Grand Canyon Accident: Pilot killed in AS350 rollover
Bob, I'm sure you will be delighted to know that after 32 years of 'cozy' RAF life I am leaving to 'work' for a living - I still won't ever be leaving a helicopter unattended with the blades turning though
Guys, the issue of leaving a machine rotors running has been discussed extensively in Leaving helicopter with engine/rotors running. Under Australian regs we are allowed to do so under certain conditions, and many of us would say that if done properly it is both safe and is essential to a remote operation.
I've operated a Wessex 60 offshore single pilot where it would have been foolhardy to have shut down both engines whilst refueling (so I and others would leave one running) on a coral atoll with no backup should a battery start fail. I've operated an AS350 in Antarctica where the fuel control cable was frozen and a restart wasn't guaranteed, necessitating constant operation all day without shutting down. Even pulling back to ground idle was a task. What other option was there other than careful calculation of the risk and the demands of the operation?
As another poster stated earlier, I don't subscribe to turning off the hydraulics as an aid to locking the controls. A proper control lock as in the BK117 or a well maintained and effective control friction is essential, plus skid gear. That and a justifiable requirement to exit rotors running are my criteria.
As to why the pilot left the machine in this accident, I think the NTSB initial report is too vague for us to be making judgement. Those who operate in regimes where rotor running exits are prohibited, you may benefit from viewing this from the experience of others who are familiar with the concept and use it on a regular basis instead of condemning the practice out of hand.
I've operated a Wessex 60 offshore single pilot where it would have been foolhardy to have shut down both engines whilst refueling (so I and others would leave one running) on a coral atoll with no backup should a battery start fail. I've operated an AS350 in Antarctica where the fuel control cable was frozen and a restart wasn't guaranteed, necessitating constant operation all day without shutting down. Even pulling back to ground idle was a task. What other option was there other than careful calculation of the risk and the demands of the operation?
As another poster stated earlier, I don't subscribe to turning off the hydraulics as an aid to locking the controls. A proper control lock as in the BK117 or a well maintained and effective control friction is essential, plus skid gear. That and a justifiable requirement to exit rotors running are my criteria.
As to why the pilot left the machine in this accident, I think the NTSB initial report is too vague for us to be making judgement. Those who operate in regimes where rotor running exits are prohibited, you may benefit from viewing this from the experience of others who are familiar with the concept and use it on a regular basis instead of condemning the practice out of hand.
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FH1100 Pilot, your Post #33 - nice one!
HeliHenry, your Post #43 - I too have squirmed at the sight of Vertical Freedoms pictures of his 206 and 350 sitting with rotors running without anyone at the controls - often in precarious locations and with people milling around them. While I agree with others who have said that vacating a helicopter with rotors turning need not be a big deal under the correct circumstances, those photo's of the 206 and 350 are quite the opposite.
HeliHenry, your Post #43 - I too have squirmed at the sight of Vertical Freedoms pictures of his 206 and 350 sitting with rotors running without anyone at the controls - often in precarious locations and with people milling around them. While I agree with others who have said that vacating a helicopter with rotors turning need not be a big deal under the correct circumstances, those photo's of the 206 and 350 are quite the opposite.
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If the combatants would pause and take a breath, they might like to remember that this is supposed to be a forum for professional aviators, not a bunch of squabbling teenagers.
Aviation is a risky business. All risks taken by pilots should be carefully considered. Some have stated how they have felt obliged and justified in taking this particular risk (no pilot at the controls of a running helicopter). In a situation where there is a fear of an engine not re-starting, in a remote and potentially dangerous environment such as the circumstances quoted by John Eacott, a stranded aircraft could be more than inconvenient, uncomfortable, or expensive; it might also prove fatal.
However, a calculated risk taken in one extreme set of circumstances should not become the normal thing to do - because that's when the danger sets in. How many times do you risk playing "Russian Roulette" before you shoot yourself? Professional aviation shouldn't operate like that.
Was the obvious risk of leaving the aircraft unmanned justified in this tragic case? I'd say not and that this was a totally avoidable accident. I'm sure the bereaved family would agree.
We aren't allowed to do this in UK by law. Seeing as most of our rules are retrospectively written because someone fouled up in a new way ( despite what some prefer to believe), I'm sure it's happened before.
Despite it being illegal here in UK, I have seen it being done, a commercial 206 being pax loaded by the lone pilot for so-called "joy-rides". There was no risk of an aircraft stranding, it was presumably being done only for financial gain, namely to expedite the operation and to save a bit of fuel and engine start cycles. I was in two minds about it at the time and I wasn't in a position to speak to the pilot. However, if I see it happening again I'd have no qualms about reporting it to the authority because it unnecessarily puts the lives of innocent people at risk. If a pilot chooses to do it and loses his own life, tragic enough, but that was his own mistaken choice.
Aviation is a risky business. All risks taken by pilots should be carefully considered. Some have stated how they have felt obliged and justified in taking this particular risk (no pilot at the controls of a running helicopter). In a situation where there is a fear of an engine not re-starting, in a remote and potentially dangerous environment such as the circumstances quoted by John Eacott, a stranded aircraft could be more than inconvenient, uncomfortable, or expensive; it might also prove fatal.
However, a calculated risk taken in one extreme set of circumstances should not become the normal thing to do - because that's when the danger sets in. How many times do you risk playing "Russian Roulette" before you shoot yourself? Professional aviation shouldn't operate like that.
Was the obvious risk of leaving the aircraft unmanned justified in this tragic case? I'd say not and that this was a totally avoidable accident. I'm sure the bereaved family would agree.
We aren't allowed to do this in UK by law. Seeing as most of our rules are retrospectively written because someone fouled up in a new way ( despite what some prefer to believe), I'm sure it's happened before.
CAP 393 Air Navigation: The Order and the Regulations
Section 1 Part 10 Page 5.
Pilot to remain at controls and be secured in seat
93 (1) This article applies to any flying machine or glider registered in the United Kingdom other than an EU-OPS aeroplane flying on a commercial air transport flight.
(2) The commander of an aircraft to which this article applies must cause one pilot to remain at the controls at all times while it is in flight.
(3) If the aircraft is required by or under this Order to carry two pilots, the commander must cause both pilots to remain at the controls during take-off and landing.
(4) If the aircraft carries two or more pilots (whether or not it is required to do so) and is flying on a flight for the purpose of the public transport of passengers, the commander must remain at the controls during take-off and landing.
(5) (a) Subject to sub-paragraph (b), each pilot at the controls of the aircraft must be secured in their seat by either a safety belt with or without one diagonal shoulder strap, or a safety harness.
(b) During take-off and landing a safety harness must be worn if it is required by article 37 and Schedule 4 to be provided.
(6) An operator must not permit a helicopter rotor to be turned under power for the purpose of making a flight unless there is a person at the controls entitled in accordance with article 50 to act as pilot-in-command of the helicopter.
Section 1 Part 10 Page 5.
Pilot to remain at controls and be secured in seat
93 (1) This article applies to any flying machine or glider registered in the United Kingdom other than an EU-OPS aeroplane flying on a commercial air transport flight.
(2) The commander of an aircraft to which this article applies must cause one pilot to remain at the controls at all times while it is in flight.
(3) If the aircraft is required by or under this Order to carry two pilots, the commander must cause both pilots to remain at the controls during take-off and landing.
(4) If the aircraft carries two or more pilots (whether or not it is required to do so) and is flying on a flight for the purpose of the public transport of passengers, the commander must remain at the controls during take-off and landing.
(5) (a) Subject to sub-paragraph (b), each pilot at the controls of the aircraft must be secured in their seat by either a safety belt with or without one diagonal shoulder strap, or a safety harness.
(b) During take-off and landing a safety harness must be worn if it is required by article 37 and Schedule 4 to be provided.
(6) An operator must not permit a helicopter rotor to be turned under power for the purpose of making a flight unless there is a person at the controls entitled in accordance with article 50 to act as pilot-in-command of the helicopter.
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(6) An operator must not permit a helicopter rotor to be turned under power for the purpose of making a flight unless there is a person at the controls entitled in accordance with article 50 to act as pilot-in-command of the helicopter.
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Perhaps there should be a new law written about the 350 and its renown ability to have the Collective Lever Pop Up! Although the new Law would only require a Placard and an additional item to be Checked on a Type Rating Check Ride while doing nothing about the cause of the problem.
Did we not see something similar recently when the CAA felt compelled to put out a Safety Notice about Off Aerodrome Take Offs?
The Rules have gotten so complex that few understood what they are well enough to be able to comply with them all.
Yet, some think Judgement can be created by writing another Law or Regulation.
Did we not see something similar recently when the CAA felt compelled to put out a Safety Notice about Off Aerodrome Take Offs?
The Rules have gotten so complex that few understood what they are well enough to be able to comply with them all.
Yet, some think Judgement can be created by writing another Law or Regulation.
Judgment is a bit more complex than you are suggesting, as I think you'll agree when reflecting upon your years in aviation.
I think the poor chap in the accident discovered exactly what the penalty for an error in judgment entailed
He had probably been told that leaving the aircraft running was a perfectly OK sort of thing to do without any emphasis on the reasons why it is sometimes necessary (as John Eacott explained).
Education not legislation would have helped here but, while there are the hairy-chested pioneers saying it is fine because they have been doing it for years, the newer pilots in the fold who aren't operating in the extreme conditions accept it as the norm rather than seeing it as a risky thing to do which needs to be justified in terms of safety vs risk.
He had probably been told that leaving the aircraft running was a perfectly OK sort of thing to do without any emphasis on the reasons why it is sometimes necessary (as John Eacott explained).
Education not legislation would have helped here but, while there are the hairy-chested pioneers saying it is fine because they have been doing it for years, the newer pilots in the fold who aren't operating in the extreme conditions accept it as the norm rather than seeing it as a risky thing to do which needs to be justified in terms of safety vs risk.
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Lone wolf I agree, that's why I wrote "should" but as often happens we all make mistakes or poor judgements sometime.
Someone told me that when you become a pilot you get issued with two buckets. One full of Luck and the other, marked "Experience" is empty. The trick being to fill up the Experience bucket before you empty the one marked luck.
I used fly an EMS AS355 which we often landed in the built up areas. As the paramedics ran to the patient I had to often wait the 2 minute turbine cool time before shutdown on scene.
During this time I would friction up and sit with my feet overboard looking at the TR, finger poised on the 700 watt sky shout to deter kids and onlookers from getting too close.
Now, much older, I wondered if what I was doing posed a greater risk to the wider public than the odd person we helped.
It's often easy to convince ourselves that the risks we take are acceptable. "Risky Shift" in its most blatant form.
Someone told me that when you become a pilot you get issued with two buckets. One full of Luck and the other, marked "Experience" is empty. The trick being to fill up the Experience bucket before you empty the one marked luck.
I used fly an EMS AS355 which we often landed in the built up areas. As the paramedics ran to the patient I had to often wait the 2 minute turbine cool time before shutdown on scene.
During this time I would friction up and sit with my feet overboard looking at the TR, finger poised on the 700 watt sky shout to deter kids and onlookers from getting too close.
Now, much older, I wondered if what I was doing posed a greater risk to the wider public than the odd person we helped.
It's often easy to convince ourselves that the risks we take are acceptable. "Risky Shift" in its most blatant form.
Quote:
(6) An operator must not permit a helicopter rotor to be turned under power for the purpose of making a flight unless there is a person at the controls entitled in accordance with article 50 to act as pilot-in-command of the helicopter
So unless there is another extract not mentioned in #65 anyone can do a groundrun with rotors turning and then leave the aircraft as long as they are not intending to get airborne ......
As chopjock said "wide open to interpretation". Is it really so difficult for those that make the rules to state them simply and clearly and thereby avoid rule "bending" and "breaking" and perhaps the resulting incidents/accidents?
(6) An operator must not permit a helicopter rotor to be turned under power for the purpose of making a flight unless there is a person at the controls entitled in accordance with article 50 to act as pilot-in-command of the helicopter
So unless there is another extract not mentioned in #65 anyone can do a groundrun with rotors turning and then leave the aircraft as long as they are not intending to get airborne ......
As chopjock said "wide open to interpretation". Is it really so difficult for those that make the rules to state them simply and clearly and thereby avoid rule "bending" and "breaking" and perhaps the resulting incidents/accidents?
Last edited by 76fan; 30th May 2014 at 15:56.
Hi 76fan
You can't take two lines from the ANO which say what you can't do and use that to decide what you can do.
Selective reading of the legislation, in isolation, allows the much quoted phrase - 'an aircraft must not fly in or over the United Kingdom' to prevent any of us flying.
Cheers
TeeS
You can't take two lines from the ANO which say what you can't do and use that to decide what you can do.
Selective reading of the legislation, in isolation, allows the much quoted phrase - 'an aircraft must not fly in or over the United Kingdom' to prevent any of us flying.
Cheers
TeeS
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Discussions on this forum are always interesting and a gold mine for a budding sociologist.
On the one hand , we have the risk averse group from across the Pond with the opinions of why it should not be done except in very exceptional circumstances and with appropriate precautions.
The you have the risk tolerant group from the US that says it is not a big deal,been done before, can be done routinely, everyday, all day and twice on Sundays.
In my never to be humble opinion, it is aircraft dependent and activity related. When I flew BO105s and BK117's for EMS, we would keep both engines running at idle at a scene, cyclic lock on ,SAS off and collective frictioned down and locked.But these aircraft were specifically designed for such operations. Matching the aircraft to the operation is key in risk management. An AS350 I believe is not a good candidate for leaving it unattended. Besides, with its great shut down and start up time frame, there is no real need for the average commercial operation.
One last thing, a long time ago an RN pilot said something very profound that has stuck with me all these years and has helped me several times to navigate the cultural minefields:
In the UK and other Commonwealth nations,anything that is not expressly authorized is considered forbidden.
In the US anything that is not expressly forbidden is considered authorized.
Alt3.
On the one hand , we have the risk averse group from across the Pond with the opinions of why it should not be done except in very exceptional circumstances and with appropriate precautions.
The you have the risk tolerant group from the US that says it is not a big deal,been done before, can be done routinely, everyday, all day and twice on Sundays.
In my never to be humble opinion, it is aircraft dependent and activity related. When I flew BO105s and BK117's for EMS, we would keep both engines running at idle at a scene, cyclic lock on ,SAS off and collective frictioned down and locked.But these aircraft were specifically designed for such operations. Matching the aircraft to the operation is key in risk management. An AS350 I believe is not a good candidate for leaving it unattended. Besides, with its great shut down and start up time frame, there is no real need for the average commercial operation.
One last thing, a long time ago an RN pilot said something very profound that has stuck with me all these years and has helped me several times to navigate the cultural minefields:
In the UK and other Commonwealth nations,anything that is not expressly authorized is considered forbidden.
In the US anything that is not expressly forbidden is considered authorized.
Alt3.
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while there are the hairy-chested pioneers saying it is fine because they have been doing it for years, the newer pilots in the fold who aren't operating in the extreme conditions accept it as the norm rather than seeing it as a risky thing to do which needs to be justified in terms of safety vs risk.
Wrong!
Every time it was said, it was said at the same time that it must be done "Right".
Which in my version of English connotes being cautious and ensuring it was done in a safe manner. (As the discussion revolves around leaving the Pilot's Seat unoccupied and the Aircraft running at Ground Idle) What we have done as a routine in certain situations over the past Forty Plus Years has proven to be safer than any other segment of flight.
Dig through the Accident Statistics and you will see all sorts of Fatal Accidents.
Why is exercising cautions in this any different than other situations that still result in Fatal Crashes?
We have no idea what really happened in the Grand Canyon accident.
We do not know if the Collective Lock was applied or not.
We don't even know what the main rotor RPM was?
We don't know if the aircraft was setting on uneven ground or a rocky surface.
So with out one bit of real evidence to go on....you wish to condemn a practice that has been done safely countless times.
As two pilot helicopters doing instrument approaches over the water seem to run into the Oggin short of the Deck or Runway......and there always appears to be a CRM issue involved.....what say we go back to Single Pilot IFR and eliminate that source of CFIT Accident? It is the same logic you are using here.
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Well that's wide open to interpretation.
If you get out of a rotors turning helicopter with the intention of flying again, how would you interpret that?
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Yet, some think Judgement can be created by writing another Law or Regulation.
Bob, I'm really not sure what your beef is.
We have mostly agreed it can be done safely when the right conditions are met - as A3 said, match the aircraft to the task.
What is open to debate is whether or not there was a NEED to get out with the rotors turning in this accident.
I haven't flown the 350 but even I know it has a propensity for jumping the collective latch - why wouldn't someone qualified on type be very wary of that possibility?
Not sure why you keep banging on about UK accidents - it's not relevant to this topic. Just because some of us from this sde of the pond have an opinion you don't like, doesn't make us wrong or irrelevant in the discussion.
We have mostly agreed it can be done safely when the right conditions are met - as A3 said, match the aircraft to the task.
What is open to debate is whether or not there was a NEED to get out with the rotors turning in this accident.
I haven't flown the 350 but even I know it has a propensity for jumping the collective latch - why wouldn't someone qualified on type be very wary of that possibility?
Not sure why you keep banging on about UK accidents - it's not relevant to this topic. Just because some of us from this sde of the pond have an opinion you don't like, doesn't make us wrong or irrelevant in the discussion.
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BOB has always taken this viewpoint.