AW139 G-LBAL helicopter crash in Gillingham, Norfolk
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Oh dear.
That AAIB report makes for very sobering reading indeed! Any pilot reading this, unfamiliar with somatogravic illusion should start reading now, and learn to fly on instruments. Luckily for all of us, there is ample RECORDED evidence that this was an intentional, manually flown manoeuvre with good oversight, and prompting by the F/O!
Agaricus:
As you will well know, you are UTTERLY out of order involving the Mull of Kintyre Chinook in your 'roll call' of pilot error! Though that may be your personal 'opinion' it is clearly unsupported by any facts, which is precisely why both pilots have, after a long battle for the truth, been unambiguously cleared of any blame whatsoever!
Though clearly you 'think' you know better than the experts!
That AAIB report makes for very sobering reading indeed! Any pilot reading this, unfamiliar with somatogravic illusion should start reading now, and learn to fly on instruments. Luckily for all of us, there is ample RECORDED evidence that this was an intentional, manually flown manoeuvre with good oversight, and prompting by the F/O!
Agaricus:
Further, testimonials from acquaintances of the pilots tell the all too familiar story of how professional they were, how they strove for perfection and took such pride in the job - none of which I doubt for a moment but sadly after so much repetition of these sentiments from the Mull to Battersea, Sumburgh, that S76, possibly Glasgow and now this latest incident it seems to show that no matter how professional, careful and dedicated pilots are they (we) are frighteningly susceptible to "company pressure" to do things we don't like or know we shouldn't be contemplating.
Though clearly you 'think' you know better than the experts!
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you are UTTERLY out of order involving the Mull of Kintyre Chinook in your 'roll call' of pilot error!
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Tragically this looks like a departure technique that sadly the pilots were not comfortable with, had not thought through properly or executed competently. Hovering out to the middle of a field surrounded by trees was sensible. But (assuming I read correctly) why did the captain elect to climb with force trim released? And then why did he start to transition at just 32 ft in IMC with trees around? Big mistake - he should have just held the hover attitude climbing to at least ensure clearance of trees so say 150ft before nose down pitch was applied to commence a transition. And it would have been best to have climbed until he picked up the visual clues that were probably above the fog (eg stars) before transitioning. Feels like he was uncomfortable with a vertical climb and too eager to get some airspeed registering. Having said that it appears he got away with that, with 60kts at 125ft height.
But then finally it seems he became (more?) disorientated and applied far too much nose down pitch which was not recognised and corrected early enough by the co-pilot. Or maybe the co-pilot couldn't overcome the pilots force on the cyclic?
TC - agree, as usual! And I do think as I said before that there may be a case for heli owners employing pilots (outside of an AOC operation) to have to undergo a training session and preferably be granted a licence to employ a pilot by the CAA. This should have been unlikely to be provided given the attitude of the owner here.
But then finally it seems he became (more?) disorientated and applied far too much nose down pitch which was not recognised and corrected early enough by the co-pilot. Or maybe the co-pilot couldn't overcome the pilots force on the cyclic?
TC - agree, as usual! And I do think as I said before that there may be a case for heli owners employing pilots (outside of an AOC operation) to have to undergo a training session and preferably be granted a licence to employ a pilot by the CAA. This should have been unlikely to be provided given the attitude of the owner here.
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I had a quick read of the report, surely on this model you can push forward against the force trim?? If the visual illusion is strong enough, you can push forward pretty hard!!
Did he ACTUALLY hold the force trim button down, or is that speculation???
Did he ACTUALLY hold the force trim button down, or is that speculation???
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jayteeto
Under the circumstances, (IMC) it is unlikely the pilot was suffering a 'visual' illusion. Perhaps more likely is a somatogravic effect? This is a very powerful, and widely understood phenomenon which would have seen him push the nose down more than required. The only protection against this in IMC is rock solid instrument flying skills.
Under the circumstances, (IMC) it is unlikely the pilot was suffering a 'visual' illusion. Perhaps more likely is a somatogravic effect? This is a very powerful, and widely understood phenomenon which would have seen him push the nose down more than required. The only protection against this in IMC is rock solid instrument flying skills.
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Anyone else think that whilst we can bang on about technique, or lack of it. The decision to depart in darkness from the middle of an unlit field, with obstructions all around, and in visibility described in the report as in the tens of metres was a sound one? We all recognise the pressure the captain was under, but I'm afraid many of these operations survive with a little luck and we never have to pick through the bones of what went wrong.
I'm left wondering how much experience either pilot had in this sort of situation, or indeed IFR flight.
Jay, the report says the FTR was held against the spring pressure, to me that means the FTR switch held in. But, they could mean the stick was being pushed against the stick force intself?
I'm left wondering how much experience either pilot had in this sort of situation, or indeed IFR flight.
Jay, the report says the FTR was held against the spring pressure, to me that means the FTR switch held in. But, they could mean the stick was being pushed against the stick force intself?
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Art
With the exception of any requirement to comply with performance 'A', yes this departure could have been carried out perfectly safely. Correct use of the autopilot in this very capable machine, would have pretty much guaranteed a successful departure. Robust IF skills would likely have prevented the accident?
Sounds like the co-pilot correctly identified the developing problem, but for whatever reason was unable to intervene. Only the presence of the CVR reveals that information.
I leave it to others to discuss whether this departure was legal.
With the exception of any requirement to comply with performance 'A', yes this departure could have been carried out perfectly safely. Correct use of the autopilot in this very capable machine, would have pretty much guaranteed a successful departure. Robust IF skills would likely have prevented the accident?
Sounds like the co-pilot correctly identified the developing problem, but for whatever reason was unable to intervene. Only the presence of the CVR reveals that information.
I leave it to others to discuss whether this departure was legal.
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TR, agreed, if we're talking about can this be safe when flown by those with training and experience in this type of departure. I've sat alongside other pilots in the Sim and seen them max out within seconds of take-off in IMC due to lack of basic IF skills and setting the aircraft up properly.
As someone who's done a few thousand departures using manufacturers approved helipad profiles, I worry about others just making it up as they go, and worse than that, an operation that allows it to be that way.
As someone who's done a few thousand departures using manufacturers approved helipad profiles, I worry about others just making it up as they go, and worse than that, an operation that allows it to be that way.
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My understanding of against the spring pressure is that the FTR button is NOT pressed. I stand to be corrected.
Apologies on my use of the words visual illusion, please substitute to 'a form of disorientation'. Many years ago, I lifted from an island off the coast of Belize on a dark dark night. I used a mix of instrument and visual flight. In the distance there was a flat low layer of cloud that made the horizon look higher in the sky. I put the nose 'on the horizon' and the instruments were chuntering away showing a 10deg climb. EVERYTHING was telling me the instruments were right, but I couldn't look outside because I felt that I was nosing into the ground. The instruments won the fight but I admit I was SEVERELY rattled by the experience.
All we know is that this pilot nosed the aircraft into the ground, the one thing that would tell him this is his AH. The co-pilot prompted him to check his attitude. WHERE was he looking??? 35deg nose down is a scary sight on an AH.
Apologies on my use of the words visual illusion, please substitute to 'a form of disorientation'. Many years ago, I lifted from an island off the coast of Belize on a dark dark night. I used a mix of instrument and visual flight. In the distance there was a flat low layer of cloud that made the horizon look higher in the sky. I put the nose 'on the horizon' and the instruments were chuntering away showing a 10deg climb. EVERYTHING was telling me the instruments were right, but I couldn't look outside because I felt that I was nosing into the ground. The instruments won the fight but I admit I was SEVERELY rattled by the experience.
All we know is that this pilot nosed the aircraft into the ground, the one thing that would tell him this is his AH. The co-pilot prompted him to check his attitude. WHERE was he looking??? 35deg nose down is a scary sight on an AH.
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I suspect we all agree. The pilot flying became, almost immediately, disoriented. Without the experience/training to scan the instruments in precisely the way jayteeto mentions.
Judging by the application of full collective, rather than pitching up, I would strongly suspect he was looking at the VSI/Altimeter, and not the Attitude Indicator at any time.
WHERE was he looking???
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Here's the text from the report...
be applied against springs to achieve manual flight, were active throughout the flight."
I wonder if it was the co-pilot who pulled the collective?
"The data
showed that trim release switches on the cyclic and collective controls, on which force must
showed that trim release switches on the cyclic and collective controls, on which force must
be applied against springs to achieve manual flight, were active throughout the flight."
I wonder if it was the co-pilot who pulled the collective?
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Art
I imagine it's possible we'll never know that kind of detail?
All I would say is, the co-pilot had correctly identified that 'attitude' was the real problem, which increasing power couldn't, wouldn't and didn't correct?
Extremely sad for all involved.
I wonder if it was the co-pilot who pulled the collective?
All I would say is, the co-pilot had correctly identified that 'attitude' was the real problem, which increasing power couldn't, wouldn't and didn't correct?
Extremely sad for all involved.
My first on this and every on going recent helicopter accident; why not let them try to rest in peace and wait for the full reports which probably won't be that different from the initials - let it rest.
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Here is a link from the local newspaper
?No fault? on helicopter - Blackpool Gazette
Seems to me like this decision was made unusually quick
AFN
?No fault? on helicopter - Blackpool Gazette
Seems to me like this decision was made unusually quick
AFN
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MOSTAFA
I absolutely understand where you are coming from. All I would say is this: PPRUNE purports to be a site for professional aviators. Many contributors both here and elsewhere, are extremely experienced individuals. We all try to understand accidents, not to see people criticised. (Every single one of us, even the very best are always guilty of human frailty!) We do it to understand. Hopefully reducing the chances of similar accidents occurring to others..
If pilots starting out in this business can pick up the odd 'nugget' from the ramblings of the KOSs, then that's a good result. If the KOSs remind themselves of things they had forgotten, then equally good. None of us have the time, nor frankly the luck, to make every mistake ourselves!
Think of these discussions as crew room chat, (which anyone can listen in to) and you may get the idea of their value?
Edited to add: KOS = Kn@ckered Old Sh1t!
I absolutely understand where you are coming from. All I would say is this: PPRUNE purports to be a site for professional aviators. Many contributors both here and elsewhere, are extremely experienced individuals. We all try to understand accidents, not to see people criticised. (Every single one of us, even the very best are always guilty of human frailty!) We do it to understand. Hopefully reducing the chances of similar accidents occurring to others..
If pilots starting out in this business can pick up the odd 'nugget' from the ramblings of the KOSs, then that's a good result. If the KOSs remind themselves of things they had forgotten, then equally good. None of us have the time, nor frankly the luck, to make every mistake ourselves!
Think of these discussions as crew room chat, (which anyone can listen in to) and you may get the idea of their value?
Edited to add: KOS = Kn@ckered Old Sh1t!
To me the HP experienced decelerative errors during his disorientation as he went IMC @ night. He might have 'felt' the cab was slowing down and thus pushed fwd on the cyclic (I say 'pushed' because he'd mashed the trim throughout (iaw the FDR) - and thus couldn't trim fwd incrementally)).
He simply didn't have time to update his SA before the inevitable.
He simply didn't have time to update his SA before the inevitable.
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JT2
I am sure the "springs" referred to are those of the button on the Cyclic (FTR) and the trigger on the Collective (FTR), both spring-loaded to the engaged position.
Tam
Tam