AS332L2 Ditching off Shetland: 23rd August 2013
dsc810 - its interesting that the S92 goes for strip gauges for the engine and system instruments, and clock dials for some of the primary flight instruments, whereas with the 225 and L2 its the exact opposite, clock dials for all system and engine gauges and strips for primary flight instruments.
Both sets of pilots of course get used to what is presented to them, but it would be interesting to trial, with brand-new-to-both-types pilots, both the S92 and EC225 layouts. My feeling is that the clock vs strip is not the primary consideration, its the overall layout in terms of logicality, intuitiveness and absence of clutter that is the more important factor.
Both sets of pilots of course get used to what is presented to them, but it would be interesting to trial, with brand-new-to-both-types pilots, both the S92 and EC225 layouts. My feeling is that the clock vs strip is not the primary consideration, its the overall layout in terms of logicality, intuitiveness and absence of clutter that is the more important factor.
Last edited by HeliComparator; 30th Aug 2013 at 17:48.
HC
This is exactly what is required and it has to be designed for the NS Helicopter environment not a FW system modified, to save money, to try and apply to NS ops. It also has to have functions that are Murphy proof so a that it is impossible for a mode to cause the a/c to enter a flight regime in which helicopters weren't designed to operate safely.
HF
its the overall layout in terms of logicality, intuitiveness and absence of clutter that is the more important factor.
HF
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However, human nature being what it is, this rationale might not be interpreted in exactly the same way by everyone - thus resulting in variations in preferences.
I am sure however that for fleet requirements (and therefore in line with this discussion) standardisation is desirable but it would be an interesting study to examine (most especially under critical circumstances) whether enhanced crew responses could be stimulated by different information display styles.
My feeling is that the clock vs strip is not the primary consideration, its the overall layout in terms of logicality, intuitiveness and absence of clutter that is the more important factor.
DB yes I agree on your point about different setups according to the task in hand. For fixed wing, they tend to land at an airfield, all of which are pretty much the same. For oil and gas RW we have offshore ops (flat earth, no need for EGPWS map), ARA where the primary navaid is the radar, onshore ops where EGPWS map can be useful, onshore instrument approaches, and of course visual approaches including night offshore ones. Then there are the different types of departures. But the SOPs should be defined for each of these scenarios so everyone is on the same page - literally!
"Destroy the Super Puma's"
Hey, I just had an idea! Lets find out all the offshore workers who signed the ridiculous Facebook page. Then BHL, CHC and Bond can put out a joint statement that sorry, anyone who signed may be a liability in flight due to predisposition to hysteria and will have to go by boat for a month. That would liven things up a bit!
OK it's Friday night and I may have had a G&T!
OK it's Friday night and I may have had a G&T!
In my experience the position of needles on an instrument doesn't really matter. I operated on a fleet that had a mixture of imperial and metric flight instrumentation. The instruments had different numbers of needles and different Zero positions and rattled through the numbers faster or slower depending on the data. We would fly a metric aircraft in kilometres at metric flight levels and cross seamlessly to a different authority using ICAO flight levels and then fly an imperial aircraft the same route with the same variations.
It doesn't happen now but in the past one could operate different types on a daily basis. I was operating three at one time. There was no problem even though the performances at different stages of flight were markedly different.
Apart from having six base checks in a year.
It doesn't happen now but in the past one could operate different types on a daily basis. I was operating three at one time. There was no problem even though the performances at different stages of flight were markedly different.
Apart from having six base checks in a year.
Yes, thanks for that, HC. The Loke Viking was very nice, the crew kind and considerate to those of us who'd just lost a friend or four, and they even tried to avoid us coming alongside in Lerwick at the same time as the Bibby Polaris was, with her cargo of AS332L2.
Enjoy your drink.
An observation; the plate that I have seen for LOC DME for 09 at Sumburgh includes the word "Recommended". Does that mean that a pilot may choose to deviate from the approach to descend below the profile?
Enjoy your drink.
An observation; the plate that I have seen for LOC DME for 09 at Sumburgh includes the word "Recommended". Does that mean that a pilot may choose to deviate from the approach to descend below the profile?
Last edited by diginagain; 31st Aug 2013 at 11:21.
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OK it's Friday night and I may have had a G&T!
It doesn't happen now but in the past one could operate different types on a daily basis. I was operating three at one time. There was no problem even though the performances at different stages of flight were markedly different.
... to go by boat for a month ...
OK it's Friday night and I may have had a G&T
As it appears now.....the main question is why did the Crew fail to keep the aircraft out of the water while on the approach?
2-3 miles out....the aircraft should have been at a fair height above the water.
They were trained, checked, and fully capable, qualified, and experienced Pilots in a very well equipped aircraft and were in weather conditions that were not extreme in any way.
This is the usual question that arises during any CFIT event usually.
If it had been an Inadvertent IMC event at night....or in rugged terrain....we could begin to understand it easier. This happened over the Sea...in daylight....while on a published approach to an airfield they were familiar with, and at the end of a routine flight from offshore.
This one needs to be studied intensely from the Human Factors perspective to determine what actions can be taken to prevent another situation like this one from occurring again. Was it training, SOP's, cockpit distractions, failure of the Autopilot that went un-noticed.....as despite it being apparently CFIT....there are still "Technical" issues that could be at play.
Last edited by SASless; 30th Aug 2013 at 20:02.
Sumburgh ILS
I think I saw this mentioned before. How about another ILS at Sumburgh?
It is becoming an O&G base again, SAR base, an alternate for Scatsta, and an enroute refuel stop for the East Shetland Basin. I would have thought there would be a lot of interest in getting a second glideslope, particularly given the weather in Shetland and the amount of activity both east and west of shetland.
Are we talking huge amounts of money and lots of calibration hassles??
It is becoming an O&G base again, SAR base, an alternate for Scatsta, and an enroute refuel stop for the East Shetland Basin. I would have thought there would be a lot of interest in getting a second glideslope, particularly given the weather in Shetland and the amount of activity both east and west of shetland.
Are we talking huge amounts of money and lots of calibration hassles??
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I'm sorry to say it appears this accident is down to the crew and whatever confused them on the approach.
Read between the lines here;
Read between the lines here;
The fatal Super Puma helicopter crash off Shetland was not caused by airworthiness or technical problems, based on current information, the Civil Aviation Authority has said.
Helicopter operators are making arrangements to return their fleets to service after the suspension of flights was lifted.
The CAA said it considered the decision to resume flights as "appropriate".
The flight data recorder is being analysed by investigators.
A CAA spokesman said: "As the UK's aviation safety regulator, protecting the public is our fundamental purpose.
"It was right that Super Puma operations were suspended in the immediate aftermath of the accident on 23 August, until further information was available.
"We have reviewed and assessed the evidence available, including the information already published by the Air Accident Investigation Branch and detailed information provided to us by the operators.
"Our team of specialists includes pilots who are experienced in flying the Super Puma AS332 L2 in the North Sea environment."
The spokesman added: "Based on all the information currently available, we do not believe that the accident was caused by an airworthiness or technical problem, and consider that the decision by the operators to resume Super Puma flights is appropriate.
"We would not allow a return to service unless we were satisfied that it was safe to do so. We will review the position if any new evidence comes to light."
None of the three North Sea helicopter operators had Super Puma passenger flights on Friday.
The Helicopter Safety Steering Group (HSSG) said a campaign to engage with the offshore workforce was under way.
Les Linklater of HSSG said: "Four people tragically lost their lives on Friday. However there are almost 16,000 people offshore currently, with over 12,000 in the most affected areas (central and northern North Sea).
"Today, there are over 250 people who have spent more than 21 days offshore, this is increasing daily and they and their families are wondering when they are going to get home.
"We have a duty of care to all offshore workers both in terms of their safety and their well-being; we must consider the cumulative risk of the 'time out'. We must avoid a further tragedy through the introduction of human factor-based risk such as fatigue, stress and other well-being concerns that increase the likelihood of a high consequence - low frequency event."
Four people died after last Friday evening's tragedy off Shetland
He added: "The individual helicopter operating companies will now work with their customers, to ensure the correct information and confidence-building communication is available, sensitive to the individual needs of the offshore workforce, before returning to full commercial passenger service."
Bob Crow, general secretary of the RMT transport union, told BBC Scotland's Good Morning Scotland programme that he backed the decision to return the Super Pumas to service, in light of the evidence currently available.
He said: "You've got to weigh up, at the end of the day, the pressures on individuals who are stranded on rigs and want to get back, or who've been away from work for two to three weeks.
"Also, at the end of the day, we've got to look at the evidence that was put in front of us and at this moment in time there's no reason why the crash was mechanical."
One offshore worker told BBC Scotland: "I am slightly concerned about how fast they are back out."
Another said: "Obviously there is a bit of concern because of what's been happening over the last couple of years, but basically (I will) try and put it to the back of my mind and just do what we are here to do."
The Air Accidents Investigation Branch (AAIB) said the Super Puma had appeared to show a "reduction in airspeed accompanied by an increased rate of descent".
The AAIB said it appeared the helicopter had been intact and upright when it entered the water.
Four people died when the Super Puma AS332 L2 went down close to shore on a flight to Shetland's Sumburgh Airport from the Borgsten Dolphin rig.
They were Duncan Munro, 46, from Bishop Auckland, Sarah Darnley, 45, from Elgin, Gary McCrossan, 59, from Inverness, and George Allison, 57, from Winchester.
The crash was the fifth incident involving Super Pumas in the North Sea since 2009.
Helicopter operators are making arrangements to return their fleets to service after the suspension of flights was lifted.
The CAA said it considered the decision to resume flights as "appropriate".
The flight data recorder is being analysed by investigators.
A CAA spokesman said: "As the UK's aviation safety regulator, protecting the public is our fundamental purpose.
"It was right that Super Puma operations were suspended in the immediate aftermath of the accident on 23 August, until further information was available.
"We have reviewed and assessed the evidence available, including the information already published by the Air Accident Investigation Branch and detailed information provided to us by the operators.
"Our team of specialists includes pilots who are experienced in flying the Super Puma AS332 L2 in the North Sea environment."
The spokesman added: "Based on all the information currently available, we do not believe that the accident was caused by an airworthiness or technical problem, and consider that the decision by the operators to resume Super Puma flights is appropriate.
"We would not allow a return to service unless we were satisfied that it was safe to do so. We will review the position if any new evidence comes to light."
None of the three North Sea helicopter operators had Super Puma passenger flights on Friday.
The Helicopter Safety Steering Group (HSSG) said a campaign to engage with the offshore workforce was under way.
Les Linklater of HSSG said: "Four people tragically lost their lives on Friday. However there are almost 16,000 people offshore currently, with over 12,000 in the most affected areas (central and northern North Sea).
"Today, there are over 250 people who have spent more than 21 days offshore, this is increasing daily and they and their families are wondering when they are going to get home.
"We have a duty of care to all offshore workers both in terms of their safety and their well-being; we must consider the cumulative risk of the 'time out'. We must avoid a further tragedy through the introduction of human factor-based risk such as fatigue, stress and other well-being concerns that increase the likelihood of a high consequence - low frequency event."
Four people died after last Friday evening's tragedy off Shetland
He added: "The individual helicopter operating companies will now work with their customers, to ensure the correct information and confidence-building communication is available, sensitive to the individual needs of the offshore workforce, before returning to full commercial passenger service."
Bob Crow, general secretary of the RMT transport union, told BBC Scotland's Good Morning Scotland programme that he backed the decision to return the Super Pumas to service, in light of the evidence currently available.
He said: "You've got to weigh up, at the end of the day, the pressures on individuals who are stranded on rigs and want to get back, or who've been away from work for two to three weeks.
"Also, at the end of the day, we've got to look at the evidence that was put in front of us and at this moment in time there's no reason why the crash was mechanical."
One offshore worker told BBC Scotland: "I am slightly concerned about how fast they are back out."
Another said: "Obviously there is a bit of concern because of what's been happening over the last couple of years, but basically (I will) try and put it to the back of my mind and just do what we are here to do."
The Air Accidents Investigation Branch (AAIB) said the Super Puma had appeared to show a "reduction in airspeed accompanied by an increased rate of descent".
The AAIB said it appeared the helicopter had been intact and upright when it entered the water.
Four people died when the Super Puma AS332 L2 went down close to shore on a flight to Shetland's Sumburgh Airport from the Borgsten Dolphin rig.
They were Duncan Munro, 46, from Bishop Auckland, Sarah Darnley, 45, from Elgin, Gary McCrossan, 59, from Inverness, and George Allison, 57, from Winchester.
The crash was the fifth incident involving Super Pumas in the North Sea since 2009.
.No, lock it down I say. Even the 225's ability to display various navaids on any screen, and the ability to select sector, HSI, rose, hover displays is getting close to 1 too many degrees of freedom, and has to be locked down by rigorous SOPs.
I think Scatsta should probably get 1st shout. They would be delighted with a localiser approach!
Digininagain, its a non-precision approach. Provided you don't go below the MDA and any other intermediate "not below" heights, the descent profile is advisory. Since you are approaching over water, in this case there aren't any intermediate "not below"s for this one -ie no high ground etc.
Did I hear someone whisper "CDFA"?
Digininagain, its a non-precision approach. Provided you don't go below the MDA and any other intermediate "not below" heights, the descent profile is advisory. Since you are approaching over water, in this case there aren't any intermediate "not below"s for this one -ie no high ground etc.
Did I hear someone whisper "CDFA"?
Last edited by HeliComparator; 30th Aug 2013 at 20:17.
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In previous major incidents the flight crew are quick to explain how the accident occurred.
We have not heard a peep in this case even though four passengers lost their lives.
Perhaps some on here discussing minor technical details might like to think how they would feel losing a loved one in such an accident
We have not heard a peep in this case even though four passengers lost their lives.
Perhaps some on here discussing minor technical details might like to think how they would feel losing a loved one in such an accident
Last edited by Ye Olde Pilot; 30th Aug 2013 at 20:15.
I know its late on Friday but...
I find this comment more than slightly alarming:
So the way I read that, any type with 10+ years of mature & safe (by any reasonable data measure) operation should be grounded in the event of any accident where the root cause is not immediately apparent (ie most of them) ???
This does seem to be a pretty seismic shift in CAA policy.
A CAA spokesman said:....
"It was right that Super Puma operations were suspended in the immediate aftermath of the accident on 23 August, until further information was available.
This does seem to be a pretty seismic shift in CAA policy.
Last edited by Non-Driver; 30th Aug 2013 at 20:43.
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Read this bit;
In other words this accident was not caused by technical problems.
Bob Crow, general secretary of the RMT transport union, told BBC Scotland's Good Morning Scotland programme that he backed the decision to return the Super Pumas to service, in light of the evidence currently available.
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Just seen the latest BBC report on this accident and feel totally gutted for the crew. To me, they may have simply proved the world that they’re human beings and as a result fallible. Sadly our work can be very very unforgiving. The AAIB will continue to do what they do best and produce a report that shall in time allow our industry learn.
This accident will test the companies flight safety principles and I hope it adheres to the corner stone of any effective SMS….the “just culture”. Far to many of our peers are flight safety stupid or perhaps ignorant is a better word. To much focus is placed on the processes of flight safety, corporate image and not the benefits of the just culture……but that’s another argument for another day.
Any pilot who believes this type of accident can’t happen to them is an idiot and a fool.
With regards to displays; dials illustrate a rate of change better than tapes, hence why the eurocopter products have a trend bar next to the airspeed/altitude tapes in attempt to overcome this inherent shortcoming.
Finally I hope the crew get all the support they need now and into the future.
This accident will test the companies flight safety principles and I hope it adheres to the corner stone of any effective SMS….the “just culture”. Far to many of our peers are flight safety stupid or perhaps ignorant is a better word. To much focus is placed on the processes of flight safety, corporate image and not the benefits of the just culture……but that’s another argument for another day.
Any pilot who believes this type of accident can’t happen to them is an idiot and a fool.
With regards to displays; dials illustrate a rate of change better than tapes, hence why the eurocopter products have a trend bar next to the airspeed/altitude tapes in attempt to overcome this inherent shortcoming.
Finally I hope the crew get all the support they need now and into the future.