NH-90 problems
Does the RAAF have any role to play in Army aviation support? Not unknown for inter service rivalry to have a part to play, particularly as the RAAF lost the helos to the Army could there be knives out?
AUS $2,7 billion saving might be very conservative
This is an interesting counter-view on the actions taken with the Australian fleet, and a potentially identifiable source of some of the logistical issues. It is an interesting comparison between the experience of New Zealand and Australia, which has been discussed here in detail, but doesn't fully recognize the dissatisfaction expressed by other operators outside Australia, which is also discussed here.
https://asiapacificdefencereporter.c...nce-logistics/
By
Kym Bergmann / Canberra
(…)
Another issue in play is the figure being used by Army that retiring the MRH early rather than in 2037 will result in a $2.7 billion saving. The problem is that this improbably large number of $200 million per year can only be achieved if things are included that have no factual basis – such as equipment that isn’t needed or upgrades that don’t exist. It feels like someone has been given the job of finding a scary number and they have worked backwards to come up with the desired result. Defence has not responded to a request for a breakdown of the figure.
(…)
.
https://asiapacificdefencereporter.c...nce-logistics/
Helicopters-There is nothing wrong with Tiger and Taipan – the problem is Defence logistics
An Australian Army MRH90 Taipan helicopter from 6th Aviation Regiment conducts reconnaissance at Shepparton, Victoria. Credit: CoA / Carolyn BarnettBy
Kym Bergmann / Canberra
(…)
Another issue in play is the figure being used by Army that retiring the MRH early rather than in 2037 will result in a $2.7 billion saving. The problem is that this improbably large number of $200 million per year can only be achieved if things are included that have no factual basis – such as equipment that isn’t needed or upgrades that don’t exist. It feels like someone has been given the job of finding a scary number and they have worked backwards to come up with the desired result. Defence has not responded to a request for a breakdown of the figure.
(…)
.
Last edited by pitchlink1; 7th Apr 2023 at 06:45.
With 47 MRH90 each flying 300 hours per year and retirement is cut short with 30 years that equals 423 000 FH. The proposed saving of $2,7 billion divided by the FH gives a saving of $6k per FH. With a reported hourly cost of MRH90 of $50k per FH (which resonates well with other 90 users) and the FH cost of Hawks is $4-6k a saving of $6k/FH seems very conservative. Hence, the saving from early retirement is not $2,7 billion but three or four times that number. Possibly higher that $15 billion. Even if you add in the procurement cost of the new helicopters of $2,5 billion the saving is very substantial. Add better availability and less frustration and you have a extremely good case.
I remember he Seasprite fiasco in RAN and how well they same airframe was operating in NZ. Looks to the same again with the -90.
I'm sorry, why 30 years early? Isn't expected retirement, at least in the article you reference, set at 2037? That is 14 years away. That would be 197,400 hours.
I remember he Seasprite fiasco in RAN and how well they same airframe was operating in NZ. Looks to the same again with the -90.
I remember he Seasprite fiasco in RAN and how well they same airframe was operating in NZ. Looks to the same again with the -90.
ADF orders for 12 MRH90 in 2005 and 34 in 2006 were not completed on time and not considered at FOC until 2015. A retirement in 2037 would leave only 22 operational years which is far less than expected when the system was purchased in 2005 and 2006. Hence planned retirement time must be calculated from FOC, not delivery. Regardless of whether retirement is cut short of 14 or 30 years the cost saving estimate of 2,6bn seems very conservative. If we use your 14 years and 300 FH per year the saving is 13k per FH which still seems very low compared to the reported actual difference in cost (6k vs 50k). Even if you add in the procurement cost of the new AC the numbers are greatly in favor of a swap.
In an interview with Defence Connect, MAJGEN Jeremy King is indicating cost per flying hour of UH-60M will be around $10-14k per hour (presumably AUD), so those are already quite different figures, and he also says this is "a third of what we’re paying now” [for MRH-90] hence implying $30-42k per hour for MRH-90, so lower than the $50k:
https://www.defenceconnect.com.au/la...wk-acquisition
But regardless, even a 3x difference in operating cost per hour seems a lot for what otherwise seem broadly similar helicopters. So what is the explanation for this? Inconsistent accounting? Some or multiple elements of maintenance or spares for the MRH-90 being incredibly expensive (to the point of being a rip-off)? Is there anything on the public record that explains this in more detail than just the overall figures? Equally informative would be to see how these figures may have varied over the years and whether they have been reducing, remained steady, or perhaps even increased (in real terms) as the capability 'matured'.
The cost of the 40 UH-60M has been reported as US$1.95B. Not sure what this includes apart from the helicopters themselves, but this equates to ~US$50M per aircraft. If we factor this cost up from 40 to 47 helicopters (to compare to the number of MRH-90's we had), it would still amount to a significant AUD 3.5B now having to be invested earlier than previously intended.
Lets hope the capability and cost benefit assessment for the UH-60M is more robust than the acquisition process for the MRH-90 seems to have been based on the ANAO's audit of the project, some of which I have skimmed through to try to understand what had gone wrong:
https://www.anao.gov.au/sites/defaul...13-2014_52.pdf
Part of it says:
...This led to a Defence recommendation to the Minister for Defence in June 2004 that the S‐70M Black Hawk be selected as the preferred aircraft for Phases 2 and 4.
...In accordance with direction provided by the Minister for Defence and government, Defence developed alternate draft submissions, initially to ask ministers to choose between the two aircraft options—the MRH90 and S‐70M Black Hawk—and later recommending acquisition of the MRH90 for Phase 2 only...
How interesting it would be to be a fly on the wall for some of the meetings.
I find it staggering that cost per flying hour of a UH-60M could be $4-6k while it is $50k for an MRH-90. Is this really comparing apples with apples? What is included in these figures? maintenance?, fuel?, crew costs?, other nominally fixed annual sustainment costs?
In an interview with Defence Connect, MAJGEN Jeremy King is indicating cost per flying hour of UH-60M will be around $10-14k per hour (presumably AUD), so those are already quite different figures, and he also says this is "a third of what we’re paying now” [for MRH-90] hence implying $30-42k per hour for MRH-90, so lower than the $50k:
https://www.defenceconnect.com.au/la...wk-acquisition
But regardless, even a 3x difference in operating cost per hour seems a lot for what otherwise seem broadly similar helicopters. So what is the explanation for this? Inconsistent accounting? Some or multiple elements of maintenance or spares for the MRH-90 being incredibly expensive (to the point of being a rip-off)? Is there anything on the public record that explains this in more detail than just the overall figures? Equally informative would be to see how these figures may have varied over the years and whether they have been reducing, remained steady, or perhaps even increased (in real terms) as the capability 'matured'.
The cost of the 40 UH-60M has been reported as US$1.95B. Not sure what this includes apart from the helicopters themselves, but this equates to ~US$50M per aircraft. If we factor this cost up from 40 to 47 helicopters (to compare to the number of MRH-90's we had), it would still amount to a significant AUD 3.5B now having to be invested earlier than previously intended.
Lets hope the capability and cost benefit assessment for the UH-60M is more robust than the acquisition process for the MRH-90 seems to have been based on the ANAO's audit of the project, some of which I have skimmed through to try to understand what had gone wrong:
https://www.anao.gov.au/sites/defaul...13-2014_52.pdf
Part of it says:
...This led to a Defence recommendation to the Minister for Defence in June 2004 that the S‐70M Black Hawk be selected as the preferred aircraft for Phases 2 and 4.
...In accordance with direction provided by the Minister for Defence and government, Defence developed alternate draft submissions, initially to ask ministers to choose between the two aircraft options—the MRH90 and S‐70M Black Hawk—and later recommending acquisition of the MRH90 for Phase 2 only...
How interesting it would be to be a fly on the wall for some of the meetings.
In an interview with Defence Connect, MAJGEN Jeremy King is indicating cost per flying hour of UH-60M will be around $10-14k per hour (presumably AUD), so those are already quite different figures, and he also says this is "a third of what we’re paying now” [for MRH-90] hence implying $30-42k per hour for MRH-90, so lower than the $50k:
https://www.defenceconnect.com.au/la...wk-acquisition
But regardless, even a 3x difference in operating cost per hour seems a lot for what otherwise seem broadly similar helicopters. So what is the explanation for this? Inconsistent accounting? Some or multiple elements of maintenance or spares for the MRH-90 being incredibly expensive (to the point of being a rip-off)? Is there anything on the public record that explains this in more detail than just the overall figures? Equally informative would be to see how these figures may have varied over the years and whether they have been reducing, remained steady, or perhaps even increased (in real terms) as the capability 'matured'.
The cost of the 40 UH-60M has been reported as US$1.95B. Not sure what this includes apart from the helicopters themselves, but this equates to ~US$50M per aircraft. If we factor this cost up from 40 to 47 helicopters (to compare to the number of MRH-90's we had), it would still amount to a significant AUD 3.5B now having to be invested earlier than previously intended.
Lets hope the capability and cost benefit assessment for the UH-60M is more robust than the acquisition process for the MRH-90 seems to have been based on the ANAO's audit of the project, some of which I have skimmed through to try to understand what had gone wrong:
https://www.anao.gov.au/sites/defaul...13-2014_52.pdf
Part of it says:
...This led to a Defence recommendation to the Minister for Defence in June 2004 that the S‐70M Black Hawk be selected as the preferred aircraft for Phases 2 and 4.
...In accordance with direction provided by the Minister for Defence and government, Defence developed alternate draft submissions, initially to ask ministers to choose between the two aircraft options—the MRH90 and S‐70M Black Hawk—and later recommending acquisition of the MRH90 for Phase 2 only...
How interesting it would be to be a fly on the wall for some of the meetings.
One must assume the MAJGEN Jeremy King compares apples to apples. However, the Aussies has not operated the UH-60M before, and he might be comparing to the older S-70s which are more expensive in operation. The Swedes have operated the UH-60M for over ten years and with a much smaller fleet than what Aussies are planning, and they have operated the NH90 for equally long: They should be in a perfect position to make comparable analysis: They claim FH cost of SEK 40 000, approx. USD 4 000 for UH-60M and close to USD 25 000 for the NH90. https://www.svt.se/nyheter/lokalt/bl...-per-flygtimme
https://www.svd.se/a/1kOo8M/forsvare...00000-i-timmen
In Norway the CHOD reported an hourly cost of NOK 600 000 (approx. USD 60 000) per flight hours with the NH90. In addition to cost of sourcing new pilots to replace the ones that left the armed forces because they could not get enough flight hours to stay current and motivated. https://www.finansavisen.no/nyheter/...sso_ott=7sqsBn
With regards to the cost of acquiring the Black Hawk you are basing your comment on the public figure of USD 1,98bn as reported by DCSA for a FMS case. That number is not necessarily accurate or could not be allocated to only accusation of the helicopters but also a lot of spares, support, training, tools, and ground support. The baseline price of a fly-away M is approx. +/- MUSD 20.
Wit 40 aircraft flying 300 hrs. each over 30 years the total number of flight hours is 360 000 and if you split the probably very high estimate of procurement on those flight hours you get USD 5 500 per flight hour in procurement cost. With a saving of USD 20 000 per flight hour a swap from the one to the other will save Australian taxpayers USD 7,2bn with procurement of the new system included. Even if you chop the saving per flight hour in half – you still see a USD 3,6bn saving by swapping fleet rather than continuing with what you have. And a positive side effect is that the aircraft will deliver the flight hours you need without needing 20 technicians for each airframe – being a scare resource around qualified technicians should not be used as patches for an aircraft that does not deliver.
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The last figure I heard for cost per flight hour for the US Army H-60M was $10,000US, was in reference to how much someone would have to reimburse the govt for for a check ride. Still far below NH-90 it appears. Would be interesting to know what CH-47F runs per hour.
FltMech
FltMech
A full list of FY 2023 reimbursement rates can be found below. Around 4 k$ for a UH-60M. Approximately 8 k$ for a CH-47F.
https://comptroller.defense.gov/Port...3/2023_b_c.pdf
EDIT
I'm just wondering, what would be, within the same organization, the rate for an AW101 comparing to a CH-47F?
https://comptroller.defense.gov/Port...3/2023_b_c.pdf
EDIT
I'm just wondering, what would be, within the same organization, the rate for an AW101 comparing to a CH-47F?
Last edited by ARRAKIS; 17th Aug 2023 at 22:17.
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The make of Army helicopter involved in a fatal training exercise will be pulled from service more than a year before its intended withdrawal date.
Defence Minister Richard Marles on Friday confirmed the MRH-90 Taipan helicopters would not return to flying as part of Australian Defence Force operations.
The helicopters were scheduled to be withdrawn from service in December 2024.
The early phasing out of the Taipans follows a crash off the Queensland coast in July, which killed four people on board during military drills.
Mr Marles said the decision did not indicate the outcome of investigations into the crash.
"The MRH-90 has been an important capability for our country and defence force and I recognise the hard work of the hundreds of people who dedicated themselves to acquiring, operating and sustaining the aircraft," he said in a statement.
"The government's highest priority is the safety and wellbeing of our people. We continue to support the families of the four soldiers who lost their lives earlier this year and the broader defence community."
Mr Marles told Nine's Today program the decision to ground the Taipans was the "only decision that makes sense" given they wouldn't have been flown until investigations into the fatal crash have wrapped up.
That is expected to take a year to complete.
"There is no world in which we should be flying these helicopters again. Given that, what we really need to do is to be moving as quickly as we can to our new capability, the Black Hawks, as soon as possible," Mr Marles said.
The federal government has been looking at speeding up the rollout of Black Hawk helicopters following the Taipan crash, with the first of the 40 aircraft already having arrived in the country.
Opposition MP Phillip Thompson, who served with the defence force, said the grounding of the Taipans was overdue.
"The inquiry into the tragic helicopter crash, which saw four of our Australian Army soldiers killed is ongoing. Their families, their mates and the wider ADF community want answers and the government needs to be honest and transparent," he said.
"I look forward to the chronically underperforming and dangerous MRH-90 being fully replaced by the proven and reliable Black Hawk."
Nationals MP Barnaby Joyce said the government had been too slow on the Black Hawk rollout, adding both Australia's allies and enemies would be taking note.
"What we're seeing overall is a weakening of our defence force ... the fact we're not spending any new money on defence, and now we've got the Taipans, which are a central platform, all grounded," he told Sky News.
"We've really got to sharpen up defence because our nation has to come as strong as possible as quickly as possible, and this sort of reshuffling the deck chairs and removing one every now and then is not helping us at all."
Defence Minister Richard Marles on Friday confirmed the MRH-90 Taipan helicopters would not return to flying as part of Australian Defence Force operations.
The helicopters were scheduled to be withdrawn from service in December 2024.
The early phasing out of the Taipans follows a crash off the Queensland coast in July, which killed four people on board during military drills.
Mr Marles said the decision did not indicate the outcome of investigations into the crash.
"The MRH-90 has been an important capability for our country and defence force and I recognise the hard work of the hundreds of people who dedicated themselves to acquiring, operating and sustaining the aircraft," he said in a statement.
"The government's highest priority is the safety and wellbeing of our people. We continue to support the families of the four soldiers who lost their lives earlier this year and the broader defence community."
Mr Marles told Nine's Today program the decision to ground the Taipans was the "only decision that makes sense" given they wouldn't have been flown until investigations into the fatal crash have wrapped up.
That is expected to take a year to complete.
"There is no world in which we should be flying these helicopters again. Given that, what we really need to do is to be moving as quickly as we can to our new capability, the Black Hawks, as soon as possible," Mr Marles said.
The federal government has been looking at speeding up the rollout of Black Hawk helicopters following the Taipan crash, with the first of the 40 aircraft already having arrived in the country.
Opposition MP Phillip Thompson, who served with the defence force, said the grounding of the Taipans was overdue.
"The inquiry into the tragic helicopter crash, which saw four of our Australian Army soldiers killed is ongoing. Their families, their mates and the wider ADF community want answers and the government needs to be honest and transparent," he said.
"I look forward to the chronically underperforming and dangerous MRH-90 being fully replaced by the proven and reliable Black Hawk."
Nationals MP Barnaby Joyce said the government had been too slow on the Black Hawk rollout, adding both Australia's allies and enemies would be taking note.
"What we're seeing overall is a weakening of our defence force ... the fact we're not spending any new money on defence, and now we've got the Taipans, which are a central platform, all grounded," he told Sky News.
"We've really got to sharpen up defence because our nation has to come as strong as possible as quickly as possible, and this sort of reshuffling the deck chairs and removing one every now and then is not helping us at all."
“Assistant Opposition defence spokesperson Phillip Thompson has praised the transition to Black Hawks following Defence Minister Richard Marles’ decision to decommission Australia’s MRH-90 Taipan helicopter fleet 15 months ahead of schedule.
“I look forward to the chronically underperforming and dangerous MRH-90 being fully replaced by the proven and reliable Black Hawk,” Mr Thompson said in a statement.”
“I look forward to the chronically underperforming and dangerous MRH-90 being fully replaced by the proven and reliable Black Hawk,” Mr Thompson said in a statement.”
This item, while subscriber only, allows anyone to view part of an interview between Channel 9 presenter Karl Stefanovic and the Defence Minister this morning:
https://www.couriermail.com.au/news/...f2bd79430e482b
Not sure why Stefanovic was acting like an attack dog, but Richard Marles didn't bite back. Perhaps Stefanovic should next interview Defence Ministers in other countries that continue to operate the NH-90. Heck, why not also interview the US Defense Secretary on why Osprey is still operating... and so on, and so on...
As for Barnaby Joyce, thankfully not our Defence Minister.
https://www.couriermail.com.au/news/...f2bd79430e482b
Not sure why Stefanovic was acting like an attack dog, but Richard Marles didn't bite back. Perhaps Stefanovic should next interview Defence Ministers in other countries that continue to operate the NH-90. Heck, why not also interview the US Defense Secretary on why Osprey is still operating... and so on, and so on...
As for Barnaby Joyce, thankfully not our Defence Minister.
Because it (1) works and (2) is fit for purpose and (3) in the last 10 years has a mishap rate of about 3 per 100,000 hours. You might want to pay attention to the customer satisfaction expressed by the USMC, the prime user.
I agree, though, with your disappointment in how journos go about this.
The insufferable David Ax went out of his way to write hatchet jobs on a variety of platforms.
I agree, though, with your disappointment in how journos go about this.
The insufferable David Ax went out of his way to write hatchet jobs on a variety of platforms.
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Lonewolf 50: Sorry, I shouldn't have listed any other specific rotorcraft in my message. Osprey simple selected due to the loss of one in Australia soon after the loss of the Army MRH-90 hence both had local media attention. My point was that if Armed Forces withdrew a fleet of aircraft each time there was an accident, and so far in this case without any public clarity whether for technical reasons, then there would be next to no military aviation. We should learn from accidents and not repeat causes, but I don't like aircraft being tagged as “dangerous” without any real substance.
NH Industries statement related to ADF grounding and withdrawal of MRH-90 available at:
http://www.nhindustries.com/website/...ogram_180.html
This release indicates they have "not identified any information from the initial flight data that relates to a failure, malfunction or defect linked to aircraft design".
That isn't to say this might not still be the case, just that it is in contrast to the "dangerous" tag the type has attracted in our local media and by some politicians.
Given NHI also list worldwide operating hours at 380,000+ in this statement, accident rate can be calculated: Searching Aviation Safety Network database for "NHIndustries" reveals 11 incidents for type (all variants) worldwide of which 2 were minor damage, but 4 fatal with 8 deaths in total. So a mishap rate of about 2.9 in 100,000 hours or fatal accident rate of about 1in 100,000 hours. Of the earlier 3 fatal accidents, unclear from the ASN descriptions whether any were due to any design or production flaws of this helicopter type.
http://www.nhindustries.com/website/...ogram_180.html
This release indicates they have "not identified any information from the initial flight data that relates to a failure, malfunction or defect linked to aircraft design".
That isn't to say this might not still be the case, just that it is in contrast to the "dangerous" tag the type has attracted in our local media and by some politicians.
Given NHI also list worldwide operating hours at 380,000+ in this statement, accident rate can be calculated: Searching Aviation Safety Network database for "NHIndustries" reveals 11 incidents for type (all variants) worldwide of which 2 were minor damage, but 4 fatal with 8 deaths in total. So a mishap rate of about 2.9 in 100,000 hours or fatal accident rate of about 1in 100,000 hours. Of the earlier 3 fatal accidents, unclear from the ASN descriptions whether any were due to any design or production flaws of this helicopter type.
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I think arguments made about safety regarding NH-90 by politicians are an attempt to cover up the more relevant issues of reliability apparently faced by the ADF, which may be part because of the ADF maintenance system. From what I’ve seen, in US Army systems at least, serviceability issues are more often supply shortages and maintenance enterprise systems than the airframe or its components.
In other words, if you have no parts in your system(supply) or you do, but can’t order them (enterprise) that’s a problem.
Accident rates can only tell part of the story for particular airframes. Has anyone tried breaking down the accident rate by pilot error vs mechanical failure?
If that were to happen for UH-60 I think you would find a period where mechanical failure played more of a role than pilot error but I think that was a relatively short period, recent history shows pilot error being far more frequent. V-22 currently seems to show a design defect (Hard Clutch Engagement) that has caused fatalities, but other accidents historically were pilot error.
And just for clarity in this discussion, by mechanical failure I mean defective in design, which is really what is being argued regarding the NH-90(which seems to lack evidence), not accidents related to improper maintenance action, which is it’s own human factors issue.
As I said, I don’t know much of anything about NH-90 and have only spoken to one person directly that had operational experience with it in ADF service. He was a senior Loadmaster here stateside doing crew member training for UH-60M and when I asked him what he thought about NH-90 he said “I reckon I love it, it’s a good aircraft.”
FltMech
In other words, if you have no parts in your system(supply) or you do, but can’t order them (enterprise) that’s a problem.
Accident rates can only tell part of the story for particular airframes. Has anyone tried breaking down the accident rate by pilot error vs mechanical failure?
If that were to happen for UH-60 I think you would find a period where mechanical failure played more of a role than pilot error but I think that was a relatively short period, recent history shows pilot error being far more frequent. V-22 currently seems to show a design defect (Hard Clutch Engagement) that has caused fatalities, but other accidents historically were pilot error.
And just for clarity in this discussion, by mechanical failure I mean defective in design, which is really what is being argued regarding the NH-90(which seems to lack evidence), not accidents related to improper maintenance action, which is it’s own human factors issue.
As I said, I don’t know much of anything about NH-90 and have only spoken to one person directly that had operational experience with it in ADF service. He was a senior Loadmaster here stateside doing crew member training for UH-60M and when I asked him what he thought about NH-90 he said “I reckon I love it, it’s a good aircraft.”
FltMech
I think arguments made about safety regarding NH-90 by politicians are an attempt to cover up the more relevant issues of reliability apparently faced by the ADF, which may be part because of the ADF maintenance system. From what I’ve seen, in US Army systems at least, serviceability issues are more often supply shortages and maintenance enterprise systems than the airframe or its components.
In other words, if you have no parts in your system(supply) or you do, but can’t order them (enterprise) that’s a problem.
Accident rates can only tell part of the story for particular airframes. Has anyone tried breaking down the accident rate by pilot error vs mechanical failure?
If that were to happen for UH-60 I think you would find a period where mechanical failure played more of a role than pilot error but I think that was a relatively short period, recent history shows pilot error being far more frequent. V-22 currently seems to show a design defect (Hard Clutch Engagement) that has caused fatalities, but other accidents historically were pilot error.
And just for clarity in this discussion, by mechanical failure I mean defective in design, which is really what is being argued regarding the NH-90(which seems to lack evidence), not accidents related to improper maintenance action, which is it’s own human factors issue.
As I said, I don’t know much of anything about NH-90 and have only spoken to one person directly that had operational experience with it in ADF service. He was a senior Loadmaster here stateside doing crew member training for UH-60M and when I asked him what he thought about NH-90 he said “I reckon I love it, it’s a good aircraft.”
FltMech
In other words, if you have no parts in your system(supply) or you do, but can’t order them (enterprise) that’s a problem.
Accident rates can only tell part of the story for particular airframes. Has anyone tried breaking down the accident rate by pilot error vs mechanical failure?
If that were to happen for UH-60 I think you would find a period where mechanical failure played more of a role than pilot error but I think that was a relatively short period, recent history shows pilot error being far more frequent. V-22 currently seems to show a design defect (Hard Clutch Engagement) that has caused fatalities, but other accidents historically were pilot error.
And just for clarity in this discussion, by mechanical failure I mean defective in design, which is really what is being argued regarding the NH-90(which seems to lack evidence), not accidents related to improper maintenance action, which is it’s own human factors issue.
As I said, I don’t know much of anything about NH-90 and have only spoken to one person directly that had operational experience with it in ADF service. He was a senior Loadmaster here stateside doing crew member training for UH-60M and when I asked him what he thought about NH-90 he said “I reckon I love it, it’s a good aircraft.”
FltMech
I wonder what excuses they will roll out when their serviceability for 60M and 64E fails to meet the promises?
True , much of the problem with the MRH and ARH is Army originated but the difference with the 60M and 64E is they will be tied into the US Mil supply chain which has worked extremely well with the CH-47's with excellent serviceability and availability over the years which is a very complicated helo with high manpower requirements , the supply and tech support system for the ARH and MRH are unique with their tie in with Airbus, the same tie in with the 60M and 64E as the 47 should ease the whole spares and support system, and with the aircraft based where OEM support is rather than strategic/tactical reasons should help serviceability. (all Boeing products 47F and 64E based in Townsville with large Boeing support facility there and all Lockheed Martin (Sikorsky) products based down south, Oakey and Holsworthy for 60M and just down the road from Holsworthy at Nowra for the Navy's MH-60R's. We have very good serviceability rates with the MH-60R (Sik)so should carry over to the 60M (Sik)and the same with the 47F (Boeing) should work with the 64E (Boeing)
Last edited by Blackhawk9; 1st Oct 2023 at 23:21.