Police helicopter crashes onto Glasgow pub

[Reely340]

Very important to make it very clear that the report refers to Warnings, not cautions.

I always felt, that those terms were used in a rather unprecise way. I might be wrong, but wheter that CDS screen was operable or not appears to me not so much relevant. The referred to warning lights are old style, real, "mechanical" lights at the top of the instrument cowling, they should live independent of the CDS' health.

Thus, even if the CDS were dead, the "recorded" ((c)AAIB) sequence of red warning light illuminations is a separate piece of user interface.
That is why I recently asked the forum if anyone could testify as to what kind of "recording" of events was going on for each warning light:

1. real supverision of lights illuminating (very expensive circuitry)
2. supervision of electric current to light in normal range
3. just the fact that the ciruitry did output suitable voltage, w/o checking it there was a current drawn by a light, too.

1 requires a photodiode per light to check illumination
2 is what nowadays cars are doing, logging anything out of the ordinary on the electric driver side of the light (short to GND, short to V+, unplausible current, open)
3 would log events w/o being proof, that the light would actually have consumes electricity and lit up!


Example:
If there were some common warning light power line for all warning lights (bad design, IMO) and that power line would - for whatever reason - not have been powered (blown fuse), monitoring method 1 and 2 would notice the lack of illumination, whereas method 3 would be ignorant of that lamp failure.


So what informantion does that "recorded sequence of warning lights" actually contain, in case of an EC135?

[Art of flight]

Reely,

Good points, would need a type specific engineer to answer those questions.
The AAIB report only states the unit has provided the order in which they were TRIGGERED, rather than actually stating the order in which they ILLUMINATED, that may infer that there is no way of knowing if they did actually illuminate?

[Reely340]

The AAIB report only states the unit has provided the order in which they were TRIGGERED, rather than actually stating the order in which they ILLUMINATED, that may infer that there is no way of knowing if they did actually illuminate?

Absolutely! Like when you switch on the light in your living room by flipping the switch and record that fact.
Actual light needs electricity in your house, all good connections from the switch to your lamp and of course a working filament in said lamp.

So w/o description what effectvely was recorded, when AAIB refers to "being triggered", we cannot be sure, if any warning light did illuminate.

[Wageslave]

Flipping Switches

As an aside, though I believe a relevant one, I'm a little disquieted by the repeated use of the expression "flipping switches". Now it may be no more than a form of speech (albeit a rather strange one) but it concerns me that while discussing an accident in which a major cause looks like mis-selection of switches some of us airily talk of "flipping" switches.

It was drilled into me by several instructors that it is vitally important to "move" or "select" switches rather than just flip them. It may seem a pedantic point but I have no doubt that a conscious and methodical process of grasping the switch and moving it positively to it's next position considerably reduces the chances of moving the wrong one. I'm very much on my guard when I fly with multi-fingered switch-flickers, and with good reason over the years.

Who knows whether "flipping" had anything to do with tis accident, but a plea now to avoid the habit might save us the trouble of discussing the next one.

[Scuffers]

with all due respect, this is becoming more like the implausible witch hunt every post?

from what is known, the EC135 has multiple warning systems for fuel, on different displays, some with audio alerts too.

it's just not credible that *all* these systems failed - but only in respect of telling the pilot his fuel situation.

if the displays had 100% failed, would it not be prudent for the pilot to have just bailed out and landed ASAP rather than push the position (in mind he is already close if not over the endurance of the initial fuel load, flying in the dark and now instrument blind?)

Look, nobody wants to point the finger especially as he is not here to defend himself, but to try and cook up wildly implausible reasons to explain it is not helping anybody.

[HeavyMetallist]

@Scuffers,

I entirely agree. PPRuNe threads often attract some ill-informed, trolling or just plain weird posts in amongst the obviously well-informed ones, but since the latest AAIB report was published this one has gone off into a fantasy land all of its own.

Also, while I understand the natural desire of piloting professionals to stick up for one of their own who's not here to defend himself, before attempting to trash the aircraft design on little or no information, perhaps people could consider that those involved in the design, manufacture, operation and service of these aircraft are also professionals, who don't just make decisions on a whim or ignore the implications to crew and passengers but actually do their damnedest to make you as safe as they can. Rant, from an aviation engineering professional, not a pilot, over!

[Lonewolf_50]

Scuffers, folks are trying to fill in the blanks about something that makes little sense.
The part that gets the head scratching is
If all lights and displays were working as advertised, how does one miss the information?
What distraction, or potential "glitch," led to someone believing that the system was in state "X" when it was really in state "Y" and thus engines rolled off?
The other head scratcher seems to be: why were prime pumps switches on and not the transfer pump switches?
Given that when one switches the pumps on or off, an indication on the display is the normal companion ...

Wageslave: point taken, and agreed, however pedantic.

[Al-bert]

Has pilot incapacitation been mentioned earlier? Heart, stroke, whatever? Apologies if it has already been mentioned and ruled out

[Scuffers]

Originally Posted by Al-bert

Has pilot incapacitation been mentioned earlier? Heart, stroke, whatever? Apologies if it has already been mentioned and ruled out

Autopsy make no mention of heart attack or stroke.

that said, some form of in-capacity would be the only other logical explanation.

That said (again!), look at the facts we have, by the time he was asking for AT clearance, he must have already been some 10+ minutes into final fuel warnings - yet chose to make no mention of it?

to then have one engine flameout, NOT to attempt to put down imediatly before the other engine flamedout (we are told 4Kg's = ~2:25mins)

to then not autorotate on second engine flameout

Either the guy was out of it, or reckless...

I can't see any other logical explanation, unless the AIB come up with something radical...?

[SASless]

Either the guy was out of it, or reckless...

I can't see any other logical explanation, unless the AIB come up with something radical...?

Scuffers....in a clear concise unambiguous manner....lay out your case for the points you made in the quoted comment.

A) The Guy Was Out Of It!


B)The Guy Was Reckless!



As I am sure you do not have access to the information, evidence, lab testing, and forensic evidence the AAIB does.....I am quite interested in hearing how you arrived at those two Options for what happened that night.

Do tell us in detail what you base those two Options upon....be specific will you as very few of us that are following this investigation seem to have been able to garner such an interesting and definitive insight as you seem to have done.

Do educate us will you?

[Art of flight]

So that's it then, he was out of it...or reckless, and the crew did absolutely nothing to inform control that he was either......case closed.

Thankfully the AAIB and others will be a little more dilligent in their investigations.

[Scuffers]

well, given time, I am sure the AAIB will report their conclusions.

My views (as you have so eloquently paraphrased above) are still my views on it, with the info we have in the public domain, I can't see any another scenarios.

I may be wrong, time will tell, however, if I were a betting man, that's where my £10 would be.

Sorry if you think this is inappropriate, but I find it better than the endless hysterical theorising weird technobabble about this and that (against the clear and concise posts from those that are familiar with the EC135 and it's systems).

[SilsoeSid]

Scuffers;

from what is known, the EC135 has multiple warning systems for fuel, on different displays, some with audio alerts too.

it's just not credible that *all* these systems failed - but only in respect of telling the pilot his fuel situation.

There is only one warning system for fuel, the one that produces the FUEL LOW 1 & FUEL LOW 2 warnings on the single warning panel.

[DOUBLE BOGEY]

I think the pilot did not understand the fuel system. Thats why the transfer pumps were off. The VMS recorded the correct warnings and they were ignored. As was the flight manual requirement to land. As was the Company OM MLA requirement. Airmanship in terms of time/fuel calculations also ignored. In fact just about every safety break in place had been breached. Finally a poor response to double OEI.

[SilsoeSid]

DB:
(a) I think the pilot did not understand the fuel system. (b) Thats why the transfer pumps were off. (c) The VMS recorded the correct warnings and they were ignored. (d) As was the flight manual requirement to land. (e) As was the Company OM MLA requirement. (f) Airmanship in terms of time/fuel calculations also ignored. (g) In fact just about every safety break in place had been breached. (h) Finally a poor response to double OEI.

my brackets

a. I totally disagree
b. I think the transfer pumps were off as a consequence of the task profile
c. The only warnings recorded were from the warning unit and these were LOW FUEL 1 LOW FUEL 2 and ROTOR RPM. I don't believe any pilot would ignore any red warning light and gong.
d. Assuming you mean the 'Land Within 10 minutes', there is no information as to when the LOW FUEL warnings occurred. What other flight manual requirement is there?
e. As the lower than company fuel state probably wasn't planned, this wouldn't be the case.
f. Assuming of course the indications were full and accurate. Besides they still had enough fuel for 20+mins flight. (see d)
g. Don't understand where that comes from.
h. Your opinion.


As we don't know which cautions and fuel indications were presented during the flight, and how accurately they were presented, any accusations relating to such, especially (f) & (g) above, are uncalled for.

[chopjock]

Has pilot incapacitation been mentioned earlier? Heart, stroke, whatever? Apologies if it has already been mentioned and ruled out

Autopsy make no mention of heart attack or stroke.

I can tell you from experience you can be incapacitated with out heart attack or stroke. I was incapacitated once and after it was all over I passed a thorough medical with nothing wrong.

I had a panic attack and was unable to do simple things like work out which way to go and was not even able to pull the transmit button. Hyper ventilating and tunnel vision with black spots in your vision, absolutely scared shi#le55 what will happen next.

On another occasion I was returning to base with the fuel light on and I was very relieved when I made it with out the donk quitting. (silly I know).
I could well imagine this happening to someone when the fuel light is on and flying at night over a city and not knowing if he will make it back.

In this condition, no way would he be able to work things out, like correct switching and perform an auto rotation.

[tigerfish]

The discussion about the Pilots state of health, ignores the fact that he was one of the first of the victims to be released for burial.
I can assure you from an investigatory background, that such a release just would not have been permitted, if there was even the slightest shadow of doubt that incapacitation might have been a cause. So lets leave it eh!

But he had been off on extended leave recently. So how current was he? How long since converting from the Chinook? At moments of extreem pressure does one revert to the more familiar?

I am sure that all these things will be being looked at closely by the AAIB So lets leave that bit to the experts.

But I am intensly interested in what the Police Control room records reveal of that final mission. Just how much pressure was exerted to stay on task in those final moments? I've been there & felt it, finally blurting out. "Look you blighters sort yourselves out, this is a helicopter and we cannot just pull over into a layby & switch off. Sort the delay out now, or we are going home fuel is getting short !" They didnt & we went home! Result - big row! but we got home!

TF

[SilsoeSid]

But he had been off on extended leave recently. So how current was he? How long since converting from the Chinook? At moments of extreem pressure does one revert to the more familiar?

I am sure that all these things will be being looked at closely by the AAIB So lets leave that bit to the experts.

"RAF Odiham station commander Group Captain Richard Maddison said: “Although David Traill left the RAF in 2008, many of us served alongside him, both at Odiham and overseas."
Tributes paid to former RAF Odiham pilot David Traill (From Basingstoke Gazette)


"Commander’s Flying Experience 5,592 hours (of which 646 were on type)
Last 90 days - 38 hours
Last 28 days - 19 hours

1. 646 hrs are the hours on type the pilot had accumulated since 2010.
2. Hours up to and including 26 November 2013."

http://www.aaib.gov.uk/cms_resources...4%20G-SPAO.pdf

[tigerfish]

So that ties that off! No concern there! The AAIB will cover all those issues

As I said I have only one niggling concern. The Police logs and what exchanges took place between the TFO's and their control.

Why was that task so extended?
TF

[Bladecrack]

I think the pilot did not understand the fuel system. Thats why the transfer pumps were off. The VMS recorded the correct warnings and they were ignored. As was the flight manual requirement to land. As was the Company OM MLA requirement. Airmanship in terms of time/fuel calculations also ignored. In fact just about every safety break in place had been breached. Finally a poor response to double OEI.

DB - Yes, maybe after 5 years of doing the job and manipulating the XFER pump switches on every flight he simply forgot how to do it...

And maybe the pilot and the front seat observer just felt like ignoring the fuel level and red FUEL LOW warnings that night and saying nothing to ATC or the police control room.

All based on a 9 page Special Bulletin with limited facts? Did you give the AAIB a call to tell them they could close this case as you have solved it?

Are you really that effing thick?

P.S. Do tell us how much experience you have on the EC135 in the emergency services role?