EC-130 Crash California
§ 135.160 Radio altimeters for rotorcraft operations. (a) After April 24, 2017, no person may operate a rotorcraft unless that rotorcraft is equipped with an operable FAA-approved radio altimeter, or an FAA-approved device that incorporates a radio altimeter, unless otherwise authorized in the certificate holder's approved minimum equipment list.
listening to the NTSB press brief, the a/c impacted ground nose low in a right turn and trackingdata show an increase groundspeed before impact…
would be very surprised if the investiogation show an engine out scenario.
🤡
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I am sorry, I do not get the logic.
1. N72EX
This was gross pilot incompetence. Fully qualified (in terms of license, recency) IFR-rated pilot and instructor, in a full IFR machine. Refusing or unable to mentally transition from VFR to IFR flying. Or simply hand the controls to George.
…
1. N72EX
This was gross pilot incompetence. Fully qualified (in terms of license, recency) IFR-rated pilot and instructor, in a full IFR machine. Refusing or unable to mentally transition from VFR to IFR flying. Or simply hand the controls to George.
…
Second, the National Transportation Safety Board determined the probable cause of the N72EX accident as:
1. The pilot's decision to continue flight under visual flight rules into instrument meteorological conditions which resulted in the pilot's spatial disorientation and loss of control.
2. Contributing to the accident was the pilot's likely self-induced pressure and the pilot's plan continuation bias which adversely affected his decision-making
3. And, Island Express Helicopter Inc's. inadequate review and oversight of its safety management process.
Interesting point, because I'm not seeing one in the video posted above (10/23/23), unless someone is aware of a device incorporating one?
§ 135.160 Radio altimeters for rotorcraft operations. (a) After April 24, 2017, no person may operate a rotorcraft unless that rotorcraft is equipped with an operable FAA-approved radio altimeter, or an FAA-approved device that incorporates a radio altimeter, unless otherwise authorized in the certificate holder's approved minimum equipment list.
§ 135.160 Radio altimeters for rotorcraft operations. (a) After April 24, 2017, no person may operate a rotorcraft unless that rotorcraft is equipped with an operable FAA-approved radio altimeter, or an FAA-approved device that incorporates a radio altimeter, unless otherwise authorized in the certificate holder's approved minimum equipment list.
[...] the National Transportation Safety Board determined the probable cause of the N72EX accident as:
1. The pilot's decision to continue flight under visual flight rules into instrument meteorological conditions which resulted in the pilot's spatial disorientation and loss of control.
2. Contributing to the accident was the pilot's likely self-induced pressure and the pilot's plan continuation bias which adversely affected his decision-making
3. And, Island Express Helicopter Inc's. inadequate review and oversight of its safety management process.
1. The pilot's decision to continue flight under visual flight rules into instrument meteorological conditions which resulted in the pilot's spatial disorientation and loss of control.
2. Contributing to the accident was the pilot's likely self-induced pressure and the pilot's plan continuation bias which adversely affected his decision-making
3. And, Island Express Helicopter Inc's. inadequate review and oversight of its safety management process.
The reference to N72EX is valid, as we might find that in this mishap all three NTSB findings will apply again:
- Inability or refusal of the PIC to transition to IMC
- client or self-induced pressure
- Lack of oversight from the operator
I agree that the recent memory from the N72EX crash should have made it easier for the pilots in this case to realise the risk and therefore to decline the flight.
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However, the potential icing risk aside (which in my case would have been the non-starter), do we at least agree that with proper equipment and proper skills this flight could safely have been conducted? We can't continue saying that the mission was impossible just because in the past other pilots who managed to stack all odds against them, failed.
As I had posted before, I am even going further, saying that this crew - finding themselves in this completely unnecessary situation - simply having a synthetic vision app (like Horizon from Helios Avionics, Garmin Pilot of Forelight) constantly running on a *second* tablet, would have allowed them to fly out of this mess, without particular IFR skills or RAD ALT.
I know many here don't like this idea and refuse to contemplate it, as having synthetic vision (arguably) creates a false sense of security and could induce inexperienced pilots to go in deeper than they should. But as a thought experiment we may well be allowed to discuss it here.
As I had posted before, I am even going further, saying that this crew - finding themselves in this completely unnecessary situation - simply having a synthetic vision app (like Horizon from Helios Avionics, Garmin Pilot of Forelight) constantly running on a *second* tablet, would have allowed them to fly out of this mess, without particular IFR skills or RAD ALT.
I know many here don't like this idea and refuse to contemplate it, as having synthetic vision (arguably) creates a false sense of security and could induce inexperienced pilots to go in deeper than they should. But as a thought experiment we may well be allowed to discuss it here.
FreeFlight TRI-40 | SEAEROSPACE.COM
a pilot's poor decision making
Malabo is correct when he posted "Operational control, management guidance, regulatory negligence. Do we as an industry really expect a couple of young R44 tour/instructor pilots to have the experience skill and judgement to attempt a night marginal weather flight through the mountains?"
Pity the bankers didn't opt for an IMC fixed wing, should have taken the merits of using Travel Risk Assessments talk mentioned by 212man.
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As I said
I know many here don't like this idea and refuse to contemplate it
You might think it poor decision making but why did the guy find himself in that position?
Malabo is correct when he posted "Operational control, management guidance, regulatory negligence. Do we as an industry really expect a couple of young R44 tour/instructor pilots to have the experience skill and judgement to attempt a night marginal weather flight through the mountains?"
Malabo is correct when he posted "Operational control, management guidance, regulatory negligence. Do we as an industry really expect a couple of young R44 tour/instructor pilots to have the experience skill and judgement to attempt a night marginal weather flight through the mountains?"
,...and he most likely found himself in that situation due to the old, "Get the job done" itis. Which is a leading driver in a pilots poor decision making.
That's probably what they said a hundred years ago when somebody invented the gyro instruments that allowed the skilled pilot to determine their orientation in space without external visual cues.
As I said
However, we can't deny that it is out there. Thousands of helicopters are equipped with full glass panels including synthetic vision, either as OEM option, or as a recent panel upgrade.
As I said
However, we can't deny that it is out there. Thousands of helicopters are equipped with full glass panels including synthetic vision, either as OEM option, or as a recent panel upgrade.
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We witnessed the loss of six lives. A family was wiped out. My claim is (post #15) that a simple synthetic vision app would have allowed them to get out of their predicament, without panic or disorientation.
This claim may, or may not, be valid. So far no reasons were give why this claim is wrong. We only hear that one mustn’t contemplate this idea.
We have to stop pontificating. Six lives could have been saved if it wasn’t for the “we don’t want VFR pilots to have those tools, as de jure they shouldn’t get themselves into a situation where having those tools could save their life.” Try explain this to Mr Wigwe’s family.
However, the opposite is the case here. Our mishap pilots did *not* have synthetic vision. Yet “they poked the bear“.
We witnessed the loss of six lives. A family was wiped out. My claim is (post #15) that a simple synthetic vision app would have allowed them to get out of their predicament, without panic or disorientation.
This claim may, or may not, be valid. So far no reasons were give why this claim is wrong. We only hear that one mustn’t contemplate this idea.
We have to stop pontificating. Six lives could have been saved if it wasn’t for the “we don’t want VFR pilots to have those tools, as de jure they shouldn’t get themselves into a situation where having those tools could save their life.” Try explain this to Mr Wigwe’s family.
We witnessed the loss of six lives. A family was wiped out. My claim is (post #15) that a simple synthetic vision app would have allowed them to get out of their predicament, without panic or disorientation.
This claim may, or may not, be valid. So far no reasons were give why this claim is wrong. We only hear that one mustn’t contemplate this idea.
We have to stop pontificating. Six lives could have been saved if it wasn’t for the “we don’t want VFR pilots to have those tools, as de jure they shouldn’t get themselves into a situation where having those tools could save their life.” Try explain this to Mr Wigwe’s family.
Kobe's pilot (if I'm not mistaken) was flying a highly sophisticated IFR ship, yet still decided to "poke the bear" VFR, killing all on board,...and in the daytime no less!
Just because a pilot has the fancy toys and training, doesn't mean they're gonna use them,...or be proficient in using them when the time comes.
We can have all the training/fancy toys/experience in the world, but in the end, we're all just human, and **** happens,...and will always "just happen".
Sure Robbie, all agreed. But I have a technical question. Not a moral one.
The thesis is that synthetic vision would allow to fly (at reasonable and safe heights above ground, and as far as spatial orientation and terrain clearance are concerned) in IMC as if your were in VMC, even without recourse to those technical and highly perishable skills required to integrate the information from various steam gauges into a mental picture about your position in space and in relation to the ground.
And the justification for this claim is that a synthetic vision screen large enough would be undistinguishable from the picture presented through the windscreen, the latter we all know allows regular VFR pilots to keep the blue side up by simply using external visual cues.
This is a priori a thought experiment, not a moral imperative.
The thesis is that synthetic vision would allow to fly (at reasonable and safe heights above ground, and as far as spatial orientation and terrain clearance are concerned) in IMC as if your were in VMC, even without recourse to those technical and highly perishable skills required to integrate the information from various steam gauges into a mental picture about your position in space and in relation to the ground.
And the justification for this claim is that a synthetic vision screen large enough would be undistinguishable from the picture presented through the windscreen, the latter we all know allows regular VFR pilots to keep the blue side up by simply using external visual cues.
This is a priori a thought experiment, not a moral imperative.
You can try flying in remote areas in the winter, extended over water or in low light conditions and you will appreciate the help you get from this fancy tool..
We can have all the training/fancy toys/experience in the world, but in the end, we're all just human, and **** happens,...and will always "just happen".
This accident, didn´t just happen….
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