Helicopter Crash Kills 3, Puts Transplant on Hold
"Manouevring"?
Cloudbase of 400', DP/OAT very close - mist coming off the trees. No visual references to speak of.
He was looking for somewhere to land or something to give him a bearing, when at 100+ feet he clipped a tree and that was that.
Avoidable.
Unnecessary.
Tragic.
Cloudbase of 400', DP/OAT very close - mist coming off the trees. No visual references to speak of.
He was looking for somewhere to land or something to give him a bearing, when at 100+ feet he clipped a tree and that was that.
Avoidable.
Unnecessary.
Tragic.
Join Date: Feb 2005
Location: Australia
Posts: 1,957
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
The sole crew member was apparently a highly experienced, 68 year old chief helicopter pilot.
very sad.
Very sad yes but
'where obviously time to complete is usually a short window.'
is wrong. Harvesting organs is not urgent and donors will wait. If this poor chap had been put under time restraints by some doctor, nurse or administrator with no aviation experience it just makes the loss than much more poiniant. And reinforces the need to separate medical go:no go decisions from aviation ones. My organisation has always operated a chinese wall where the pilot knows very little about the reason for the flight and the doctor has no say whatsoever over the pilot. Sure, it isnt always absolute, but we do avoid 90% of the pressure on our pilots and it engendours an understanding amongst medical crew that the pilot's decision is his and his alone. Oh, and they know if they even joke about it they are history.
'where obviously time to complete is usually a short window.'
is wrong. Harvesting organs is not urgent and donors will wait. If this poor chap had been put under time restraints by some doctor, nurse or administrator with no aviation experience it just makes the loss than much more poiniant. And reinforces the need to separate medical go:no go decisions from aviation ones. My organisation has always operated a chinese wall where the pilot knows very little about the reason for the flight and the doctor has no say whatsoever over the pilot. Sure, it isnt always absolute, but we do avoid 90% of the pressure on our pilots and it engendours an understanding amongst medical crew that the pilot's decision is his and his alone. Oh, and they know if they even joke about it they are history.
homonculus is right,
transplants are not time critical in the same way like HEMS. They take the organs planned and in coordination with the receiver hospitals, but mostly at night. Usually they have more free operation rooms and medics at night and the daylight business can go in the normal way. Thats the simple reason for night transplant flights.
The problem is, they don't ask the flight crews about the weather. We are just service providers. Simple call and we have to come.
transplants are not time critical in the same way like HEMS. They take the organs planned and in coordination with the receiver hospitals, but mostly at night. Usually they have more free operation rooms and medics at night and the daylight business can go in the normal way. Thats the simple reason for night transplant flights.
The problem is, they don't ask the flight crews about the weather. We are just service providers. Simple call and we have to come.
The weather in the area at the time of the crash was reported to be 400/5sm and "Mist"....with a slight stirring wind...temp and dewpoint within 2 degrees.
That Sports Fans is not Night VFR weather for cross country flying in any helicopter.
That Sports Fans is not Night VFR weather for cross country flying in any helicopter.
Avoid imitations
Join Date: Nov 2000
Location: Wandering the FIR and cyberspace often at highly unsociable times
Posts: 14,576
Received 433 Likes
on
228 Posts
SASless, no of course not. That has been the whole point of my contributrions to these discussions about rotary accidents. So that is why I pointed out this:
A suitably qualified pilot flying a suitably equipped IFR helicopter could have chosen to do the return flight under IFR.
To clarify for the hard of understanding, I'd like to re-iterate, yet again, it's got NOTHING to do with the number of engines, unless you consider the OEI situation, of course. But these days the latter isn't what's repeatedly causing these accidents.
I note that Gainesville Regional airport lies 7 road miles/ 16 minutes drive away from the intended destination, according to Google Earth. Gainesville Airport is advertised as open 24/24 and appears to have an ILS on runway 11. The surface wind was easterly at 5 kts.
To clarify for the hard of understanding, I'd like to re-iterate, yet again, it's got NOTHING to do with the number of engines, unless you consider the OEI situation, of course. But these days the latter isn't what's repeatedly causing these accidents.
(I put this in the HEMS thread but it applies equally here. Rather than construct a new text, below is contents of an email on the subject sent to the Rapporteur of the ICAO HEMS WG in 2009.)
In my view the issue is not so much about the ability to fly in IFR (for which the certification criteria exists) but one of addressing the issue of flight in VFR when it is no longer possible (or really difficult) to "...be able to see outside the cockpit, to control the aircraft's attitude, navigate and avoid obstacles and other aircraft".
Jim
In my view the issue is not so much about the ability to fly in IFR (for which the certification criteria exists) but one of addressing the issue of flight in VFR when it is no longer possible (or really difficult) to "...be able to see outside the cockpit, to control the aircraft's attitude, navigate and avoid obstacles and other aircraft".
My main comment would be that problems are mostly associated with reduced visibility and, not necessarily, a descending cloud base. This leads to two additional problems:
1. How is visibility measured in flight (I don’t know the answer); and
2. What if the cloud is descending generally – executing the 180º will not result in a flight back into a clear area.
This is why I emphasized that the decision is never presented to the pilot in clear and unambiguous terms. On the other hand, if the aircraft is well equipped – either with two pilots or with an autopilot (but in any case with some form of augmentation); there is a buffer both in height and in control.
My view has always been that although Parts 27/29 have a clause that states in 2x.141(c):
Although the objective of the rule does state that visual cues must be “sufficient to safely control the helicopter”, we all know that this (subjective judgement) is totally reliant upon the other part of the equation - i.e. the stability of the helicopter. Whilst that stability is addressed by Appendix B to Parts 27/29 for any aircraft that is certificated for flight in IMC, it is not for most singles (and even some twins).
The handing qualities of the helicopter and the usable cue environment are inversely proportionate to each other. As the quality of handling increases, the requirement for visual cues reduces. At the extreme (with an auto-pilot), the only cues that are required, are those which provide for obstacle avoidance (not unimportant but of a secondary order).
This is not a message that is usually well received by regulators, or operators, as it really points to the necessity to address stability in a reduced visual cue environment – particularly at night. The traditional answer to this dilemma is to place a requirement, at night, for twins (knowing that most will come with certification for flight in IMC) - this is the European solution; in addition, in some States (the UK for one), airspace at night is designated IFR; which leads to the (JAR) requirement for an auto-pilot for single-pilot operations.
Night IFR in the UK does not mandate the full set of rules contained in ICAO Annex 2 but instead a quasi-night-VFR regime exists that permits operations below 3,000ft to be conducted much as they are for day VFR.
No simple answers but, if States wish to address the main issues, stability is key; it does not have to be twins, Appendix B to Parts 27/29 can be used for singles.
It is only when the issue of stability has been addressed that EVS or SVS come into play; they address (the secondary issue mentioned above of) obstacle avoidance but can never replace the necessity for good handling qualities.
1. How is visibility measured in flight (I don’t know the answer); and
2. What if the cloud is descending generally – executing the 180º will not result in a flight back into a clear area.
This is why I emphasized that the decision is never presented to the pilot in clear and unambiguous terms. On the other hand, if the aircraft is well equipped – either with two pilots or with an autopilot (but in any case with some form of augmentation); there is a buffer both in height and in control.
My view has always been that although Parts 27/29 have a clause that states in 2x.141(c):
The rotorcraft must: (c) Have any additional characteristics required for night or instrument operations, if certification for those kinds of operation is requested. Requirements for helicopter instrument flight are contained in appendix B.
It is well known that there are no enforced requirements for certification associated with night operations (or operations in a reduced visual cue environment by day). This is not such an issue in those States where aircraft used for night HEMS are twins certificated under Appendix B of Part 27/29, but in the USA where singles with no additional (stability) requirements are used, too much reliance is placed upon FAR 135.207:Sec. 135.207 - VFR: Helicopter surface reference requirements.
No person may operate a helicopter under VFR unless that person has visual surface reference or, at night, visual surface light reference, sufficient to safely control the helicopter
which, in an unlit area, relies upon the use of NVG to meet the visual surface reference requirements.No person may operate a helicopter under VFR unless that person has visual surface reference or, at night, visual surface light reference, sufficient to safely control the helicopter
Although the objective of the rule does state that visual cues must be “sufficient to safely control the helicopter”, we all know that this (subjective judgement) is totally reliant upon the other part of the equation - i.e. the stability of the helicopter. Whilst that stability is addressed by Appendix B to Parts 27/29 for any aircraft that is certificated for flight in IMC, it is not for most singles (and even some twins).
The handing qualities of the helicopter and the usable cue environment are inversely proportionate to each other. As the quality of handling increases, the requirement for visual cues reduces. At the extreme (with an auto-pilot), the only cues that are required, are those which provide for obstacle avoidance (not unimportant but of a secondary order).
This is not a message that is usually well received by regulators, or operators, as it really points to the necessity to address stability in a reduced visual cue environment – particularly at night. The traditional answer to this dilemma is to place a requirement, at night, for twins (knowing that most will come with certification for flight in IMC) - this is the European solution; in addition, in some States (the UK for one), airspace at night is designated IFR; which leads to the (JAR) requirement for an auto-pilot for single-pilot operations.
Night IFR in the UK does not mandate the full set of rules contained in ICAO Annex 2 but instead a quasi-night-VFR regime exists that permits operations below 3,000ft to be conducted much as they are for day VFR.
No simple answers but, if States wish to address the main issues, stability is key; it does not have to be twins, Appendix B to Parts 27/29 can be used for singles.
It is only when the issue of stability has been addressed that EVS or SVS come into play; they address (the secondary issue mentioned above of) obstacle avoidance but can never replace the necessity for good handling qualities.
Join Date: Oct 2006
Location: London
Posts: 68
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
It might seem fortunate that the organ was being picked up from Gainesville, and so the transplant recipient may well still have received it at some point...
I had a look and think the NTSB prelim has the location wrong, as 12Statute North East of Palatka Municipal is the St. John's River.
I'm guessing the site is north west, which tallies up with the other notes about being south and slightly east of direct track - something I'd perhaps put down to the pilot knowing the area and looking for lower terrain (the elevations are 20m (63') higher on the direct track than a point at Georges Lake (elevation 35m (118') amsl). Assuming I had more background about pilot and the conditions he was directly experiencing.
There is one small town 4sm to the southwest, and little else, with higher ground to the northwest, and the small lake, which would have been passed just ahead and to the pilot's right hand side.
I had a look and think the NTSB prelim has the location wrong, as 12Statute North East of Palatka Municipal is the St. John's River.
I'm guessing the site is north west, which tallies up with the other notes about being south and slightly east of direct track - something I'd perhaps put down to the pilot knowing the area and looking for lower terrain (the elevations are 20m (63') higher on the direct track than a point at Georges Lake (elevation 35m (118') amsl). Assuming I had more background about pilot and the conditions he was directly experiencing.
There is one small town 4sm to the southwest, and little else, with higher ground to the northwest, and the small lake, which would have been passed just ahead and to the pilot's right hand side.
Join Date: Dec 2007
Location: uk
Posts: 419
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Spot on Jim, sadly you can post that response every few months in reaction to the next (very predictable) event of this type. You have provided the reason these things happen and other posters on here have stated why it won't change (in the USA) so we'll sit back and wait for the next one in a few days, weeks or months....
Shame is that as pilots we know the risks and limitations of both ourselves and the equipment, our passengers haven't a clue.
Shame is that as pilots we know the risks and limitations of both ourselves and the equipment, our passengers haven't a clue.
Avoid imitations
Join Date: Nov 2000
Location: Wandering the FIR and cyberspace often at highly unsociable times
Posts: 14,576
Received 433 Likes
on
228 Posts
I had a look and think the NTSB prelim has the location wrong, as 12Statute North East of Palatka Municipal is the St. John's River.
Earlier a location near Turkey Branch Road, and Dynamite Road was given by local news folks....if my memory serves me correctly. Their description would be far more accurate than that of the NTSB's at this time I think.
I posted this earlier......
I posted this earlier......
Hit Google Earth and search for "Dynamite Road, Palatka Florida" for a good view of the terrain over which this crash occurred. The cross road in the news report was given as being Turkey Branch Road with the crash site within about a mile of the interesection supposedly.
