EC225 crash near Bergen, Norway April 2016
3 weeks ago an EC225 crashed killing everyone on board for an as yet unknown reason.
....5 days ago an A320 crashed killing everyone on board for an as yet unknown reason.
How many offshore workers have since flown out of/back to Aberdeen on A320s without a murmur?
Ask them to get on a 225: "no chance"!
....5 days ago an A320 crashed killing everyone on board for an as yet unknown reason.
How many offshore workers have since flown out of/back to Aberdeen on A320s without a murmur?
Ask them to get on a 225: "no chance"!
We know without a doubt the reason the EC225 crashed: the entire rotor system detached. (The cause for the detachment is under investigation.)
If over the last decade two A320 variants had been found in the ocean, 15nm from their wings. Then 3 weeks ago someone filmed a pair of wings flying down like sycamore seeds, with smoke rising from a crater in the distance, then maybe they would be grounded and/or the traveling public might vote with their feet.
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A few points:
We know without a doubt the reason the EC225 crashed: the entire rotor system detached. (The cause for the detachment is under investigation.)
If over the last decade two A320 variants had been found in the ocean, 15nm from their wings. Then 3 weeks ago someone filmed a pair of wings flying down like sycamore seeds, with smoke rising from a crater in the distance, then maybe they would be grounded and/or the traveling public might vote with their feet.
We know without a doubt the reason the EC225 crashed: the entire rotor system detached. (The cause for the detachment is under investigation.)
If over the last decade two A320 variants had been found in the ocean, 15nm from their wings. Then 3 weeks ago someone filmed a pair of wings flying down like sycamore seeds, with smoke rising from a crater in the distance, then maybe they would be grounded and/or the traveling public might vote with their feet.
We have to get real for a moment , the reliability rate we have come to enjoy from the Puma which has been honed over many decades of experience doesn't come overnight , the bare facts are helicopters are not risk free.... It is not a fixed wing aircraft yet we have become complacent at this aircrafts exemplary service and expect our rotating mass of nuts and bolts to perform like a 737 day in , day out . To which largely the 225/332 does better than anything else in its class even to this day .
3 cases of rotor head detachment in 9000000 hours flying , 2 of which were MGB epicyclic planet gear 2nd stage bearing's , However the MGB was trying to give warning by making metal for a couple of weeks beforehand that were ( for different reasons) unfortunately misdiagnosed and 1 where we don't quite know yet , but we do know that there was no issue with CWP / Marms beforehand and an intact epicyclic ring gear in the wreckage , so nothing like the 2 earlier accidents, yet all this hysteria .....! I'm just glad I get to sit out the remainder of my career in an Aircraft that the 'REAL' experts deem to be the safer option ...........because no matter what you think of the the puma/225 the fact is there is NO better alternative ......Simple .
Last edited by chance it; 24th May 2016 at 06:32. Reason: Grammar
Well that latest update was worth waiting for. What is the NAAIB playing at?
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Riff raff, while I can't truly argue the fact that 2 bolts are better then 1 and that it does add some form of redundancy, the fact of the matter is, we are on phase 3 of the MGB because of mounting foot issues. Which in at least one (phase 2) incident resulted in complete separation of one foot. At which time, the second fastener adds no redundancy.
Now, you kinda condradict yourself a little as well. You made the following statement about structural failure, "structural failure of the housing is considered to be an extremely improbable event." Yet it seems you strongly believe that the suspension bars are at fault or at least believe that they should require some form of redundancy. Even if this was determined to be suspension bar failure, which is yet to be determined and was not determined to be a fault in the previous accidents, wouldn't that as well fall into being an extremely improbable event?
Now, you kinda condradict yourself a little as well. You made the following statement about structural failure, "structural failure of the housing is considered to be an extremely improbable event." Yet it seems you strongly believe that the suspension bars are at fault or at least believe that they should require some form of redundancy. Even if this was determined to be suspension bar failure, which is yet to be determined and was not determined to be a fault in the previous accidents, wouldn't that as well fall into being an extremely improbable event?
Chance it
Welcome to the forum.
Thanks for your first post.
Nice support (rant) of the EC225.
I have a reasonable number of hours flying Pumas and EC225s I'm a big fan.
You seem to have missed the point of my post, which was only to address the perceived different approach regarding the A320.
Welcome to the forum.
Thanks for your first post.
Nice support (rant) of the EC225.
I have a reasonable number of hours flying Pumas and EC225s I'm a big fan.
You seem to have missed the point of my post, which was only to address the perceived different approach regarding the A320.
Chance It
You seem to know more than AIBN, Bristow, CHC, Babcock, UK CAA and NCAA combined. Please tell us more.........
but we do know that there was no issue with CWP / Marms beforehand and an intact epicyclic ring gear in the wreckage , so nothing like the 2 earlier accidents, yet all this hysteria ...
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Data from the CVFDR that was recovered indicated that there were no CWP warnings immediately prior to the detachment . This was in the preliminary report . In the REDL incident they had XMSN chip and MGBP illuminate prior to the gearbox / head separating . If you look through the photos of the wreckage you will see the intact epicyclic module casing.
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chance it
I think if there was significant evidence that this was a carbon copy of G-REDL (or the two bevel gear incidents) AH would not have made the statement that the 225 is safe to fly.
I also think it likely that the AIBN would have alluded to such evidence by now to justify the continuing ban.
They would also have shared that evidence with other regulators who would likely have introduced bans of their own.
So the cause remains undetermined for now. The latest from the AIBN is "most of the wreckage is recovered" - hopefully including the missing lift/suspension bar and associated components. That is encouraging as it suggests they will ultimately be able to point to the primary cause with more authority than if components were at the bottom of the sea.
Like you, I believe that this latest incident can be analysed and measures be brought to bear to resume flying these aircraft which, viewed over their lifetime, have a very good safety record by the standards of medium weight helicopters.
I also agree that switching to the S92 or some newer types not yet in service will not in any way guarantee a safer ride and an accident free future is a completely unrealistic expectation.
However, the short-term problem is that the Puma's safety record in the NS in the last seven years is nothing short of appalling. Whether they will continue to be part of the solution in the NS E&P business only time will tell.
I first flew in a Puma in 1974 and like you would willingly do so again, but it is not you and I that AH need to convince.
I think if there was significant evidence that this was a carbon copy of G-REDL (or the two bevel gear incidents) AH would not have made the statement that the 225 is safe to fly.
I also think it likely that the AIBN would have alluded to such evidence by now to justify the continuing ban.
They would also have shared that evidence with other regulators who would likely have introduced bans of their own.
So the cause remains undetermined for now. The latest from the AIBN is "most of the wreckage is recovered" - hopefully including the missing lift/suspension bar and associated components. That is encouraging as it suggests they will ultimately be able to point to the primary cause with more authority than if components were at the bottom of the sea.
Like you, I believe that this latest incident can be analysed and measures be brought to bear to resume flying these aircraft which, viewed over their lifetime, have a very good safety record by the standards of medium weight helicopters.
I also agree that switching to the S92 or some newer types not yet in service will not in any way guarantee a safer ride and an accident free future is a completely unrealistic expectation.
However, the short-term problem is that the Puma's safety record in the NS in the last seven years is nothing short of appalling. Whether they will continue to be part of the solution in the NS E&P business only time will tell.
I first flew in a Puma in 1974 and like you would willingly do so again, but it is not you and I that AH need to convince.
Last edited by birmingham; 24th May 2016 at 14:25.
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Subsea
The report was posted nearly 2 weeks ago, you are a little behind the times. There is a lot of discussion about it on the thread, maybe a good idea to read before you post?
Chance It
You make a good point about the CWP but I am surprised that the departure of the whole MRH wouldn't generate some kind of warning light, although the poor unfortunate crew would not have noticed it.
Would you be able to show the intact epicyclic module picture for me?
The report was posted nearly 2 weeks ago, you are a little behind the times. There is a lot of discussion about it on the thread, maybe a good idea to read before you post?
Chance It
You make a good point about the CWP but I am surprised that the departure of the whole MRH wouldn't generate some kind of warning light, although the poor unfortunate crew would not have noticed it.
Would you be able to show the intact epicyclic module picture for me?
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Reliability is in a certain way calculation of risks, also of nerve and confidence. You would never exclude any risk in helicopter aviations and especially not in Offshore Ops by 100%. But when the whole matter becomes incalculably out of a view of your pilot skills and volatile under technical aspects, it is hubris, or even foolishness and ignorance of untrustworthiness.
The (SUPER-) PUMA might be (or might have been) a super helicopter, however in present stage of investigations and their up to now open results, in my opinion the risks are incalculably and irresponsible.
Let us all hope in very clear results and positive solutions, the sooner the better. The contraries must not be discussed, because then consequent decisions are required and are on schedule, also in the sense of the current states of technology and science. Therefore an attitude of professional scepticism is required, not an infringment of technologogical neutrality. .
The (SUPER-) PUMA might be (or might have been) a super helicopter, however in present stage of investigations and their up to now open results, in my opinion the risks are incalculably and irresponsible.
Let us all hope in very clear results and positive solutions, the sooner the better. The contraries must not be discussed, because then consequent decisions are required and are on schedule, also in the sense of the current states of technology and science. Therefore an attitude of professional scepticism is required, not an infringment of technologogical neutrality. .
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Hi folks,
I've been a long-time lurker, but thought I'd join upon hearing the sad news of yet another NS chopper downing. I am not a pilot and nor do I work in aviation (I'm a legal advisor in Oil & Gas), so I can only look up to you all - especially the chopper drivers - as my heros. Alas, the furthest I got was my gliding wings in the RAF cadets. I have always had a fascination with aviation though.
I am sickened to the stomach that in 2016 and 50 years since we started extracting oil in the NS, that we should still be having these all too frequent tragic losses of life.
It is regretful that CHC have now filed for C11 because frankly it seems like a lottery between the three players - CHC, Bond and Bristow - as to whom will next suffer a loss.
I understand that there is an element of risk with any aircraft; after-all, there are so many things that could theoretically go bang. But my question is this: would the operators allow this frequency of failure or this level of calculated risk on a well-head or a production facility?
Perhaps I am over-simplifying the issue, but it seems to me as a by-standing lay person, that there is an unacceptable frequency to any chopper incident in this industry, which I cannot help but feel that if such incidents were to directly impact production/revenue, they genuinely wouldn't happen ever again.
It's been a while since I have let any aviation contracts, but last time I checked, the value of a human being was about USD$10m and in general, the chopper carriers are insured against loss of life to around USD$50-100m. Hence, a chopper downing needn't necessarily bring down the carrier (CHC notwithstanding) and the client can go about its business as usual after the de-rigueur HSE hand-wringing and knee-jerk media sorrow.
On the other hand, the ramifications from an oil spill... Well, you've seen what happens there. The current bill for Macondo is roughly USD$25bn, with the cost for the loss of 11 souls being but a drop in the ocean (so to speak). And only a giant like BP could sustain this sort of exposure.
Accordingly, I refuse to accept that the downing of a chopper cannot be prevented. And while accidents do happen, I regret that it appears they happen more when the ramifications are cost-manageable; human life seemingly just a costed portion of the risk to the business.
RIP.
I've been a long-time lurker, but thought I'd join upon hearing the sad news of yet another NS chopper downing. I am not a pilot and nor do I work in aviation (I'm a legal advisor in Oil & Gas), so I can only look up to you all - especially the chopper drivers - as my heros. Alas, the furthest I got was my gliding wings in the RAF cadets. I have always had a fascination with aviation though.
I am sickened to the stomach that in 2016 and 50 years since we started extracting oil in the NS, that we should still be having these all too frequent tragic losses of life.
It is regretful that CHC have now filed for C11 because frankly it seems like a lottery between the three players - CHC, Bond and Bristow - as to whom will next suffer a loss.
I understand that there is an element of risk with any aircraft; after-all, there are so many things that could theoretically go bang. But my question is this: would the operators allow this frequency of failure or this level of calculated risk on a well-head or a production facility?
Perhaps I am over-simplifying the issue, but it seems to me as a by-standing lay person, that there is an unacceptable frequency to any chopper incident in this industry, which I cannot help but feel that if such incidents were to directly impact production/revenue, they genuinely wouldn't happen ever again.
It's been a while since I have let any aviation contracts, but last time I checked, the value of a human being was about USD$10m and in general, the chopper carriers are insured against loss of life to around USD$50-100m. Hence, a chopper downing needn't necessarily bring down the carrier (CHC notwithstanding) and the client can go about its business as usual after the de-rigueur HSE hand-wringing and knee-jerk media sorrow.
On the other hand, the ramifications from an oil spill... Well, you've seen what happens there. The current bill for Macondo is roughly USD$25bn, with the cost for the loss of 11 souls being but a drop in the ocean (so to speak). And only a giant like BP could sustain this sort of exposure.
Accordingly, I refuse to accept that the downing of a chopper cannot be prevented. And while accidents do happen, I regret that it appears they happen more when the ramifications are cost-manageable; human life seemingly just a costed portion of the risk to the business.
RIP.
I have nothing to do with NS but my AOC auditor who used to be a quality auditor for Jag/landrover came up with an interesting view on how we as an industry wave 2 fingers at safety. As he said if a car crashes or catches fire and it is seen as as a fault in design / manufacturer there is an immediate recall of those vehicles e.g. recently Toyota recalled millions of vehicles and modified for free. Do we see this sort of reaction in our industry, do we f..k. The attitude seems to be it will be all right just keep flying it and by the way it is the owners / operators problem ! As an operator I can vouch for how OEM's and regulators don't really take safety really seriously despite their protestations.
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Tenfour, nice thought provoking post.
It probably is simply wrong in 2016 to accept an aircraft that is suspended in the air by just three attachments knowing that failure of one attachment would be immediately catastrophic. To accept that "it hasn't happened before" is of little comfort. By comparison the S92 has four attachment feet. When these feet, on the early MGB's, were experiencing cracks Sikorsky confirmed any one of the feet could become totally severed (detached) and the aircraft will continue to fly for up to 30 hours before other attachment feet become over-stressed. This condition would be detected early by a special HUMS tool.
Does that make an S92 safer than an EC225? Cougar may argue otherwise.
All helicopters will have some inherent weakness when compared to other models. The ideal is to get all the best features into one aircraft. But who pays for it.
The EC225 is cheaper than an S92. The AW189 is much cheaper than an EC225. There's little doubt that as in life the same applies to helicopters - You get what you pay for.
It probably is simply wrong in 2016 to accept an aircraft that is suspended in the air by just three attachments knowing that failure of one attachment would be immediately catastrophic. To accept that "it hasn't happened before" is of little comfort. By comparison the S92 has four attachment feet. When these feet, on the early MGB's, were experiencing cracks Sikorsky confirmed any one of the feet could become totally severed (detached) and the aircraft will continue to fly for up to 30 hours before other attachment feet become over-stressed. This condition would be detected early by a special HUMS tool.
Does that make an S92 safer than an EC225? Cougar may argue otherwise.
All helicopters will have some inherent weakness when compared to other models. The ideal is to get all the best features into one aircraft. But who pays for it.
The EC225 is cheaper than an S92. The AW189 is much cheaper than an EC225. There's little doubt that as in life the same applies to helicopters - You get what you pay for.
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That's just it though, Sanus - you get what you pay for!
Hence, if I decide to buy some cheap mountaineering equipment and go for a hike up Everest, then I can reasonably expect that my subsequent death from exposure was due to my tight wallet: I got what I paid for instead of buying the expensive kit that all the expert mountaineers recommended me to buy, due to its top of the range technology etc.
So let's apply that model to helicopters; only this time, I'm bringing along a budding employee to my Everest expedition. Sure, he's had all the training etc, but unless I provide him with the best kit...
Now of course, I'm not for a minute suggesting that our colleagues are being flown from platform to platform in Acme Helicopters Ltd products; today's choppers are developments of millions of flying hours etc. But here's another question: are these choppers designed from the ground up for offshore applications? If they are, then any accident as a result of technical failure can only be seen as a failure of the aircraft and its manufacturer: it is simply not fit for purpose. If the answer is no and these choppers are modified to operate in world's harshest environments (i.e. offshore), then the operators ought to be bloody ashamed of ourselves for allowing their people to set foot in sub-optimal solutions. Either way, we clearly do not have a fit-for-purpose solution.
As I said above: one technical-induced accident is a tragedy; any more is unacceptable.
So in essence, when I step onto a helicopter in order to be transported to my place of work, I should damn well hope that my boss hasn't 'got what he's paid for' with his helicopter!
At the risk of derailing the thread, we cannot know what went wrong until the full report has been released, but for the time being, I think we as an industry have every right to make a damn big fuss about a persistent re-occurring issue which results in some kid's Dad not coming home at night.
Hence, if I decide to buy some cheap mountaineering equipment and go for a hike up Everest, then I can reasonably expect that my subsequent death from exposure was due to my tight wallet: I got what I paid for instead of buying the expensive kit that all the expert mountaineers recommended me to buy, due to its top of the range technology etc.
So let's apply that model to helicopters; only this time, I'm bringing along a budding employee to my Everest expedition. Sure, he's had all the training etc, but unless I provide him with the best kit...
Now of course, I'm not for a minute suggesting that our colleagues are being flown from platform to platform in Acme Helicopters Ltd products; today's choppers are developments of millions of flying hours etc. But here's another question: are these choppers designed from the ground up for offshore applications? If they are, then any accident as a result of technical failure can only be seen as a failure of the aircraft and its manufacturer: it is simply not fit for purpose. If the answer is no and these choppers are modified to operate in world's harshest environments (i.e. offshore), then the operators ought to be bloody ashamed of ourselves for allowing their people to set foot in sub-optimal solutions. Either way, we clearly do not have a fit-for-purpose solution.
As I said above: one technical-induced accident is a tragedy; any more is unacceptable.
So in essence, when I step onto a helicopter in order to be transported to my place of work, I should damn well hope that my boss hasn't 'got what he's paid for' with his helicopter!
At the risk of derailing the thread, we cannot know what went wrong until the full report has been released, but for the time being, I think we as an industry have every right to make a damn big fuss about a persistent re-occurring issue which results in some kid's Dad not coming home at night.
But here's another question: are these choppers designed from the ground up for offshore applications? If they are, then any accident as a result of technical failure can only be seen as a failure of the aircraft and its manufacturer: it is simply not fit for purpose. If the answer is no and these choppers are modified to operate in world's harshest environments (i.e. offshore)...
Secondly, it is not realistic for helicopters to be designed for one role only in the civil market, with its relatively (compared to the military) low production/sales volumes. The 225 is a variant of a military type but how that is relevant in this context is unclear to me. Other types such as the AW189, AH175, are designed for the civil market but have to capture a range of operations across a wide spectrum - air ambulance, police, SAR, VIP etc. but, again, it is not clear in the context of your assertions why that has any relevance.
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Sanus could you or someone in the engineering community help me with this ...
We all know that achieving redundancy with MGBs and MRHs by it's very nature is in most respects impossible. So we take the view that we must engineer it until the point that failure becomes "extremely improbable"
The three suspension bars that are getting a lot of attention at the moment accept, as I understand it, >11 to of lift forces. They also are subjected to downward loading resulting from the mass of the helicopter itself.
Some types are engineered so as some of the lift forces are taken by the MGB casing (which I guess would have both safety advantages and disadvantages compared to using the suspension bars) but that isn't the case with the Puma - is that true?
Is is also a fact that the failure of a single one of the three suspension bars or associated components could really lead to this?
I appreciate that it is "extremely improbable" for this to happen as I am not aware of any tragedies (including this one so far) that have been found to have this as the primary cause. But there are a number of possible failure modes including ...
1. Maintenance
2. Manufacture
3. External damage
and certainly more.
If something can happen it probably will ... and maybe ,extremely improbably, it has ...
So what is the redundancy? - if one goes west is a catastrophe inevitable?
Is it impossible to build in redundancy? Is there redundancy already built in? or are we relying on extreme improbability?
The views of someone with a decent Puma engineering background would be appreciated.
We all know that achieving redundancy with MGBs and MRHs by it's very nature is in most respects impossible. So we take the view that we must engineer it until the point that failure becomes "extremely improbable"
The three suspension bars that are getting a lot of attention at the moment accept, as I understand it, >11 to of lift forces. They also are subjected to downward loading resulting from the mass of the helicopter itself.
Some types are engineered so as some of the lift forces are taken by the MGB casing (which I guess would have both safety advantages and disadvantages compared to using the suspension bars) but that isn't the case with the Puma - is that true?
Is is also a fact that the failure of a single one of the three suspension bars or associated components could really lead to this?
I appreciate that it is "extremely improbable" for this to happen as I am not aware of any tragedies (including this one so far) that have been found to have this as the primary cause. But there are a number of possible failure modes including ...
1. Maintenance
2. Manufacture
3. External damage
and certainly more.
If something can happen it probably will ... and maybe ,extremely improbably, it has ...
So what is the redundancy? - if one goes west is a catastrophe inevitable?
Is it impossible to build in redundancy? Is there redundancy already built in? or are we relying on extreme improbability?
The views of someone with a decent Puma engineering background would be appreciated.
Last edited by birmingham; 25th May 2016 at 11:21.
Technically yes, so maybe not the best example, although both are evolutions of the AW139 - which was not military - and designed to CS29/Part29 from the outset.
212man
I think that is exactly the point Tenfour is making.
OEMs 'hedge' their production bets and compromise to ensure chopper sells across various sectors - rather than the O&G customers insisting - and paying the inevitable premium - for on an operator to use a machine that has been specifically designed to fly extended periods of time where, currently, if you do get a warning the only precautionary options are limited to ditching.
It will mean an extraodinarily-expensive machine when compared to a standard model.
However, this will never happen as the meticulously-costed Safety Case permits the use of 'compromised' machines in the cost-based analysis.
We all know that the helicopter logistic element is minuscule in the great scheme of O&G.
If clients stopped trying to do it 'on the cheap' - by using modified general purpose machines - then maybe the magnitude of investment would stop the cavalier chopping and changing of contracts for 'convenience' purposes and the industry might make some serious progress when it comes to flight safety.
You rarely hear of companies using 'compromised' installation designs - each installation specialises in a specific task; be it exploration, production, storage, pumping etc
What has been alluded too is that this will not change until the client's cost of a life is significantly increased.
That is one of the reasons why I am grateful that my exposure to the O&G mentality was relatively short-lived!
OEMs 'hedge' their production bets and compromise to ensure chopper sells across various sectors - rather than the O&G customers insisting - and paying the inevitable premium - for on an operator to use a machine that has been specifically designed to fly extended periods of time where, currently, if you do get a warning the only precautionary options are limited to ditching.
It will mean an extraodinarily-expensive machine when compared to a standard model.
However, this will never happen as the meticulously-costed Safety Case permits the use of 'compromised' machines in the cost-based analysis.
We all know that the helicopter logistic element is minuscule in the great scheme of O&G.
If clients stopped trying to do it 'on the cheap' - by using modified general purpose machines - then maybe the magnitude of investment would stop the cavalier chopping and changing of contracts for 'convenience' purposes and the industry might make some serious progress when it comes to flight safety.
You rarely hear of companies using 'compromised' installation designs - each installation specialises in a specific task; be it exploration, production, storage, pumping etc
What has been alluded too is that this will not change until the client's cost of a life is significantly increased.
That is one of the reasons why I am grateful that my exposure to the O&G mentality was relatively short-lived!
Last edited by EESDL; 25th May 2016 at 18:03.