Broward County accident...
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Given the short flight time, fire trailing and persistent and the pilot reporting and engine failure.....maybe a turbine burst (looking like engine failure with zero Tq/Nf), That savages the tail boom flange area with shrapnel. Meanwhile the Gas Generator is still working and the FADEC response to Zero NF is to open the fuel to max chat. The fire escaping from the compromised combustion chamber finishes the job. I have no idea why the pilot did not have a fire warning or if he missed this in the mix of confusing indications.
With an engine fully failed (ie all parts stop rotating) the fuel pressure becomes zero everywhere in that firewall box and the chances of a persistent fire almost zero. Maybe!
DB
With an engine fully failed (ie all parts stop rotating) the fuel pressure becomes zero everywhere in that firewall box and the chances of a persistent fire almost zero. Maybe!
DB
As mentioned before, all 3 occasions in the ASN history of EC135 incidents where there has been an in flight engine fire have all been after engine overspeed events (all on P1 thus far due to inadvertant entry into manual).
Interesting side discussion. I wonder if this was a Public Use ops and who was overseeing the "piece-mealing" of parts and maintenance?
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This was a HEMS machine so no baggage compartment. No problem, especially for the CabinCrew, to look aft through the whole cabin. As seen on the videos the fire took place in the aft section of engine bay or even battery/Aircondition compartment. Fire is seen on both sides of the fuselage on different videos.
skadi
skadi
Here are a few images from the internet showing the engine bay and how, if there was a fuel line failure, fuel could flow to quite low down in that bay, and probably aft once it caught hold. But fire seemed to have spread beyond that area if indeed that was the origin:
Sadly, the footage is a demonstration that lightweight structures desirable for efficient rotorcraft don't equate to prolonged fire resistance.
It looks to me like that sloping area at the back of the engine bay is a perfect place for fuel/oil/etc to pool and would give the impression the fire is lower than the engine
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Presumably she would be much more level, or nose down in forward flight, than standing on the apron.
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But if he had a fire outside the engine bays he probably wouldn’t know unless he looked for smoke. And IMO if it was a fuel fire this would have ended earlier and been trailing darker smoke. Unfortunately they didn’t have the clam shell door window mod installed as it may have resulted in a different ending.
Sadly, the footage is a demonstration that lightweight structures desirable for efficient rotorcraft don't equate to prolonged fire resistance.
Definitely politics. And if this was a Public Use ops with no FAA oversight then politics also influenced how the aircraft was maintained and operated. Especially with the Sheriff’s comments above. Time will definitely tell.
Originally Posted by [email protected]
It looks to me like that sloping area at the back of the engine bay is a perfect place for fuel/oil/etc to pool and would give the impression the fire is lower than the engine
skadi
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I’m not convinced decision based off if he knew he was on fire or not is valid based off the radio calls or not landing immediately.
Aviate Navigate Communicate.
He had made an emergency call and been given priority landing.
Further com’s on fire update would not have changed any response from the tower. They still press the big red button. I guarantee it would have initiated more coms back from the tower when he had his hands full.
less than 1 minute from the initial problem, definitely still trouble shooting and resolving. If I was in that position, updating the tower would have been low priority unless needing the tower to confirm it.
Aviate Navigate Communicate.
He had made an emergency call and been given priority landing.
Further com’s on fire update would not have changed any response from the tower. They still press the big red button. I guarantee it would have initiated more coms back from the tower when he had his hands full.
less than 1 minute from the initial problem, definitely still trouble shooting and resolving. If I was in that position, updating the tower would have been low priority unless needing the tower to confirm it.
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I see a lot of criticism of this BSO pilot on social media and YouTube. Everybody simply assumes that he screwed-up by not pulling the good engine off and autorotating into a schoolyard. The internet is chock-full of experts.
But the Big Question...the one we do not yet have the answer...is whether the EC135 pilot knew he was on fire? All he told the Tower was that he'd had an engine failure. Unless the fire had breached the cabin (which I doubt), I'd bet that those people onboard had their eyes focused forward - if there was no fire warning indication, there would have been no reason to look rearward. But would it have mattered? We do know that he was only about a mile away from the Pompano Beach Airport field boundary when he began his turn back - about a minute away at 60 knots. So even if he did know that he was on fire, would a "LAND IMMEDIATELY" situation have made a difference? Just how "immediately" is immediately when you have an airport with fire/rescue a minute away and you're busy dealing with a problem (engine failure)? Had he been at 5,000 feet instead of 500 feet, how "immediately" could he have gotten it on the ground?
Which, to me, brings up a bigger question: Should that pilot have expected that his aircraft would fail so catastrophically and so quickly? How come we're not pointing fingers at Airbus for their plastic, junky airframes?
But the Big Question...the one we do not yet have the answer...is whether the EC135 pilot knew he was on fire? All he told the Tower was that he'd had an engine failure. Unless the fire had breached the cabin (which I doubt), I'd bet that those people onboard had their eyes focused forward - if there was no fire warning indication, there would have been no reason to look rearward. But would it have mattered? We do know that he was only about a mile away from the Pompano Beach Airport field boundary when he began his turn back - about a minute away at 60 knots. So even if he did know that he was on fire, would a "LAND IMMEDIATELY" situation have made a difference? Just how "immediately" is immediately when you have an airport with fire/rescue a minute away and you're busy dealing with a problem (engine failure)? Had he been at 5,000 feet instead of 500 feet, how "immediately" could he have gotten it on the ground?
Which, to me, brings up a bigger question: Should that pilot have expected that his aircraft would fail so catastrophically and so quickly? How come we're not pointing fingers at Airbus for their plastic, junky airframes?
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I see a lot of criticism of this BSO pilot on social media and YouTube. Everybody simply assumes that he screwed-up by not pulling the good engine off and autorotating into a schoolyard. The internet is chock-full of experts.
But the Big Question...the one we do not yet have the answer...is whether the EC135 pilot knew he was on fire? All he told the Tower was that he'd had an engine failure. Unless the fire had breached the cabin (which I doubt), I'd bet that those people onboard had their eyes focused forward - if there was no fire warning indication, there would have been no reason to look rearward. But would it have mattered? We do know that he was only about a mile away from the Pompano Beach Airport field boundary when he began his turn back - about a minute away at 60 knots. So even if he did know that he was on fire, would a "LAND IMMEDIATELY" situation have made a difference? Just how "immediately" is immediately when you have an airport with fire/rescue a minute away and you're busy dealing with a problem (engine failure)? Had he been at 5,000 feet instead of 500 feet, how "immediately" could he have gotten it on the ground?
Which, to me, brings up a bigger question: Should that pilot have expected that his aircraft would fail so catastrophically and so quickly? How come we're not pointing fingers at Airbus for their plastic, junky airframes?
But the Big Question...the one we do not yet have the answer...is whether the EC135 pilot knew he was on fire? All he told the Tower was that he'd had an engine failure. Unless the fire had breached the cabin (which I doubt), I'd bet that those people onboard had their eyes focused forward - if there was no fire warning indication, there would have been no reason to look rearward. But would it have mattered? We do know that he was only about a mile away from the Pompano Beach Airport field boundary when he began his turn back - about a minute away at 60 knots. So even if he did know that he was on fire, would a "LAND IMMEDIATELY" situation have made a difference? Just how "immediately" is immediately when you have an airport with fire/rescue a minute away and you're busy dealing with a problem (engine failure)? Had he been at 5,000 feet instead of 500 feet, how "immediately" could he have gotten it on the ground?
Which, to me, brings up a bigger question: Should that pilot have expected that his aircraft would fail so catastrophically and so quickly? How come we're not pointing fingers at Airbus for their plastic, junky airframes?
I think we would all try to make it back to an airfield were you have emergency service ready and being only 1 mile out vs landing in highly populated area during midday traffic, even if it was confirmed fire.
But we would also in our heads expect the airframe to withstand fire for 1 or 2 min.
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To add another speculative angle, how long was the aircraft running on the ground or taxiing for departure? Maybe the fire was burning longer than we all think.
Again, pure speculation but would be interesting when the final chain of events is announced.
I try to take everything in when doing final checks on my side of the aircraft (exterior) before getting in, like am I taking everything in or just glancing it over. I would hope a fire would be readily detected but would depend on where it started I suppose.
Just one more thing to make you think about what you’re doing. At least I’m fairly confident primary structure in my airframe will last longer than a few minutes in the unfortunate case of fire, still rather not experience it!
FltMech
Again, pure speculation but would be interesting when the final chain of events is announced.
I try to take everything in when doing final checks on my side of the aircraft (exterior) before getting in, like am I taking everything in or just glancing it over. I would hope a fire would be readily detected but would depend on where it started I suppose.
Just one more thing to make you think about what you’re doing. At least I’m fairly confident primary structure in my airframe will last longer than a few minutes in the unfortunate case of fire, still rather not experience it!
FltMech
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Civil versus public use is a non issue. Any agency that has a certificated aircraft most likley flies both civil ops. and PAOs. It is the mission, not the agency or the aircraft that determines if a particular flight is public or civil; as long as the aircraft has a non-restricted type certificate, like the EC 135. If they ever fly non-required crew members, dignitaries or anyone who would be designated a passenger they are conductiing civil operations and must adhere to at least part 91 maintenance guidelines. Any agency not doing so woild be foolish indeed if a savy laywer gets involved.
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I don't believe we should start blaming the airframe. If this was a turbine casing breach/overspeed event, that's not assumed in the certification. Hence O/S protection and no turbine containment device for the shrapnel.
I also recall 2 pilots in Aberdeen suffering a high pressure fuel fire in the AS332 Engine bay shortly after taking off on a test flight. The reacted promptly, the fire extinguished 6 seconds after the warning activated, if my memory has served me well! They completed the circuit they started and upon landing, were horrified at the extent of the damage.
If my memory can be relied on a bit further, I recall the Norwegian AS332L1 suffering an engine overspeed that resulted in the turbine bursting. That one took out the MR Hydraulics and fired shrapnel into the occupants. The resulting conflagration did not permit time for a fire to become the salient point. Loss of control and impact the the sea finished the job sadly for all of the occupants.
I am surprised nothing has been released thus far seeing as the Pilot survived the event. The initial sequence and cause of the fire need to be identified quickly enough for the rest of us operating/flying the type to understand how we can mitigate.
Ultimately, we bear in mind aluminum is a bit like butter in a microwave when subjected to fire and the composites are stuffed full of things that will burn nicely. Fire sucks. It always has I think if we consider every serious fire event, Concorde etc.
DB
I also recall 2 pilots in Aberdeen suffering a high pressure fuel fire in the AS332 Engine bay shortly after taking off on a test flight. The reacted promptly, the fire extinguished 6 seconds after the warning activated, if my memory has served me well! They completed the circuit they started and upon landing, were horrified at the extent of the damage.
If my memory can be relied on a bit further, I recall the Norwegian AS332L1 suffering an engine overspeed that resulted in the turbine bursting. That one took out the MR Hydraulics and fired shrapnel into the occupants. The resulting conflagration did not permit time for a fire to become the salient point. Loss of control and impact the the sea finished the job sadly for all of the occupants.
I am surprised nothing has been released thus far seeing as the Pilot survived the event. The initial sequence and cause of the fire need to be identified quickly enough for the rest of us operating/flying the type to understand how we can mitigate.
Ultimately, we bear in mind aluminum is a bit like butter in a microwave when subjected to fire and the composites are stuffed full of things that will burn nicely. Fire sucks. It always has I think if we consider every serious fire event, Concorde etc.
DB
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For a private entity I would agree as they might fly a Part 135, Part 91, and PAO flight all in the same day. However, for a public entity with no regulatory oversight and minimal requirements not so much. A privately owned Cessna 172 flown only on Sundays has more FAA oversight and regulatory requirements than a PAO EC135. And unfortunately there are “foolish” ops out there, especially small flight departments with tight budgets. Whether this is the case with this department has yet to be seen.
I see a lot of criticism of this BSO pilot on social media and YouTube. Everybody simply assumes that he screwed-up by not pulling the good engine off and autorotating into a schoolyard. The internet is chock-full of experts.
Which, to me, brings up a bigger question: Should that pilot have expected that his aircraft would fail so catastrophically and so quickly? How come we're not pointing fingers at Airbus for their plastic, junky airframes?
Which, to me, brings up a bigger question: Should that pilot have expected that his aircraft would fail so catastrophically and so quickly? How come we're not pointing fingers at Airbus for their plastic, junky airframes?
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Purveyor of Egg Liqueur to Lucifer
Lots of input from expertise from folk who've never been thrown the keys and flown the damn thing.
Good day.
Last edited by SilsoeSid; 8th Sep 2023 at 18:49.
Exactly my point when it comes to oversight. And in my experience on the mx side with PAO, its only the public entities that enjoy such traditions.