AS332L2 Ditching off Shetland: 23rd August 2013
Flying in on Dan Scare to start my Work Shift.....I always seemed to be praying to accept a missed approach and speedy return to Aberdeen.
SAS, you've quite spoiled my morning: I'd forgotten about DA and the 12" seat pitch lumbering in and out of Sumburgh 
Further thread drift, sorry........
Further thread drift, sorry........
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Kirkwall, would be pretty much be the same as Sumburgh, as would most East coast Airports with a South Easterly. The point is Sumburgh Head, the topography and the meteorological incidents that occur because of it.. not the smart arse comments that swell a pilot's already inflated ego in reminding everyone of the list of his accomplishments.
Two pilots sat in beautifully old, leather armchairs, discussing the follies of less experienced minnows..
EXP1: You know that chap was on minima...
EXP2: And What of it , in my vast experience, there's always a place to go.
EXP1: Well yes, of course old chap, no such thing as being in the ****, after all, we're both vastly superior due to our extensive TRI/TRE quals., not like any of us would cock it up, exspesho since we're ex mil, and even better, ex Crabs!
EXP2: Well of course, who could doubt your superior wit and knowledge No 1...
EXP1: Fancy a blow job on account of your amazing knowledge and all round superiority..?
A mate of mine told me that Pprune was a place where all decent and professional pilots avoided because the forum that should be the place to go...was filled wit wee men wit weeer breeans...
Bring it mofos..
Two pilots sat in beautifully old, leather armchairs, discussing the follies of less experienced minnows..
EXP1: You know that chap was on minima...
EXP2: And What of it , in my vast experience, there's always a place to go.
EXP1: Well yes, of course old chap, no such thing as being in the ****, after all, we're both vastly superior due to our extensive TRI/TRE quals., not like any of us would cock it up, exspesho since we're ex mil, and even better, ex Crabs!
EXP2: Well of course, who could doubt your superior wit and knowledge No 1...
EXP1: Fancy a blow job on account of your amazing knowledge and all round superiority..?
A mate of mine told me that Pprune was a place where all decent and professional pilots avoided because the forum that should be the place to go...was filled wit wee men wit weeer breeans...
Bring it mofos..
Last edited by Rotoronin; 12th Nov 2013 at 20:35.
Something suggests attrition from the Forum might pick up shortly.
Rotoronin
Check facts before you post drivel
Having used EGPB many times in poor weather you fly to minimums as accurately as possible and if no visual references you divert to the alternate that you MUST have!!
HF
Kirkwall, would be pretty much be the same as Sumburgh, as would most East coast Airports with a South Easterly.
METAR EGPC 231820Z 16007KT 6000 -RA FEW045 16/15 Q1011=
HF
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Rotornin:
Might explain why you are posting.
You suggest you are an expert on flying into Sumburgh yet since when has a Radar vectored LOC approach to RW09 involved flying over Sumburgh Head.
Not wanting to make light of a serious situation but 17kts hardly constitutes a windy day. I hope your posts are little more than an attempt to troll and not the reasoned beliefs of someone who flys!!
A mate of mine told me that Pprune was a place where all decent and professional pilots avoided because the forum that should be the place to go...was filled wit wee men wit weeer breeans...
You suggest you are an expert on flying into Sumburgh yet since when has a Radar vectored LOC approach to RW09 involved flying over Sumburgh Head.
Not wanting to make light of a serious situation but 17kts hardly constitutes a windy day. I hope your posts are little more than an attempt to troll and not the reasoned beliefs of someone who flys!!
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I don't fly rotary,. but there are 2 things from recent days that I feel I can comment on,
The first is to ask the question why rotary wing, with its ability to go forward, backwards, and if necessary nowhere fast is constrained to use facilities and procedures that were designed and intended for use by fixed wing aircraft that cannot do some of the things that rotary do extremely well. Yes, I'm sure that there will be screams of "beancounters" or similar, and I have copped that holding in a hover and letting down is a bad thing to do because of Vortex ring, which I will admit to not having heard about before this thread, but the question is still valid, with the modern aids available, and apparently installed on the most recent rotary wing machines, it should (in theory) be possible and feasible to approach a landing point from any direction and using pretty much any profile, the only limiting factors being the final transition to visual for landing, obstacle clearance and the ability of ATC to manage a much less structured system as a result.
Simulators, and this is an area I did some very specialised work in, for research rather than training, so the device was being used or operated by type rated crews that were not under training, they were being used to research possible new alerting or warning system responses.
The biggest hurdles I had to overcome, working with one of the partners of a major European manufacturer, was getting accurate information about how some of the aircraft systems really worked. Then there was the issue of fidelity of the device, the people carrying out the research were not fully aware of how important some of the underlying memory procedures are, and that if their device did not accurately replicate the real thing, a crew carrying out a memory items check list would be thrown by a non standard device, invalidating the research,
There is a fundamental requirement that what happens in the sim should transfer to the real thing without gotchas, and if there are gotchas, then the sim really should not be used for those areas, people do what they've been trained to do, not what they did with differences. Then there's the issue of the cost of getting the devices or components for the sim, we were replicating a complete overhead panel for a commercial twin jet, and the cost of buying the genuine dual illuminated switches would have been more than the total budget we had available, so we had to make them.
As has been mentioned, some procedures, concepts and training can be carried out without a level D, I did a system for a major airline that needed an MCC device that used Flight Sim 4, so a long time ago, but it worked very well and achieved the required result, but when it comes to type specific, then the fidelity and replication and response of the training device has to provide the same result as will happen in the real thing, and if it does not, then the sim has to be changed.
A long time ago, I made the comment that the day I saw a Windows logo on a flight deck would be the day I stopped flying on that aircraft type, and I've seen nothing at all to make me change that view, and that's after nearly 30 years working with PC level systems.
There are clearly some very experienced and skilled people contributing to this thread, it's a pity that they have not been brought together by either the CAA, AAIB or the operators for a round table discussion of the bigger picture, with the caveat that the discussions should be confidential for now, and that all opinions are valid.
A long time ago, someone said that what's needed is a shields down approach, and it looks to me like it's not quite there yet, and things like commercial competitive pressure, non aviation beancounters, legal eagle paranoia and simple fear factor are preventing this from happening in a timely manner. Maybe the regulatory side needs to mandate such meetings, so that they have to happen, but somehow, some of the issues that this thread is highlighting need to be addressed for the well being of the industry and more importantly, its passengers.
And yes, but not for this thread, some of the issues the NS is facing with rotary ops are also happening in fixed wing ops across the globe, they've been mentioned, and in some ways leave me cold, and I see little enthusiasm from the regulators to address them, which is scary, I spend more time as SLF than as a driver these days, so if I am letting someone else do the driving, I really want to be sure that they do have the skills to get me where I want to get to, and not end up in a smoking hole or worse somewhere unexpected due to lack of core skills or type specific understanding.
The first is to ask the question why rotary wing, with its ability to go forward, backwards, and if necessary nowhere fast is constrained to use facilities and procedures that were designed and intended for use by fixed wing aircraft that cannot do some of the things that rotary do extremely well. Yes, I'm sure that there will be screams of "beancounters" or similar, and I have copped that holding in a hover and letting down is a bad thing to do because of Vortex ring, which I will admit to not having heard about before this thread, but the question is still valid, with the modern aids available, and apparently installed on the most recent rotary wing machines, it should (in theory) be possible and feasible to approach a landing point from any direction and using pretty much any profile, the only limiting factors being the final transition to visual for landing, obstacle clearance and the ability of ATC to manage a much less structured system as a result.
Simulators, and this is an area I did some very specialised work in, for research rather than training, so the device was being used or operated by type rated crews that were not under training, they were being used to research possible new alerting or warning system responses.
The biggest hurdles I had to overcome, working with one of the partners of a major European manufacturer, was getting accurate information about how some of the aircraft systems really worked. Then there was the issue of fidelity of the device, the people carrying out the research were not fully aware of how important some of the underlying memory procedures are, and that if their device did not accurately replicate the real thing, a crew carrying out a memory items check list would be thrown by a non standard device, invalidating the research,
There is a fundamental requirement that what happens in the sim should transfer to the real thing without gotchas, and if there are gotchas, then the sim really should not be used for those areas, people do what they've been trained to do, not what they did with differences. Then there's the issue of the cost of getting the devices or components for the sim, we were replicating a complete overhead panel for a commercial twin jet, and the cost of buying the genuine dual illuminated switches would have been more than the total budget we had available, so we had to make them.
As has been mentioned, some procedures, concepts and training can be carried out without a level D, I did a system for a major airline that needed an MCC device that used Flight Sim 4, so a long time ago, but it worked very well and achieved the required result, but when it comes to type specific, then the fidelity and replication and response of the training device has to provide the same result as will happen in the real thing, and if it does not, then the sim has to be changed.
A long time ago, I made the comment that the day I saw a Windows logo on a flight deck would be the day I stopped flying on that aircraft type, and I've seen nothing at all to make me change that view, and that's after nearly 30 years working with PC level systems.
There are clearly some very experienced and skilled people contributing to this thread, it's a pity that they have not been brought together by either the CAA, AAIB or the operators for a round table discussion of the bigger picture, with the caveat that the discussions should be confidential for now, and that all opinions are valid.
A long time ago, someone said that what's needed is a shields down approach, and it looks to me like it's not quite there yet, and things like commercial competitive pressure, non aviation beancounters, legal eagle paranoia and simple fear factor are preventing this from happening in a timely manner. Maybe the regulatory side needs to mandate such meetings, so that they have to happen, but somehow, some of the issues that this thread is highlighting need to be addressed for the well being of the industry and more importantly, its passengers.
And yes, but not for this thread, some of the issues the NS is facing with rotary ops are also happening in fixed wing ops across the globe, they've been mentioned, and in some ways leave me cold, and I see little enthusiasm from the regulators to address them, which is scary, I spend more time as SLF than as a driver these days, so if I am letting someone else do the driving, I really want to be sure that they do have the skills to get me where I want to get to, and not end up in a smoking hole or worse somewhere unexpected due to lack of core skills or type specific understanding.
Bertie you can bet your last dollar that the profile will have been beaten to death by numerous operators, synthetic or otherwise.
Level D sims are in danger of pricing themselves out of the market place. Level B++ is all that is needed to meet standrads these days and they are half the price of a Level; D.
Irish Steve: I enjoyed your overview -seriously, I did. However might I be permitted to suggest that (and I can only speak for the UK) the civilian rotary world, on the whole, has its s*it in one sock! The big operators and the CAA agree on most things and our systems and safeguards tend to protect us from most evils out there.
We might need to draw breath remind ourselves that in instances such as this one - it is human error that spoilt the show, nothing else???
Level D sims are in danger of pricing themselves out of the market place. Level B++ is all that is needed to meet standrads these days and they are half the price of a Level; D.
Irish Steve: I enjoyed your overview -seriously, I did. However might I be permitted to suggest that (and I can only speak for the UK) the civilian rotary world, on the whole, has its s*it in one sock! The big operators and the CAA agree on most things and our systems and safeguards tend to protect us from most evils out there.
We might need to draw breath remind ourselves that in instances such as this one - it is human error that spoilt the show, nothing else???
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TC
I think your last line would have had David Beaty (the Naked Pilot) turning in his grave.... and Emil Zotov (The Zotov Error Map) chortling in his borsch.
The guy who created the Heindrich Pyramid theory based his calculations on 1930's data and methodology and his recipe for the reduction of accidents was to focus on the individual and the errors he/she made. Modern analysis recognises that accidents are a product of a process and the design of the process should be one that minimises the opportunity for error (accidents). The design of a process is a management responsibility and they must NOT escape from the investigation without an examination of the role their input or lack of input played.
The question to be asked is: "who chose the equipment for the helicopter?", then, "who designed the pilot training for that equipment?" then, "who approved the equipment and the training?"
You might go on to ask "who did the risk assessments", who designed the "change management" for the new equipment/procedures?"
When all has been analysed you may then point the finger at the operative - Joe Pilot.
G.
PS. Perhaps it is worth pointing out to those that are not aware that designing a better/safer system does not remove a 'hazard' - in the short term it actually creates a hazard and the risks associated with changing to a new system must be fully understood before making the change. Upgrading to a new sophisticated type brings a whole host of these issues but how many operators tested their internal systems to see if they could cope BEFORE taking delivery?
The guy who created the Heindrich Pyramid theory based his calculations on 1930's data and methodology and his recipe for the reduction of accidents was to focus on the individual and the errors he/she made. Modern analysis recognises that accidents are a product of a process and the design of the process should be one that minimises the opportunity for error (accidents). The design of a process is a management responsibility and they must NOT escape from the investigation without an examination of the role their input or lack of input played.
The question to be asked is: "who chose the equipment for the helicopter?", then, "who designed the pilot training for that equipment?" then, "who approved the equipment and the training?"
You might go on to ask "who did the risk assessments", who designed the "change management" for the new equipment/procedures?"
When all has been analysed you may then point the finger at the operative - Joe Pilot.
G.
PS. Perhaps it is worth pointing out to those that are not aware that designing a better/safer system does not remove a 'hazard' - in the short term it actually creates a hazard and the risks associated with changing to a new system must be fully understood before making the change. Upgrading to a new sophisticated type brings a whole host of these issues but how many operators tested their internal systems to see if they could cope BEFORE taking delivery?
Last edited by Geoffersincornwall; 13th Nov 2013 at 23:48.
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Here in Brazil the authority says it should only be Level C or D simulators for traning - yet are forced to accept level B by the North Sea operators and Eurocopter who only provide one level D world-wide with only half a year availability because the simulador is used for 2 types. If more and more training is to be done on the simulator it has to be right that it is the same as the aircraft?
voando, if you look at the actual difference in requirements between level D and level B /FTD3 you will see it's very minor and of no practical consequence. The Brazilian authorities have probably been taken in by the vociferous lobbying from the big (level D) sim manufacturers. If you ask people who have a passing knowledge of simulators you will usually find they have a completely false idea of what the differences are ( I did, until I read the documents!).
Question for those in the know.
Does the SFIM (SAGEM) AP 155 have speed protection for Vmin Autopilot/IMC?
Does the SFIM (SAGEM) AP 155 have speed protection for Vmin Autopilot/IMC?
The question to be asked is: "who chose the equipment for the helicopter?", then, "who designed the pilot training for that equipment?" then, "who approved the equipment and the training?"
You might go on to ask "who did the risk assessments", who designed the "change management" for the new equipment/procedures?"
When all has been analysed you may then point the finger at the operative - Joe Pilot.
You might go on to ask "who did the risk assessments", who designed the "change management" for the new equipment/procedures?"
When all has been analysed you may then point the finger at the operative - Joe Pilot.
The L2 has not had a previous CFIT accident so surely, the design, equipment and training must have been adequate for some time. It cannot suddenly become inadequate so I agree with TC's assessment in this case.
Last edited by industry insider; 14th Nov 2013 at 08:48. Reason: typo
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This discussion about the merits of a simulator is somewhat similar to those seen on PPRune about the 'best helicopter'. All such comparisons without reference to operational requirement are meaningless.
What is probably required is the provision of a list of objectives that must be met; in that way it might be possible to provide a correlation between the objective and the necessary FSTD terminology and functionality.
As previously discussed in this thread, this operational requirement will be divided into those elements that are part of the Type Rating and the elements association with the operation of the helicopter in its role.
Further, the operation of the helicopter in its role will differ between operators and, although this could be harmonised with the use of Universal SOPs for the most common activities of flight management, there are likely to be differences.
The efficient use of simulation therefore depends upon the definition of such operational requirements. Whilst the OEM might be able to provide the elements that are associated with the Type Rating, unless they have access to Universal SOPs for flight management in the role (provided by the operators in harmony), their contribution might have to involve dry leasing arrangements (which would be extremely difficult for smaller operators - which needs to be considered carefully).
In any case, the provision of a list of operational objectives (from the operational requirement) is the first essential step in associating the appropriate FSTD to the task. This could result in two improvements: the first would be requirements that are objective and correlate with the competence required; the second would be a more directed approach to the use of simulation that is more appropriate to the task (and cheaper).
Mars
What is probably required is the provision of a list of objectives that must be met; in that way it might be possible to provide a correlation between the objective and the necessary FSTD terminology and functionality.
As previously discussed in this thread, this operational requirement will be divided into those elements that are part of the Type Rating and the elements association with the operation of the helicopter in its role.
Further, the operation of the helicopter in its role will differ between operators and, although this could be harmonised with the use of Universal SOPs for the most common activities of flight management, there are likely to be differences.
The efficient use of simulation therefore depends upon the definition of such operational requirements. Whilst the OEM might be able to provide the elements that are associated with the Type Rating, unless they have access to Universal SOPs for flight management in the role (provided by the operators in harmony), their contribution might have to involve dry leasing arrangements (which would be extremely difficult for smaller operators - which needs to be considered carefully).
In any case, the provision of a list of operational objectives (from the operational requirement) is the first essential step in associating the appropriate FSTD to the task. This could result in two improvements: the first would be requirements that are objective and correlate with the competence required; the second would be a more directed approach to the use of simulation that is more appropriate to the task (and cheaper).
Mars
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Industry Insider
When a company embarks on a new fleet acquisition programme it should follow the pathway I described and this should apply for every change in an organisation, even if perceived as an improvement, it will involve the risks associated with 'change'.
Example - The Swedish military took a decision to retread experienced jet pilots into their helicopter force. No risk assessment was carried out and the result was that a pilot who was commanding a helicopter (seniority derived from jet-jockey days) carrying out SAR did not have the necessary experience to take on the task in the way he did. Result - accident, fatal I seem to recall.
All change carries risks and as one contributor has already remarked the growth in helicopter automation was not a 'big-bang' event but crept upon us incrementally. Looking back we can see that the risks associated with these new 'toys' were never fully understood. It is the case though that by doing a little digging we are finding out that there is a plethora of 'near misses' out there but nobody joined up the dots... until now.
It's not the helicopter itself that I am getting at but the way an organisation deals with it's introduction. It also needs to ask itself "are our current training systems going to deliver the right solution for the new equipment", along with "Are our SOPs adequate for the new type."
G.
Example - The Swedish military took a decision to retread experienced jet pilots into their helicopter force. No risk assessment was carried out and the result was that a pilot who was commanding a helicopter (seniority derived from jet-jockey days) carrying out SAR did not have the necessary experience to take on the task in the way he did. Result - accident, fatal I seem to recall.
All change carries risks and as one contributor has already remarked the growth in helicopter automation was not a 'big-bang' event but crept upon us incrementally. Looking back we can see that the risks associated with these new 'toys' were never fully understood. It is the case though that by doing a little digging we are finding out that there is a plethora of 'near misses' out there but nobody joined up the dots... until now.
It's not the helicopter itself that I am getting at but the way an organisation deals with it's introduction. It also needs to ask itself "are our current training systems going to deliver the right solution for the new equipment", along with "Are our SOPs adequate for the new type."
G.
I'm going to go out on a limb and say that I am not a fan of "management of change" processes as they currently are. Shock horror!
In my experience, a Management of Change process mostly revolves around writing a Management of Change document. Whilst it's true that this very process does encourage consideration of various factors, in the end there are so many factors, many of them somewhat etherial and hard to pin down in writing, that such a document and process becomes more of a poor replacement for informed management by an individual(s) suitably experienced, qualified and with good judgement.
This issue does of course relate to a general problem which is the proliferation of middle and senior management who have no idea of the practicalities of aviation, no experience in the role, and who consequently often show poor judgement in critical areas.
In summary, a management of change document is no substitute for having the right person in the right place. But unfortunately it is increasingly seen as so being.
In my experience, a Management of Change process mostly revolves around writing a Management of Change document. Whilst it's true that this very process does encourage consideration of various factors, in the end there are so many factors, many of them somewhat etherial and hard to pin down in writing, that such a document and process becomes more of a poor replacement for informed management by an individual(s) suitably experienced, qualified and with good judgement.
This issue does of course relate to a general problem which is the proliferation of middle and senior management who have no idea of the practicalities of aviation, no experience in the role, and who consequently often show poor judgement in critical areas.
In summary, a management of change document is no substitute for having the right person in the right place. But unfortunately it is increasingly seen as so being.
Geoffers
I was agreeing with TC that human error "spoiled the show" because the L2 is not a new type and there was no "change" associated with this accident. Any deficiencies in the MOC process and mis identification of the training needs would surely have shown up a long time ago?
HC
There has to be a form or a spread sheet for everything now. Its because the younger generation need to have a step by step process which has been mapped.
The days of being an expert are almost over, the lowering of education standards has ensured that the older generation have to write everything down so that the newer generation who have grown up without exams and with continuous assessment and multi-choice can follow instructions on how to do things (assuming they can read)
I was agreeing with TC that human error "spoiled the show" because the L2 is not a new type and there was no "change" associated with this accident. Any deficiencies in the MOC process and mis identification of the training needs would surely have shown up a long time ago?
HC
There has to be a form or a spread sheet for everything now. Its because the younger generation need to have a step by step process which has been mapped.
The days of being an expert are almost over, the lowering of education standards has ensured that the older generation have to write everything down so that the newer generation who have grown up without exams and with continuous assessment and multi-choice can follow instructions on how to do things (assuming they can read)