EC-130 Crash California
Unfortunately happens to experienced folk as well, remember the great safety advocate "Torch" Lewis writing on the subject and telling the story of how he made an ILS in a Lodestar to landing in zero/zero conditions because his boss demanded it and he feared for his job if he didn'tExcept when you fly for certain oil companys crab, transit 300' IMC was par for the course, descend to the water at night through fog, hover taxi to the platform legs and climb to the deck. Not me, but he became the CP.
I've seen and heard of all sorts of stupid stuff done in helicopters 'to get the job done' which some get away with and some don't - depends on what, if any, risk mitigation is applied.
IE - I have hover-taxied from field to field for an hour in the dark and fog to get a seriously ill casualty to hospital when IFR wasn't an option (except with a very long diversion) and we were in a remote area.
The risk mitigation? Very well trained military crew used to low level ops, NVG, Rad Alt and an ability to convert to IFR and divert a long way with the fuel reserves.
I am trying to think of an Operator I worked for that emphasized sticking to the "Rules" as printed in company documentation or government pubs.....rather than encouraging getting the job done.
That list is very small....like none.
I did enjoy some that did not question a decision to stay on the ground or land out......well one actually.
For sure everyone of them would show up in Court with their fancy Lawyers who would very eloquently explain how I had violated Company Policy and Federal Regs and suggest they held no responsibility or liability.
Things have not changed since Gann's generation put on a Flying Suit in that regard.
We should take heed of sound advice from those more experienced in our profession.
Always have a Plan B as all too often Plan A becomes obsolete.
With Plan B becoming the deal....you then best have Plan C ready.
It is when you run out of Options that disaster happens.
Per Ernie Gann......
That list is very small....like none.
I did enjoy some that did not question a decision to stay on the ground or land out......well one actually.
For sure everyone of them would show up in Court with their fancy Lawyers who would very eloquently explain how I had violated Company Policy and Federal Regs and suggest they held no responsibility or liability.
Things have not changed since Gann's generation put on a Flying Suit in that regard.
We should take heed of sound advice from those more experienced in our profession.
Always have a Plan B as all too often Plan A becomes obsolete.
With Plan B becoming the deal....you then best have Plan C ready.
It is when you run out of Options that disaster happens.
Per Ernie Gann......
I am trying to think of an Operator I worked for that emphasized sticking to the "Rules" as printed in company documentation or government pubs.....rather than encouraging getting the job done.
The EC130 flight was a charter. And I'm sure that the operator had night VFR weather minimums in their Ops Specs. But there's a problem. It's the same problem that Kobe Bryant's pilot found himself dealing with...the same problem that all VFR helicopter pilots face: What happens when the weather is fine at the departure point and destination, but you run into a band of bad weather when you're past the mid-point of a long flight? Now what!
Years ago in the Gulf of Mexico, I left one of PHI's shore bases in a BO-105 to help with a rig crew-change. A 412 left the base behind me, VFR, giving me enough time to get on and off the deck before they arrived. The rig was waaaaay out, over an hour in the Bolkow. Weather was fine on "the beach." The rig was reporting "clear, blue and 22." Fifteen miles or so from it, I ran into an unforecast (and unforcastable) line of crap weather with a fog bank that I could not get over or under. Taking a deep breath and counting on my two RR-250's to keep running, I got down on the deck and hovered along for several tense minutes until I broke through to clear skies the other side. I radioed the 412 that they'd run into a line of sh*t, and things were bad down to about 10 miles from the rig but that the rig itself was in the clear. Once on the deck, I had a decision to make. I couldn't stay there because there wasn't enough room for me and the 412 and the rig didn't have fuel. Taking another deep breath, I launched and headed north. Hitting the fog bank, I got down on the deck again. Ghostly platforms appeared and slid slowly by on our left and right. My front seat passenger complimented me on knowing the right path through them. But I was just lucky that there weren't any directly in front of us. It was horrible. I promised God that if He got me through that mess, I would never, ever do something so stupid and I would devote my life to rescuing topless dancers from that industry if I had to visit every titty bar in Pensacola and tip them accordingly so they'd have enough money to switch careers and get a real job...like Helicopter Pilot. I broke out of the fog and found my refueling platform. The VFR 412, being able to take round-trip fuel, beat me back to base. All they said was, "Yeaaahhhh, it got pretty bad there for a while." None of us were newbies. The three of us knew what we had done. And we weren't proud of it. Sh*t happens, as they say. I'm sure we weren't the first Gulf of Mexico pilots to ever have that particular kind of sh*t happen, and we certainly were not the last.
The boys in that EC130 obviously should have turned around before they got in too deep. Did they think they could continue to follow the Interstate but were unable? Decisions are tough sometimes. And not all of us make the best ones. Sometimes we screw up badly but live to tell the tale. Sometimes we don't live. I wish it was a perfect world where everything was all cut-and-dried, and you get to a point where you just shrug and go, "Okay folks, can't make it. We're going back to where we took off from!" In theory it's that easy, but in reality it's not.
EDIT: Quick! Someone go repost this on the JH forum so you can all laugh and make fun of a pilot and make yourselves feel good! Oh, and if you do, please get it right: The prayer to God was on the flight back inbound, not the outbound. Yes, there really was a 412 who flew through the same crap I did, both times. And yes, rules were broken. But I always had surface contact and, I don't know about the 412 guys, but I was just hovering along at a speed that would have allowed me to avoid a platform directly in front of me, had there been one. Make fun all you want. Claim that *you* would never do such a stupid thing. We did some dumb sh*t 30 years ago. And, judging by the EC130 accident, some still do today.
Years ago in the Gulf of Mexico, I left one of PHI's shore bases in a BO-105 to help with a rig crew-change. A 412 left the base behind me, VFR, giving me enough time to get on and off the deck before they arrived. The rig was waaaaay out, over an hour in the Bolkow. Weather was fine on "the beach." The rig was reporting "clear, blue and 22." Fifteen miles or so from it, I ran into an unforecast (and unforcastable) line of crap weather with a fog bank that I could not get over or under. Taking a deep breath and counting on my two RR-250's to keep running, I got down on the deck and hovered along for several tense minutes until I broke through to clear skies the other side. I radioed the 412 that they'd run into a line of sh*t, and things were bad down to about 10 miles from the rig but that the rig itself was in the clear. Once on the deck, I had a decision to make. I couldn't stay there because there wasn't enough room for me and the 412 and the rig didn't have fuel. Taking another deep breath, I launched and headed north. Hitting the fog bank, I got down on the deck again. Ghostly platforms appeared and slid slowly by on our left and right. My front seat passenger complimented me on knowing the right path through them. But I was just lucky that there weren't any directly in front of us. It was horrible. I promised God that if He got me through that mess, I would never, ever do something so stupid and I would devote my life to rescuing topless dancers from that industry if I had to visit every titty bar in Pensacola and tip them accordingly so they'd have enough money to switch careers and get a real job...like Helicopter Pilot. I broke out of the fog and found my refueling platform. The VFR 412, being able to take round-trip fuel, beat me back to base. All they said was, "Yeaaahhhh, it got pretty bad there for a while." None of us were newbies. The three of us knew what we had done. And we weren't proud of it. Sh*t happens, as they say. I'm sure we weren't the first Gulf of Mexico pilots to ever have that particular kind of sh*t happen, and we certainly were not the last.
The boys in that EC130 obviously should have turned around before they got in too deep. Did they think they could continue to follow the Interstate but were unable? Decisions are tough sometimes. And not all of us make the best ones. Sometimes we screw up badly but live to tell the tale. Sometimes we don't live. I wish it was a perfect world where everything was all cut-and-dried, and you get to a point where you just shrug and go, "Okay folks, can't make it. We're going back to where we took off from!" In theory it's that easy, but in reality it's not.
EDIT: Quick! Someone go repost this on the JH forum so you can all laugh and make fun of a pilot and make yourselves feel good! Oh, and if you do, please get it right: The prayer to God was on the flight back inbound, not the outbound. Yes, there really was a 412 who flew through the same crap I did, both times. And yes, rules were broken. But I always had surface contact and, I don't know about the 412 guys, but I was just hovering along at a speed that would have allowed me to avoid a platform directly in front of me, had there been one. Make fun all you want. Claim that *you* would never do such a stupid thing. We did some dumb sh*t 30 years ago. And, judging by the EC130 accident, some still do today.
Last edited by FH1100 Pilot; 28th Feb 2024 at 22:37.
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I take your point Megan but the R in IFR stands for Rules - if your operator chooses to break them that is their folly (can't imagine any insurer would pay out following a crash)
All too common in the industry it would seem Megan.
Too many of you are airline types and dont appreciate the different environment helicopters work in.. same way you cant apply same TEM to bush pilot ops vs Airline.. different skillsets. Most of you button-pushers would be horrified at a normal days flying for an Alaskan bush pilot let alone a heli pilot utilizing what a heli does best.
Also, the IFR environment is a PITA for a helicopter as its mainly setup for planks and their speeds.
regards from somebody who flies in both worlds and found out quickly there is no cross cultural exchange of info from either side to how we can co-exist safely..
Also, the IFR environment is a PITA for a helicopter as its mainly setup for planks and their speeds.
regards from somebody who flies in both worlds and found out quickly there is no cross cultural exchange of info from either side to how we can co-exist safely..
This thread is about a serious fatal helicopter crash, just to remind you. And some months before that there was a similar crash of a television news helicopter in similar circumstances.
Would you prefer that we plank flying button pushers took you and your family on holiday or to visit your inlaws in our airliners by flying below MSA along valleys, because it would be more fun for us pilots ?
For tactical helicopter operations; war, fire, police, air ambulance etc, I can see that well trained and experienced pilots would need to go below MSA in the course of their duties. Ditto heli-skiing and mountain rescue. But it seems odd to me if this is also routinely done by "regular" pilots, on "normal" transport routes even at night - when trees, ridges electricity pylons and transmitter towers for example, are not always lit. Why not give yourself a safety margin ?
MSA is a very basic safety device that commercial fixed wing pilots should not ignore. (I did once years ago in early training in the Sim, because I knew where I was - safely away from high ground, but I got a bollocking for doing it and never did it again, and my misdemeanour probably kept me out of the LHS for longer).
I usually lurk here as I'm a plank driver but can't let this one go without comment.
MSA is set to give clearance (1,000 ft) over the highest peak or obstacle in a large area (25 nm radius of a navaid or waypoint). Where there are hills there are often valleys. I enjoy flying in the valleys when the peaks are obscured by cloud. I'm often several thousand feet below MSA when flying in my local area. No emergency, no commercial operation, just flying because I enjoy flying.
To put this in perspective - my base airport is at 1,480 ft and has a charted MSA of 7,800 ft!
MSA is set to give clearance (1,000 ft) over the highest peak or obstacle in a large area (25 nm radius of a navaid or waypoint). Where there are hills there are often valleys. I enjoy flying in the valleys when the peaks are obscured by cloud. I'm often several thousand feet below MSA when flying in my local area. No emergency, no commercial operation, just flying because I enjoy flying.
To put this in perspective - my base airport is at 1,480 ft and has a charted MSA of 7,800 ft!
I was once sitting in the back of a fixed wing training aircraft, which entered slightly marginal VMC at one point, and the horizon could no longer be seen all around. I became concerned that the student and his instructor were flying below MSA in the vicinity of a television transmitter mast in the area. I asked them what the local MSA was, and reminded them about the mast, and they immediately climbed to a safe altitude.
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Last edited by Uplinker; 9th Mar 2024 at 08:45. Reason: edited following Robbie's correction, below.
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OK, he seemed to be disorientated and in an unusual attitude, but he was too low, since he hit the ground.
Do heli pilots never look at their altimeter or Rad Alt ? He must have seen it winding down ?
I would have thought that if entering marginal VMC; the first thing you would do would be to ensure you are above MSA, otherwise how will you avoid pylons, masts, high ground ??
Do heli pilots never look at their altimeter or Rad Alt ? He must have seen it winding down ?
I would have thought that if entering marginal VMC; the first thing you would do would be to ensure you are above MSA, otherwise how will you avoid pylons, masts, high ground ??
MSA
MSA is not a thing for a professional VFR flight. You are always bellow it. The marginal weather pretty much beeing the definition of bellow MSA. Masts are avoided by slowing down enought to be able to see and avoid them. Maps and HTAWS helps but are far from perfect. The general 500/1000 ft minum altitude and aviation maps/obstacle databases are a good way to not hitting anything static. Professional operators authorized to go bellow that need special procedures and training as there are increasing number of unchrated obstacles. (And a more limited number of options if the westher gets worse)
During a marginal weather VFR flight in a helicoper, MSA is only relevant when cosidering if transition (climb) to IFR is available due to icing and no aerofoil anti-icing. When flying off-route with IFR, MSA is of course the minimum altitude allowed (in a VFR to IFR transition one may need to be bellow MSA whilen flying unde IFR).
During a marginal weather VFR flight in a helicoper, MSA is only relevant when cosidering if transition (climb) to IFR is available due to icing and no aerofoil anti-icing. When flying off-route with IFR, MSA is of course the minimum altitude allowed (in a VFR to IFR transition one may need to be bellow MSA whilen flying unde IFR).
Last edited by mechpowi; 9th Mar 2024 at 12:53.
Uplinker
You seem to be stuck in the groove here.
You state that you don't know about helicopters and are asking out of interest.
Then you ignore what people who do know what they're talking about are telling you.
VFR helicopters operate perfectly safely below MSA if flown in accordance with VFR.
It's kind of the reason that we have helicopters.
There is no requirement whatsoever - legal or safety - to fly above MSA if you are flying in suitable VFR conditions.
This accident did not happen because they were below MSA or flying too low. It happened because they continued flying in conditions that were unsuitable for VFR / VMC flight.
You seem to be stuck in the groove here.
You state that you don't know about helicopters and are asking out of interest.
Then you ignore what people who do know what they're talking about are telling you.
VFR helicopters operate perfectly safely below MSA if flown in accordance with VFR.
It's kind of the reason that we have helicopters.
There is no requirement whatsoever - legal or safety - to fly above MSA if you are flying in suitable VFR conditions.
This accident did not happen because they were below MSA or flying too low. It happened because they continued flying in conditions that were unsuitable for VFR / VMC flight.
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Then there is those things known as Regulations such as US FAA Part 135. (My bolding of Text)
My reading of the Regulation and in consideration of the route, weather, and terrain tells me they were not in compliance with the Regulations.
It gets very dark in Nevada at night if there is an overcast and thus an absence of terrestrial lighting
The actual visibility available probably will not allow sufficient light reference of any kind adequate to control the aircraft without reference to flight instrumentation.
Absent a mechanical failure this accident will probably be het another IIMC uncontrolled flight into terrain accident.
My view is the concept of calling it a VFR into IFR accident misses the reality of these tragedies....the "Rules" have nothing to do with the accident happening as it is the loss of control that gets you.
Had you obeyed those awful Regulations (The Rules) t hen you would not have found yourself in that situation that leads to your sudden demise and that of your passengers.
Ask longtime EMS pilots what tricks and techniques they use that have kept them alive and healthy and you will see most of them have altered routing to avoid those dark holes when possible. (If you comply with the FAR's....you have to do that to be legal)
If they are not able to stay over areas with enough surface lighting from homes, businesses, highways.....they treat the flight as an Instrument trip and are equipped, trained, and proficient (not just legally "current" but up to speed) and fly high as possible using Radar Flight Following assistance from ATC.
That reminds us there is the perfect world of Rules and Regulations but there is also reality where perfect compliance might not be achievable and stay in business.
But that is a topic for another discussion rather than in this thread.
Most of the Regulations might as well be written in blood as they came about due to events just like this one.....but unless the industry as a whole adopts the proper safety culture the toll in lives just keeps on growing.
Helicopter pilots are not very bright it seems as we (I include myself in that number) keep using using the same old tired ways of coming to an ugly end or at least try to after making very poor decisions.
Every one of these accidents provide us with Lessons Learned....or some would say.....Lessons Not Learned.
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My reading of the Regulation and in consideration of the route, weather, and terrain tells me they were not in compliance with the Regulations.
It gets very dark in Nevada at night if there is an overcast and thus an absence of terrestrial lighting
The actual visibility available probably will not allow sufficient light reference of any kind adequate to control the aircraft without reference to flight instrumentation.
Absent a mechanical failure this accident will probably be het another IIMC uncontrolled flight into terrain accident.
My view is the concept of calling it a VFR into IFR accident misses the reality of these tragedies....the "Rules" have nothing to do with the accident happening as it is the loss of control that gets you.
Had you obeyed those awful Regulations (The Rules) t hen you would not have found yourself in that situation that leads to your sudden demise and that of your passengers.
Ask longtime EMS pilots what tricks and techniques they use that have kept them alive and healthy and you will see most of them have altered routing to avoid those dark holes when possible. (If you comply with the FAR's....you have to do that to be legal)
If they are not able to stay over areas with enough surface lighting from homes, businesses, highways.....they treat the flight as an Instrument trip and are equipped, trained, and proficient (not just legally "current" but up to speed) and fly high as possible using Radar Flight Following assistance from ATC.
That reminds us there is the perfect world of Rules and Regulations but there is also reality where perfect compliance might not be achievable and stay in business.
But that is a topic for another discussion rather than in this thread.
Most of the Regulations might as well be written in blood as they came about due to events just like this one.....but unless the industry as a whole adopts the proper safety culture the toll in lives just keeps on growing.
Helicopter pilots are not very bright it seems as we (I include myself in that number) keep using using the same old tired ways of coming to an ugly end or at least try to after making very poor decisions.
Every one of these accidents provide us with Lessons Learned....or some would say.....Lessons Not Learned.
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§ 135.205 VFR: Visibility requirements.
§ 135.205 VFR: Visibility requirements.
(a) No person may operate an airplane under VFR in uncontrolled airspace when the ceiling is less than 1,000 feet unless flight visibility is at least 2 miles.
(b) No person may operate a helicopter under VFR in Class G airspace at an altitude of 1,200 feet or less above the surface or within the lateral boundaries of the surface areas of Class B, Class C, Class D, or Class E airspace designated for an airport unless the visibility is at least—
(1) During the day— 1⁄2 mile; or
(2) At night—1 mile.
[Doc. No. 16097, 43 FR 46783, Oct. 10, 1978, as amended by Amdt. 135–41, 56 FR 65663, Dec. 17, 1991]
(b) No person may operate a helicopter under VFR in Class G airspace at an altitude of 1,200 feet or less above the surface or within the lateral boundaries of the surface areas of Class B, Class C, Class D, or Class E airspace designated for an airport unless the visibility is at least—
(1) During the day— 1⁄2 mile; or
(2) At night—1 mile.
[Doc. No. 16097, 43 FR 46783, Oct. 10, 1978, as amended by Amdt. 135–41, 56 FR 65663, Dec. 17, 1991]
§ 135.207 VFR: Helicopter surface reference requirements.
No person may operate a helicopter under VFR unless that person has visual surface reference or, at night, visual surface light reference, sufficient to safely control the helicopter.
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OK, he seemed to be disorientated and in an unusual attitude, but he was too low, since he hit the ground.
Do heli pilots never look at their altimeter or Rad Alt ? He must have seen it winding down ?
I would have thought that if entering marginal VMC; the first thing you would do would be to ensure you are above MSA, otherwise how will you avoid pylons, masts, high ground ??
Do heli pilots never look at their altimeter or Rad Alt ? He must have seen it winding down ?
I would have thought that if entering marginal VMC; the first thing you would do would be to ensure you are above MSA, otherwise how will you avoid pylons, masts, high ground ??
I've read many comments on r/flying where fixed-wingers will brag about using their instruments to fly through black holes on VFR flight, but chopper pilots aren't like that.
We're not really trained to switch from VFR to IFR at the flip of a switch (and quite often not even flying IFR ships), that's why a lot of us end up killing ourselves scudd-running, or while on night flights out in the middle of sparsely lighted nowhere where black holes live.
When we encounter marginal VMC we generally aren't in the right mindset to handle it like you guys are. That's just the way the cookies crumble in rotor-wing.
Do whatever you want by yourself - as long as you don't crash into my house or my car - but with fare paying passengers, or other commercial operations, I am surprised. Remember I am talking about marginal VFR or night flying. Exciting and good fun, yes I am sure, but seems unnecessarily risky to me in the sort of situation this helicopter crashed in.
Did you understand the relationship betwen the elevation of my base airport and the MSA? Did you understand that MSA is based on the highest obstacle in a very large area? All flight operations in my local area are below MSA and that includes all the IFR arrivals to KPHX following the BRUSR ONE or BUNTR THREE arrival routes and perhaps other STAR.
MSA may be critical to safety if you don't know where you are in relation to the terrain or obstacle that defined it. It has no influence at all on safety if you are 20-30 miles aways from that terrain or obstacle and in VMC.
Also MSA is of no importance if IFR and being controlled at or above the minimum vectoring altitude which is much lower than MSA in my local area.
Again - airport elevation 1,480 ft, MSA 7,800 ft
One thing apparent from preliminary report is the pilot was following highways for navigation & orientation as has already been discussed here. But having to do so for VFR flight seems to defeat some of the advantage of using a helicopter in the first place. Seems like a dog leg route needed to be followed, rather than a more direct (IFR) flight path, and then perhaps still without sufficient visual cues. EC130 cruise is around 120 knots, so 222 km/h or 138 mph. Taking a car may have doubled travel time but perhaps may have been safer in this instance.
For all of us who have flown helicopters in Nigeria or West Africa know that many times of the year the weather is really difficult and requires the best of flying skills.
But for a Nigerian Business Man to die in a helicopter in a weather related accident in “Sunny California” is really paradox.
But for a Nigerian Business Man to die in a helicopter in a weather related accident in “Sunny California” is really paradox.
For all of us who have flown helicopters in Nigeria or West Africa know that many times of the year the weather is really difficult and requires the best of flying skills.
But for a Nigerian Business Man to die in a helicopter in a weather related accident in “Sunny California” is really paradox.
But for a Nigerian Business Man to die in a helicopter in a weather related accident in “Sunny California” is really paradox.
You can easily get disoriented at nite and crash as a result, even when its perfectly clear. No moon, sparsly lighted desert, mountainous terrain, late nite flight fatigue.
,..or you could make your go/no go decisions based on memes and songs.
,..or you could make your go/no go decisions based on memes and songs.
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