Police helicopter crashes onto Glasgow pub
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Even if the CPDS was faulty, it still is not possible for it to display (or not display) any set of conditions which would justify staying airborne. Edit - During the long leg from Dalkeith to Bothwell it would have been checked many times and any inconsistent behaviour noted.
Two questions not answered:
At 2218 was the task completed or was it terminated?
Do EC135 pilots wear gloves?
Two questions not answered:
At 2218 was the task completed or was it terminated?
Do EC135 pilots wear gloves?
Last edited by henry_crun; 22nd Feb 2014 at 09:12.
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Originally Posted by SilsoeSid
As you can see, there's a lot going on that has to be 'ignored' by each member of the crew.
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Too much amber text?
It shows four legitimate warnings, and perhaps a needless statement of the state of the pitot heater.
Prime pumps on is unusual, main tank pumps off is unusual, but it's not impossible you'd want it that way - so they're cautions. Neither are red warnings. If a pump had failed, then it would probably be right to note it in red.
Too many cautions? Well there is the screens and screens of ECAM factor to consider from QF32 for example, but the unusual settings need to be noted somewhere, and if everything is normal there should be no mention: perhaps pitot heater off should be an amber and pitot heater/pitot failed as a red, rather than normal as green?
Prime pumps on is unusual, main tank pumps off is unusual, but it's not impossible you'd want it that way - so they're cautions. Neither are red warnings. If a pump had failed, then it would probably be right to note it in red.
Too many cautions? Well there is the screens and screens of ECAM factor to consider from QF32 for example, but the unusual settings need to be noted somewhere, and if everything is normal there should be no mention: perhaps pitot heater off should be an amber and pitot heater/pitot failed as a red, rather than normal as green?
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Do ec135 pilots wear gloves? - think the real issue is how all this information from the 5 senses is processed with about 100 billions of neurons. If these neurons get conflicting or for them irrational information, they start to have a big battle who is right or wrong. Which part of the brain will dominate in the decision making (if there is any and not only confusion)? What information stored (knowledge, training, experience) will be used? very basic survival instincts could dominate (fight, flight, freeze). In serious stress situations people, also very experienced pilots, can react very differently to what would seem normal or appropriate for an outsider not understanding the whole situation the person and his cognitive system is confronted with.
The cognitive system could be also affected by underlying factors such as a simple infection of a vital part of the cognitive system. That could be a gland for example. Very often these infections are not discovered. Or a tick bite and then Lyme disease. Very often not tested. If the body is fighting such a problem, perhaps already over a long period, the reaction to immediate serious stress might be different as it used to be in normal 'healthy' conditions. Human factor is not always human error. The factors for the 'errors' are not clear but some indications are already pointed out.
The cognitive system could be also affected by underlying factors such as a simple infection of a vital part of the cognitive system. That could be a gland for example. Very often these infections are not discovered. Or a tick bite and then Lyme disease. Very often not tested. If the body is fighting such a problem, perhaps already over a long period, the reaction to immediate serious stress might be different as it used to be in normal 'healthy' conditions. Human factor is not always human error. The factors for the 'errors' are not clear but some indications are already pointed out.
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SID I know this is deeply unpalatable to you but I think you should breath out and face the facts and findings detailed in the AAIB report and see them for what they actually represent.
Nothing you have said is unpalatable to me as if is clear that the prime pumps were switched on, that would have give the warning shown, which for some reason wasn't actioned or there wasn't time to action. It is also clear that regardless of the switch positions, there wasn't enough fuel in the ac to get back to base with the 85kgs required.
I know exactly what your and those that support you so strongly are saying, but imho it's not as simple as you present it. As I said at the beginning of this post, I am showing the cockpit as best I can to you and those that may need to see for yourselves what cautions were, or should have been illuminating.
Tonight I'll try and show the same pictures/vid with the CAD off.
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Vendee;
Were the other crew members qualified to comment? Would a police observer question the actions of a very experienced pilot?
Were the other crew members qualified to comment? Would a police observer question the actions of a very experienced pilot?
I didn't know the observers personally, but I'm sure that every qualified police observer would say something about what was going on. I know ours would. This is actively encouraged throughout their training, currencies and checks, despite what anyone may think about the single pilot aircraft and operations etc.
Every person qualified to fly in an operational police aircraft is current with CRM training and these warnings and cautions simply wouldn't be ignored.
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Of course what is ( also ) not known ( and may never be ),
is precisely WHEN those prime Pumps were switched on and the XFER pumps switched off.
In the case of losing both engines without warning ( e.g if there was a false reading on the CAD ),
could it be that an attempt was being made to relight the engines, with use of the Prime pumps - as you would if starting up on the Ground ?
Would that be a more likely scenario than a pilot inadvertently operating the wrong switches - switches that they are very familiar with ??
Nail
is precisely WHEN those prime Pumps were switched on and the XFER pumps switched off.
In the case of losing both engines without warning ( e.g if there was a false reading on the CAD ),
could it be that an attempt was being made to relight the engines, with use of the Prime pumps - as you would if starting up on the Ground ?
Would that be a more likely scenario than a pilot inadvertently operating the wrong switches - switches that they are very familiar with ??
Nail
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Sid, thanks for the pictures.
As you know, I do have a problem with the expectations of the TFOs regarding their involvement in aviation matters. You describe them as 'qualified police observers'. I know exactly what you mean. They have qualified in their role as observers.
But they have absolutely no aviation qualification whatsoever. Yes they may (or may not) have absorbed technical information, and may even have the knowledge to ask sensible questions. But they are absolutely not qualified aviators! The system is absolutely designed to give specific individuals 'partitioned' responsibilities! It's supposed to be safer when police officers do the police work in the company of a professional aviator who is the final arbiter of all things aviation! That makes it different, and supposedly safer than the US for example?
Let me put it another way. IF (a big if!) all indications were operating perfectly prior to the aircraft running out of fuel, how much responsibility for the tragedy could you ascribe to the TFOs?
My personal view is, non whatsoever. Simple! Exactly as it should be!
If you want a second qualified aviator in that aircraft, then you pay for a second pilot. Or you accept that one individual soaks up all the pressure! To attempt to blur the lines is just fudging the issue, placing too much expectation/burden on unqualified people! Fudging happens in other areas of police aviation too! In terms of flight safety, blurring and fudging, are not good bedfellows!
Now, we have no idea yet what the precise situation was here, and we won't for some time. But if anyone wishes to understand how a police helicopter's fuel system can be mishandled to cause a double engine failure and autorotation, then there is an example from Christmas Day 2001 involving G-DPPH. You can google the AAIB report and see how the AAIB regards TFOs, and how the pilot explained the situation to them.
As you know, I do have a problem with the expectations of the TFOs regarding their involvement in aviation matters. You describe them as 'qualified police observers'. I know exactly what you mean. They have qualified in their role as observers.
But they have absolutely no aviation qualification whatsoever. Yes they may (or may not) have absorbed technical information, and may even have the knowledge to ask sensible questions. But they are absolutely not qualified aviators! The system is absolutely designed to give specific individuals 'partitioned' responsibilities! It's supposed to be safer when police officers do the police work in the company of a professional aviator who is the final arbiter of all things aviation! That makes it different, and supposedly safer than the US for example?
Let me put it another way. IF (a big if!) all indications were operating perfectly prior to the aircraft running out of fuel, how much responsibility for the tragedy could you ascribe to the TFOs?
My personal view is, non whatsoever. Simple! Exactly as it should be!
If you want a second qualified aviator in that aircraft, then you pay for a second pilot. Or you accept that one individual soaks up all the pressure! To attempt to blur the lines is just fudging the issue, placing too much expectation/burden on unqualified people! Fudging happens in other areas of police aviation too! In terms of flight safety, blurring and fudging, are not good bedfellows!
Now, we have no idea yet what the precise situation was here, and we won't for some time. But if anyone wishes to understand how a police helicopter's fuel system can be mishandled to cause a double engine failure and autorotation, then there is an example from Christmas Day 2001 involving G-DPPH. You can google the AAIB report and see how the AAIB regards TFOs, and how the pilot explained the situation to them.
Last edited by Tandemrotor; 22nd Feb 2014 at 10:25.
SS, to me that display of `Prime on,transfer OFF` is confusing in relation to the fuel system as the fuel system is showing opposed selections ,in the same colour /format.Since the prime pumps are only used to start,they should go `green`,then out when `off`. Likewise,the transfer pumps,green when `on`,amber when failed/not immersed/out when `off`.Otherwise it is `Illogical Captain`(Spock).....
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Was the pilot wearing gloves? This has been asked by Mary and myself several times. It relates to the operation of the overhead switch panel. Pics of the EC135 and CH-47 switch panels have been posted. The CH-47 panel has switches well spaced out and easily operable whilst wearing gloves. The EC135 panel has tiny, closely-spaced switches which appear too small to operate whilst wearing gloves. I think this is a very good question and needs to be answered. Yes or no. Not some long diatribe about sensory perception.
Was the final task completed or terminated? This is an important question. If the task was completed then the return to base was routine. But if the task was terminated that would imply a realisation at that time that fuel was an issue. Again this is a simple yes or no.
Display fault The flight from Dalkeith to Bothwell was a long leg during which the instrument scan should have taken in the fuel indications many times. It should have shown full supply tanks with main tank fuel depleting and then empty main fuel tank with supply tanks depleting. Any incorrect indication or non-indication would have been obvious and there was plenty of time to observe it and think about it. And indeed act on it.
Green non-cautions When these are displayed they give confirmation that the CPDS is working and not just showing a blank screen.
Was the final task completed or terminated? This is an important question. If the task was completed then the return to base was routine. But if the task was terminated that would imply a realisation at that time that fuel was an issue. Again this is a simple yes or no.
Display fault The flight from Dalkeith to Bothwell was a long leg during which the instrument scan should have taken in the fuel indications many times. It should have shown full supply tanks with main tank fuel depleting and then empty main fuel tank with supply tanks depleting. Any incorrect indication or non-indication would have been obvious and there was plenty of time to observe it and think about it. And indeed act on it.
Green non-cautions When these are displayed they give confirmation that the CPDS is working and not just showing a blank screen.
Whilst I can understand why DB says what he says, I think it is still premature to dump this on the pilot.
The following illustrates my reasoning for this.
Even if the aircraft hadnt crashed, it would have arrived back at base below MLA, leading to grief of some form for the pilot. Yet he accepted not one but two additional taskings on his way back from Dalkeith. Logic would suggest that the only explanations for this would be:
a) pilot incompetence - a non starter in this instance.
b) Pilot taking leave of his senses - ditto
c) Pilot misled regarding actual fuel contents
As would be apparent from my earlier posts, I am convinced that c) is the explanation, and that the fuel probe fault is the culprit.
Why were the transfer pumps off? they had been switched off earlier in the flight as the warnings had begun to appear more frequently as the main tank approached empty. We all know that they should have been switched back on, so why didnt he? Possibly because the fuel gauges still showed the supply tanks to have plenty fuel (erroneously). He would expect to have to play tunes on the transfer pumps later to top up the supply tanks, but that did not appear to be necessary at this point. (side comment, why can the transfer pumps not be automated??) .
No amber fuel contents warning, due to fuel probe fault. Red warnings appear very near home, but contents gauges still showing fuel in the supply tanks (erroneously) and fuel in the main tank (correctly). All of his thinking during the mission had been conditioned by the gauged contents, and he had made several decisions based on them. He was convinced they had enough fuel.
Pilot faced with a choice of which inputs to believe, elects to believe gauges rather than lights, carries on as normal. Engine flameout, supply tank still showing adequate fuel, suspects engine pump, swithces prime pumps on.
Clearly speculation on my part, but does seem to join quite a few of the dots together in a way which puts the pilots actions in a different light
The following illustrates my reasoning for this.
Even if the aircraft hadnt crashed, it would have arrived back at base below MLA, leading to grief of some form for the pilot. Yet he accepted not one but two additional taskings on his way back from Dalkeith. Logic would suggest that the only explanations for this would be:
a) pilot incompetence - a non starter in this instance.
b) Pilot taking leave of his senses - ditto
c) Pilot misled regarding actual fuel contents
As would be apparent from my earlier posts, I am convinced that c) is the explanation, and that the fuel probe fault is the culprit.
Why were the transfer pumps off? they had been switched off earlier in the flight as the warnings had begun to appear more frequently as the main tank approached empty. We all know that they should have been switched back on, so why didnt he? Possibly because the fuel gauges still showed the supply tanks to have plenty fuel (erroneously). He would expect to have to play tunes on the transfer pumps later to top up the supply tanks, but that did not appear to be necessary at this point. (side comment, why can the transfer pumps not be automated??) .
No amber fuel contents warning, due to fuel probe fault. Red warnings appear very near home, but contents gauges still showing fuel in the supply tanks (erroneously) and fuel in the main tank (correctly). All of his thinking during the mission had been conditioned by the gauged contents, and he had made several decisions based on them. He was convinced they had enough fuel.
Pilot faced with a choice of which inputs to believe, elects to believe gauges rather than lights, carries on as normal. Engine flameout, supply tank still showing adequate fuel, suspects engine pump, swithces prime pumps on.
Clearly speculation on my part, but does seem to join quite a few of the dots together in a way which puts the pilots actions in a different light
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wording: qualified to comment is not the same as qualified in actively taking part of aviation, but any comment could of course influence the PIC's decisions. A bit generalised but from my experience Glasgow cops are certainly not shy, rather the opposite. The ones I got to know don't deal precisely according rules and regs as Glasgow isn't really a rule and regs culture and place (as most places down in Englandshire..), perhaps more a who shouts the loudest environment. David Trail didn't seem to be like that though.
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Tr,
How much of a qualified aviator was/is an Army Aircrewman, an RAF Navigator or RN Aircrewman? Come to think of it, what about an airgunner/doorgunner winch-person or dope on a rope?
By the way, amongst the police observers out there, we have a mixture of PPL(A ) & (H), RAF VGS instructors, ex Army Aircrewmen etc. To top this part of the post off, at our unit we even have an ATPL(A) qualified on 737's.
As for your comment about how much responsibility the TFO's had in this tragedy, as in every part of aviation, the ultimate responsibility is the Captains regardless of anyone else's qualifications. To go back to another of your posts, how much responsibility would your qualified CRM'd aviation aware air steward have if an Airbus went down
As you know, I do have a problem with the expectations of the TFOs regarding their involvement in aviation matters. You describe them as 'qualified police observers'. I know exactly what you mean. They have qualified in their role as observers.
But they have absolutely no aviation qualification whatsoever. Yes they may (or may not) have absorbed technical information, and may even have the knowledge to ask sensible questions. But they are absolutely not qualified aviators! The system is absolutely designed to give specific individuals 'partitioned' responsibilities!
But they have absolutely no aviation qualification whatsoever. Yes they may (or may not) have absorbed technical information, and may even have the knowledge to ask sensible questions. But they are absolutely not qualified aviators! The system is absolutely designed to give specific individuals 'partitioned' responsibilities!
By the way, amongst the police observers out there, we have a mixture of PPL(A ) & (H), RAF VGS instructors, ex Army Aircrewmen etc. To top this part of the post off, at our unit we even have an ATPL(A) qualified on 737's.
As for your comment about how much responsibility the TFO's had in this tragedy, as in every part of aviation, the ultimate responsibility is the Captains regardless of anyone else's qualifications. To go back to another of your posts, how much responsibility would your qualified CRM'd aviation aware air steward have if an Airbus went down
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SilsoeSid
Thanks for the excellent photos and explanations.
Mary and Henry
Military pilots wear gloves in the cockpit to help provide protection in event of damage to the aircraft or flash burns due to enemy action, bird strike, etc. Civilian pilots generally choose not to wear gloves in an enclosed cockpit.
Thanks for the excellent photos and explanations.
Mary and Henry
Military pilots wear gloves in the cockpit to help provide protection in event of damage to the aircraft or flash burns due to enemy action, bird strike, etc. Civilian pilots generally choose not to wear gloves in an enclosed cockpit.
Last edited by G0ULI; 22nd Feb 2014 at 10:54. Reason: spelling
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Sycamore, sorry I don't see what you find confusing.
The prime pump and transfer pump cautions are on because in normal circumstances they should be extinguished, they bring to the pilots attention the state if the main tank switches and the prime pump switches.
Transfer pump off - warning on
Prime Pump on - warning on
Imho, your logic of having green lights on for when the Prime pumps are on (which would indicate all is well) is illogical.
The prime pump and transfer pump cautions are on because in normal circumstances they should be extinguished, they bring to the pilots attention the state if the main tank switches and the prime pump switches.
Transfer pump off - warning on
Prime Pump on - warning on
Imho, your logic of having green lights on for when the Prime pumps are on (which would indicate all is well) is illogical.
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Your argument is erratic and frankly bizarre Sid.
You clearly don't understand what 'qualified' means in this sense. Are you a line blurrer? A fudger? The answer is obvious!
Ask the CAA if they consider any of the individuals you mention to have the necessary experience (never mind QUALIFICATIONS!!) to be a licensed crew member on a police EC135!
In case you didn't know. Cabin crew don't have 'licences' either. Just like your TFOs!
As far as your licensing authority is concerned, it's all down to you. Stop trying to pretend otherwise.
You clearly don't understand what 'qualified' means in this sense. Are you a line blurrer? A fudger? The answer is obvious!
Ask the CAA if they consider any of the individuals you mention to have the necessary experience (never mind QUALIFICATIONS!!) to be a licensed crew member on a police EC135!
In case you didn't know. Cabin crew don't have 'licences' either. Just like your TFOs!
As far as your licensing authority is concerned, it's all down to you. Stop trying to pretend otherwise.
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Tr,
I take it the G-DPPH incident you refer to is this one?
http://www.aaib.gov.uk/cms_resources...pdf_508162.pdf
I can see how you find linking a page so complicated
In your post 2290 you had a go at someone referring to an incident in 1998, now you are referring to an incident in 2001, hey ho!
I can see why you didn't want to link to the report, as it doesn't mention anything about the TFO's, apart from banging their heads when exiting!
I take it the G-DPPH incident you refer to is this one?
http://www.aaib.gov.uk/cms_resources...pdf_508162.pdf
I can see how you find linking a page so complicated
In your post 2290 you had a go at someone referring to an incident in 1998, now you are referring to an incident in 2001, hey ho!
You can google the AAIB report and see how the AAIB regards TFOs, and how the pilot explained the situation to them.
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Tr;
Hold on, you said "But they have absolutely no aviation qualification whatsoever."
Disregarding the individual licences aviation qualifications that I mentioned earlier, I think you'll find that police observers are indeed 'qualified'. If you don't think this is the case, please tell us your definition.
Here's something from the CAA that you may be interested in, that's online and I can refer you to;
http://www.caa.co.uk/docs/33/CAP612.PDF
If you think that Police Observers/TFO's are really just passengers, I strongly suggest that you read part D.
Seems a lot of CAA boxes to tick if they are just a pax!
Your argument is erratic and frankly bizarre Sid.
You clearly don't understand what 'qualified' means in this sense. Are you a line blurrer? A fudger? The answer is obvious!
Ask the CAA if they consider any of the individuals you mention to have the necessary experience (never mind QUALIFICATIONS!!) to be a licensed crew member on a police EC135!
In case you didn't know. Cabin crew don't have 'licences' either. Just like your TFOs!
As far as your licensing authority is concerned, it's all down to you. Stop trying to pretend otherwise.
You clearly don't understand what 'qualified' means in this sense. Are you a line blurrer? A fudger? The answer is obvious!
Ask the CAA if they consider any of the individuals you mention to have the necessary experience (never mind QUALIFICATIONS!!) to be a licensed crew member on a police EC135!
In case you didn't know. Cabin crew don't have 'licences' either. Just like your TFOs!
As far as your licensing authority is concerned, it's all down to you. Stop trying to pretend otherwise.
Disregarding the individual licences aviation qualifications that I mentioned earlier, I think you'll find that police observers are indeed 'qualified'. If you don't think this is the case, please tell us your definition.
Here's something from the CAA that you may be interested in, that's online and I can refer you to;
http://www.caa.co.uk/docs/33/CAP612.PDF
If you think that Police Observers/TFO's are really just passengers, I strongly suggest that you read part D.
Seems a lot of CAA boxes to tick if they are just a pax!
Vendee
It's not often that one has the opportunity to agree with both Sid and TR but my take on your question is:
No, because there is no requirement for them to be trained or examined in aircraft systems. However, I haven't yet met a training officer who would allow a TFO to continue flying if they didn't understand enough to at least make an educated comment and assist with emergencies.
Yes, simple as that. It is not a world which is full of shrinking violets or those who would rather crash than ask a difficult question.
TR, your incessant harping on about "fudging" and "blurring" is dull, boring and unnecessary. We all know that TFOs are officially pax and most of us know the reasons why. We all know that the aircraft commander is the aircraft commander, that's how he or she got the title. Most of us know that none of this means that they are mute passengers who would never question or comment on the appearance of warnings, cautions or other unusual indications.
I don't know the three on board that night and I don't know what happened beyond what the AAIB have reported but I do know that I have never met an observer who would not have raised questions if all of the usual indications for the situation they found themselves in were indeed present. I also know that I've never met a pilot who was so arrogant and unprofessional that he or she didn't welcome reasoned and reasonable questions, assistance and input. I don't think we've met.
Were the other crew members qualified to comment? Would a police observer question the actions of a very experienced pilot?
Were the other crew members qualified to comment?
Would a police observer question the actions of a very experienced pilot?
TR, your incessant harping on about "fudging" and "blurring" is dull, boring and unnecessary. We all know that TFOs are officially pax and most of us know the reasons why. We all know that the aircraft commander is the aircraft commander, that's how he or she got the title. Most of us know that none of this means that they are mute passengers who would never question or comment on the appearance of warnings, cautions or other unusual indications.
I don't know the three on board that night and I don't know what happened beyond what the AAIB have reported but I do know that I have never met an observer who would not have raised questions if all of the usual indications for the situation they found themselves in were indeed present. I also know that I've never met a pilot who was so arrogant and unprofessional that he or she didn't welcome reasoned and reasonable questions, assistance and input. I don't think we've met.