Oz is in the progress of aligning itself with JAR Ops, but in the written format of the FAR's. [Just like a politician with a hand in each pie].

IFR Performance:

Once at Vy on Take Off, OEI and in IMC, must have a 1% climb gradient at Vy, upto and maintain 1% ROC at LSALT to destination or alternate. [assume you can't land at departure point]

VFR Performance:

Once at Vy on Take Off, OEI and in VMC, must have the climb performance at Vy to climb to 500 agl, upto and maintain 0 % Climb Gradient at 500 agl to destination or alternate.

Platform Arrivals:

No limit [By legislation, Operator or Client]

Platform Departures:

Use OGE weights at the local OAT [And if operating from low decks, MSV's, Dive Tenders etc, reduce your OGE Take Off Weight by another 500 lbs]...[Normally an Operator limit]

Always having Offshore return fuel.....And yes, Oz has tropical monsoons, through blue sky to low level icing....but I love my job!!!!

What about if your flight manual doesn't have OGE performance in the 'approved' section - not required information for a lot of older helicopters???

Thanks Red Wine.

Summary so far looks like this (please correct me if I screwed):

AFM data to provide the RTOM

For en-route (remember this is offshore so it is a little simplistic):

Additionally for fuel requirements:

However, we still have some gaps in our coverage of areas; anyone else wish to donate some information.

By the way Sandy Helmet - where do you come from?

Bladestrike

I have just re-read your post on the change of performance standard when the sea is hostile:is there a Canadian definition of hostile in that context?

Is it perhaps tied to the ditching approval of the aircraft, or some other metric?

The only regulatory required performance criteria are the aforementioned CARs. As far as determining a hostile enviroment, its left up to the PIC's discrection and endorsed by our SOP's. I'm being quoted far more than I intended here, simply trying to answer the question posed as vaguely as possible, but to correct an earlier statement; our SOP's also determine a OEI climb of 50 fpm at our
MOCA.

Thanks Bladestrike - I have amended the post and taken out the quotations (and attribution).

The issue of offshore performance was touched upon in the S92 design thread. As the topic was starting to drift to other ytpes I thought a new thread was in order?

JimL said:
Jim, my earlier use of the word "pure" was something of a mistake, I should have used that easy to say phrase "PC2 with exposure".

Back to my original point, I am surprised to hear that PC2e is dependent upon suitable engine reliability data being produced, but 'pure PC2' does not.

PC2 guarantees OEI deck edge miss, but accepts the possibility of the aircraft ditching before achieving Vtoss.

PC2e profiles and weights are predicated on OEI deck edge miss and fly away capability.

Take the scenario that a given aircraft type/engine combination is producing an inflight shutdown rate that does not meet the requirements. Are you saying that the regulators would stop an operator using PC2e and get them to increase operating weights by flying to PC2, a performance criteria that has more inherent risk?

I am aware of the helideck Cat A profiles for the S76C series. Have Sikorsky also produced some additional data regarding PC2e for the S76C?

Has there been any sign of movement from ECF with regard to PC2e and the looming deadline?

Did you read my post on the 92 thread?

PC2 is only permitted in non-hostile environments. If you are operating in a hostile environment you have, post 2010, two options.

1. Your helicopter has PC2e approval - operate to PC2e weights according to the appropriate RFM data. (not sure if all types will have a specific PC2e WAT)

2. Your helicopter does NOT have PC2e approval - You would have to delve into the RFM and find some way of extracting data that will indicate that you can safely fly away from the helideck if you go OEI at or after TDP. It may mean that you are unable to make use of any 'drop-down' and are left with only the 'OEI HOVER' graph to indicate a suitable weight. For most machines this may not even give you enough fuel to get home let alone take any payload. It is likely to be a show-stopper for some.

G

Lots of rumours that the 2010 date will slip yet again.

Hi Geoffers,

I did read your post. I am also aware of the regulation and it's implementation date. My "exposure" to PC2e goes back quite a way as Jim can testify.

I am now lucky enough to be flying in a non-hostile environment according to the regulation, however my customer takes a different view and classifies all offshore work as 'hostile. Hence we fly to PC2e, or should that be PC2 with no exposure?

I am surprised that PC2e still requires adequate engine reliability data though. The logic seems to be lacking. If I am flying a procedure that has "no OEI exposure", something akin to Class 1 operations, why am I worried about engine reliability when it comes to PC2e (other than the obvious i.e. engine failures are not a good thing!).

If the regulators think this logic is sound, should the same principal not apply to Class 1 operations for all aircraft? Maybe it does already?

Back to my question about what happens if "Machine X" does not have adequate engine reliability. It now looks like it cannot do any offshore duties in a hostile environment post 2010. That's interesting

More than interesting. Its the elephant in the room waiting to embarass us all. If we look at what has happened in the past I fear a spate of failed engines in a particular region that are put down to 'local maintenance difficiencies' and the index fudged accordingly only to find that actually it's a basic design flaw that those with top notch engineering staff (properly apprenticed and aviation oriented) have managed to keep at bay for years (oh! we all knew about that - didn't you?). Does that ring a (92) bell?

With regard to PC2. You say you are flying a procedure with no OEI exposure. I would appreciate a description of that procedure and the origin of the data on which its based if that's possible. Thanks

G

Actually VL, you might like to revisit the JAR AMC 3.517 and the flight regimes that require approval to operate with exposure - you will see penetrating the H/V curve is included. What's the TDP for the S-92 helideck take off without exposure? 30ft. Where does the base of the H/V curve start? 15ft!

I have queried it with the proverbial horse, and from his mouth came confirmation my logic is correct.

Geoffers,

Sure, I'm flying a PC2e profile at PC2e weights straight out of the RFM.

Something I am sure you will be encouraging AW139 customers to be doing real soon?

Still not sure why we need to consider engine reliability data as a fundamental behind PC2e operations. Aren't we giving up about a 1000 lbs of payload so that if a donk quits after my NHP calls "30 feet" we can still fly away and bring back the passengers safe and dry?

I am not saying that engine reliability data is not important. Of course it is. As is reliability of most components on these machines we strap ourselves to.
If there is a fundamental reliability issue, the manufacturer is duty bound to find a fix.

But should an engine reliability problem result in a ban on hostile offshore operations, operations that are being conducted with "no OEI exposure", when that same aircraft can fly from airfield to airfield with fare paying passengers on board?

212man,

This issue was covered some time ago when Sikorsky and ECF were first coming up with solutions and data to the PC2e performance requirements.

It was interesting that Sikorsky and ECF ended up with totally different interpretations. My recollection was that "we", JimL included, tried to persuade ECF that their position was perhaps incorrect.

If I were to say more it would be based on supposition, a failing memory and a very poor knowledge of the technical basis for the requirements! If more is required I could go and look at my old notes?

Maybe JimL can offer more guidance, technical input and history?

BTW, who is the "proverbial horse"

My comments on the 92 post about the JAA's ambitions for PC1 are perhaps relevant. PC2e is the 'get-out-of-jail' card for not being able to deliver it. It uses, or at least attempts to use, 'equivalence' via 'risk management'.

G

It's a little more complicated than 'not being able to deliver PC1'.

A Category A procedure is deterministic such that:

• the site has to be surveyed and meet the requirement for size (remember that the adequate visual reference has to be provided which usually results in a requirement for a larger than 1D deck);
• the environment must permit flight in accordance with the procedure and the limitations of the aircraft (including cross wind limits);
• the performance calculations must be accurate - which means that
  • all aspects of wind accountability must be within some limits;
  • the actual level of the obstacles must be know (and that means the sea under conditions of tide and sea state).
• the reject must be assured.

Take a simple example; the wind is strong, from the direction of the derrick and exceeds the cross wind limits (which for the AW139 is still 17kts); the aircraft will probably be facing into wind (it would if I were flying it); the actual conditions of wind will be variable and none of the vertical components will be known (usually called turbulence); the sea surface will be chaotic and the level (of this obstacle) will be unknown. The take-off might be into wind and a sideways departure with a yawing manoeuvre effected.

None of these conditions are deterministic because the environment does not permit accurate planning and the manoeuvre, although comfortable, does not conform to the manufacturer's Cat A procedure. If an engine failure was to occur after the Rotation Point and whilst within the banking/yawing manoeuvre what would be the outcome - the truth is that none of us know.

We also have a number of aircraft for which there is no Cat A procedure (and/or flight test data) on which to base the PC2e procedure; in these cases, it has been accepted that a procedure can be provided (even in the Operations Manual) which is based upon modelling with a validated model. Most manufacturers (at least with modern aircraft) have numeric models on which profiles can be based. Profiles provided under these conditions will not be as robust as those which are provided for and tested under the conditions required for acceptance by the Certificating Authority (that is not the case for the S92 because the amount of testing for their PC2e procedure was at least as robust as that for the S76C+ Cat A Helideck procedure). (In fact before PC2e was written into the regulations, the efficacy of the profile was tested on three modern aircraft on the latest 'generic' numeric model - the one funded by the EU for the EUROPA Project).

For all of these reasons, it was decided to contain the text of PC2e within the exposure requirement.

Just a short word on Pure PC2; if an aircraft has a deterministic procedure for deck-edge clearance and operates under benign conditions, the regulations permits (Pure) PC2 (without exposure). These conditions usually exist where the Sea State is less than 4 (4-8ft and 17-21 kts); you can see that with these conditions, the take-off can always be taken into the 180 degree obstacle clear segment (and within the 5:1 falling gradient). Without assuring drop-down the aircraft will clear the deck but will be forced to ditch (under the worst conditions of failure - i.e. 1 second before RP). The text that permits a safe-forced-landing for PC2 (Pure PC2) has never been subject to any additional conditions and is therefore outside the exposure concept.

It could be argued that this provides a very good implementation scheme for those oil companies which are working in a non-hostile environment and for whom the ditching is an acceptable outcome. Up to 20 kts Pure PC2 could be flown and, from 20 kts (from which point most aircraft can operate to their maximum mass) PC2e. However, it is stressed that there must be a procedure for deck-edge clearance - which is usually provided within the Cat A or PC2e procedure.

Jim

Jim/212man

Having spent some time thinking about the PC2e profile and the obstacle environment issues, I can see why some element of engine reliability would be prudent, even with all of the benefits that PC2e brings.

Can anyone elaborate on Droopy's comment re the 2010 deadline. If it is true it would be interesting to learn who is pushing for the delay and why!


VL

Perhaps Droopy might wish to elaborate!

Jim

When PC2 was going to expire with the only alternative being PC1, I was a big fan of PC2E. Now that its possible that EU Ops might provide the means to think again, I am not so sure.

We have to look at the big safety picture, and bear in mind that no-one has died from an engine failure during the critical exposure period in an offshore takeoff or landing. However, there have been a number of issues associated with hopelessly inaccurate TAFs, airfields closing unexpectedly, PPR diversion airfields declining to accept mass diversions, massive queues for procedural IFR approaches etc.

So my question is, is the hazard associated with engine failure when taking off or landing offshore greater or less than the hazard associated with flying around with legal minimum fuel most of the time (in order to maximise payload to the client)?

One of the great strides of the EC225 is the ability to carry max passengers and full fuel. It makes for very relaxing and safe operations. With PC2E it would be likely that fuel carried would have to be significantly reduced towards or to the legal minimum. I am not convinced this will improve overall safety.

HC

HC

I have to agree that the debate should take place. I do not believe that the risk analysis has been completed as accurately as perhaps we would expect. The point you make was also made by me with regard to the operation that 212man is now flying. There were recorded incidents because of fuel state, regulation and unreliable TAFs, yet we were faced with PC2e operating weights that would limit the options for carrying "additional" fuel.

My current operation also has similar limitations. We may be looking at flying about 265nm from a land alternate, but the fuel we can carry is being limited due to PC2e requirements. The balance between risks seems somewhat skewed, especially considering the "relatively benign" environment we are flying in?

I can also recall returning from Beatrice with an S61 on minimum VFR fuel thanks to the TAF. The METAR on return meant that an ILS to 34 was inevitable. On coasting in I asked if there would be "any delay". No was the answer, until I reached Inverurie when I was informed I would be No.10 for the ILS. That was immediately followed by "Pan, Pan...". Not a comfortable position at all!

Unfortunately the fuel issue is not statistically quantifiable?

Should Pure PC2 be the proper way forward? A performance criteria that balances the performance capability of current aircraft with the overall risks associated with the task we are carrying out?