AS332L2 Ditching off Shetland: 23rd August 2013
Civil S-65
SAS,
Actually there were two different projects, and not directly connected.
There was an S-65 Commercial Compound project, with a large group of design engineers assigned, down at the original a South Avenue ( Bridgeport ) plant. Rather large wings with a T-64/prop on each, cross-shafted to the main box and tail rotor. Likely that was the one Jock Cameron was involved with.
Later on, there was a much smaller effort, whose goal was simply to delineate the scope of work required to take the 53D and certify it. The laundry list was longer than one might think. There was no serious cabin stretch in this look, just the sort of stuff Nick did did in building the VH-92 demo aircraft. ( an aside there: that machine had the additional three force generators and the N/rev ride was excellent. An option that if made standard, would certainly have changed the general impression of the ride quality )
Neither concept generated anywhere close to a break even point in potential sales, or so was the word.
Thanks,
John
Actually there were two different projects, and not directly connected.
There was an S-65 Commercial Compound project, with a large group of design engineers assigned, down at the original a South Avenue ( Bridgeport ) plant. Rather large wings with a T-64/prop on each, cross-shafted to the main box and tail rotor. Likely that was the one Jock Cameron was involved with.
Later on, there was a much smaller effort, whose goal was simply to delineate the scope of work required to take the 53D and certify it. The laundry list was longer than one might think. There was no serious cabin stretch in this look, just the sort of stuff Nick did did in building the VH-92 demo aircraft. ( an aside there: that machine had the additional three force generators and the N/rev ride was excellent. An option that if made standard, would certainly have changed the general impression of the ride quality )
Neither concept generated anywhere close to a break even point in potential sales, or so was the word.
Thanks,
John
It is all well and good trying to design a cabin that is perfect for evacuation but it will take time (years) to design and certify such a helicopter. We have to look at the present cabins and improve them as required. This is not a new problem in the 1990s some oil companies wouldn't use the rear centre seat on the 332. The seats then were also more bulky and some had head rests as well.
Today the SP windows have been made bigger and the seats redesigned to be less bulky.
In my opinion more should be done in the way we operate to make sure that there is a standard which if flown correctly won't allow inadvertent ditchings.
I quote below from the ETAP accident report where a fully serviceable helicopter was "landed" on the water. The first quote concerns the initial approach.
This is not the way to approach a rig in those conditions - as a former shuttle pilot our limit for "cruise between rigs" was 500ft amsl. In those conditions I would approach at 500ft - flare height, with the intention of orbiting the rig to asses the way the fog banks were affecting conditions - Fog was a common problem in the ETAP area at certain times of the year. Once you assess that a bank is not going to interfere with your approach you make a slightly steeper descent keeping the green deck lights in view at all time. This was a routine procedure but I was very used to flying at night and on some contracts would do 21 night rig landings - 21 being a BP limit. So in a 2 week period off shore I would do a max of 294 night landings.
Contrast this with the experience level of the crew on the ETAP flight below.
12 night landings in the past 90 days it not very many!
To counter this lack of practice a solid foolproof way of approaching a rig at night has to be constructed. This has been done now and DB has done a lot of work to make the procedure safe and hopefully easy and foolproof to use.
A through review of all approach procedures needs to be done, across all 3 companies, to make sure that the best practice of one company can be used to improve the SOPs of the other. ideally the SOPs for every type of approach will be the same for each company
I won't prejudge the out come of the latest accident but if it was a procedural failure then 2 sophisticated SPs with good autopilots managed to "land" on the water. Procedures and autopilot settings have to be rigorously applied to stop this happening again.
HF
Today the SP windows have been made bigger and the seats redesigned to be less bulky.
In my opinion more should be done in the way we operate to make sure that there is a standard which if flown correctly won't allow inadvertent ditchings.
I quote below from the ETAP accident report where a fully serviceable helicopter was "landed" on the water. The first quote concerns the initial approach.
At 1831 hrs the helicopter descended to a height of 300 ft, at a range of 7 nm
from the ETAP. As it did so it entered low cloud and the crew lost sight of
the ETAP, so they commenced a climb and at a height of 400 ft they regained
visual contact with the platform. The crew discussed the conditions and agreed
that they had encountered a fog bank. They elected to remain at 400 ft and,
with 5 nm to run to the ETAP, continued the approach visually, monitoring
their range using the weather radar.vironment which allows
from the ETAP. As it did so it entered low cloud and the crew lost sight of
the ETAP, so they commenced a climb and at a height of 400 ft they regained
visual contact with the platform. The crew discussed the conditions and agreed
that they had encountered a fog bank. They elected to remain at 400 ft and,
with 5 nm to run to the ETAP, continued the approach visually, monitoring
their range using the weather radar.vironment which allows
Contrast this with the experience level of the crew on the ETAP flight below.
Night Deck Landings Commander 12 last 90days 15 last 365 Days
Co-pilot 9 last 90days 16 last 365 Days
Co-pilot 9 last 90days 16 last 365 Days
To counter this lack of practice a solid foolproof way of approaching a rig at night has to be constructed. This has been done now and DB has done a lot of work to make the procedure safe and hopefully easy and foolproof to use.
A through review of all approach procedures needs to be done, across all 3 companies, to make sure that the best practice of one company can be used to improve the SOPs of the other. ideally the SOPs for every type of approach will be the same for each company
I won't prejudge the out come of the latest accident but if it was a procedural failure then 2 sophisticated SPs with good autopilots managed to "land" on the water. Procedures and autopilot settings have to be rigorously applied to stop this happening again.
HF
Join Date: Aug 2012
Location: Hassocks, Mid-Sussex
Age: 67
Posts: 278
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
As mentioned previously, that a review of comparative North Sea operations will take place now seems inevitable. What one must try and do (as best as possible) is to ensure that such a review is accurate and takes the time necessary to draw-out those salient discoveries which could help NS operations overall.
No re the 53D
HC,
I imagine your comment addressed the economic practicality of the S-65 in that market, given the purchase price and operating costs. That was the issue, and you are correct.
On the flying side of the assessment though, the S-65 at that time was far and away the best flying big machine. Far better than the 61 and the early CH-47 models ( SA sort of sat on our hands there, and Boeing certainly did not! ).
Someone mentioned the S-64, in jest, and I'll just add that incorporating lateral shaft tilt provides for a zero roll angle hover attitude, but everything else associated with it is a downhill story. Example: think side slip angle ( heading vs track ) at the bottom end of a decelerated, slow approach in the fog/rain.
I imagine your comment addressed the economic practicality of the S-65 in that market, given the purchase price and operating costs. That was the issue, and you are correct.
On the flying side of the assessment though, the S-65 at that time was far and away the best flying big machine. Far better than the 61 and the early CH-47 models ( SA sort of sat on our hands there, and Boeing certainly did not! ).
Someone mentioned the S-64, in jest, and I'll just add that incorporating lateral shaft tilt provides for a zero roll angle hover attitude, but everything else associated with it is a downhill story. Example: think side slip angle ( heading vs track ) at the bottom end of a decelerated, slow approach in the fog/rain.
Last edited by JohnDixson; 1st Sep 2013 at 13:30. Reason: Typo
Brother Dixson,
Can you compare and contrast the Cabin size of the 53D and 92 for us?
If one were to modify the fuselage on the 53D....by adding large...like really large pop-out windows and install airline type seating...put a cabin door on both sides up front....and perhaps an emergency exit of huge proportions in the Ramp....how would that compare to the 92?
Can you compare and contrast the Cabin size of the 53D and 92 for us?
If one were to modify the fuselage on the 53D....by adding large...like really large pop-out windows and install airline type seating...put a cabin door on both sides up front....and perhaps an emergency exit of huge proportions in the Ramp....how would that compare to the 92?
Not sure about the cabin size, but S-92A D-value is about 21m (from memory happy to be corrected!), whereas a 53D is nearer 27m.
Chinook used to do it so there must be some, but without the HCA plates to hand are there many in the NS that could take the size?
Chinook used to do it so there must be some, but without the HCA plates to hand are there many in the NS that could take the size?
Rough comparisons....
S61 59 feet long, rotor diameter 62 feet max weight 19,000 lbs
53D 88 feet long, rotor diameter 72 feet, max weight 42,000 lbs
234 99 feet long, rotor diameter 60 feet, max weight 50,000 lbs
I think the weights for the 53D/234 might be the max weight for external load ops.
S61 59 feet long, rotor diameter 62 feet max weight 19,000 lbs
53D 88 feet long, rotor diameter 72 feet, max weight 42,000 lbs
234 99 feet long, rotor diameter 60 feet, max weight 50,000 lbs
I think the weights for the 53D/234 might be the max weight for external load ops.
Last edited by SASless; 1st Sep 2013 at 14:37.
Originally Posted by batboy1970
Apologies for not reading every post as this may have been asked already but has it been reported if any of the pax deployed rebreather and if it was effective or was the whole thing just to quick with there being no brace warning given, point raised is has the rebreather actually been used in anger ?? , personally I hated it on every foet I've done and found it so bloody diddly I'd likely take my chances without it
53D
SAS, there is a version of the 53D with 53E type blades qualified to 50K. Non-US military. Actually, we did a structural flight qual of a standard 53D to 50K prior to that. Same operator as I recall.
Internal loading.
Internal loading.
Last edited by JohnDixson; 1st Sep 2013 at 14:50. Reason: Added info
If one uses an 8,000 pound payload, figures 300 pounds per passenger including baggage, that still allows for 27 passengers or so.
With the 50,000 weight limit....that adds about 10,000 pounds more payload.....and a very crowded cabin yet again as the oil company would demand every single possible seat be filled.....say 60 passengers.
With the 50,000 weight limit....that adds about 10,000 pounds more payload.....and a very crowded cabin yet again as the oil company would demand every single possible seat be filled.....say 60 passengers.
As we appear to be onto hypothetical helicopters now; for ultimate passenger safety, if a helicopter such as an S-64 Skycrane was used, and passengers travelled in a purpose-made detachable freefall lifeboat suspended underneath, then the hazards of passenger evacuation, risk of drowning/hypothermia, need for immersion suits/liferafts etc. would all be avoided.
Savoia, great schematic but I can't help wondering what happens when the heli arrives in the water unexpectedly, no time to jettison the boat and it ends up being pushed under water by a bloody great big helicopter on top of it!
Guys we are getting into fantasy land now with these ideas of using airborne lifeboats, bigger helicopters and other slightly far fetched ideas which would take years to certify. The problem is now!!
The a/c SASLESS proposes below would never operate on the NS with out significant redesign and strengthening of every NS helideck - costing?????
For those indulging in this fantasy perhaps you should find out the answers to the following questions.
1. What is the maximum allowable landing weight that most NS helidecks are certified for?
2 What is the maximum "d" value that most NS helidecks are certified for?
3 How many passengers are you allowed to carry without a flight attendent?
4.What is the average crewchange number - bearing in mind you can't change large numbers as you lose continuity on the rig?
I know this thread is drifting at the moment due to the lack of further accurate info on what happened but hopefully we will get the fuller picture soon.
HF
The a/c SASLESS proposes below would never operate on the NS with out significant redesign and strengthening of every NS helideck - costing?????
If one uses an 8,000 pound payload, figures 300 pounds per passenger including baggage, that still allows for 27 passengers or so.
With the 50,000 weight limit....that adds about 10,000 pounds more payload.....and a very crowded cabin yet again as the oil company would demand every single possible seat be filled.....say 60 passengers.
With the 50,000 weight limit....that adds about 10,000 pounds more payload.....and a very crowded cabin yet again as the oil company would demand every single possible seat be filled.....say 60 passengers.
1. What is the maximum allowable landing weight that most NS helidecks are certified for?
2 What is the maximum "d" value that most NS helidecks are certified for?
3 How many passengers are you allowed to carry without a flight attendent?
4.What is the average crewchange number - bearing in mind you can't change large numbers as you lose continuity on the rig?
I know this thread is drifting at the moment due to the lack of further accurate info on what happened but hopefully we will get the fuller picture soon.
HF
Humm,
Is it really day dreaming....or is it provoking some discussion and thinking?
Yes....the North Sea decks are what they are....and the aircraft are what they are.....and the Pilots are what they are....and the Engineers are what they are....and the Safety Standards are what they are.....and on and on.
The question is again "Why?".
The answer lies in a multitude of answers based upon uncountable factors and issues resulting in Decisions that have brought us to where we are.
If we are to have this wide open, no holds barred, review of the North Sea Offshore Helicopter Industry we have all participated in.....then we need to open the box....climb outside the confines it puts upon us....and really "THINK" through all this.
Are we building Helicopters to fit the Decks or are we building Decks to fit the helicopters? Do we continue to place decks on Rigs and Platforms out of habit as an evolution or have the Engineers decided to build the Helideck then build the Platform/Rig to best accomodate the Helideck?
Are we building the right kind of decks, do we have the right kind of lighting, can we not devise some effective sort of Glide Slope lighting system or other kind of Glide Slope system?
Have we formulated a Low Altitude Enroute IFR structure that works for Helicopters? Do we have a method to track Helicopters effectively in a non-Radar environment? Is our methods of controlling offshore helicopter traffic truly innovative or just an evolution from things past?
How many questions can you think to ask....that seeks to fashion the future of Offshore Helicopter Aviation and not just describe the existing system?
That is the kind of review that needs doing.
In order to solve problems, one has to accept there is a problem, then define the problem, determine the significance of the problem, then assess priorities for each of the defined problems and after that....formulate a solution, implement the solution, then assess progress and correctness of the solution.
This thread has shown there to be a lot of immediate, fairly easy solved problems and issues. There are some not so simple and not so easily solved issues as well.
Hopefully, whatever review does take place is done with the intent to look forward as well backwards.
Just because we do something a particular way right now....does not mean it is the best way. Not everything we do today is bad but for sure we need to look at everything if we are to see real improvement in the system as a whole.
The system is that proverbial Chain.....if we ignore one link or fail to ensure the fitness of that one link....the Chain continues to fail with the results we see coming from all these accidents and crashes.
Is it really day dreaming....or is it provoking some discussion and thinking?
Yes....the North Sea decks are what they are....and the aircraft are what they are.....and the Pilots are what they are....and the Engineers are what they are....and the Safety Standards are what they are.....and on and on.
The question is again "Why?".
The answer lies in a multitude of answers based upon uncountable factors and issues resulting in Decisions that have brought us to where we are.
If we are to have this wide open, no holds barred, review of the North Sea Offshore Helicopter Industry we have all participated in.....then we need to open the box....climb outside the confines it puts upon us....and really "THINK" through all this.
Are we building Helicopters to fit the Decks or are we building Decks to fit the helicopters? Do we continue to place decks on Rigs and Platforms out of habit as an evolution or have the Engineers decided to build the Helideck then build the Platform/Rig to best accomodate the Helideck?
Are we building the right kind of decks, do we have the right kind of lighting, can we not devise some effective sort of Glide Slope lighting system or other kind of Glide Slope system?
Have we formulated a Low Altitude Enroute IFR structure that works for Helicopters? Do we have a method to track Helicopters effectively in a non-Radar environment? Is our methods of controlling offshore helicopter traffic truly innovative or just an evolution from things past?
How many questions can you think to ask....that seeks to fashion the future of Offshore Helicopter Aviation and not just describe the existing system?
That is the kind of review that needs doing.
In order to solve problems, one has to accept there is a problem, then define the problem, determine the significance of the problem, then assess priorities for each of the defined problems and after that....formulate a solution, implement the solution, then assess progress and correctness of the solution.
This thread has shown there to be a lot of immediate, fairly easy solved problems and issues. There are some not so simple and not so easily solved issues as well.
Hopefully, whatever review does take place is done with the intent to look forward as well backwards.
Just because we do something a particular way right now....does not mean it is the best way. Not everything we do today is bad but for sure we need to look at everything if we are to see real improvement in the system as a whole.
The system is that proverbial Chain.....if we ignore one link or fail to ensure the fitness of that one link....the Chain continues to fail with the results we see coming from all these accidents and crashes.
Join Date: Mar 2001
Location: UK
Posts: 206
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Hummingfrog,
Stop being boring, it's Sunday and SASless told us to think outside the box.
Perhaps Mechta's boat could have a couple of those paraglider propeller things on the sides to push it away from the plummeting/plunging/<insert unnecessarily dramatic Daily Mail verb here> helicopter?
Stop being boring, it's Sunday and SASless told us to think outside the box.
Perhaps Mechta's boat could have a couple of those paraglider propeller things on the sides to push it away from the plummeting/plunging/<insert unnecessarily dramatic Daily Mail verb here> helicopter?
Last edited by obnoxio f*ckwit; 1st Sep 2013 at 16:09. Reason: Adding "Hummingfrog" as SASless is too quick!
obnoxio f*ckwit
So 4 people have died, the passengers are very concerned about the size of the SP cabin and our oil industry is trying to find a quick solution to their concern so that helicopter transport capacity can be returned to a more normal level and you call it boring
If you want to indulge in fantasy solutions then perhaps another thread should be started to try and satisfy those who want to think out of the box!!
HF
Stop being boring, it's Sunday and SASless told us to think outside the box.
If you want to indulge in fantasy solutions then perhaps another thread should be started to try and satisfy those who want to think out of the box!!
HF