s come with their own separate Automatic Logistics Information System (ALIS) supplied by Lockheed Martin that supports the global fleet of aircraft.

CAMM-2 was meant to integrate seamlessly with several other databases such as Army’s separate, orphan, Weapons System Data Base (WSDB) but that has not proven to be the case. Apart from being old, CAMM-2 has several limits, for example not doing inventory management. There is a veritable alphabet soup of other unconnected logistic packages such as MRI, LSAR, MILIS, ADAASS and WFD that are all part of the Australian military support structure – in additional to local uncontrolled databases and spreadsheets.

This means that for one of the simplest tasks that frequently occurs – a part number change on an engineer-approved basis from the OEM – must be manually entered into about eight different systems, potentially by eight different people. This lack of integration and a labour-intensive approach to updating documentation is why the Australian system is such a mess. That is neither the fault of the helicopters nor the company making them.

Another issue in play is the figure being used by Army that retiring the MRH early rather than in 2037 will result in a $2.7 billion saving. The problem is that this improbably large number of $200 million per year can only be achieved if things are included that have no factual basis – such as equipment that isn’t needed or upgrades that don’t exist. It feels like someone has been given the job of finding a scary number and they have worked backwards to come up with the desired result. Defence has not responded to a request for a breakdown of the figure.

As part of the process of demonising both Tiger and Taipan, the Canberra bubble has been awash with commentary that neither aircraft was wanted by Army in the first place, and they were imposed from above by politicians. These claims are incorrect.

The situation with Tiger is clear: it was preferred by Defence (Army) because it met all the key performance requirements, was the most modern of the helicopters offered, the price was attractive – and it had a high level of Australian content. In procurement terms it was a slam dunk. Apache was fourth on the list after the Mangusta and the Cobra. After these came the Rooivalk from South Africa.

The situation with the MRH is more complex. Both it and the Blackhawk met performance requirements and since Defence could live with either, it was finally selected for a range of reasons. These included a high level of local content and that it was a better fit with the overall AIR 9000 objective of rationalising the ADF helicopter fleet.

This masterplan was based in part on the assumption that the naval version of the MRH – the NFH90 – would be mature enough to replace RAN Seahawks around 2016. However, that fell apart with the cancellation of the Seasprite project in 2008 – Defence did not cover itself in glory after spending $1.5 billion on that failed undertaking – and that led to the subsequent selection of the MH-60R.

A further claim is that other MRH customers are also unhappy, and the prime example is Norway. Indeed, Norway is threatening to scrap their helicopter fleet. The only problem is that the Norwegians purchased the ASW version of the helicopter – the NFH90 referred to above, not the MRH – and then decided to fit their own dipping sonar and indigenous lightweight torpedo, guaranteeing that it would be a program manager’s nightmare.

This has no relevance to Australia. Nor does the Swedish case of their MEDEVAC helicopters. The cabin size of the MRH is one of its attractive features – being more spacious than a Blackhawk – but for reasons known only to themselves the Swedes insisted on raising the cabin height by 20cm. Despite the resultant delays they remain an important part of the program.

If the fundamentals of APDR’s research are correct – that there’s basically nothing wrong with the helicopters – something has gone badly awry with Defence’s processes. The result is that people from Ministers all the way through to the media have been misinformed for years.

External agencies such as the ANAO that have been critical of Tiger and Taipan – but have relied on information supplied to them by Defence. An independent review of the Tiger program conducted in 2016 was quickly classified as SECRET and consequently has never seen the light of day.

All this needs to be checked out – urgently.

There has already been far too much selective use of information to support a particular pre-determined outcome, and someone needs to objectively evaluate and report on the situation – preferably publicly. Australians are entitled to know where their money is going.

It looks too late to stop the purchase of Apache and Blackhawk – which are fine helicopters of an older design – but it might be possible to achieve billions of dollars of savings by slowing down the delivery schedule and keeping Tiger and Taipan in service for longer.

The problem is that a lot of powerful people – on both sides of politics and at high levels in Defence – run the risk of looking like fools for not doing their homework. All the matters detailed in this article are not the result of espionage, they are the product of asking a lot of questions and not being fobbed off with simple explanations.

For anyone who remains unconvinced: how else is it possible to explain the vast difference between the Australian and New Zealand experiences with the MRH?

Unfortunately, this might all be swept under the carpet because the embarrassment caused by revealing the facts will be too great – which should never be a factor when taking decisions in the security interests of Australia.

This is an interesting article on the experience of Greece with the NH-90.

https://defencereview.gr/nh-90-ta-di...apotis-proore/

NH-90: The successive blows with the early withdrawals and the Greek case

Home / Defense , Greece , Central , Recommended /NH-90: The consecutive blows with the early withdrawals and the Greek case

Efthymios Lazos

Defense , Greece , Central , Featured |
March 22, 2023 4:54 p.mThe reason for this particular article was given by the news that on March 17 Airbus Helicopters delivered the 500th NH -90 helicopter. It is a tactical transport helicopter (TTH: Tactical Transport Helicopter), numbered "1486", which was delivered to the French Air Force. NH-90 has recorded significant commercial successes, but in the last two years it has also suffered serious setbacks, with early withdrawals, mainly due to low availability. It is natural that such developments directly concern Greece, which uses the NH-90. During the handover ceremony of the 500th helicopter, Bruno Even, CEO of Airbus Helicopters, spoke about the issue of NH-90 support.

As Bruno Even stated, Airbus Helicopters " is convinced that it has the structures in place to deal with the availability problem " and that " there are measures that we have worked out, to improve availability, but they have not yet been implemented ". In 2021 NH Industries launched the " New Horizons " program with the aim of increasing the low availability rates of helicopters to almost all users. The " New Horizons " program includes 22 initiatives to improve the helicopter support chain, from the first to the last level. "I know the disappointment and the expectations, but I am convinced that the initiatives we started two years ago, and others we will take, will bear fruit ," said Bruno Even.

Today, 14 countries have chosen the NH-90, either in the TTH tactical transport version, or in the NFH (NATO Frigate Helicopter) naval cooperation version. These are Australia, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Netherlands, New Zealand, Oman, Qatar, Spain, Sweden and Norway. Of these 14 countries, Australia, Belgium, Sweden and Norway have decided and announced their decision to retire and replace the helicopters early. The beginning was made with Belgium, when in June 2020, reports in the Belgian press reported the country's intention to proceed with the procurement of 18 new helicopters, to replace four (4) NH-90 TTI and 13 light A-109ABi (in service since 1992).

In 2007, Belgium signed a contract for the supply of eight (8) NH-90s, of which four (4) NH-90 TTHs and an equal number of NH-90 NFHs, with an option for two (2) more NH-90 TTHs. The first Belgian NH-90 TTH flew for the first time in September 2012, while the first helicopter, an NH-90 NFH, was delivered in August 2013. The first NH-90 TTH was delivered in October 2013, while all eight ( 8) helicopters had been delivered by the beginning of 2015. The reason for the Belgian decision to retire the helicopters (the four TTHs, not the same number of NFHs) early is their high operational costs and low availability. According to the current planning the Belgian NH-90 TTH will be retired by 2025.

Belgium was followed by Australia , which, in May 2022, announced its decision to replace 69 Airbus Helicopters helicopters with American ones. In particular, Australia decided to replace 22 Tiger attack helicopters, with 29 AH-64E Guardian Apache, and 47 NH-90 (MRH-90 Taipan in Australian service) from 40 UH-60M Black Hawk (for the Army) and six (6 ) MH-60R Sea Hawk (for the Navy). The story of the Australian Tiger began in December 2001 with the signing of a relevant contract for the supply of 22 helicopters. In 2016 Australia announced its intention to replace the Tigers, due to the high cost of maintaining the engines and the long time required to repair the systems sent to Europe.

In 2004 the country proceeded to purchase 12 MRH-90s, while in June 2006 it proceeded to purchase another 34 helicopters of the type to replace the Army's S-70A-9 Black Hawk and the Navy's Sea Kings. In April 2010 one (1) MRH-90 experienced engine failure and the fleet was temporarily grounded. In July 2014 Australia issued a report stating procurement errors and development failures resulting in the MRH-90 Full Operational Capability being achieved in April 2019, five (5) years late. As compensation Australia received one (1) additional helicopter. In June 2021 there was another incident of the helicopters getting stuck, and on December 9 the early retirement and replacement of the MRH-90s was announced.

In June 2022, Norway was added to the list of countries that decided to retire NH-90 helicopters early. In particular, the country's Minister of Defense announced the cancellation of the program of 14 NH-90 NFH helicopters, that he will return to NH Industries the 13 helicopters that have already been delivered and will demand the return of the $500 million that the country has spent on the procurement . " It is a serious decision, but no matter how hard the staff works, no matter how many spare parts we order, the NH-90 will never be able to meet the needs of our Armed Forces", the Norwegian Minister of Defense had stated. Norway made this decision for four (4) main reasons: Severe delays in delivery of the helicopters, reliability issue, support issues and age of sub-systems.

In 2001 Norway proceeded to procure 14 NH-90s for use by the Navy and Coast Guard. Deliveries were scheduled for 2005-2008. However, the first helicopter was delivered in December 2011, while by January 2016 six (6) of the 14 helicopters had been delivered. In February 2018, a report by the country's Armed Forces said the helicopters were not providing sufficient flight hours for their role. According to the final schedule, all 14 helicopters would be delivered within 2022, but ultimately this schedule was also not met and the last helicopter would be delivered in 2024.

This, as it turned out, was also the final straw for Norway, who proceeded to cancel the program. Regarding the reliability of the helicopter, Norway announced that the failure rate was 40 times higher than predicted. This, combined with problems with maintenance and support, sometimes resulted in only one (1) helicopter being available or none at all. According to the country's Ministry of Defense the helicopters were supposed to fly 3,900 hours a year, but they only flew 700 hours during that time. In addition, subsystems related to the anti-submarine capability of the helicopters are now technologically obsolete.

After Belgium, Australia and Norway, in November 2022, Sweden announced that as part of the new design it will prematurely retire the 18 in service NH-90 TTH/NFH and replace them with new ones. The first public peak for the NH-90 was in July 2022, when the Chief of the Swedish Air Force revealed that he is evaluating the effectiveness and performance of the NH-90 NFH and that so far the helicopter is not performing according to the intended capabilities. In 2001 Sweden proceeded to procure 18 NH-90, nine (9) TTH and nine (9) NFH. The first NH-90 was delivered in 2015, the last in 2019. The helicopters were supposed to achieve Full Operational Capability in 2008. However, the first NH-90 achieved Initial Operational Capability in April 2011. This long delay led Sweden to expedited supply of 15 UH-60M Black Hawk;

As for Greece, at the beginning of April 2021 the GDAEE (General Directorate of Defense Equipment and Investments) announced that the 6th amendment to contract 034A/03 was signed , which governs the supply program of 16 NH-90 transport helicopters, four (4) of special operations helicopters of the same type and four (4) medical collections for converting the helicopters into casualty transport (MEDEVAC). With the signing of this amendment, the way was opened for the receipt of the last six (6) helicopters (in November 2022 it arrived in Greece on the 15th helicopter). As for the support of the helicopters, in October 2021, the Parliament approved the signing of the relevant technical support contract, although the contract has not yet been signed. The latest development is the signing, on November 24, 2022, of contract 006A/2022 for the supply of spare parts for the NH-90.

The history of the Greek NH-90s begins in August 2003 when the contract, totaling $657,523,069, was signed for the supply of 20 NH-90s. According to the original schedule, the first helicopter was to be delivered in December 2005, six (6) helicopters were to be delivered in 2006, five (5) in 2007, six (6) in 2008 and two (2) in 2009. However, during the acceptance tests of the first helicopter, many technical observations and problems arose (about 200 according to GES) that judged the helicopters to be unacceptable from the Greek side. After a series of negotiations, the manufacturing company committed to resolving the technical observations and problems, but the delay in deliveries included a penalty clause of €34,000,000, which was included as a related term in the original contract.

The issue was finally resolved in August 2010 with the signing of a relevant amendment to the original contract. According to the terms of the amendment, the manufacturing company assumed responsibility for the delay, paid compensation of €70,030,540, granted a credit of €20,000,000 for materials and services for subsequent support, provided additional materials and services of an estimated amount of €30,000,000, withheld an amount of € 4,800,000 (€ 1,200,000 for each of the four helicopters until the completion of their repair work), while a penalty clause of € 120,000,000 was foreseen in case of derailment of the program again.

Until then, i.e. in August 2010, Greece had paid the advance of € 263,009,227.60 (ie 40% of the contract value). Therefore, the amount of € 394,513,841.40 – € 70,030,540 (agreed compensation) = € 324,483,301.40 remained to be paid. Thus, the first two (2) helicopters were delivered in June 2011, while by October 2013 seven (7) helicopters had been delivered. This was followed by the delivery of the 8th helicopter in April 2014, the 9th helicopter in July 2014, the 10th helicopter in November 2014 and the 11th helicopter in December 2014.

In February 2015, while the 12th helicopter was to be delivered, Greece raised the issue of a lack of technical support. The issue caused reactions when the Minister of National Defence, Pannos Kammenos, stated that the 12th helicopter would not be received, that the last installment (approximately €110,000,000) would not be paid and that the contract would not be signed continued support in the amount of €75,500,000, approved by the competent parliamentary committee in July 2014 (by then the Greek State had already repaid approximately 70% of the total price). Finally, when it was established, from the Greek side, that the refusal to receive the helicopters burdened the Greek State with additional costs for their custody, the issue was re-examined, resulting in the 12[size=8333px]th[/size] helicopter to be delivered in April 2017, the 13th helicopter in June 2017 and the 14th helicopter in October 2017.

It's good to see Airbus, supporting one-man comedy shows in Australia. As you can see, Kym is very appreciative.

Airbus also thanks Kym for supporting the Mklll upgrade. Which has the very low cost, of 60 million euro a tail. That will be for 15 years, before retirement. Even though a new Apache costs under 40 million euro, flyaway.
https://asiapacificdefencereporter.c...iii-programme/