Shell drops Bond
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Sasless says:
Lets just point out that certain discerning customers are happy to fly with the EC225
But not with certain operators.
Kapiche!
The other question that is begged....is why did those gear boxes have the problems they did....to the same Operator in a relatively short time period? Is it the Gear Boxes were certified to a lower standard than today and thus have a Design problem....or if a "good" design....was there a Manufacturing failure of some kind.....
or if not the first two.....something done/not done in the maintenance engineering during operations?
Kapiche!
Hi Sas
The 225 gearbox is similar in concept to the older Super Puma but different in detail, certainly the upper part. Any change requires recertification which requires compliance with the current rules, hence the need to meet 29.927 30 mins after loss of oil.
The L2 was 1992 tech so pre- requirement mentioned above. The recent one was a 225, 2004 tech so had to comply with the requirement mentioned above.
As to the rest of your questions, yes the way I read the report there did seem to be something "not done" with the L2 crash following the chip 30 or so hours earlier. For the recent one, too early to say because no report out yet!
It certainly seems as though there was a manufacturing defect in the shaft. Which can happen but should be picked up by the manufacturer's quality control system. Whether Bond failed in some way to detect the impending failure, that another operator might have picked up in time, is too early to say.
The 225 gearbox is similar in concept to the older Super Puma but different in detail, certainly the upper part. Any change requires recertification which requires compliance with the current rules, hence the need to meet 29.927 30 mins after loss of oil.
The L2 was 1992 tech so pre- requirement mentioned above. The recent one was a 225, 2004 tech so had to comply with the requirement mentioned above.
As to the rest of your questions, yes the way I read the report there did seem to be something "not done" with the L2 crash following the chip 30 or so hours earlier. For the recent one, too early to say because no report out yet!
It certainly seems as though there was a manufacturing defect in the shaft. Which can happen but should be picked up by the manufacturer's quality control system. Whether Bond failed in some way to detect the impending failure, that another operator might have picked up in time, is too early to say.
B73,
HC may have been referring to a prior discussion about commonality of engineering procedures and whether in fact Bond uses different techniques than other Operators.....that may not be as effective as the other protocols.
That is not an indictment or slur on Bond....but it is a legitimate question in light of their experiences of late.
We have already seen that different models of the Puma have different capabilities re downloading of HUMS data during Rotors Running Turnarounds. Some Operators have insisted their aircraft have Mods to achieve that ability.
It stands to reason....others have not....and thus are operating to a lower standard in that regard.
HC can be a bit biased towards his 225 and prone to snipe about the 92.....but that doesn't mean every single comment he makes is an attempt to score points after the whistle has blown.
The 92 MGB situation deserves some criticism.....as does EC's gear boxes based upon Bond's experiences.
HC may have been referring to a prior discussion about commonality of engineering procedures and whether in fact Bond uses different techniques than other Operators.....that may not be as effective as the other protocols.
That is not an indictment or slur on Bond....but it is a legitimate question in light of their experiences of late.
We have already seen that different models of the Puma have different capabilities re downloading of HUMS data during Rotors Running Turnarounds. Some Operators have insisted their aircraft have Mods to achieve that ability.
It stands to reason....others have not....and thus are operating to a lower standard in that regard.
HC can be a bit biased towards his 225 and prone to snipe about the 92.....but that doesn't mean every single comment he makes is an attempt to score points after the whistle has blown.
The 92 MGB situation deserves some criticism.....as does EC's gear boxes based upon Bond's experiences.
Jeez, HC. You really can't help yourself (with your unnecessary attempts at point scoring), can you?
Epiphany
Call me pedantic if you like, but complying with 29.927(c) (1) with the installation of an emergency glycol lubrication system is not a true Run Dry system - à la the AW139 (I believe?), but Run Wet, so I would disagree with you.
HC
Some might just agree with you that my head works in funny ways, but “he who lives in a glass house……..” as they say.
With the O&G industry having to drill further offshore to find new oil and gas reserves, surely the idea of a 30-minute clearance is old hat, so the O&G industry should be pushing for 45-minutes or an hour even?
It does have a 30 min run dry capability - that's what the emergency lube system is - Glycol, not oil
HC
Some might just agree with you that my head works in funny ways, but “he who lives in a glass house……..” as they say.
With the O&G industry having to drill further offshore to find new oil and gas reserves, surely the idea of a 30-minute clearance is old hat, so the O&G industry should be pushing for 45-minutes or an hour even?
HiLife
The requirement is often misquoted as "run dry" but if you bother to read the actual requirement, it is for continued operation for 30 minutes after loss of oil by whatever means, not necessarily "running dry". So I would call you an incorrect pedant!
Of course it would be nice to have longer "run dry" time (yes, I am falling for it too!) but even 45 mins - 1hr doesn't take you very far at Vy. I am inclined to agree with the sentiments expressed by others here that one should only contemplate using the full "dry run" time if the option to land/ditch immediately looks unsurvivable, or if there is a solid landing site quite near. Would you really be happy trundling along for 1 hr not knowing whether the failure mode the gearbox is experiencing is one that the designers had thought of, or one that they had not thought of!
Who me? I am totally neutral of course!
The requirement is often misquoted as "run dry" but if you bother to read the actual requirement, it is for continued operation for 30 minutes after loss of oil by whatever means, not necessarily "running dry". So I would call you an incorrect pedant!
Of course it would be nice to have longer "run dry" time (yes, I am falling for it too!) but even 45 mins - 1hr doesn't take you very far at Vy. I am inclined to agree with the sentiments expressed by others here that one should only contemplate using the full "dry run" time if the option to land/ditch immediately looks unsurvivable, or if there is a solid landing site quite near. Would you really be happy trundling along for 1 hr not knowing whether the failure mode the gearbox is experiencing is one that the designers had thought of, or one that they had not thought of!
HC can be a bit biased towards his 225 and prone to snipe about the 92
Last edited by HeliComparator; 8th Jun 2012 at 15:57.
You are never going to get any gearbox system running 2,000 hp through it to run for 45 minutes dry and still be of a reasonable weight. You could piggyback two smaller gearboxes, with seperate lubrication systems; with both working in normal conditions. In an emergency one could run at a lighter load with the other, failed, freewheeling but it would take years to design, build and certify it. Even so, you would still have people dumping it into the sea at the first sign of trouble, so what's the point.
With the L2 accident as far as I understand the catastrophy happened when the gearbox case broke up. Some of the early helicopters had seperate support system for the main rotor so even if the gearbox dissassembled the aircraft was still supported and had managable Rrpm.
With the L2 accident as far as I understand the catastrophy happened when the gearbox case broke up. Some of the early helicopters had seperate support system for the main rotor so even if the gearbox dissassembled the aircraft was still supported and had managable Rrpm.
I wonder why the gearbox designers haven't repeated the emergency lube system in the S61, which had a separate sump of oil under the main gearbox. If the pilot operated a switch, it used an electric pump if I recall correctly to send oil to the high-speed hot gears/bearings at the input side.
Obviously such a separate reservoir of oil could be located anywhere in the vicinity of the gearbox and metered to supply just enough oil to critical areas to keep them from disintegrating for half an hour or longer while operating at reduced power.
Why use glycol? Is it lighter than oil? I believe that its main function is to cool; not to lubricate. Just curious.
Obviously such a separate reservoir of oil could be located anywhere in the vicinity of the gearbox and metered to supply just enough oil to critical areas to keep them from disintegrating for half an hour or longer while operating at reduced power.
Why use glycol? Is it lighter than oil? I believe that its main function is to cool; not to lubricate. Just curious.
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It must be remembered that Shell Aircraft International are the world leaders in aviation safety and the driving force behind all major safety successess of the last 20 years.
As ICAO run to catch up with SAI, the 7/7=1 initiative is the bedrock of the hole IHST initiative to reduce accidents globally by 80% in 10 years just as Shell has done:
Rotor & Wing Magazine :: 7/7=1
Or see more of SAI's industry leadership here:
on maintaining a safety case to show you are safe: http://www.caa.lv/upload/userfiles/f...%20Edwards.pdf
and
On making use of data like HUMS to prevent accidents: http://www.raes-hfg.com/reports/08de...e/comp-mon.pdf and http://www.hfdm.org/LinkClick.aspx?f...language=es-MX
and finally, most relavent here on monitoring compliance: http://www.ebace.aero/2011/archives/...-standards.pdf
As ICAO run to catch up with SAI, the 7/7=1 initiative is the bedrock of the hole IHST initiative to reduce accidents globally by 80% in 10 years just as Shell has done:
Rotor & Wing Magazine :: 7/7=1
Or see more of SAI's industry leadership here:
on maintaining a safety case to show you are safe: http://www.caa.lv/upload/userfiles/f...%20Edwards.pdf
and
On making use of data like HUMS to prevent accidents: http://www.raes-hfg.com/reports/08de...e/comp-mon.pdf and http://www.hfdm.org/LinkClick.aspx?f...language=es-MX
and finally, most relavent here on monitoring compliance: http://www.ebace.aero/2011/archives/...-standards.pdf
Safety initiatives like requiring companies to meet constantly changing requirements at the lowest possible cost and then, just when they have established themselves and proven themselves to be safe, reliable and consistent, taking the contract away and giving it to another operator just to save a few dollars - way to improve safety Mr Shell Management! 
Don't kid yourself - these improvements in safety have been brought about despite companies like Shell, not because of them!
Safety happens when good operators can run stable operations with sensible budgets and decent support form the client - it doesn't happen because some suit brings out a flashy brochure with some flow-charts and buzz-words in it.
Oh
Don't kid yourself - these improvements in safety have been brought about despite companies like Shell, not because of them!
Safety happens when good operators can run stable operations with sensible budgets and decent support form the client - it doesn't happen because some suit brings out a flashy brochure with some flow-charts and buzz-words in it.Oh
Of course there are new operators - you incentivise them into the marketplace to drive down costs, load contract terms to favour them at the expense of established operators, award the contract and then shaft them three years later in the same manner!
There is an argument for it making good commercial sense, but the suggestion that it is good for safety makes me want to puke!
There is an argument for it making good commercial sense, but the suggestion that it is good for safety makes me want to puke!
When helicopters are about 2% of the oil company's transportation budget....which is a very small portion of their operating budget....and some are making Tens of Billions of Dollars in profit.....and the shoddy way they treat the Helicopter Operators.....it just shows what their priorities are....and it isn't about fostering improved safety and good vender relationships.
Every oil company is the same in that regard.
When Chevron took over Texaco....where Texaco required twin engined aircraft....Chevron did not. Needless to say the standard did not go up during or after the take over. The Escravos operation was just GOM Africa.
Mind you some of the Operators need to take a hard look in the mirror as well.
Some one has to lead the process and do a marketing pitch to convince the customer of the financial benefit and operational efficiencies that can be brought about by improving the way they do business. Granted the Customer has to at least give the Operator a chance to make that pitch. We know how that game is played!
A while back someone noted smaller sized operators had far more to risk in the event of a fatal crash than did larger operators and thus smaller operators might tend to be more attentive to their engineering and operational procedures.
I guess we could say the same about the Oil Companies.....they have very deep pockets and a few fatalities now and then just don't amount to much in the way of Risk to the business and its profitability.....so they have a much more casual view of the odd crash now and then.
Every oil company is the same in that regard.
When Chevron took over Texaco....where Texaco required twin engined aircraft....Chevron did not. Needless to say the standard did not go up during or after the take over. The Escravos operation was just GOM Africa.
Mind you some of the Operators need to take a hard look in the mirror as well.
Some one has to lead the process and do a marketing pitch to convince the customer of the financial benefit and operational efficiencies that can be brought about by improving the way they do business. Granted the Customer has to at least give the Operator a chance to make that pitch. We know how that game is played!
A while back someone noted smaller sized operators had far more to risk in the event of a fatal crash than did larger operators and thus smaller operators might tend to be more attentive to their engineering and operational procedures.
I guess we could say the same about the Oil Companies.....they have very deep pockets and a few fatalities now and then just don't amount to much in the way of Risk to the business and its profitability.....so they have a much more casual view of the odd crash now and then.
Last edited by SASless; 9th Jun 2012 at 14:57.
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Every oil company is the same in that regard.
When Chevron took over Texaco....where Texaco required twin engined aircraft....Chevron did not.
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Well obviously most North Sea crews appreciate all the hard work that has gone into reducing the risk to them.
In fact I'm sure all SAI advisors would appreciate more feedback on how much their tireless work is appreciated.
In fact I'm sure all SAI advisors would appreciate more feedback on how much their tireless work is appreciated.
Last edited by Shell Management; 9th Jun 2012 at 15:06.
