North Sea heli ditching: Oct 2012
Yes I understand the stable state logic and I guess they have increased the priority for data collection for the relevant components. Although given the sweep of data collection takes around 30 minutes and the helicopter to be in a normal flight regime some condition indicators might not log very much data. In fact it would be interesting to see a data table for what is actually logged.
The time critical nature of indentifying a faliure and the effective lack of reliable data within timescales that correlate with the short time available to indentify any failure mean that with the current system its very hit and miss.
Especially given the need to indentify a significant up trend... So what is that absolutely??
As for flying on for 30 mins well forget that, it is the single most stupid piece of advice anyone could give.
Edited to add :- if you can tell from the download time at what point in the flight the acquisition was made why does the 3 hour flight time not start from that point??
Also I understood that if no data acquisitions had been made for 10 hours flight time it would flag?
The time critical nature of indentifying a faliure and the effective lack of reliable data within timescales that correlate with the short time available to indentify any failure mean that with the current system its very hit and miss.
Especially given the need to indentify a significant up trend... So what is that absolutely??
As for flying on for 30 mins well forget that, it is the single most stupid piece of advice anyone could give.
Edited to add :- if you can tell from the download time at what point in the flight the acquisition was made why does the 3 hour flight time not start from that point??
Also I understood that if no data acquisitions had been made for 10 hours flight time it would flag?
Last edited by Pittsextra; 22nd Nov 2012 at 09:21.
Also:-
So its taken a month to figure this out? EC on the ball.
Previous to yesterday the requirement was to check the download at the end of the flight and if the MOD45 acquisition was below the limits and no significant upward trend was noted the aircraft could go for another 3 hrs. This was reasonably fine for people who do a lot of straight and level with lots of acquisitions. However it didn’t cater for the people with a low number of acquisitions, the change is to tighten up on the foreseeable possibilities of operation.
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if you can tell from the download time at what point in the flight the acquisition was made why does the 3 hour flight time not start from that point??
It sort of does with effect from yesterday.
Edited to add
Also I understood that if no data acquisitions had been made for 10 hours flight time it would flag?
I may be wrong but I think you get a warning after 5hrs. At the moment if you don't get information for more than 3 hrs you have to NDT the shaft.
It sort of does with effect from yesterday.
Edited to add
Also I understood that if no data acquisitions had been made for 10 hours flight time it would flag?
I may be wrong but I think you get a warning after 5hrs. At the moment if you don't get information for more than 3 hrs you have to NDT the shaft.
Last edited by Pablo332; 22nd Nov 2012 at 10:23.
Its a mess and effectively the thing is grounded because its got so confused to the point that no one really has a good hand on this.
But its pretty clear the issue is accepted so how and why now?
Of the EC225's you run what is the highest hours?
But its pretty clear the issue is accepted so how and why now?
Of the EC225's you run what is the highest hours?
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I am not type-rated on these aircraft, but when I read the new EASA AD (released in the last 24 hrs) I got completely lost in the detail. Some of the detailed discussion was also less than reassuring, it seemed to me. The rationale still seems to rely on VM giving 100% reliable advanced warning, prior to failure.
Does anyone who thinks they understand where we are now want to give a summary in plain English?
Does anyone who thinks they understand where we are now want to give a summary in plain English?
Yes I'll have a go.
Much of the detail in the reason is sad and winding tale of how we got where we are now justifying the reasons and rational of prior AD's. Then we cut to the chase which is to try and keep these things in the air no matter what. (at some point the cockpit is going to be so littered with notices that forward viz might be an issue! - thankfully the CAA are not playing this silly game).
So the lastest one basically says with reduced torque that helps, that you can perform a check on the vertical shaft in situ that if you have M'ARMS check it and check it again and that there is now issue with AS332's.
With respect its becoming a bigger joke with each release and it feels like nobody at EC has a grip on this because the level of checking and restriction on the type show that essentially the EC225 is still FUBAR and the investigation is on going.
Someone needs to explain risk / reward to Eurocopter and EASA because the reward for limping on in this way is blown away by the downside of having another accident.
Much of the detail in the reason is sad and winding tale of how we got where we are now justifying the reasons and rational of prior AD's. Then we cut to the chase which is to try and keep these things in the air no matter what. (at some point the cockpit is going to be so littered with notices that forward viz might be an issue! - thankfully the CAA are not playing this silly game).
So the lastest one basically says with reduced torque that helps, that you can perform a check on the vertical shaft in situ that if you have M'ARMS check it and check it again and that there is now issue with AS332's.
With respect its becoming a bigger joke with each release and it feels like nobody at EC has a grip on this because the level of checking and restriction on the type show that essentially the EC225 is still FUBAR and the investigation is on going.
Someone needs to explain risk / reward to Eurocopter and EASA because the reward for limping on in this way is blown away by the downside of having another accident.
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Does anyone who thinks they understand where we are now want to give a summary in plain English?
AS332 with the old type shafts are unaffected by this AD although this effectively brings EASA, in a gentle way, into line with CAA for EC225 as it is practically impossible to comply with it in North Sea operation given the flight hours before check, maintenance flight or inspection of the MGB.
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Things appear to getting far to serious here.
Letts lighten the mood with a little survey of all the engineers that might be watching.
With regard to the Mlube system.
Did you find the N0 1 engine interface (A) bizarre no gasket and the clamp appears to have an imperial nut on it. Strange for a metric aircraft (B) apparently designed for the job.
P2.4 valve had any problems? (A) almost always leaks, to one degree or another(B) appears designed for the job.
P2.4 intercooler. (A) There is no A (B) designed for the job
Hose intercooler to P2,4 pressure sw manifold. (A) strange angle should have had a 45 degree angle on it.It always looks crushed(B) designed for the job.
Pipework from manifold to MGB. (A) how do you test that without removing the box? (B) designed for the job.
Glycol pump had any problems (A) not since I installed the replacement (B) designed for the job.
Maintenance panel had any problems? (A) it appears to dispense glycol into the MGB every time I put the battery on post maintenance, (B) appears designed for the job.
Pressure switches had any problems? (A) not to my knowledge apparently someone has quite recently. (B) Appears designed for the job.
Procedure in maintenance Manuel for testing M lube system (A) please don’t interrupt me I’m searching the hangar to coble something together. I’ve no chance of reproducing the Mk 1 regulator as I’m a new operator my makabel kit looks nothing like the picture trying to find something to fit the hose from the engine is doing my head in, how the hell do you get shop air to test it with at the required pressure without the P2.4 valve sounding like its about to mutate (B) designed for the job.
Edited to remove poor spelling.
Letts lighten the mood with a little survey of all the engineers that might be watching.
With regard to the Mlube system.
Did you find the N0 1 engine interface (A) bizarre no gasket and the clamp appears to have an imperial nut on it. Strange for a metric aircraft (B) apparently designed for the job.
P2.4 valve had any problems? (A) almost always leaks, to one degree or another(B) appears designed for the job.
P2.4 intercooler. (A) There is no A (B) designed for the job
Hose intercooler to P2,4 pressure sw manifold. (A) strange angle should have had a 45 degree angle on it.It always looks crushed(B) designed for the job.
Pipework from manifold to MGB. (A) how do you test that without removing the box? (B) designed for the job.
Glycol pump had any problems (A) not since I installed the replacement (B) designed for the job.
Maintenance panel had any problems? (A) it appears to dispense glycol into the MGB every time I put the battery on post maintenance, (B) appears designed for the job.
Pressure switches had any problems? (A) not to my knowledge apparently someone has quite recently. (B) Appears designed for the job.
Procedure in maintenance Manuel for testing M lube system (A) please don’t interrupt me I’m searching the hangar to coble something together. I’ve no chance of reproducing the Mk 1 regulator as I’m a new operator my makabel kit looks nothing like the picture trying to find something to fit the hose from the engine is doing my head in, how the hell do you get shop air to test it with at the required pressure without the P2.4 valve sounding like its about to mutate (B) designed for the job.
Edited to remove poor spelling.
Last edited by Pablo332; 22nd Nov 2012 at 17:05.
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HELINUT & MOODYMAN - where we are now is clearly explained on the Eurocopter website.
EUROCOPTER are testing an EC225 in the air at the moment in an attempt to isolate the cause of the crack in the shaft. They will continue to test until they, DGAC, EASA, CAA and AAIB are satisfied that they have identified the root cause. When they have identified the root cause they will set about working out how to overcome the problem in consultation and agreement with DGAC, EASA, CAA and AAIB. This is science not speculation.
EUROCOPTER are benchtesting a complete EMLUB system in order to establish the root cause of the erronous EMLUB failure indication under the appropriate MGB operating conditions. They will follow the same procedure as for the MGB until rectification is achieved.
In the meantime EUROCOPTER have issued an ASB to establish some interim management protocols for other variants that may be affected pending identification of the root cause.
This is a complex problem and EUROCOPTER cannot move forward without the agreement of at least 4 independant authorities.
I would suggest that the kind of science currently being deployed in the EUROCOPTER facilities far exceeds the experience and understanding of majority of the postings on this thread (including mine).
MOODYMAN - PM me and we can talk further about your worries re the 225/L2
DB
EUROCOPTER are testing an EC225 in the air at the moment in an attempt to isolate the cause of the crack in the shaft. They will continue to test until they, DGAC, EASA, CAA and AAIB are satisfied that they have identified the root cause. When they have identified the root cause they will set about working out how to overcome the problem in consultation and agreement with DGAC, EASA, CAA and AAIB. This is science not speculation.
EUROCOPTER are benchtesting a complete EMLUB system in order to establish the root cause of the erronous EMLUB failure indication under the appropriate MGB operating conditions. They will follow the same procedure as for the MGB until rectification is achieved.
In the meantime EUROCOPTER have issued an ASB to establish some interim management protocols for other variants that may be affected pending identification of the root cause.
This is a complex problem and EUROCOPTER cannot move forward without the agreement of at least 4 independant authorities.
I would suggest that the kind of science currently being deployed in the EUROCOPTER facilities far exceeds the experience and understanding of majority of the postings on this thread (including mine).
MOODYMAN - PM me and we can talk further about your worries re the 225/L2
DB
DB with respect your comments about the future do not stand the test of the recent past and even the current!
Currently even though EASA have moved closer to the CAA's treatment of the 225 they still do not hold a common view. The AAIB are just a reporting body and will be guided by the CAA/EASA. So qualify what this means:-
Currently this is very far from science. Given what has happened explain the latest EASA AD which is the what 4th or 5th ammendment and tell me where science plays any part?? Its a total embarresment.
The MOD45 data is so flakey that you might not even get reliable data for as many as 10 flight hours - so when you have a problem that might need attention within 3 flight hours you have a directive which just fudges things to work around.
Its not beyond people here because much of the solution is common sense and yet so far we have seen a total absense of common sense from EASA and Eurocopter.
Moodyman - until this has a proper analysis and remedy just stay away from the type. At the moment they assume the AS332 is ok on the old shaft and yet nobody can tell you why. Is it design or material for example.
Currently even though EASA have moved closer to the CAA's treatment of the 225 they still do not hold a common view. The AAIB are just a reporting body and will be guided by the CAA/EASA. So qualify what this means:-
This is a complex problem and EUROCOPTER cannot move forward without the agreement of at least 4 independant authorities.
The MOD45 data is so flakey that you might not even get reliable data for as many as 10 flight hours - so when you have a problem that might need attention within 3 flight hours you have a directive which just fudges things to work around.
Its not beyond people here because much of the solution is common sense and yet so far we have seen a total absense of common sense from EASA and Eurocopter.
Moodyman - until this has a proper analysis and remedy just stay away from the type. At the moment they assume the AS332 is ok on the old shaft and yet nobody can tell you why. Is it design or material for example.
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Is there any truth in the rumour (doing the rounds at ABZ) that one operator discovered a crack in a shaft when it was boroscoped post the ditching although there had been no indications on MARMS up to this point? If this I true then I think it puts a completely different slant on things. I find it hard to believe that an operator or EC would keep this quiet....
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PITSEXTRA - seeing as you seem to have all the answers why bother griping. Just phone Eurocopter and tell them the solution.
Telling a PAX to stay away from a type is fine but make sure include ALL the other types that have actually caused a loss of life.
Telling a PAX to stay away from a type is fine but make sure include ALL the other types that have actually caused a loss of life.
DB - THe only answer I have is to stop guessing at the answer and for EC to be brave and stop the drip drip of info that leads to further restrictions and work load on the ground crew that is a road that leads to those guys being over loaded and finger trouble. You know it does.
You said before :-
Is the same testing to isolate the cause that led to a particular set of shafts, that then wasn't when the October accident happened??
Good job.
Yes of course there are other types that have gone down but you know its the process here that is incredible. I mean whilst we are talking AS332L2 you might recall the accident that claimed REDL in April 2009 still had EASA Emergency (emergency!) AD's in July 2012 (see 2012-0129-E).
And in that AD it says:-
"Since issuance of EASA AD 2009-0099-E, the UK Air Accident Investigation Board published the final accident report. On the basis of these investigation findings, it has been decided to standardize the intervals of the visual checks of all electrical and non-electrical chip detectors, and to require this check for all models of the Super-Puma helicopter family, in order to increase the likelihood of detecting any adhered particles. This action must be accomplished on all rotor drive system gear boxes, i.e. on the MGB, but also on the Intermediate Gear Box (IGB) and the Tail Gear Box (TGB)."
Well the AAIB report into this was November 2011 so it took 8 months for EASA to the react but then and you might ask why is it the AAIB/EASA leading the way here and not the OEM?
Frankly I think it calls into question the quality of people at EC.
DB given your attitude to safety on another thread, trying to be-little peoples concerns is a poor show. Tell me do you think this has been handled well or that EC has done the right thing??
You said before :-
EUROCOPTER are testing an EC225 in the air at the moment in an attempt to isolate the cause of the crack in the shaft.
Good job.
Yes of course there are other types that have gone down but you know its the process here that is incredible. I mean whilst we are talking AS332L2 you might recall the accident that claimed REDL in April 2009 still had EASA Emergency (emergency!) AD's in July 2012 (see 2012-0129-E).
And in that AD it says:-
"Since issuance of EASA AD 2009-0099-E, the UK Air Accident Investigation Board published the final accident report. On the basis of these investigation findings, it has been decided to standardize the intervals of the visual checks of all electrical and non-electrical chip detectors, and to require this check for all models of the Super-Puma helicopter family, in order to increase the likelihood of detecting any adhered particles. This action must be accomplished on all rotor drive system gear boxes, i.e. on the MGB, but also on the Intermediate Gear Box (IGB) and the Tail Gear Box (TGB)."
Well the AAIB report into this was November 2011 so it took 8 months for EASA to the react but then and you might ask why is it the AAIB/EASA leading the way here and not the OEM?
Frankly I think it calls into question the quality of people at EC.
DB given your attitude to safety on another thread, trying to be-little peoples concerns is a poor show. Tell me do you think this has been handled well or that EC has done the right thing??
Tell me do you think this has been handled well or that EC has done the right thing??
