Shell drops Bond
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Fareastdriver
I think their shareholders and at-risk crews will be pleased with the business.
Jetboxer
It remains a fact that Bond have had more accidents operating from Aberdeen since they reformed than Bristow and CHC had in the previous 30 years+.
That is statistically significant fact.
Shell have the advantage of the greatest aviation advisors in the world, tough global aviation safety standards and have listened to their employees as a caring employer.
g-mady
BP have an inferior, US approach, to aviation safety and don't even have their own global standards!
Genie the Greenie
Do you say that to their faces my any chance big man?
No I thought not.
I bet Bristow is cursing their luck.
Jetboxer
It remains a fact that Bond have had more accidents operating from Aberdeen since they reformed than Bristow and CHC had in the previous 30 years+.
That is statistically significant fact.
Shell have the advantage of the greatest aviation advisors in the world, tough global aviation safety standards and have listened to their employees as a caring employer.
g-mady
BP have an inferior, US approach, to aviation safety and don't even have their own global standards!
Genie the Greenie
"roughy toughy North Sea tigers" who piss their pants at the slightest turbulence but are all "aviation experts"
No I thought not.
Last edited by Shell Management; 1st Jun 2012 at 19:21.
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SM
I know you find things a little tricky at times, not being a helicopter professional and all that, but I think you'll find that CHC hasn't been in the NS for 30 years and a lot of the local company are still there from the Bond buy out days - HS etc.
North Sea Tigers - there are some great characters offshore. If they weren't offshore, they wouldn't be heard. You lose your case slightly when you offer the "my dad is bigger than your dad" argument. Bless.
I know you find things a little tricky at times, not being a helicopter professional and all that, but I think you'll find that CHC hasn't been in the NS for 30 years and a lot of the local company are still there from the Bond buy out days - HS etc.
North Sea Tigers - there are some great characters offshore. If they weren't offshore, they wouldn't be heard. You lose your case slightly when you offer the "my dad is bigger than your dad" argument. Bless.
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SM - Are you statistically talking sh£t again?
SM,
Are you statistically talking sh£t again?
I'd rather not dwell on the past, as lessons have been learned, and some of the incidents below were tragically fatal.
However, highlighting the below, may put things into perspective.
I do notice you mention Aberdeen. If you put the blinkers on and just look at Aberdeen based aircraft, off the top of my head, Bristow have had 3 serious accidents, and CHC have had 1.
If you take the blinkers off:
Cormmorant A - 1992
Bristow - AS332L G-TIGH - Fatal (Serviceable aircraft CFIT)
North Sea - 1995
Bristow - AS332L G-TIGK - No Fatalities (Aircraft ditched following lightning strike)
Aberdeen - 1996
Bristow - AS332L G-TIGT - No Injuries (Serviceable aircraft rollover rotors turning at airport)
Southern North Sea - 2002
Bristow - S76 - G-BJVX - Fatal (Blade Manufacturing Defect)
West Navion North Sea - 2004
CHC - AS332 G-BKZE - 1 Injury (Serviceable aircraft roll over Rotors turning on deck)
Morecambe Bay - 2006
CHC - AS365 G-BLUN - Fatal (Serviceable Aircraft CFIT)
Dutch Sector - 2006
Bristow - AS332L2 G-JSAR - No injuries (Serviceabe aircraft Ditched)
Nigeria - 2009
Bristow - AS332L - No fatalities (Serviceable aircraft Ditched)
Some of the above accidents: the lightning strike, rollover on deck, and the S76 blade detachment lay no blame on the operator, in a similar fashion to the way that the last 2 Bond accidents 'may' lay no blame on the operator.
As previously mentioned, unfortunately, Bond are the 'unlucky' operator at this time, and I can understand the decision made by Shell. Human factors will inevitablely take a part in these decisions
However, I don't believe this decision has been based on statistics, facts, or logic.
It remains a fact that Bond have had more accidents operating from Aberdeen since they reformed than Bristow and CHC had in the previous 30 years+.
That is statistically significant fact.
I'd rather not dwell on the past, as lessons have been learned, and some of the incidents below were tragically fatal.
However, highlighting the below, may put things into perspective.
I do notice you mention Aberdeen. If you put the blinkers on and just look at Aberdeen based aircraft, off the top of my head, Bristow have had 3 serious accidents, and CHC have had 1.
If you take the blinkers off:
Cormmorant A - 1992
Bristow - AS332L G-TIGH - Fatal (Serviceable aircraft CFIT)
North Sea - 1995
Bristow - AS332L G-TIGK - No Fatalities (Aircraft ditched following lightning strike)
Aberdeen - 1996
Bristow - AS332L G-TIGT - No Injuries (Serviceable aircraft rollover rotors turning at airport)
Southern North Sea - 2002
Bristow - S76 - G-BJVX - Fatal (Blade Manufacturing Defect)
West Navion North Sea - 2004
CHC - AS332 G-BKZE - 1 Injury (Serviceable aircraft roll over Rotors turning on deck)
Morecambe Bay - 2006
CHC - AS365 G-BLUN - Fatal (Serviceable Aircraft CFIT)
Dutch Sector - 2006
Bristow - AS332L2 G-JSAR - No injuries (Serviceabe aircraft Ditched)
Nigeria - 2009
Bristow - AS332L - No fatalities (Serviceable aircraft Ditched)
Some of the above accidents: the lightning strike, rollover on deck, and the S76 blade detachment lay no blame on the operator, in a similar fashion to the way that the last 2 Bond accidents 'may' lay no blame on the operator.
As previously mentioned, unfortunately, Bond are the 'unlucky' operator at this time, and I can understand the decision made by Shell. Human factors will inevitablely take a part in these decisions
However, I don't believe this decision has been based on statistics, facts, or logic.
Last edited by Jetboxer; 1st Jun 2012 at 20:29.
Didn't the AAIB report on the fatal L2 accident say that Bond failed to carry the mandatory (in the MM) inspection of the epicyclic following the epicyclic chip warning? Bond said that EC had said in a phone call not to bother, but really such a thing should not be down to phone calls between 2 people with different 1st languages. Other operators might have handled it differently.
As to the latest one, too early to comment
As to the latest one, too early to comment
Nemo Me Impune Lacessit
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Possibly one of the biggest factors that influenced Shells decision was the fact that the unions were mobilising the safety officers to express their doubts about Bond. I would imagine that Shell would go a long way to avoid any industrial action on the North Sea.
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A couple missing off that list
Southern North Sea- March 2008
CHC - G-BKXD's tail strike on the Leman platform. (non-fatal)
Aberdeen - October 2006
Bristow - G-PUMI's rotor blade spindle crack. (non-fatal) Reading that report sends shivers down my spine.
Southern North Sea- March 2008
CHC - G-BKXD's tail strike on the Leman platform. (non-fatal)
Aberdeen - October 2006
Bristow - G-PUMI's rotor blade spindle crack. (non-fatal) Reading that report sends shivers down my spine.
Alarming though PUMI's incident was, I don't think you could describe it as an accident. Just a technical problem like any other, with the heli landing normally on the airfield moments later.
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HC
Using the same logic, if G-REDW had landed and the fault diagnosed by HUMS was found then it also wouldn't have been an accident. It is a case of timing, in this case about 10mins.
I respect your 225 knowledge, but your speculation as to where blame lays seems to totally ignore EC's role in this. In case you hadn't realised, EC announced the faulty batch of shafts before they had even looked at the aircraft. Whilst I think you may be trying to use this forum to take commercial advantage (which seems peculiar as I doubt you have shares in Bristow Group) then please don't try to paint Bond as the bad boy of the industry, we have the press to do that. Now if EC are blameless and it is all down to Bond's engineering processes, why are the aircraft all on 5hr monitoring and some of them on 3?
Using the same logic, if G-REDW had landed and the fault diagnosed by HUMS was found then it also wouldn't have been an accident. It is a case of timing, in this case about 10mins.
I respect your 225 knowledge, but your speculation as to where blame lays seems to totally ignore EC's role in this. In case you hadn't realised, EC announced the faulty batch of shafts before they had even looked at the aircraft. Whilst I think you may be trying to use this forum to take commercial advantage (which seems peculiar as I doubt you have shares in Bristow Group) then please don't try to paint Bond as the bad boy of the industry, we have the press to do that. Now if EC are blameless and it is all down to Bond's engineering processes, why are the aircraft all on 5hr monitoring and some of them on 3?
Cyclic, I already said it was too early to comment on REDW but I agree that probably the only fundamental difference between that and PUMI was the location where it happened.
I say "too early" because we don't yet know whether it was possible for Bond to have determined before despatch whether there was an adverse HUMS trend and I think it has previously been established that Bond do not process the HUMS data on each turnaround at base (rotors running) whereas we do. This I suspect is due to Bond policy of operating L2 and 225 as one fleet (RRTR HUMS download not possible on L2). However I am happy to be corrected on that.
Clearly the primary fault lies with EC for quality control etc, but it is the Operators duty to nevertheless catch these faults before they become an accident.
On the L2 accident I have no knowledge except for what was published in the report, and am only quoting the spirit (not letter) of that report.
Much more worrying than the actual events of ETAP, L2 and REDW themselves would be if Bond really felt they were absolutely not at all to blame for any of them, for then there would be no hope.
I say "too early" because we don't yet know whether it was possible for Bond to have determined before despatch whether there was an adverse HUMS trend and I think it has previously been established that Bond do not process the HUMS data on each turnaround at base (rotors running) whereas we do. This I suspect is due to Bond policy of operating L2 and 225 as one fleet (RRTR HUMS download not possible on L2). However I am happy to be corrected on that.
Clearly the primary fault lies with EC for quality control etc, but it is the Operators duty to nevertheless catch these faults before they become an accident.
On the L2 accident I have no knowledge except for what was published in the report, and am only quoting the spirit (not letter) of that report.
Much more worrying than the actual events of ETAP, L2 and REDW themselves would be if Bond really felt they were absolutely not at all to blame for any of them, for then there would be no hope.
Last edited by HeliComparator; 2nd Jun 2012 at 08:52.
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MP
Yes they are. It depends on the serial number of the component and the number of hours flown. EC originally wanted 4hrs between HUMS downloads but one of the operators pointed out to EC that they wouldn't be able to complete one of their contracted crew change flights due to the distance and time involved so EC agreed to 5hrs.
Yes they are. It depends on the serial number of the component and the number of hours flown. EC originally wanted 4hrs between HUMS downloads but one of the operators pointed out to EC that they wouldn't be able to complete one of their contracted crew change flights due to the distance and time involved so EC agreed to 5hrs.
Shell's contract with the Boeing 234 came to a grinding halt after the Sumburgh crash; almost certainly through personnel demands. The same eventually with Helicopter Service. This was despite the Chinook being recognised as one of the most safe and efficient helicopters ever built.
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Jetboxer - Thanks for taking the time to prove my point!
I specifically said Aberdeen because: 1) a Safety Case should be done for each base seperately, 2) Aberdeen is also the base that the majority of all new Bond's flying has been from and 3) it is the base where the vast majority of their AS332 family flying has been from. The last two points should actually favour Bond statistically.
So in 8 years Bond have lost 3 aircraft and 17 people.
My challenge to go back 30 yeras in Aberdeen finds that Bristow have lost two AS332 in 1995/1996 and CHC (including BAH, Britintel and old Bond) hae had one substantially damaged due to a deck roll over in 2004 (and I think that was rebuilt!). Both even predate Bond's reformation.
All the other cases you bring up were not Aberdeen or even Central North Sea ops (in fact you have scrapped the ESB, SNS, Irish Sea, Dutch sector SAR and Nigeria to try to reinforce your weak case).
The fact remains that the majority of accidents to Aberdeen helicopters have involved Bond
The advantage of small operators, which is why I prefer contracting with them, is that they know (or should know) that an accident can finish them (whereas the big boys can always point to all their other accident free experience).
So the small operators (in which I include all the Norweigian operators because they never really pay attention to their owners) really have to strive to be the best and listen to experts like Shell Aircraft.
Certainly a small operator with 3 strikes against them has little to fall back on.
The arguement that the MRGB failures 'could have happened to anyone else' is unconvincing because worldwide, Bond has such a tiny percentage of AS332L2 and EC225 experience. Other posters have noted that in cases the helicopters were meant to be being 'closely monitored'. I will say no more.
Now that management changes have started I can confidentally predict that by Christmas, certainly before the next anniversaries of the three accidents that:
I'm also sure that in 2 or 3 years, after they have built up EC225 experience in Denmark, Dancopter UK will appear. Maybe by 2020 there will by NHV UK too in Aberdeen!
If BMI Regional fold or relocate that will free up a nice new base on the east side. The old Heli-One hangar is still empty too.
Roll on some competition!
I specifically said Aberdeen because: 1) a Safety Case should be done for each base seperately, 2) Aberdeen is also the base that the majority of all new Bond's flying has been from and 3) it is the base where the vast majority of their AS332 family flying has been from. The last two points should actually favour Bond statistically.
So in 8 years Bond have lost 3 aircraft and 17 people.
My challenge to go back 30 yeras in Aberdeen finds that Bristow have lost two AS332 in 1995/1996 and CHC (including BAH, Britintel and old Bond) hae had one substantially damaged due to a deck roll over in 2004 (and I think that was rebuilt!). Both even predate Bond's reformation.
All the other cases you bring up were not Aberdeen or even Central North Sea ops (in fact you have scrapped the ESB, SNS, Irish Sea, Dutch sector SAR and Nigeria to try to reinforce your weak case).
The fact remains that the majority of accidents to Aberdeen helicopters have involved Bond
The advantage of small operators, which is why I prefer contracting with them, is that they know (or should know) that an accident can finish them (whereas the big boys can always point to all their other accident free experience).
So the small operators (in which I include all the Norweigian operators because they never really pay attention to their owners) really have to strive to be the best and listen to experts like Shell Aircraft.
Certainly a small operator with 3 strikes against them has little to fall back on.
The arguement that the MRGB failures 'could have happened to anyone else' is unconvincing because worldwide, Bond has such a tiny percentage of AS332L2 and EC225 experience. Other posters have noted that in cases the helicopters were meant to be being 'closely monitored'. I will say no more.
Now that management changes have started I can confidentally predict that by Christmas, certainly before the next anniversaries of the three accidents that:
I'm also sure that in 2 or 3 years, after they have built up EC225 experience in Denmark, Dancopter UK will appear. Maybe by 2020 there will by NHV UK too in Aberdeen!
If BMI Regional fold or relocate that will free up a nice new base on the east side. The old Heli-One hangar is still empty too.
Roll on some competition!
Last edited by Shell Management; 2nd Jun 2012 at 09:43. Reason: To remove a silly typo
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So is having only one main gearbox which takes all the flight loads.
It is perfectly possible to design a system where the main gearbox takes none of the flight loads and the flying controls are not attached to it.
Hughes 500, so not even a new concept.
It is perfectly possible to design a system where the main gearbox takes none of the flight loads and the flying controls are not attached to it.
Hughes 500, so not even a new concept.
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HC - no more so than tail rotor blades that depart the airframe, cabin doors that fly through the main disc, in flight rotor brake applications, or perhaps more pertinently, MGB's that have inadequate oil lubrication design that leads to catastrophic failure - despite certification implying otherwise!
I think a broad survey of CH47 failures over the last 4 decades would reveal that the interlocking rotors are not the prime reason for concern.
You know as well as I that its meticulous attention to design and rigourous CAME processes that are the keys to safety, not something a little bit different about the overall design.
Bond has been undergoing significant organisational change in recent years - now that can effect flight safety just as much as any design or engineering process faults. I suspect they may about to undergo more!
I think a broad survey of CH47 failures over the last 4 decades would reveal that the interlocking rotors are not the prime reason for concern.
You know as well as I that its meticulous attention to design and rigourous CAME processes that are the keys to safety, not something a little bit different about the overall design.
Bond has been undergoing significant organisational change in recent years - now that can effect flight safety just as much as any design or engineering process faults. I suspect they may about to undergo more!
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meticulous attention to
plus
SMS, QMS, EMS, SeMS, H&SMS, HEMP etc
Last edited by Shell Management; 2nd Jun 2012 at 09:59.
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