Kobe Bryant killed in S76 crash
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Following your logic: Until the the pilot decided to climb ("over a layer"), he had two options at that time: 1) find a place and , in the vicinity, land or 2) or revert course and find a place to land. Climbing his options would have increased (as would the work load): 1) Flight to destination , VFR on top a layers, and hope for a hole; 2) or IFR approach to an airport; 3) or Precautionary landing on some ridge top, 3) or Declaration of an emergency. Note: More information is required to determine if fuel would have been an issue and 4) "pop up' check things out and make a determination from there (and continue flight or go back down and make a new decision). As you pointed out, what doesn't make sense is the climb to 2300' and then a sudden turn (especially since that it seems the ROC to get there was about 900 FPM) (10 seconds and then in the 'clear') Presumably, that climb was with poor forward visibility and use of instruments (autopilot?) must have been in use. If there were no other, casues, then, the post about the left turn crashes after VFR takeoff into IMC in the sim make sense, if there was a decision to go back down and in those moments there was a loss of spatial orientation (since the flight path obviously doesn't indicate a controlled descent). As you noted, the weather conditions and options) would have been recognized (presumably) by a seasoned pilot and the best decision would have been not to go in the first place.
What might have happened in the Bryant accident is similar to what I see in the simulator. The pilot was in sight of the 101 freeway in very marginal weather and he's flown left to maintain the best view of the ground reference (the freeway) from out the pilot side window. He's lost visual contact with the ground, commenced an immediate climb as per IIMC procedure, had an oopsie moment and pitched it forward (incorrectly) sensing the climb attitude was too steep. Sensory overload, nothing computes any more, and the rest is history. The instrument scan and IFR flying skills were not to the required standard for flying in real cloud for the first time. I'm guessing the pilot had never done an IFR recurrent check in the Level D S76 sim. The place to practice is in the sim, punch a few holes in the pretend ground, reset, and try again. Unfortunately in real life the ground is much harder, and there is no reset button.
I can virtually guarantee he turned left in order to maintain visual contact with the 101 out his pilot door window, and he was hand flying at the time. He just kept turning left when he lost sight of the ground. Nothing wrong with the instrumentation at all. His intention was to press on to destination. If he intended to discontinue to destination he would have done a right turn, maintaining visual reference with the 101 out the right side pilot door window as he did the 180 turn. Bet my house on it.
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This is consistent with what I have read from the couple of experienced rotor instructors who have chimed in. Thanks for the insight and the perspective. I initially thought someone with that many hours and time in type would have gotten onto the gauges quick smart. But anything is possible on the day. I made that mistake myself many years ago but had the benefit of a lot of feet below me.
I spent several sessions in the Vertical Motion sim out at Moffet doing upset training and they definitely have done some very interesting studies there. The AF447 simulation was a beaut. And the comparison of vertical vs. non vertical motion in upset recovery was an eye opener.
That would be an interesting little project for the guys at Moffet to look at I would think, if it is prevalent.
JimEli, you make a valid point. Based upon his qualifications, training and experience, I felt that spatial disorientation was unlikely. But I really don't know of course and the final moments of flight do point to a loss of control.
SASless, I'm going to pass on responding to your questions about airspace. I was not suggesting that the pilot was out of compliance with the FARs, if that's where you were going. Let's assume that he was in compliance, all the way up to where he left Van Nuys' airspace. Which is where I disagree with you:
The FARs do not differentiate between intentional or otherwise. The FARs specify that a pilot must fly under VFR until cleared by ATC to fly under IFR. The only intention the pilot declared was to climb to 4000. He was asked multiple times whether he was VFR. He confirmed VFR. VFR into IMC, intentionally or otherwise, is bad. And yes, it is a violation. If ATC asks you and you admit it, they will declare an emergency on your behalf immediately. If you live, you get to copy down a number when you land. I know because I've been there. And in the pilot's case, he could not have received a pop up clearance from ATC because he was below the MDA shelf for that area. The pilot, with his experience, would have known that.
I suspect he decided to climb through the marine layer to get on top. He almost made it. Almost.
My main point here is that a VFR flight from SNA to CMA that day was going to be marginal AT BEST and the pilot would have known that before departure.
gulliBell, I am fixed wing only so your comment about 76 pilots crashing within 20 seconds of going IMC on the sim was an eye opener.
SASless, I'm going to pass on responding to your questions about airspace. I was not suggesting that the pilot was out of compliance with the FARs, if that's where you were going. Let's assume that he was in compliance, all the way up to where he left Van Nuys' airspace. Which is where I disagree with you:
The FARs do not differentiate between intentional or otherwise. The FARs specify that a pilot must fly under VFR until cleared by ATC to fly under IFR. The only intention the pilot declared was to climb to 4000. He was asked multiple times whether he was VFR. He confirmed VFR. VFR into IMC, intentionally or otherwise, is bad. And yes, it is a violation. If ATC asks you and you admit it, they will declare an emergency on your behalf immediately. If you live, you get to copy down a number when you land. I know because I've been there. And in the pilot's case, he could not have received a pop up clearance from ATC because he was below the MDA shelf for that area. The pilot, with his experience, would have known that.
I suspect he decided to climb through the marine layer to get on top. He almost made it. Almost.
My main point here is that a VFR flight from SNA to CMA that day was going to be marginal AT BEST and the pilot would have known that before departure.
gulliBell, I am fixed wing only so your comment about 76 pilots crashing within 20 seconds of going IMC on the sim was an eye opener.
In simple terms, VFR in a chopper permits flight in a visibility that is similar to minima on a lot of instrument approaches. 1/2 mile is not VFR in a 777, it is acceptable for a helo. In class G airspace, that is the basic limit for the helo, in control airspace, SVFR would apply.
For flight altitude, the chopper can be operated at essentially any altitude if the operation does not endanger 3rd party persons or property. If the pilot can argue he did not pose a risk to life or limb outside of their own copter, then they are compliant. Your friendly FSDO FOI may beg to differ, but it is pretty much a statement of the law, beauty being in the eye of the beholder. If you break anyone or anything outside, then you would probably run into non compliance with this rule.
Choppers are quite different to fixed wing, and the FAA in particular has rules that permit helicopters to be operated with acknowledgement of the unique requirements.
Correct. We do low visibility runway takeoff training at night. Pilot usually flying from the right seat. I suspect as they are accelerating and rotate to climb attitude, as the runway starts to disappear below them there is an inclination to fly left to maintain visual contact with the runway for as long as possible. When they lose sight of the runway they are already in a left bank, and probably with the somatogravic illusion they instinctively pitch forward. Before you know it they are in a nose down left wing low attitude with 2000 fpm sink rate and punch a hole in the grass next to the runway.
What might have happened in the Bryant accident is similar to what I see in the simulator. The pilot was in sight of the 101 freeway in very marginal weather and he's flown left to maintain the best view of the ground reference (the freeway) from out the pilot side window. He's lost visual contact with the ground, commenced an immediate climb as per IIMC procedure, had an oopsie moment and pitched it forward (incorrectly) sensing the climb attitude was too steep. Sensory overload, nothing computes any more, and the rest is history. The instrument scan and IFR flying skills were not to the required standard for flying in real cloud for the first time. I'm guessing the pilot had never done an IFR recurrent check in the Level D S76 sim. The place to practice is in the sim, punch a few holes in the pretend ground, reset, and try again. Unfortunately in real life the ground is much harder, and there is no reset button.
What might have happened in the Bryant accident is similar to what I see in the simulator. The pilot was in sight of the 101 freeway in very marginal weather and he's flown left to maintain the best view of the ground reference (the freeway) from out the pilot side window. He's lost visual contact with the ground, commenced an immediate climb as per IIMC procedure, had an oopsie moment and pitched it forward (incorrectly) sensing the climb attitude was too steep. Sensory overload, nothing computes any more, and the rest is history. The instrument scan and IFR flying skills were not to the required standard for flying in real cloud for the first time. I'm guessing the pilot had never done an IFR recurrent check in the Level D S76 sim. The place to practice is in the sim, punch a few holes in the pretend ground, reset, and try again. Unfortunately in real life the ground is much harder, and there is no reset button.
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Unfortunately, this was not the case, and the ceiling was much lower than 1900 ft MSL in the mountains. The fog was around 1150 ft MSL, which local residents said it was the lowest they had ever seen.
But it could explain why the pilot was hopeful that it would be clear enough for VFR in the mountains.
Weheka.......very glad to have you with us still!
You raise some good points in that one short post!
Inop Attitude Indicator....not covered.....now there is an interesting situation.
You are very lucky it was not a Helicopter you were flying at the time....the end result would probably have not allowed you to post about it.
You raise some good points in that one short post!
Inop Attitude Indicator....not covered.....now there is an interesting situation.
You are very lucky it was not a Helicopter you were flying at the time....the end result would probably have not allowed you to post about it.
Do any 135 VFR operators, with aircraft that have FD's, include the use of some FD modes, such as HDG, in their written procedure, training and competency check for IIMC?
I find it perplexing that there is no apparent use of the FD during any part of this flight. The FD, when used correctly, can help to prevent SD and LOC.
I find it perplexing that there is no apparent use of the FD during any part of this flight. The FD, when used correctly, can help to prevent SD and LOC.
If the operator lacked an establish procedure, I would suggest, that verbally stating the mantra “attitude, torque, trim” during the initial UIMC event helped me prevent the sudden onset of LOC. “Attitude, torque, trim,” was used to cue the actions of leveling the wings, applying cruise torque, and centering the ball. Repeating until calm enough before making the next move. In many cases, not moving the controls is initially beneficial. Airspeed upon entry is a key factor, because if high, it tends to improve the stability of the aircraft and provide a greater margin if the pilot started slowing. It was a rare occurrence to see a pilot survive UIMC if he attempted to slow to climb speed. In my experience, worse advice was never given.
IF the aircraft had an autopilot/flight director, immediate engagement would be a life saver. However, dependent upon type of AP/FD, it may need some setup prior to the UIMC entry, or it could simply be a hinderance. Use of a FD alone doesn’t always work due to the aforementioned pause, fixation and slow scan issues. Regardless, the pilot needs to have memorized and recently practiced procedures to survive. Most don’t. In my mind, an AP would be the single biggest rotorcraft enhancement to prevent single pilot LOC/UIMC accidents.
Furthermore IMHO, the fact that one is a highly experienced VFR pilot and CFII adds very little to the successful execution of a UIMC transition.
We must constantly remember "Currency", especially if it is only the "legal" definition of currency, is not to be confused in anyway as being "proficiency".
My experience teaching in Sim's was far too many Pilots release the AP and try to fly manually when things got all pear shaped.
Last time I checked....AutoPilots are fearless, do not have emotions, ignore psychological pressures, ignores stress....and do a fine job of flying helicopters and do what they are told.
If the stated goal was a straight ahead cruise climb from about 1100 feet to 4000 feet.....how hard should it be if done manually....and even easier if it was done using the AP?
A 76 with all the kit working should be one of the easiest helicopters to fly as exist.
All that being said.....we are back to guessing what. might have happened and why that is not what was done.
My experience teaching in Sim's was far too many Pilots release the AP and try to fly manually when things got all pear shaped.
Last time I checked....AutoPilots are fearless, do not have emotions, ignore psychological pressures, ignores stress....and do a fine job of flying helicopters and do what they are told.
If the stated goal was a straight ahead cruise climb from about 1100 feet to 4000 feet.....how hard should it be if done manually....and even easier if it was done using the AP?
A 76 with all the kit working should be one of the easiest helicopters to fly as exist.
All that being said.....we are back to guessing what. might have happened and why that is not what was done.
Weheka.......very glad to have you with us still!
You raise some good points in that one short post!
Inop Attitude Indicator....not covered.....now there is an interesting situation.
You are very lucky it was not a Helicopter you were flying at the time....the end result would probably have not allowed you to post about it.
You raise some good points in that one short post!
Inop Attitude Indicator....not covered.....now there is an interesting situation.
You are very lucky it was not a Helicopter you were flying at the time....the end result would probably have not allowed you to post about it.
What happens if you hit three times?
Resets to "Manual"?
Resets to "Manual"?
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I agree with you a 100%, once the option to turn around or to land was gone; then straight ahead climb with autopilot. (There would have been headlines, but different ones.) Somewhere in the climb, probably splitting time between trying to maintain a ground visual and fly on instruments & other distractions, my guess something along the lines of what you have described in the simulator occured. All it takes is unconcious pressure on a control.
The key to flying the S76 in IMC is not to touch the flight controls. Fly it in ATT mode using the trim switch for attitude changes, or just let George fly. Some pilots feel bravado is required as soon as they punch a hole in a cloud and they hands fly, failing to make use of George. It takes demonstration and training to get out of that mindset. And you can only do that training in the S76. Fair chance the IIMC and UA recovery training the pilot did in his May 2019 check was not on the S76. As soon as pilots touch the force trim release on the cyclic (or worse, fly in SAS mode), and it's their instinctive reaction to do that, things can go pear shaped very quickly. Which is why S76 pilots should do their IIMC and UA recovery training in the S76.
The key to flying the S76 in IMC is not to touch the flight controls. Fly it in ATT mode using the trim switch for attitude changes, or just let George fly. Some pilots feel bravado is required as soon as they punch a hole in a cloud and they hands fly, failing to make use of George. It takes demonstration and training to get out of that mindset. And you can only do that training in the S76. Fair chance the IIMC and UA recovery training the pilot did in his May 2019 check was not on the S76. As soon as pilots touch the force trim release on the cyclic (or worse, fly in SAS mode), and it's their instinctive reaction to do that, things can go pear shaped very quickly. Which is why S76 pilots should do their IIMC and UA recovery training in the S76.