Helicopter - v - crane LONDON
Join Date: Aug 2003
Location: Not a million miles from EGTF
Age: 68
Posts: 1,579
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
When I fly my fixed wing toy, I am barrelling along at 100kts + but at 2000' or so. PB was flying much lower but the worrying thing for me was that there was quite a lot of text traffic. I know I can dictate a text on my smartphone so I don't have to key it in. Reading a reply is something different. I would be surprised if AAIB didn't remark on this in the final report
AnFI
If there is widespread FZFG, low cloud, poor visibility, temperatures around -5 & -6 and nil spread - how can you can you be so adamant in dismissing icing?
Even if you can fly in clear dry air (it was over London in nil wind so I seriously doubt it was crystal blue!), you still have to land. And you will be flying in cold air in a cold aircraft. So unless you are flying above an inversion - the incipient icing conditions below would almost certainly accumulate on the aircraft once you descend back into the saturated air below. And the ice might like your aircraft anyway, even if it is initially warmer than the icing conditions.
Seriouly AnFI - what do think is causing visibility to be poor, if not ice-cold condensation?
If there is widespread FZFG, low cloud, poor visibility, temperatures around -5 & -6 and nil spread - how can you can you be so adamant in dismissing icing?
Even if you can fly in clear dry air (it was over London in nil wind so I seriously doubt it was crystal blue!), you still have to land. And you will be flying in cold air in a cold aircraft. So unless you are flying above an inversion - the incipient icing conditions below would almost certainly accumulate on the aircraft once you descend back into the saturated air below. And the ice might like your aircraft anyway, even if it is initially warmer than the icing conditions.
Seriouly AnFI - what do think is causing visibility to be poor, if not ice-cold condensation?
Join Date: Oct 2012
Location: 15 DME
Posts: 109
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
robin - what are the differences that you would deem important between a/ reading a map or b/ reading a text ?
I would suggest that the last text was not read for a reason.
I would suggest that the last text was not read for a reason.
Last edited by Richard Westnot; 23rd Jan 2013 at 22:33. Reason: Add
Our discussion about Air Space, Rules, Minimum heights are all well and good.
But....we have to recall one small important point....the basic requirement to maintain adequate visibility to see and avoid obstacles and other traffic.
Ultimately....something happened that worked to allow the aircraft to strike the Crane....and that is where the focus of the investigation needs to be with all these other issues being ancillary to that singular focus.
But....we have to recall one small important point....the basic requirement to maintain adequate visibility to see and avoid obstacles and other traffic.
Ultimately....something happened that worked to allow the aircraft to strike the Crane....and that is where the focus of the investigation needs to be with all these other issues being ancillary to that singular focus.
Join Date: Sep 2008
Location: Cornwall UK
Age: 79
Posts: 507
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
The St Georges Wharf site was known as the Vauxhall-Effra site for some time in the town-planning world (CAA input para 5.29)
http://www.lambeth.gov.uk/moderngov/...18-11-2003.pdf
Para 4.7, same document, notes the 50-storey residential block replacing the 7-storey office 'Block L' of the earlier scheme approved ca.1999-2001
(I believe the Effra was a South London river which drained into the Thames nearby)
http://www.lambeth.gov.uk/moderngov/...18-11-2003.pdf
Para 4.7, same document, notes the 50-storey residential block replacing the 7-storey office 'Block L' of the earlier scheme approved ca.1999-2001
(I believe the Effra was a South London river which drained into the Thames nearby)
Last edited by A30yoyo; 23rd Jan 2013 at 23:17.
Join Date: Oct 2012
Location: 15 DME
Posts: 109
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
SASless - Not much that you have said I disagree with.
Notwithstanding that, the crane was notamed. The height information was available to the controller as was the position and height to the A109.
Notwithstanding that, the crane was notamed. The height information was available to the controller as was the position and height to the A109.
Join Date: Jul 2010
Location: Chobham
Posts: 116
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
On the subject of cold helicopters flying in cold conditions, did the interim report identify if the airframe had been cold-soaked all night outside, or wheeled out of a hangar, and if so when during the morning was it wheeled out and was the hangar heated overnight?
Aircraft and their instrumentation and electronics generally like to be warmed, gently.
A cold-soaked helicopter going into the prevailing conditions would be more likely to have associated problems.
Aircraft and their instrumentation and electronics generally like to be warmed, gently.
A cold-soaked helicopter going into the prevailing conditions would be more likely to have associated problems.
Join Date: Mar 2001
Location: Caribbean
Posts: 171
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
RW seriously - what's the difference between a map and reading / sending a text?? Try it, even sat at home behind a computer desk.
Instead of seconds with regard to a map, fractions of minutes with texts. 20 - 30 seconds a go at best with texts. In that time the whole situation and outside world has changed.
Anybody trying to defend a single pilot in marginal conditions at low level texting is barking up the wrong tree.
Instead of seconds with regard to a map, fractions of minutes with texts. 20 - 30 seconds a go at best with texts. In that time the whole situation and outside world has changed.
Anybody trying to defend a single pilot in marginal conditions at low level texting is barking up the wrong tree.
Join Date: Oct 2007
Location: Close to the hangar, UK.
Posts: 162
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
One factor I have not seen reflected in this thread yet is the commercial pressure the pilot was applying to himself.
Working as a contractor he was (presumably) only paid when he got to fly. The winter slowdown and recent poor weather may have made this day one of only a few in his diary (though I concede that I may be completely wrong here). The commercial pressure could be his financial pressure.
Was his decision to launch made because he was hoping for the best and in need of a "pay day"?
Working as a contractor he was (presumably) only paid when he got to fly. The winter slowdown and recent poor weather may have made this day one of only a few in his diary (though I concede that I may be completely wrong here). The commercial pressure could be his financial pressure.
Was his decision to launch made because he was hoping for the best and in need of a "pay day"?
Notwithstanding that, the crane was notamed. The height information was available to the controller as was the position and height to the A109.
Yet something happened to allow the aircraft to hit it....and only two basic choices exist....either it was in cloud/fog and could not be seen.....or it was visible and something happened that caused the aircraft to hit it despite being visible.
If it was in cloud...so was the aircraft.
It it was not in cloud....why did the Pilot not see and avoid the Crane?
I wouldn't dream of speculating on someone I'd never met's integrity but based on human nature, I would be inclined to suggest most motorists involved in an accident walk away convinced there was some reason it wasn't their fault. They can't all be correct!
The thought had occurred to me reading through that an average person in the position of the client may slant the words and emphasise the bit that later turned out to be important. Without the rest of the conversation that bit could be insignificant. That said its the bit the papers replay.... Nuff said.
I am very impressed by AAIBs response but still confused about 2 things though;
1) no mention about that the building had not yet made it onto aviation charts or approach plates - as discussed here a few days ago.
This would have been a significant factor IF the NOTAM was miles out geographically and even more so if the top of the building was in cloud (at 590ft) and the aircraft was descending/flying through that cloud as the AAIB radar height plot suggests.
Irrespective of anything else I struggle to believe such an experienced pilot would fly that close to the building itself - the only inference I can draw is that not only did he not see the crane he wasn't situationally aware of the building itself (maybe as there's nothing else around above 332ft on the charts)
2) NATS (apparently) released a statement to the press very very quickly saying that the aircraft had been previously under a service but wasn't at the time of the accident. Howcome? It was either in ClassA or ClassD talking to Thames Radar and being given instructions about where he could and couldn't go.
Did I misunderstand the statement or did it get reported wrong?
AAIB "at 07.55 GCRST was put under radar control..."
I have no axe to grind and just want to sort the wheat from the chaff but just become suspicious when there is a statement relating to the NOTAM but not the geographic accuracy of the notam IF that is questionable, no information on what the charts say but info on the ANO is quoted etc and I didn't see anything in the AAIB report stating that the ATC advised the aircraft of the NOTAM and/or the building - given the height (i know - altitude) of the aircraft (even if it is the pilots responsibility to ensure terrain clearance) it looks to me that the pilot and the controller were both not aware how close the obstacle was.
It sounds obvious but all the speculation about texting and icing seem to ignore the basic question - its a huge building and if you were aware it was there why would you even consider going that close that you could hit the crane?
So all said and done readgeoff asks a good question, you are en-route back to Redhill - client advises Battersea may be open. If not to just save a few minutes flying time why bother to land at Battersea ?
A) you have to as the weather seems too bad to continue - seems not by the casual R/T reference to it being "useful"
If you don't declare a wx diversion I assume you get charged full wack so probably marginal difference between the cost to RTB. Vs? Landing - why bother?
B) you suspect (or know) client intends to meet at Battersea to complete flight
Doesn't quite tally with the chill pill - I'm not that fussed if we don't go suggestion!
EDIT - please note i was typing while SASless was posting but both arrive at same key facts and were independent works!!
EDIT2 - OK I just re-read the AAIB RT transcripts - Thames Radar asked the pilot to call Battersea 7 seconds before impact. So even though it was only by a few seconds, technically not under NATS control. It has been speculated that a frequency change caused distraction, I'd have Battersea selected as my next flip-flop flying down H4 even if I didn't intend / need to call them just in case.
The thought had occurred to me reading through that an average person in the position of the client may slant the words and emphasise the bit that later turned out to be important. Without the rest of the conversation that bit could be insignificant. That said its the bit the papers replay.... Nuff said.
I am very impressed by AAIBs response but still confused about 2 things though;
1) no mention about that the building had not yet made it onto aviation charts or approach plates - as discussed here a few days ago.
This would have been a significant factor IF the NOTAM was miles out geographically and even more so if the top of the building was in cloud (at 590ft) and the aircraft was descending/flying through that cloud as the AAIB radar height plot suggests.
Irrespective of anything else I struggle to believe such an experienced pilot would fly that close to the building itself - the only inference I can draw is that not only did he not see the crane he wasn't situationally aware of the building itself (maybe as there's nothing else around above 332ft on the charts)
2) NATS (apparently) released a statement to the press very very quickly saying that the aircraft had been previously under a service but wasn't at the time of the accident. Howcome? It was either in ClassA or ClassD talking to Thames Radar and being given instructions about where he could and couldn't go.
Did I misunderstand the statement or did it get reported wrong?
AAIB "at 07.55 GCRST was put under radar control..."
I have no axe to grind and just want to sort the wheat from the chaff but just become suspicious when there is a statement relating to the NOTAM but not the geographic accuracy of the notam IF that is questionable, no information on what the charts say but info on the ANO is quoted etc and I didn't see anything in the AAIB report stating that the ATC advised the aircraft of the NOTAM and/or the building - given the height (i know - altitude) of the aircraft (even if it is the pilots responsibility to ensure terrain clearance) it looks to me that the pilot and the controller were both not aware how close the obstacle was.
It sounds obvious but all the speculation about texting and icing seem to ignore the basic question - its a huge building and if you were aware it was there why would you even consider going that close that you could hit the crane?
So all said and done readgeoff asks a good question, you are en-route back to Redhill - client advises Battersea may be open. If not to just save a few minutes flying time why bother to land at Battersea ?
A) you have to as the weather seems too bad to continue - seems not by the casual R/T reference to it being "useful"
If you don't declare a wx diversion I assume you get charged full wack so probably marginal difference between the cost to RTB. Vs? Landing - why bother?
B) you suspect (or know) client intends to meet at Battersea to complete flight
Doesn't quite tally with the chill pill - I'm not that fussed if we don't go suggestion!
EDIT - please note i was typing while SASless was posting but both arrive at same key facts and were independent works!!
EDIT2 - OK I just re-read the AAIB RT transcripts - Thames Radar asked the pilot to call Battersea 7 seconds before impact. So even though it was only by a few seconds, technically not under NATS control. It has been speculated that a frequency change caused distraction, I'd have Battersea selected as my next flip-flop flying down H4 even if I didn't intend / need to call them just in case.
Last edited by chopperchappie; 24th Jan 2013 at 00:28.
Join Date: Oct 2012
Location: 15 DME
Posts: 109
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
SASless - Indeed. Knowing that the pilot is spoken about here as being as professional. (and I do not doubt that for one minute) Could it not be that he was marginally on top of a layer and did not see the crane ?
I see no avoiding actions given to the A109 in the ATC transcript published by the AAIB.
I see no avoiding actions given to the A109 in the ATC transcript published by the AAIB.
Last edited by Richard Westnot; 24th Jan 2013 at 00:11.
That would bring up another issue....Cloud Separation requirements in the varying airspaces and under the various clearances given.
Join Date: Jul 2012
Location: Shropshire
Age: 51
Posts: 37
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Radar
How rude of you all, to look back in hindsight with 'this and that' arguments. None of you have waited for the official report before you commented.
From reading the forum, many of you appear to be an intrinsic part of the aaib. Or so it would seem.
Many people will have viewed this forum about what happened and what they will have seen is a bunch of non qualified opinions about what happened. Your view will be the basis of their view and I have no doubt will also become a reported view. Confirmed or otherwise.
None of us know what actually happened. Lets the aaib understand, reflect, report and advise before you all give your opinion.
From reading the forum, many of you appear to be an intrinsic part of the aaib. Or so it would seem.
Many people will have viewed this forum about what happened and what they will have seen is a bunch of non qualified opinions about what happened. Your view will be the basis of their view and I have no doubt will also become a reported view. Confirmed or otherwise.
None of us know what actually happened. Lets the aaib understand, reflect, report and advise before you all give your opinion.
Join Date: Dec 2005
Location: Nr Gatwick, UK
Age: 43
Posts: 16
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Mistaken Identity
IMHO, notwithstanding all the other questions regarding the decision to fly, and in-cockpit distractions, I think that the pilot was unfortunately,and tragically, geographically disorientated, if only for a fraction of the flight.
The AAIB ATC transcript reads that the captain stated he had visual with Vauxhall [Bridge - I assume] and requests entry onto H4 to head West to Battersea Heliport.
He is instructed to hold between Vauxhall and Westminster Bridge pending a decision from Battersea regarding his diversion request.
At this point from the radar track we see he descends, turns, and heads straight for...Grosvenor bridge (West of Vauxhall).
Could it be that in the poor conditions and at 1500ft he had a brief glimpse of Grosvenor bridge (GB) through a gap in the clouds, and simply mistook it for Vauxhall bridge (VB).
If he was correctly visually aware of his location, why would he head past his holding point, against ATC direction, unless he thought he was in the right place. The stretch of water between GB and VB is of a similar length to that of the stretch between VB and Westminster Bridge (WB).
His arc to the right side of the Thames prior to GB, then makes sense given he assumed there was a tall building lurking beyond the bridge on the left bank...which would have been true if he was indeed approaching Vauxhall.
Once given clearance to land at Battersea he turns to the right over what he assumes was WB area, way above any hazards below.
Up to this point the flight seemed to be impeccable (regardless of whether he should have been there), so it does not seem fitting that he would ignore ATC direction at a well known holding point, unless he had momentarily lost his situational awareness.
This is by no means a professional judgement, nor should it be taken as such. I am not an aviator, professional or otherwise, however I do have the utmost respect for those who are.
Apologies for any inaccuracies, I will certainly edit/remove the post if it causes any offence.
The AAIB ATC transcript reads that the captain stated he had visual with Vauxhall [Bridge - I assume] and requests entry onto H4 to head West to Battersea Heliport.
He is instructed to hold between Vauxhall and Westminster Bridge pending a decision from Battersea regarding his diversion request.
At this point from the radar track we see he descends, turns, and heads straight for...Grosvenor bridge (West of Vauxhall).
Could it be that in the poor conditions and at 1500ft he had a brief glimpse of Grosvenor bridge (GB) through a gap in the clouds, and simply mistook it for Vauxhall bridge (VB).
If he was correctly visually aware of his location, why would he head past his holding point, against ATC direction, unless he thought he was in the right place. The stretch of water between GB and VB is of a similar length to that of the stretch between VB and Westminster Bridge (WB).
His arc to the right side of the Thames prior to GB, then makes sense given he assumed there was a tall building lurking beyond the bridge on the left bank...which would have been true if he was indeed approaching Vauxhall.
Once given clearance to land at Battersea he turns to the right over what he assumes was WB area, way above any hazards below.
Up to this point the flight seemed to be impeccable (regardless of whether he should have been there), so it does not seem fitting that he would ignore ATC direction at a well known holding point, unless he had momentarily lost his situational awareness.
This is by no means a professional judgement, nor should it be taken as such. I am not an aviator, professional or otherwise, however I do have the utmost respect for those who are.
Apologies for any inaccuracies, I will certainly edit/remove the post if it causes any offence.
Join Date: Oct 2012
Location: 15 DME
Posts: 109
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Prazum - Eh ? 
Some of us have debated about what is in the preliminary AAIB report.
Some of us have debated about what is so far missing from the AAIB report.
And some just do not have a clue.
Some of us have debated about what is in the preliminary AAIB report.
Some of us have debated about what is so far missing from the AAIB report.
And some just do not have a clue.
Last edited by Richard Westnot; 24th Jan 2013 at 00:39.
Prazum,
Do tell us about it will you!
What's the old saying about the Pot and Kettle?
Do tell us about it will you!
what they will have seen is a bunch of non qualified opinions about what happened.
...Working as a contractor he was (presumably) only paid when he got to fly. The winter slowdown and recent poor weather may have made this day one of only a few in his diary (though I concede that I may be completely wrong here). The commercial pressure could be his financial pressure.
Was his decision to launch made because he was hoping for the best and in need of a "pay day"?
Was his decision to launch made because he was hoping for the best and in need of a "pay day"?
In this instance (in light of the information in the public arena so far, if true), I'm just left to wonder why, after the client cancelled, that the job still went ahead. To my way of thinking no point starting a job if you're not going to get paid for it, and particularly if it's going to cost the boss money.
Last edited by gulliBell; 24th Jan 2013 at 00:59.