Missing Twin Squirrel: Wales/Ireland
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ST,
Thanks for your response re CVR.
WRT to ZD576, I accept that the incidents are very different, save that deceased aircrew may be subject to unfair allegations without a CVR to illuminate what was happening in the cockpit.
EG
Thanks for your response re CVR.
WRT to ZD576, I accept that the incidents are very different, save that deceased aircrew may be subject to unfair allegations without a CVR to illuminate what was happening in the cockpit.
EG
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Page 69 recommendation 3
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AAIB have published a summary of investigation into G-OHCP accident in Mar 2018 bulletin. https://www.gov.uk/government/upload...018_Lo_Res.pdf
From the Conclusion
From the Conclusion
Conclusion
The accident occurred after the helicopter entered cloud while descending. The pilot did not
carry out a 180° turn away from the rising ground and probably did not regain VMC before
impact with the side of the mountain
The accident occurred after the helicopter entered cloud while descending. The pilot did not
carry out a 180° turn away from the rising ground and probably did not regain VMC before
impact with the side of the mountain
So, very sadly, pretty much as surmised earlier - a poor plan with inadequate met appreciation and a pilot's ambition exceeding his ability to manage the flight.
The self-imposed pressures to get the family to Ireland seem to have clouded sensible judgement regarding both the preparation (over AUM on departure) and the conduct (ending up IMC on a VFR sortie) of this flight.
Another CFIT which could so easily have been avoided, RIP.
The self-imposed pressures to get the family to Ireland seem to have clouded sensible judgement regarding both the preparation (over AUM on departure) and the conduct (ending up IMC on a VFR sortie) of this flight.
Another CFIT which could so easily have been avoided, RIP.
Another tragic element is that the pilot had access to all the relevant planning/weather information before and during the flight but pressed on regardless.
It sounds like the cockpit was full of gadgets, displaying that reassuring track line to destination......
It sounds like the cockpit was full of gadgets, displaying that reassuring track line to destination......
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The report makes some interesting human factors observations on pilots faced with a transition from VFR to IMC.
‘a. When under stress, people tend to place a greater emphasis on positive
outcomes when making decisions.
b. When conditions deteriorate gradually, cues suggesting that a course of
action be abandoned often fail to change that course.
This indicates that, if intending to remain in VMC, it is better to anticipate the
need to avoid the boundary between VMC and IMC than to fly towards it and,
perhaps inadvertently, across it.’
outcomes when making decisions.
b. When conditions deteriorate gradually, cues suggesting that a course of
action be abandoned often fail to change that course.
This indicates that, if intending to remain in VMC, it is better to anticipate the
need to avoid the boundary between VMC and IMC than to fly towards it and,
perhaps inadvertently, across it.’
It seems to be a difference between the professional pilot and the successful businessman/sportsman - when faced with a changing scenario whilst flying, someone who is used to being right (or being told they are right) in their own profession appears to be less likely to change their course of action when conditions change.
Now that is clearly a generalisation but a professional pilot is more used to replanning on the hoof when the weather changes suddenly - the 'amateur' who may have bags of experience in his own profession may be more reluctant (especially when he has people relying on his plan) when his aviation scenario doesn't turn out to be what he hoped for or expected.
If you are a VFR pilot, it is likely you have very little experience of dealing with rapidly deteriorating weather and even less of IIMC.
Perhaps it is a problem with over-reliance on i-pad style planning which seems so much quicker, modern and more attractive to modern aviators rather than looking at a synoptic or ringing a met office to check conditions. Or even looking at a proper map to gain a better appreciation of the terrain you will be flying over.
Interesting that the report seems to indicate that one of the apps he had running thought the aircraft was much further East than it actually was - or I may have got the wrong end of the stick on that detail.
Now that is clearly a generalisation but a professional pilot is more used to replanning on the hoof when the weather changes suddenly - the 'amateur' who may have bags of experience in his own profession may be more reluctant (especially when he has people relying on his plan) when his aviation scenario doesn't turn out to be what he hoped for or expected.
If you are a VFR pilot, it is likely you have very little experience of dealing with rapidly deteriorating weather and even less of IIMC.
Perhaps it is a problem with over-reliance on i-pad style planning which seems so much quicker, modern and more attractive to modern aviators rather than looking at a synoptic or ringing a met office to check conditions. Or even looking at a proper map to gain a better appreciation of the terrain you will be flying over.
Interesting that the report seems to indicate that one of the apps he had running thought the aircraft was much further East than it actually was - or I may have got the wrong end of the stick on that detail.
crab,
They were screenshots, stored when the aircraft was approaching Welshpool.
They were screenshots, stored when the aircraft was approaching Welshpool.
Figure 13 to 15 show the stored screenshots for the relevant apps.
Both of the screenshots for RunwayHD (Figure 13) and SkyDemon (Figure 14) show the position of the helicopter as 8 nm east of Welshpool Airport (33 nm from the accident site, at 2,280 ft amsl with 112 kt groundspeed), implying that SkyDemon had been selected prior to this point (no information available as to how long for) and that RunwayHD was then selected and remained selected until the accident5.
Both of the screenshots for RunwayHD (Figure 13) and SkyDemon (Figure 14) show the position of the helicopter as 8 nm east of Welshpool Airport (33 nm from the accident site, at 2,280 ft amsl with 112 kt groundspeed), implying that SkyDemon had been selected prior to this point (no information available as to how long for) and that RunwayHD was then selected and remained selected until the accident5.
I thought I might have got it wrong but why have screenshots of that point - are they surmising that he cross checked one against the other and then selected Runway HD as his choice?
Originally Posted by [email protected]
I thought I might have got it wrong but why have screenshots of that point - are they surmising that he cross checked one against the other and then selected Runway HD as his choice?
He had the tools. Own position map with terrain GPWS shading, backed up with the Garmin. Plus an autopilot. Could have stayed coupled on heading and altitude and bored along until he could descend to VMC, or punched off the autopilot before going into cloud and maneuvered lower to stay visual. Unprepared for the decision. I’ve trained a few owner/pilots that have two or three screens up but nothing meaningful on them for the conditions. The shaded EGPWS page is a good start.
god bless, for the grace of god, most of us have made mistakes
Some of us have, freely admit it, learned from them....and others will blunder on down the path thinking they are immune till we read about them someday.
A wise man will quickly learn from other's mistakes and be slow to criticize.
Seeking to understand what might have happened in and of itself is not unfair criticism.
Below the Glidepath - not correcting
The fact that the direct track between point A and Point B took these unfortunate souls over some of the highest terrain in the country on a day with marginal (for VFR) ceilings speaks volumes. In the "ipad" and Garmin era, does anyone even do route planning and terrain appreciation anymore? Twin engines are no protection against cumulo granite.
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Yet another AAIB report which does not really consider the HF elements as follows:
(a) Why did the pilot plan a flight when Shawbury was RADZ 003 and Valley cloud base at 600 ft, was the pilot's thinking that the Rhiongs would be better?
(b) Would a 180 degree turn helped, simply do not enter IMC.
(c) Did the pilot brief the PAX that in the event the weather was bad, they would land at Welshpool, or Liverpool and via taxi and scheduled flight continue to Dublin.
(d) Jut another CFIT of not lossing face in not getting to the destination.
I am sorry if this is not respectfull to the deseased, but perhaps we can learn from this,
(a) Why did the pilot plan a flight when Shawbury was RADZ 003 and Valley cloud base at 600 ft, was the pilot's thinking that the Rhiongs would be better?
(b) Would a 180 degree turn helped, simply do not enter IMC.
(c) Did the pilot brief the PAX that in the event the weather was bad, they would land at Welshpool, or Liverpool and via taxi and scheduled flight continue to Dublin.
(d) Jut another CFIT of not lossing face in not getting to the destination.
I am sorry if this is not respectfull to the deseased, but perhaps we can learn from this,
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Originally Posted by [email protected]
It seems to be a difference between the professional pilot and the successful businessman/sportsman - when faced with a changing scenario whilst flying, someone who is used to being right (or being told they are right) in their own profession appears to be less likely to change their course of action when conditions change.
Now that is clearly a generalisation but a professional pilot is more used to replanning on the hoof when the weather changes suddenly - the 'amateur' who may have bags of experience in his own profession may be more reluctant (especially when he has people relying on his plan) when his aviation scenario doesn't turn out to be what he hoped for or expected.
If you are a VFR pilot, it is likely you have very little experience of dealing with rapidly deteriorating weather and even less of IIMC.
Perhaps it is a problem with over-reliance on i-pad style planning which seems so much quicker, modern and more attractive to modern aviators rather than looking at a synoptic or ringing a met office to check conditions. Or even looking at a proper map to gain a better appreciation of the terrain you will be flying over.
Interesting that the report seems to indicate that one of the apps he had running thought the aircraft was much further East than it actually was - or I may have got the wrong end of the stick on that detail.
Now that is clearly a generalisation but a professional pilot is more used to replanning on the hoof when the weather changes suddenly - the 'amateur' who may have bags of experience in his own profession may be more reluctant (especially when he has people relying on his plan) when his aviation scenario doesn't turn out to be what he hoped for or expected.
If you are a VFR pilot, it is likely you have very little experience of dealing with rapidly deteriorating weather and even less of IIMC.
Perhaps it is a problem with over-reliance on i-pad style planning which seems so much quicker, modern and more attractive to modern aviators rather than looking at a synoptic or ringing a met office to check conditions. Or even looking at a proper map to gain a better appreciation of the terrain you will be flying over.
Interesting that the report seems to indicate that one of the apps he had running thought the aircraft was much further East than it actually was - or I may have got the wrong end of the stick on that detail.
You're pushing on an open door here. I don't know how many times over the last 30 years I've commented on the fact that success in one area of your life means being successful, or even competent in others. The risk taking attitude that so often makes business success can be lethal in aviation.
I flew OHCP a lot between 2000 and 2005, she was a good 355, but heavy, taking off 150 kg over weight says to me that the rules were there to be bent, if not ignored.
SND
SND
is that what you meant to say?
I don't know how many times over the last 30 years I've commented on the fact that success in one area of your life means being successful, or even competent in others.
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Yet another AAIB report which does not really consider the HF elements as follows:
(a) Why did the pilot plan a flight when Shawbury was RADZ 003 and Valley cloud base at 600 ft, was the pilot's thinking that the Rhiongs would be better?
(b) Would a 180 degree turn helped, simply do not enter IMC.
(c) Did the pilot brief the PAX that in the event the weather was bad, they would land at Welshpool, or Liverpool and via taxi and scheduled flight continue to Dublin.
(d) Jut another CFIT of not lossing face in not getting to the destination.
I am sorry if this is not respectfull to the deseased, but perhaps we can learn from this,
(a) Why did the pilot plan a flight when Shawbury was RADZ 003 and Valley cloud base at 600 ft, was the pilot's thinking that the Rhiongs would be better?
(b) Would a 180 degree turn helped, simply do not enter IMC.
(c) Did the pilot brief the PAX that in the event the weather was bad, they would land at Welshpool, or Liverpool and via taxi and scheduled flight continue to Dublin.
(d) Jut another CFIT of not lossing face in not getting to the destination.
I am sorry if this is not respectfull to the deseased, but perhaps we can learn from this,
Brief the pax? They were his family!