Helicopter Crash Kills 3, Puts Transplant on Hold
Hit Google Earth and search for "Dynamite Road, Palatka Florida" for a good view of the terrain over which this crash occurred. The cross road in the news report was given as being Turkey Branch Road with the crash site within about a mile of the interesection supposedly.
Last edited by SASless; 28th Dec 2011 at 15:03.
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So Shytorque we are speculating why it crashed. You seem to be saying it crashed because it had but one engine and if it had two the pilot and passenger would have still been alive? (or this flight occurred in the UK)
Rotorspeed you seem to be saying it is not so much having 2 engines it is having IFR capability, right? Even though your rules say "No IFR in a single" it is not so much having 2 engines, it is having IFR capability....right? And if so (and we are still speculating why it crashed right?) if itis 206 had IFR capability we would not be having this discussion other then the UK regulated themselves out if one engine IFR even though you are saying it was not the engine that caused it but the lack of IFR capability? Right?
Rotorspeed you seem to be saying it is not so much having 2 engines it is having IFR capability, right? Even though your rules say "No IFR in a single" it is not so much having 2 engines, it is having IFR capability....right? And if so (and we are still speculating why it crashed right?) if itis 206 had IFR capability we would not be having this discussion other then the UK regulated themselves out if one engine IFR even though you are saying it was not the engine that caused it but the lack of IFR capability? Right?
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Just a few comments as the company is based at my local airport. This isn't exactly a "mom and pop" operation. They have about 35 employees with multiple jet aircraft and the accident B206 and an Agusta 109.
I suspect that the 109 may not be flying as the mishap pilot had a mishap taxiing at night on his ramp and put the tail rotor into some bushes. He neglected to report the mishap to the FAA and NTSB but they found out anyway.
Hoke Smith (68) was a very experienced pilot.
SK Jets has had a contract with Mayo Clinic in JAX to support their transplant program for a few years. This includes not only their helicopters but also their LearJets for more distant flights. As what was stated previously, this is not an EMS or HEMS operation, but a charter operation contracted to fly the transplant teams and organs.
The weather Jacksonville weather was 700 overcast but I don't know what the vis. was.
To make this tragic accident worse a needy patient did not receive the heart.
I suspect that the 109 may not be flying as the mishap pilot had a mishap taxiing at night on his ramp and put the tail rotor into some bushes. He neglected to report the mishap to the FAA and NTSB but they found out anyway.
Hoke Smith (68) was a very experienced pilot.
SK Jets has had a contract with Mayo Clinic in JAX to support their transplant program for a few years. This includes not only their helicopters but also their LearJets for more distant flights. As what was stated previously, this is not an EMS or HEMS operation, but a charter operation contracted to fly the transplant teams and organs.
The weather Jacksonville weather was 700 overcast but I don't know what the vis. was.
To make this tragic accident worse a needy patient did not receive the heart.
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And the airframe age makes no difference at all.
Last edited by EN48; 29th Dec 2011 at 14:40.
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So Shytorque we are speculating why it crashed. You seem to be saying it crashed because it had but one engine and if it had two the pilot and passenger would have still been alive? (or this flight occurred in the UK)
No, total rubbish. I've not said that the number of engines or geographical location was the cause, you've made that up. I have no idea why this accident occurred. My discussion has revolved around the differences in legislation between CAA and FAA and the history and reasoning behind the UK standpoint of not allowing single engined, and by definition VFR only, helicopter charters by night.
FYI, Regarding engines, I've absolutely nil personal objection to singles being operated under IFR in IMC provided they are properly equipped (been there, done that, used to be allowed in UK). I've been flying turbine engined rotary for a living since 1977, both single and twins, and never suffered any engine failure at all. A few I've had to shut down at short notice, in IMC as it happens (e.g. chip lights, oil overtemp), but no actual sudden failure. However, as someone else has mentioned, two engines isn't the real issue, it's the systems and redundancy that go with two engines that needs to be borne in mind.
Gomer pilot has it in one:
However, there is no way to break even, much less make a profit, using twin-engine two-pilot helicopters. And profit is the overriding issue, make no mistake about that.
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So, it is possible in the UK to have VFR only multis? Not likely they exist but is it the multi part that makes it legal to fly VFR at night or is it the equipment and the trained pilots? How is the law in the UK written?
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So, it is possible in the UK to have VFR only multis? Not likely they exist but is it the multi part that makes it legal to fly VFR at night or is it the equipment and the trained pilots? How is the law in the UK written?
Note: you can still fly single engine helicopter privately at night in the UK, just not for public transport.
BC
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BLCL, All those factors are part of the equation for operating IFR in helicopters in the UK.
If a twin engined helicopter doesn't meet the criteria for IFR flight in any way then it would be limited to VFR ops only.
You can look it all up here (I wish you good luck with finding your way round it, btw
):
CAP 393: Air Navigation: The Order and the Regulations | Publications | CAA
If a twin engined helicopter doesn't meet the criteria for IFR flight in any way then it would be limited to VFR ops only.
You can look it all up here (I wish you good luck with finding your way round it, btw
):CAP 393: Air Navigation: The Order and the Regulations | Publications | CAA
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EN48,
Don't want to sidetrack this interesting thread, but Gomer Pyle is right: the airframe age makes no difference at all.
Keep in mind that the only component remaining from 1976 may well have been the Bell nameplate attached to main shell structure, containing the cockpit, bathtub, rear seats and roof structure.
The remaining airframe components could have all been purchased new yesterday, for all we know.
The investigation will reveal if the airframe and powerplant components were maintained per OEM and FAA regs. But a 1976 ship does not by any stretch of the definition, mean it is an old "beater."
Again, this fact has nothing to do with the suitability of the Bell 206 for single pilot night VRF; which is another subject altogether.
Don't want to sidetrack this interesting thread, but Gomer Pyle is right: the airframe age makes no difference at all.
Keep in mind that the only component remaining from 1976 may well have been the Bell nameplate attached to main shell structure, containing the cockpit, bathtub, rear seats and roof structure.
The remaining airframe components could have all been purchased new yesterday, for all we know.
The investigation will reveal if the airframe and powerplant components were maintained per OEM and FAA regs. But a 1976 ship does not by any stretch of the definition, mean it is an old "beater."
Again, this fact has nothing to do with the suitability of the Bell 206 for single pilot night VRF; which is another subject altogether.
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Before Landing Check List.
It's all of the above. To save you a trawl through the entirety of UK legislation the Air Navigation Order (2009) defines the Performance Classes in Part 33, the equipment requirements in Schedules 4 & 5 and the licensing requirements in Schedule 7. The restriction on singles at night for public transport comes from the Air Navigation (General) Regulations of 2006 (Schedule 2).
So, it is possible in the UK to have VFR only multis? Not likely they exist but is it the multi part that makes it legal to fly VFR at night or is it the equipment and the trained pilots? How is the law in the UK written?
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Regarding minimum crew; an excerpt from UK's CAP393:
As mentioned before, VFR by night in UK doesn't exist. So two pilots must be carried by night in a non-autopilot equipped helicopter, irrespective of the number of engines it has.
The "floppy sticked" police helicopter I flew ten years ago would no longer be allowed to operate for that purpose by night because we could not carry two pilots.
Pilots required on public transport flights by helicopters of 5700kg or less
46 (1) Subject to paragraph (2), a helicopter registered in the United Kingdom must carry at least two pilots as members of its flight crew if it:
(a) is flying for the purpose of public transport;
(b) has a maximum total weight authorised of 5700kg or less; and
(c) is flying in circumstances where the commander is required to comply with the Instrument Flight Rules or is flying at night on a special VFR flight.
(2) A helicopter described in paragraph (1) is not required to carry two pilots if it:
(a) is equipped with an autopilot with altitude hold and heading mode which is
serviceable on take-off;
(b) is equipped with such an autopilot even though before take-off the autopilot is found to be unserviceable, if the helicopter flies in accordance with arrangements approved by the CAA; or
(c) is flying by day and remains clear of cloud and with the surface in sight.
46 (1) Subject to paragraph (2), a helicopter registered in the United Kingdom must carry at least two pilots as members of its flight crew if it:
(a) is flying for the purpose of public transport;
(b) has a maximum total weight authorised of 5700kg or less; and
(c) is flying in circumstances where the commander is required to comply with the Instrument Flight Rules or is flying at night on a special VFR flight.
(2) A helicopter described in paragraph (1) is not required to carry two pilots if it:
(a) is equipped with an autopilot with altitude hold and heading mode which is
serviceable on take-off;
(b) is equipped with such an autopilot even though before take-off the autopilot is found to be unserviceable, if the helicopter flies in accordance with arrangements approved by the CAA; or
(c) is flying by day and remains clear of cloud and with the surface in sight.
The "floppy sticked" police helicopter I flew ten years ago would no longer be allowed to operate for that purpose by night because we could not carry two pilots.
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If a twin engined helicopter doesn't meet the criteria for IFR flight in any way then it would be limited to VFR ops only.
You can look it all up here (I wish you good luck with finding your way round it, btw ):
CAP 393: Air Navigation: The Order and the Regulations | Publications | CAA
You can look it all up here (I wish you good luck with finding your way round it, btw ):
CAP 393: Air Navigation: The Order and the Regulations | Publications | CAA
"Just a pilot"
First, this was NOT an EMS flight. Nor was the flight transporting the transplant team Minnesota to Florida. The accident flight was a charter that happened to be a helicopter night flight. US HEMS has no bearing on this event, other than a few coincidental points: there were medical types on board a helicopter which crashed at night. Yes, I believe there's an issue inside US HEMS that results in a night accident rate about 4 times greater than our daytime rate. Perhaps the issues I see contributing to the problem were factors in this accident. Perhaps not.
I've not heard any mention that this was an NVG flight. I've been flying helos at night since 1968, my opinion is that aided night vision is magnitudes of order safer than unaided in spite of the hassles the equipment brings. The biggest single difference between day and night operations is being able to see...
There's nothing to indicate an engine failure, how does the fact that this was a single have any bearing? Because Great Britain's meteorology, transportation infrastructure, population density and culture require such-and-such to do this, that and the other thing? St Augustine, FL has very little in common with the British Isles.
I'm wondering why the transplant crew were being transported by helicopter from a quaint old village like St Augustine, which has no airline service, to a city, Gainesville, which has scheduled airline service? To substitute a 30 minute helicopter flight for a 20 minute cab ride?
How did the transplant team get to St Augustine?
How much notification and how long was the planning period for the helicopter pilot? What was his schedule, where was everybody in the sleep cycle?
I've not heard any mention that this was an NVG flight. I've been flying helos at night since 1968, my opinion is that aided night vision is magnitudes of order safer than unaided in spite of the hassles the equipment brings. The biggest single difference between day and night operations is being able to see...
There's nothing to indicate an engine failure, how does the fact that this was a single have any bearing? Because Great Britain's meteorology, transportation infrastructure, population density and culture require such-and-such to do this, that and the other thing? St Augustine, FL has very little in common with the British Isles.
I'm wondering why the transplant crew were being transported by helicopter from a quaint old village like St Augustine, which has no airline service, to a city, Gainesville, which has scheduled airline service? To substitute a 30 minute helicopter flight for a 20 minute cab ride?
How did the transplant team get to St Augustine?
How much notification and how long was the planning period for the helicopter pilot? What was his schedule, where was everybody in the sleep cycle?
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Irrespective of where the accident(s) occur, and how many engines the helicopter has, appreciation of human performance and limitations holds the main key to safe night operations.
However, if the industry will not self regulate out of concern for lost profits and the FAA regulators cannot/will not regulate because of pressure from the industry (as has been claimed in this discussion here) then nothing will change until the customer decides enough is enough.
However, if the industry will not self regulate out of concern for lost profits and the FAA regulators cannot/will not regulate because of pressure from the industry (as has been claimed in this discussion here) then nothing will change until the customer decides enough is enough.
nothing will change until the customer decides enough is enough.
How many more operators have to go out of business over there due to the sheer cost of compliance with all the rules and regs you folks suffer under? How many aspiring young folks will have to find non-aviation employment before the dream to fly dies in the UK?
As the CAA is required to turn a profit....and how does a guvmint operation ever do that realistically....do you think there will ever be a way to turn the situation around in the UK where aviation prospers witout the burden of expense you suffer from currentl?.
At least we see the entire population as being "Users" of the Aviation Infrastructure and thus support it with Tax Revenues so the costs are spread over a very large number of people rather than a small number as the UK does.
Point the finger this way....and be prepared to hear an opposing view point.
One can work in the US Helicopter industry a life time and do so safely....despite the negative influences and factors that one encounters.
If you remember your own posts about the "Old Days".....despite all the regulatory changes and other restrictions placed upon operations in the UK...the accident statistics are still about the same as for equivalent US operations. So what have you actually gained?
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NTSB Preliminary
NTSB Identification: ERA12MA122
Nonscheduled 14 CFR Part 135: Air Taxi & Commuter
Accident occurred Monday, December 26, 2011 in Green Cove Springs, FL
Aircraft: BELL 206B, registration: N5016M
Injuries: 3 Fatal.
This is preliminary information, subject to change, and may contain errors. Any errors in this report will be corrected when the final report has been completed.
On December 26, 2011, at 0554 eastern daylight time, a Bell 206B, N5016M, operated by SK Logistics, d.b.a. SK Jets, collided with terrain while maneuvering near Green Cove Springs, Florida. The certificated airline transport pilot and 2 passengers (a doctor and a medical technician) were fatally injured. The on-demand air taxi flight was conducted under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 135. Night instrument meteorological conditions prevailed and no flight plan was filed for the planned flight to Shands Cair Heliport (63FL), Gainesville, Florida. The flight originated from Mayo Clinic Heliport (6FL1), Jacksonville, Florida, about 0537.
According to representatives of the Mayo Clinic Hospital, Jacksonville, Florida, the flight was contracted by the hospital to carry a doctor and a medical technician to Shands Hospital, Gainesville, Florida, for the purpose of procuring an organ for transplantation. The flight was then to return to the Mayo Clinic Hospital with the procured organ. The flight did not arrive at Shands Hospital and was reported overdue by a Mayo Clinic Hospital representative, which activated local search and rescue operations. The wreckage was located about 1000 in a remote wooded area by the Jacksonville Sheriff's Department Aviation Unit.
According to preliminary radar and communication data from the Federal Aviation Administration, the helicopter departed 6FL1 to the southwest, flying a track slightly south and east of a direct course to 63FL. The pilot contacted Jacksonville Approach at 0549 to inquire about the status of restricted airspace. At 0550, the controller replied the restricted areas were inactive, and the pilot acknowledged the transmission. No further communications were received from the helicopter. During the enroute portion of the flight, the helicopter's altitude varied between 200 and 700 feet mean sea level (msl). The last radar target was recorded at 0553:23, about 1 mile north of the accident site, indicating an altitude of 300 feet msl.
A debris field was observed which originated with several trees that were severed by breaks at descending altitudes. The debris field was approximately 320 feet long, 70 feet wide, extending on a magnetic course of 172 degrees. The initial tree strike was at an estimated height of 30 feet above the ground, which severed an approximately 50-foot tall tree, at a ground elevation of 118 feet msl. The main wreckage was located about 175 feet along the debris path and approximately 80 percent of the wreckage was consumed during a postcrash fire. Sections of the skids, tailboom, main rotor blades, and engine were identified. The airframe and engine were retained for further examination.
The accident site was located about 12 miles northeast of Palatka Municipal Airport (28J), Palatka, Florida. The recorded weather at 28J, at 0554, was: wind 070 degrees at 5 knots; visibility 5 miles in mist; overcast ceiling at 400 feet; temperature 17 degrees C; dew point 15 degrees C; altimeter 30.21 inches Hg.
NTSB Identification: ERA12MA122
Nonscheduled 14 CFR Part 135: Air Taxi & Commuter
Accident occurred Monday, December 26, 2011 in Green Cove Springs, FL
Aircraft: BELL 206B, registration: N5016M
Injuries: 3 Fatal.
This is preliminary information, subject to change, and may contain errors. Any errors in this report will be corrected when the final report has been completed.
On December 26, 2011, at 0554 eastern daylight time, a Bell 206B, N5016M, operated by SK Logistics, d.b.a. SK Jets, collided with terrain while maneuvering near Green Cove Springs, Florida. The certificated airline transport pilot and 2 passengers (a doctor and a medical technician) were fatally injured. The on-demand air taxi flight was conducted under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 135. Night instrument meteorological conditions prevailed and no flight plan was filed for the planned flight to Shands Cair Heliport (63FL), Gainesville, Florida. The flight originated from Mayo Clinic Heliport (6FL1), Jacksonville, Florida, about 0537.
According to representatives of the Mayo Clinic Hospital, Jacksonville, Florida, the flight was contracted by the hospital to carry a doctor and a medical technician to Shands Hospital, Gainesville, Florida, for the purpose of procuring an organ for transplantation. The flight was then to return to the Mayo Clinic Hospital with the procured organ. The flight did not arrive at Shands Hospital and was reported overdue by a Mayo Clinic Hospital representative, which activated local search and rescue operations. The wreckage was located about 1000 in a remote wooded area by the Jacksonville Sheriff's Department Aviation Unit.
According to preliminary radar and communication data from the Federal Aviation Administration, the helicopter departed 6FL1 to the southwest, flying a track slightly south and east of a direct course to 63FL. The pilot contacted Jacksonville Approach at 0549 to inquire about the status of restricted airspace. At 0550, the controller replied the restricted areas were inactive, and the pilot acknowledged the transmission. No further communications were received from the helicopter. During the enroute portion of the flight, the helicopter's altitude varied between 200 and 700 feet mean sea level (msl). The last radar target was recorded at 0553:23, about 1 mile north of the accident site, indicating an altitude of 300 feet msl.
A debris field was observed which originated with several trees that were severed by breaks at descending altitudes. The debris field was approximately 320 feet long, 70 feet wide, extending on a magnetic course of 172 degrees. The initial tree strike was at an estimated height of 30 feet above the ground, which severed an approximately 50-foot tall tree, at a ground elevation of 118 feet msl. The main wreckage was located about 175 feet along the debris path and approximately 80 percent of the wreckage was consumed during a postcrash fire. Sections of the skids, tailboom, main rotor blades, and engine were identified. The airframe and engine were retained for further examination.
The accident site was located about 12 miles northeast of Palatka Municipal Airport (28J), Palatka, Florida. The recorded weather at 28J, at 0554, was: wind 070 degrees at 5 knots; visibility 5 miles in mist; overcast ceiling at 400 feet; temperature 17 degrees C; dew point 15 degrees C; altimeter 30.21 inches Hg.
During the enroute portion of the flight, the helicopter's altitude varied between 200 and 700 feet mean sea level (msl). The last radar target was recorded at 0553:23, about 1 mile north of the accident site, indicating an altitude of 300 feet msl.
The accident site was located about 12 miles northeast of Palatka Municipal Airport (28J), Palatka, Florida. The recorded weather at 28J, at 0554, was: wind 070 degrees at 5 knots; visibility 5 miles in mist; overcast ceiling at 400 feet; temperature 17 degrees C; dew point 15 degrees C; altimeter 30.21 inches Hg.
a Bell 206B... collided with terrain while maneuvering near Green Cove Springs, Florida.
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Seems a lot of these cfit (if that's what happened here) collisions, occur in met conditions that to the human senses are 'IMC', just that we have this inbuilt desire to continue to want/hope to see things outside the cockpit to remain VMC especially if we haven't planned to fly IFR. The purist can argue that 5 mile vis and 400' cloudbase are VMC, the counter argument would be that it was at night, over unlit terrain with no/few geographical features that could be seen, no horizon and without NVS so would need to be flown by reference almost entirely to instruments.
Did the aircraft have an autopilot and nav system at all?
Did the aircraft have an autopilot and nav system at all?
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From the accident report:
I note that Gainesville Regional airport lies 7 road miles/ 16 minutes drive away from the intended destination, according to Google Earth. Gainesville Airport is advertised as open 24/24 and appears to have an ILS on runway 11. The surface wind was easterly at 5 kts.
This flight appears to have been planned and attempted under "Night VFR" with a local 400 foot cloudbase. The sole crew member was apparently a highly experienced, 68 year old chief helicopter pilot.
Night instrument meteorological conditions prevailed and no flight plan was filed for the planned flight to Shands Cair Heliport (63FL), Gainesville, Florida.
This flight appears to have been planned and attempted under "Night VFR" with a local 400 foot cloudbase. The sole crew member was apparently a highly experienced, 68 year old chief helicopter pilot.