Helicopter crash off the coast of Newfoundland - 18 aboard, March 2009
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Seems there were problems with the winch that were not mentioned in the TSB report.
Rescuer in Cougar 491 crash recalls sole survivor waving faintly in Atlantic - Winnipeg Free Press
Ian Wheeler remembers heading into work at the Cougar offices in St. John's, N.L., on what was looking to be a pretty typical day at the aviation company.
The rescue specialist planned to do some hoist training with his crew in one of the company's Sikorsky S-92 helicopters.
As he walked along the flight ramp, he saw 18 crew and rig workers filing onto another helicopter for a short, routine trip out to one of the offshore platforms.
It was just after 9 a.m. on March 12, 2009, and Wheeler was in the control centre gearing up for training when word came that the helicopter he had just waved off was having an oil pressure problem.
The news soon grew more dire as Wheeler saw a maintenance worker race to get a rescue helicopter ready, saying that Flight 491 might have to ditch in the water. Minutes later, he heard that the aircraft had gone down, prompting him and his team to head to the scene about 55 kilometres east of St. John's.
But the veteran specialist, who is being rewarded for his rescue work by the Governor General, says he was stunned to see a debris field that contained a mess of chopper parts, luggage, the bulkhead and empty life-rafts, but no immediate sign of survivors.
"We were looking around and not seeing anybody so it's starting to set in that, 'My God, where is everybody?'" Wheeler said from his home in Torbay, N.L., more than a week after finding out he is one of nine Canadians to receive a Medal of Bravery from the Governor General this year.
"They couldn't have drifted very far. If they're not on the surface, my God, they must be in the aircraft and the aircraft is gone."
Wheeler, 49, and his four crew mates did a broad, structured sweep of the area, scanning for telltale orange survival suits and signs of life.
In the midst of a tangle of netting, baggage and other debris, the crew saw someone in an orange suit who managed a faint wave from the frigid waters.
Wheeler was carefully lowered down to the site in two-metre waves and swam up to the man, who was slipping in and out of consciousness following 75 minutes in the water after a terrifying scramble out one of the helicopter's windows.
The hypothermic man, who was almost delirious and speaking in a slur, repeated a pleading question.
"He kept asking me over and over again, 'Are we OK? Are we OK?' " Wheeler said.
Wheeler assured the man he would get him out, later learning he was 27-year-old was Robert Decker. But Wheeler had trouble with the hoist and told him he would get another device to raise him up.
Panicked, Decker misunderstood and thought Wheeler was leaving.
"He looked at me and said, 'Don't leave me here, don't leave me,' " Wheeler said. "I looked him straight in the eye and said, 'I'm not going anywhere.' "
Hopes rose of more survivors when they spotted a dark suit that matched those worn by the pilots and what appeared to be an arm waving in the steady wind.
But when they got closer, they realized it was a kit bag with a black strap blowing in the breeze.
"There was a bit of disappointment there," he said. "We realized relatively quickly that the likelihood of seeing anybody else was very remote."
He said the gravity of what happened began sinking in for him when he arrived at the hospital with Decker and saw a line of 15 ambulances waiting for survivors. He told a doctor not to expect any more survivors.
It became more difficult when he returned to the Cougar office and had to tell dozens of anxious colleagues that their co-workers were likely lost.
Only then did Wheeler find out that several of his friends were on the flight, including First Officer Tim Lanouette, who he had lunch with five days earlier.
"I knew a lot of these guys going and coming," he says. "It's a pretty unique situation. ... Everybody knows everybody."
What stays with him are those initial sights of the debris scene, the empty life-rafts and his first face-to-face encounter with Decker, who later met the crew to thank them for saving him.
An official with the Governor General's office said the award would be handed out some time in the new year.
The rescue specialist planned to do some hoist training with his crew in one of the company's Sikorsky S-92 helicopters.
As he walked along the flight ramp, he saw 18 crew and rig workers filing onto another helicopter for a short, routine trip out to one of the offshore platforms.
It was just after 9 a.m. on March 12, 2009, and Wheeler was in the control centre gearing up for training when word came that the helicopter he had just waved off was having an oil pressure problem.
The news soon grew more dire as Wheeler saw a maintenance worker race to get a rescue helicopter ready, saying that Flight 491 might have to ditch in the water. Minutes later, he heard that the aircraft had gone down, prompting him and his team to head to the scene about 55 kilometres east of St. John's.
But the veteran specialist, who is being rewarded for his rescue work by the Governor General, says he was stunned to see a debris field that contained a mess of chopper parts, luggage, the bulkhead and empty life-rafts, but no immediate sign of survivors.
"We were looking around and not seeing anybody so it's starting to set in that, 'My God, where is everybody?'" Wheeler said from his home in Torbay, N.L., more than a week after finding out he is one of nine Canadians to receive a Medal of Bravery from the Governor General this year.
"They couldn't have drifted very far. If they're not on the surface, my God, they must be in the aircraft and the aircraft is gone."
Wheeler, 49, and his four crew mates did a broad, structured sweep of the area, scanning for telltale orange survival suits and signs of life.
In the midst of a tangle of netting, baggage and other debris, the crew saw someone in an orange suit who managed a faint wave from the frigid waters.
Wheeler was carefully lowered down to the site in two-metre waves and swam up to the man, who was slipping in and out of consciousness following 75 minutes in the water after a terrifying scramble out one of the helicopter's windows.
The hypothermic man, who was almost delirious and speaking in a slur, repeated a pleading question.
"He kept asking me over and over again, 'Are we OK? Are we OK?' " Wheeler said.
Wheeler assured the man he would get him out, later learning he was 27-year-old was Robert Decker. But Wheeler had trouble with the hoist and told him he would get another device to raise him up.
Panicked, Decker misunderstood and thought Wheeler was leaving.
"He looked at me and said, 'Don't leave me here, don't leave me,' " Wheeler said. "I looked him straight in the eye and said, 'I'm not going anywhere.' "
Hopes rose of more survivors when they spotted a dark suit that matched those worn by the pilots and what appeared to be an arm waving in the steady wind.
But when they got closer, they realized it was a kit bag with a black strap blowing in the breeze.
"There was a bit of disappointment there," he said. "We realized relatively quickly that the likelihood of seeing anybody else was very remote."
He said the gravity of what happened began sinking in for him when he arrived at the hospital with Decker and saw a line of 15 ambulances waiting for survivors. He told a doctor not to expect any more survivors.
It became more difficult when he returned to the Cougar office and had to tell dozens of anxious colleagues that their co-workers were likely lost.
Only then did Wheeler find out that several of his friends were on the flight, including First Officer Tim Lanouette, who he had lunch with five days earlier.
"I knew a lot of these guys going and coming," he says. "It's a pretty unique situation. ... Everybody knows everybody."
What stays with him are those initial sights of the debris scene, the empty life-rafts and his first face-to-face encounter with Decker, who later met the crew to thank them for saving him.
An official with the Governor General's office said the award would be handed out some time in the new year.
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The 24/7 SAR capability is not expected for another winter, 7 years after Cougar claimed they had it and 3 years after the accident.
CNLOPB have been having a safety seminar this week. I wondered if that was discussed.
Communication key issue at helicopter safety forum: Ruelokke - Business - The Telegram
CNLOPB have been having a safety seminar this week. I wondered if that was discussed.
Communication key issue at helicopter safety forum: Ruelokke - Business - The Telegram
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Seems there were problems with the winch that were not mentioned in the TSB report
Ian Wheeler and the SAR crew did an excellent job considering they were flying in the same A/C type that just went down. I'm assuming all the SAR team is being awarded.
Safe flying
Max
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Amazing that TSB didn't examine the winch failure.
Robert Dekker may only be alive because an aircraft was already fitted with a dual hoist for the exercise mentioned. I wonder how much longer he would have been in the water otherwise? 20 minutes? 30 minutes?
Robert Dekker may only be alive because an aircraft was already fitted with a dual hoist for the exercise mentioned. I wonder how much longer he would have been in the water otherwise? 20 minutes? 30 minutes?
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Cougar have single and double hoists. The latter are more difficult to install.
It is only recently that they have had an aircraft actually on stand-by with a hoist. Before that a crew change aircraft needed to be re-roled for SAR (well really LIMSAR). During a busy flying programme it might have been necessary to land to offload pax first.
It is only recently that they have had an aircraft actually on stand-by with a hoist. Before that a crew change aircraft needed to be re-roled for SAR (well really LIMSAR). During a busy flying programme it might have been necessary to land to offload pax first.
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Open Letter to Federal Minister Regarding Cougar Flight 491 Helicopter Crash
Open Letter to Federal Minister Regarding Cougar Flight 491 Helicopter Crash
Nov 4th, 2011 10:07 AM
The following is an open letter sent to Minister of Transport, Infrastructure and Communities Denis Lebel, by the families of the passengers killed in, and the sole survivor of, the crash of Cougar Flight 491. For more information, please contact: Michael Zupanic, Environmental Communication Options, at 416-972-7401 or [email protected]
Of course it was a CHC Australia aircraft at Broome.
Nov 4th, 2011 10:07 AM
The following is an open letter sent to Minister of Transport, Infrastructure and Communities Denis Lebel, by the families of the passengers killed in, and the sole survivor of, the crash of Cougar Flight 491. For more information, please contact: Michael Zupanic, Environmental Communication Options, at 416-972-7401 or [email protected]
Office of the Honourable Denis Lebel
Minister of Transport, Infrastructure and Communities
Dear Minister:
Re: An Open Letter From Brenda Anwyll, Janet Breen, Cecilia Corbett, Robert Decker, Wanda Drake, Melinda Duggan, Karen Eddy, Janet Escott, Susan March, Richard and Marjorie Maher, Heather Warren, Roxanne Mullowney, Marilyn Nash, Lori Chynn, and Sharon Pike - the Families of the Passengers Killed in, and the Sole Survivor of, the Crash of Cougar Flight 491.
As you are aware, on March 12, 2009 a Sikorsky S-92 helicopter, operated by Cougar Helicopters, carrying 2 pilots and 16 passengers crashed into the seas off St. John's, NL following the failure of the helicopter's main gearbox ("MGB"). The crew and all but one of the passengers were killed in the crash.
We wrote to your office on February 18, 2011 on behalf of the sole survivor and the families of the deceased passengers of Cougar Flight 491 seeking answers to various questions relating to the manner in which Transport Canada certified the MGB of the S92.
These families have been devastated by this accident. They are entitled to the courtesy of a response. More troubling is the fact that it appears from your silence that you are unwilling to investigate how this helicopter was certified so that the steps necessary to prevent recurrence of this tragedy can be properly identified and implemented.
The victims are not alone in raising concerns about the role which Transport Canada played in this accident. In July 2011, the Commissioner of the Offshore Helicopter Safety Inquiry, retired Newfoundland and Labrador Supreme Court Judge Robert Wells, issued his second phase report which raises many of the same concerns voiced by our clients.
(the same model helicopter and MGB as involved in this accident) due to stud failure:
I find it difficult to understand why the replacement studs could not have been installed forthwith or as quickly as possible. The same applies to the three-month delay in issuing the Alert Service Bulletin. Even less can I understand the replacement time frame of one year or 1250 flight hours. It is clear from their submissions that the families of the passengers who died in the March 12, 2009, crash also have difficulty understanding why the titanium studs were not required to be replaced much sooner, and so do many offshore workers and members of the public. It is also difficult to understand why the FAA did not insist on earlier replacement, because the October 20, 2008, determination had included FAA consultations. It was well known that the S-92A was being used to transport passengers long distances over hostile ocean waters. Despite the apparent lack of urgency, Cougar Helicopters, to its credit, ordered the steel studs within three weeks of the Alert Service Bulletin, but unfortunately the parts did not begin to arrive until shortly after March 12, 2009.
Commissioner Wells went on to note:
The foregoing information raises a serious question: why did not Sikorsky and the aviation regulators recognize the danger and cause the titanium studs to be replaced as quickly as possible?
This is indeed a serious question and it is the same one raised by our clients in their letter of February 18, 2011. It is worthy of a serious response.
We look forward to hearing from you.
Yours truly,
Camp Fiorante Matthews
Minister of Transport, Infrastructure and Communities
Dear Minister:
Re: An Open Letter From Brenda Anwyll, Janet Breen, Cecilia Corbett, Robert Decker, Wanda Drake, Melinda Duggan, Karen Eddy, Janet Escott, Susan March, Richard and Marjorie Maher, Heather Warren, Roxanne Mullowney, Marilyn Nash, Lori Chynn, and Sharon Pike - the Families of the Passengers Killed in, and the Sole Survivor of, the Crash of Cougar Flight 491.
As you are aware, on March 12, 2009 a Sikorsky S-92 helicopter, operated by Cougar Helicopters, carrying 2 pilots and 16 passengers crashed into the seas off St. John's, NL following the failure of the helicopter's main gearbox ("MGB"). The crew and all but one of the passengers were killed in the crash.
We wrote to your office on February 18, 2011 on behalf of the sole survivor and the families of the deceased passengers of Cougar Flight 491 seeking answers to various questions relating to the manner in which Transport Canada certified the MGB of the S92.
These families have been devastated by this accident. They are entitled to the courtesy of a response. More troubling is the fact that it appears from your silence that you are unwilling to investigate how this helicopter was certified so that the steps necessary to prevent recurrence of this tragedy can be properly identified and implemented.
The victims are not alone in raising concerns about the role which Transport Canada played in this accident. In July 2011, the Commissioner of the Offshore Helicopter Safety Inquiry, retired Newfoundland and Labrador Supreme Court Judge Robert Wells, issued his second phase report which raises many of the same concerns voiced by our clients.
Like the families, Commissioner Wells found it difficult to understand how the regulators could have failed to grasp the significance of the incident in Western Australia involving a loss of transmission oil in the Canadian Helicopters S92,
I find it difficult to understand why the replacement studs could not have been installed forthwith or as quickly as possible. The same applies to the three-month delay in issuing the Alert Service Bulletin. Even less can I understand the replacement time frame of one year or 1250 flight hours. It is clear from their submissions that the families of the passengers who died in the March 12, 2009, crash also have difficulty understanding why the titanium studs were not required to be replaced much sooner, and so do many offshore workers and members of the public. It is also difficult to understand why the FAA did not insist on earlier replacement, because the October 20, 2008, determination had included FAA consultations. It was well known that the S-92A was being used to transport passengers long distances over hostile ocean waters. Despite the apparent lack of urgency, Cougar Helicopters, to its credit, ordered the steel studs within three weeks of the Alert Service Bulletin, but unfortunately the parts did not begin to arrive until shortly after March 12, 2009.
Commissioner Wells went on to note:
The foregoing information raises a serious question: why did not Sikorsky and the aviation regulators recognize the danger and cause the titanium studs to be replaced as quickly as possible?
This is indeed a serious question and it is the same one raised by our clients in their letter of February 18, 2011. It is worthy of a serious response.
We look forward to hearing from you.
Yours truly,
Camp Fiorante Matthews
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More press coverage on this:
Lone crash survivor, families seek answers - Local - The Telegram
The truth is out there.
Lone crash survivor, families seek answers - Local - The Telegram
“The accident itself and then the Wells commission both point to the fact that there were signs of an obvious safety defect in the transmission of that helicopter and it’s never been adequately explained how our regulator, Transport Canada, missed that,” Fiorante said.
“What (the families) are calling on the minister to do is to investigate how the regulatory system failed. In other words, why the safeguards that are supposed to be in place to protect the flying public didn’t work in this case, and there’s never been an adequate explanation for that. It’s not something that the Transportation Safety Board went into.”
“What (the families) are calling on the minister to do is to investigate how the regulatory system failed. In other words, why the safeguards that are supposed to be in place to protect the flying public didn’t work in this case, and there’s never been an adequate explanation for that. It’s not something that the Transportation Safety Board went into.”
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At least TC are working with FAA and EASA even if the Transport Minister won't engage on why Advisory material was used to water down a certification test.
Ottawa sent "platitudes" to N.L. chopper crash victims - Nfld. & Labrador - CBC News
Ottawa sent "platitudes" to N.L. chopper crash victims - Nfld. & Labrador - CBC News
Ottawa sent "platitudes" to N.L. chopper crash victims
CBC News
Posted: Nov 8, 2011 5:47 PM NT
A lawyer for people affected by the crash of Cougar Flight 491 says a response received from the federal transport minister is not acceptable.
"Our take is that the letter is long on platitudes about safety and short on answers to the serious question of what went wrong in the certification process of the S-92A's main gearbox," lawyer Joe Fiorante wrote in an email to CBC News.
The letter from Transport Minister Denis Lebel is a response to three letters from the families and Robert Decker, the only person who survived the crash.
Those letters call on the minister to answer questions the families say were not addressed by the Transportation Safety Board’s investigation into the March 2009 crash that killed 17 people southeast of St. John’s.
They want to know why the Sikorsky S-92A’s main gearbox was certified to fly for 30 minutes after losing oil pressure — when it clearly couldn't.
They also want to know why a similar S-92A main gearbox failure in Australia, months before the crash southeast of St. John’s, wasn't followed up and acted on more quickly.
Minister apologizes
Monday Federal Transport Minister Denis Lebel responded after Lori Chynn, whose husband John Pelley died in the crash, publicly called on the federal government to respond to the families.
"Please accept my apologies for the delay in responding," he wrote.
"My department continues to work with the FAA and EASA to review the regulations and guidance material to reach an international agreement on any changes that are necessary … we will continue to work with the TSB, the C-NLOPB to maintain and enhance the safety of Canadian Aviation."
Regarding recommendations made by the Offshore Helicopter Safety Inquiry following the crash, Lebel said:
"I will be in a position to provide a response to the board very soon."
The families wrote their first letter asking the federal transport minister to investigate the certification of the Silkorsky S-92A on Feb. 18, 2011.
The Transportation Safety Board of Canada (TSB) released its final report on the crash on Feb. 9, 2011.
Retired Supreme Court Justice Robert Wells, who led the Offshore Helicopter Safety Inquiry, called on Transport Canada to adopt and act on the four recommendations of the Transportation Safety Board.
The TSB's report recommended helicopters must:
Have a main gearbox able to run without oil for 30 minutes.
Not fly in rough conditions.
Have emergency breathing equipment on all flights where survival suits are worn.
Have an emergency flotation system to keep a chopper afloat long enough to evacuate safely.
CBC News
Posted: Nov 8, 2011 5:47 PM NT
A lawyer for people affected by the crash of Cougar Flight 491 says a response received from the federal transport minister is not acceptable.
"Our take is that the letter is long on platitudes about safety and short on answers to the serious question of what went wrong in the certification process of the S-92A's main gearbox," lawyer Joe Fiorante wrote in an email to CBC News.
The letter from Transport Minister Denis Lebel is a response to three letters from the families and Robert Decker, the only person who survived the crash.
Those letters call on the minister to answer questions the families say were not addressed by the Transportation Safety Board’s investigation into the March 2009 crash that killed 17 people southeast of St. John’s.
They want to know why the Sikorsky S-92A’s main gearbox was certified to fly for 30 minutes after losing oil pressure — when it clearly couldn't.
They also want to know why a similar S-92A main gearbox failure in Australia, months before the crash southeast of St. John’s, wasn't followed up and acted on more quickly.
Minister apologizes
Monday Federal Transport Minister Denis Lebel responded after Lori Chynn, whose husband John Pelley died in the crash, publicly called on the federal government to respond to the families.
"Please accept my apologies for the delay in responding," he wrote.
"My department continues to work with the FAA and EASA to review the regulations and guidance material to reach an international agreement on any changes that are necessary … we will continue to work with the TSB, the C-NLOPB to maintain and enhance the safety of Canadian Aviation."
Regarding recommendations made by the Offshore Helicopter Safety Inquiry following the crash, Lebel said:
"I will be in a position to provide a response to the board very soon."
The families wrote their first letter asking the federal transport minister to investigate the certification of the Silkorsky S-92A on Feb. 18, 2011.
The Transportation Safety Board of Canada (TSB) released its final report on the crash on Feb. 9, 2011.
Retired Supreme Court Justice Robert Wells, who led the Offshore Helicopter Safety Inquiry, called on Transport Canada to adopt and act on the four recommendations of the Transportation Safety Board.
The TSB's report recommended helicopters must:
Have a main gearbox able to run without oil for 30 minutes.
Not fly in rough conditions.
Have emergency breathing equipment on all flights where survival suits are worn.
Have an emergency flotation system to keep a chopper afloat long enough to evacuate safely.
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On the next edition of CBC's The Current:
... the sole survivor of a helicopter crash that killed 17 people speaks out about concerns he has for the safety of Canadians who commute to work by helicopter. Robert Decker was on his way to work on the Hibernia offshore oil platform on March 12, 2009. He never made it. His helicopter crashed in the Atlantic, killing 17 of it passengers. He'll tell his story on Wednesday's program.
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He's told his story today (Wed 23 Nov) and it's been reported here Cougar chopper crash survivor criticizes Ottawa - Nfld. & Labrador - CBC News
There is no doubt that quicker action should have been taken after the Australian incident, but hindsight is a wonderful thing.
The question is surely it's certification should have been revoked after the second fatal accident, or are the steel studs all that was needed to satisfy the 'extremely remote' loop hole added to the certification requirements after the S92 failing the dry run testing?
There is no doubt that quicker action should have been taken after the Australian incident, but hindsight is a wonderful thing.
The question is surely it's certification should have been revoked after the second fatal accident, or are the steel studs all that was needed to satisfy the 'extremely remote' loop hole added to the certification requirements after the S92 failing the dry run testing?
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A powerful piece, the main thrust was the slow Sikorsky response to the first filter failure, the lack of regulatory action until the second event and why the type was ever certified.
Cougar crash survivor's concerns reach Parliament - Nfld. & Labrador - CBC News
Cougar crash survivor's concerns reach Parliament - Nfld. & Labrador - CBC News
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I'm told C-NLOPB and Transport Canada attended the last meeting of the UK's Helicopter Safety Research Committee to discuss lessons learned from this accident and that liaison on common initiatives to respond to it is planned.
TSB are making a public presentation in Cologne next month on this accident.
TSB are making a public presentation in Cologne next month on this accident.
espresso drinker:
Well of course the S-92's airworthiness certificate should have been revoked following the Cougar crash! Of course. That's not even in question anymore.
SAC managed to convince the FAA guy (whose name we don't need to mention because everyone already knows who signed-off on it) that the ONLY possible source of a leak of transmission oil would be the lines leading to the oil cooler. Filter won't/can't leak...driveshaft inputs can't leak...the mast seal can't leak...the list goes on!
And the (unnamed) FAA guy said, "Yup, I agree!" But if they were using the S-92 design to justify that "extremely remote" crap, they had no historical base to draw from. If they (SAC) were using an industry-wide base for loss of transmission oil, they STILL were not on solid ground, because such things happen more than extremely remotely. (Admittedly they don't happen often, but "extremely remote" is a defined term.) SAC took the awkward wording of section 29.927(c)(1) and used it to their financial advantage.
So no, the S-92 does not IN FACT meet the requirements of FAR part-29 when it comes to the transmission. I would venture to say that there is no helicopter in existence that would qualify under that "extremely remote" clause. Why do we care? Because when you design an aircraft that's going to take LOTS of people out over some very inhospitable parts of the earth, then you are - and should be - held to a higher standard.
We know now that the S-92 transmission cannot withstand a complete loss of oil. Sikorsky admitted that their testing showed (and Cougar proved in the field) that you get "about" ten minutes of run time with no oil. This is undisputed. What's truly disturbing to me is that so few people seem to care. Pilots in particular are so very cavalier about this, as if it's a trivial or inconsequential point. It boggles my already-feeble mind.
What it boils down to is that it would have been economically unfeasible, unrealistic and unreasonable to summarily ground the S-92 fleet and force Sikorsky to redesign the transmission. Passenger safety takes a back seat to money. It's not the first time this has happened in aviation. Shamefully, it probably won't be the last. Personally, I think we owe the paying passengers - and the pilots who fly them! - more than that...better than that.
I mean, why have rules at all if exemptions and "work-arounds" are allowed and applied so freely?
The question is surely it's certification should have been revoked after the second fatal accident, or are the steel studs all that was needed to satisfy the 'extremely remote' loop hole added to the certification requirements after the S92 failing the dry run testing?
SAC managed to convince the FAA guy (whose name we don't need to mention because everyone already knows who signed-off on it) that the ONLY possible source of a leak of transmission oil would be the lines leading to the oil cooler. Filter won't/can't leak...driveshaft inputs can't leak...the mast seal can't leak...the list goes on!
And the (unnamed) FAA guy said, "Yup, I agree!" But if they were using the S-92 design to justify that "extremely remote" crap, they had no historical base to draw from. If they (SAC) were using an industry-wide base for loss of transmission oil, they STILL were not on solid ground, because such things happen more than extremely remotely. (Admittedly they don't happen often, but "extremely remote" is a defined term.) SAC took the awkward wording of section 29.927(c)(1) and used it to their financial advantage.
So no, the S-92 does not IN FACT meet the requirements of FAR part-29 when it comes to the transmission. I would venture to say that there is no helicopter in existence that would qualify under that "extremely remote" clause. Why do we care? Because when you design an aircraft that's going to take LOTS of people out over some very inhospitable parts of the earth, then you are - and should be - held to a higher standard.
We know now that the S-92 transmission cannot withstand a complete loss of oil. Sikorsky admitted that their testing showed (and Cougar proved in the field) that you get "about" ten minutes of run time with no oil. This is undisputed. What's truly disturbing to me is that so few people seem to care. Pilots in particular are so very cavalier about this, as if it's a trivial or inconsequential point. It boggles my already-feeble mind.
What it boils down to is that it would have been economically unfeasible, unrealistic and unreasonable to summarily ground the S-92 fleet and force Sikorsky to redesign the transmission. Passenger safety takes a back seat to money. It's not the first time this has happened in aviation. Shamefully, it probably won't be the last. Personally, I think we owe the paying passengers - and the pilots who fly them! - more than that...better than that.
I mean, why have rules at all if exemptions and "work-arounds" are allowed and applied so freely?
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FH1100 - good post. As stated above, the S-92's inadequacies probably do not justify canceling the type certificate, but changing the type certificate data sheet to show it only achieved a much earlier certification basis would be a reasonable action in the circumstances.
It seems that having stalled and fought to have the case brought by Cougar and their insurers held in the US (and lost), Sikorsky have now settled out of court and avoided legal determination on the claim that Sikorsky were negligent and misrepresented the S-92 safety in their marketing claims:
N.L. chopper operator settles lawsuit after fatal crash | CTV News
It seems that having stalled and fought to have the case brought by Cougar and their insurers held in the US (and lost), Sikorsky have now settled out of court and avoided legal determination on the claim that Sikorsky were negligent and misrepresented the S-92 safety in their marketing claims:
The Canadian Press
Date: Friday Nov. 25, 2011 4:32 PM ET
ST. JOHN'S, N.L. — A Newfoundland-based helicopter operator that sued Sikorsky Aircraft Corp. after a fatal helicopter crash in March 2009 has reached an out-of-court settlement with the American company.
Cougar Helicopters of St. John's and eight insurance companies had filed a lawsuit against Sikorsky, alleging negligence and misrepresentation in their statement of claim.
Those claims were not proven in court.
On Friday, Cougar spokeswoman Candace Moakler said the settlement prevents her from discussing the deal that was recently reached with Sikorsky.
"We were seeking damages for the loss of aircraft against Sikorsky," Moakler said in an interview. "That action has been settled, and the action has been discontinued."
Cougar's statement of claim sought almost $27 million in damages.
It accused Sikorsky of using a flawed analysis to claim its S-92 helicopters could run without oil in the main gearbox for 30 minutes.
The pilots of Cougar Flight 491 reported a loss of oil pressure in their S-92's main gearbox about 11 minutes before plunging into the North Atlantic, killing 17 of the 18 people on board.
Two weeks after the disaster, the Transportation Safety Board of Canada said two of three titanium studs that secure the oil filter bowl assembly to the helicopter's main gearbox sheared off mid-flight.
The board concluded in a report last February that the resulting loss of oil pressure was one of a "complex web" of factors that contributed to the crash. It also blamed unclear safety and training procedures.
Despite the loss in pressure, the pilots thought there was still oil in the gearbox, which is why they decided to fly on to St. John's rather than risk a controlled ditching in the ocean, the board said.
In January 2010, the families of 15 passengers who died in the crash, as well as the sole survivor of the tragedy, Robert Decker, reached a settlement in their lawsuit against the U.S. company.
Their 2009 lawsuit alleged Sikorsky and its parent company, United Technologies Corp., made false claims about the aircraft's safety. Again, those claims were not proven in court.
At the time, a Sikorsky spokesman confirmed that a similar settlement had been reached with the families of the helicopter's two pilots.
Date: Friday Nov. 25, 2011 4:32 PM ET
ST. JOHN'S, N.L. — A Newfoundland-based helicopter operator that sued Sikorsky Aircraft Corp. after a fatal helicopter crash in March 2009 has reached an out-of-court settlement with the American company.
Cougar Helicopters of St. John's and eight insurance companies had filed a lawsuit against Sikorsky, alleging negligence and misrepresentation in their statement of claim.
Those claims were not proven in court.
On Friday, Cougar spokeswoman Candace Moakler said the settlement prevents her from discussing the deal that was recently reached with Sikorsky.
"We were seeking damages for the loss of aircraft against Sikorsky," Moakler said in an interview. "That action has been settled, and the action has been discontinued."
Cougar's statement of claim sought almost $27 million in damages.
It accused Sikorsky of using a flawed analysis to claim its S-92 helicopters could run without oil in the main gearbox for 30 minutes.
The pilots of Cougar Flight 491 reported a loss of oil pressure in their S-92's main gearbox about 11 minutes before plunging into the North Atlantic, killing 17 of the 18 people on board.
Two weeks after the disaster, the Transportation Safety Board of Canada said two of three titanium studs that secure the oil filter bowl assembly to the helicopter's main gearbox sheared off mid-flight.
The board concluded in a report last February that the resulting loss of oil pressure was one of a "complex web" of factors that contributed to the crash. It also blamed unclear safety and training procedures.
Despite the loss in pressure, the pilots thought there was still oil in the gearbox, which is why they decided to fly on to St. John's rather than risk a controlled ditching in the ocean, the board said.
In January 2010, the families of 15 passengers who died in the crash, as well as the sole survivor of the tragedy, Robert Decker, reached a settlement in their lawsuit against the U.S. company.
Their 2009 lawsuit alleged Sikorsky and its parent company, United Technologies Corp., made false claims about the aircraft's safety. Again, those claims were not proven in court.
At the time, a Sikorsky spokesman confirmed that a similar settlement had been reached with the families of the helicopter's two pilots.
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While a properly qualified transmission 30-minute loss of lube capability is a good idea, it doesn't completely eliminate lube system related failures in the transmission. Here's a fatal crash that occurred in 1982 with a CH-47.
The crash of Boeing's CH-47C Chinook 74-22292.
The final catastrophic structural failure was preceded by a sequence of failure events, which were initiated by a loss of lube oil flow to one single point in the input nose gearbox module (an oil jet clogged by debris). As I understand it, the rest of the lube system was still functioning right up until the structural failure. Just a few moments prior to the crash the crew received some sort of warning indication and were attempting to land. I'm not sure of the failed gearbox's maintenance history, but it is quite possible the aircraft had been operating for some time with this condition (ie. longer than 30 minutes), and it didn't manifest itself until the drivetrain was loaded sufficiently.
The point of the story is that there is no direct method to monitor for this type of failure in transmissions. There are only indirect detection methods such as chip detectors or local thermocouples. Having said that, a clogged oil jet is no longer likely to occur because all modern gearbox designs typically use "last chance" filter screens on every oil jet.
riff_raff
The crash of Boeing's CH-47C Chinook 74-22292.
The final catastrophic structural failure was preceded by a sequence of failure events, which were initiated by a loss of lube oil flow to one single point in the input nose gearbox module (an oil jet clogged by debris). As I understand it, the rest of the lube system was still functioning right up until the structural failure. Just a few moments prior to the crash the crew received some sort of warning indication and were attempting to land. I'm not sure of the failed gearbox's maintenance history, but it is quite possible the aircraft had been operating for some time with this condition (ie. longer than 30 minutes), and it didn't manifest itself until the drivetrain was loaded sufficiently.
The point of the story is that there is no direct method to monitor for this type of failure in transmissions. There are only indirect detection methods such as chip detectors or local thermocouples. Having said that, a clogged oil jet is no longer likely to occur because all modern gearbox designs typically use "last chance" filter screens on every oil jet.
riff_raff
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Riff Raff
Things inside of a transmission are rarely without all lube even if jets are clogged due to misting of all of the oil flowing around. I attended an AHS meeting where Bell Helicopter showed a HUMS trace from a 412 where the tail rotor output quill of the main transmission had restricted lube to the bearings due to "cork" in the oil port (not known until inspected). The vibration of the quill was monitored for one year before the decision was made to overhaul it where the cork was found. The bearings had sufficient damage to cause vibration alerts, but no chip indications.
One reason the 412 quill did not fail is its basic design uses bearings more forgiving to many defects than the type used in the S-92.
Tcabot113
Things inside of a transmission are rarely without all lube even if jets are clogged due to misting of all of the oil flowing around. I attended an AHS meeting where Bell Helicopter showed a HUMS trace from a 412 where the tail rotor output quill of the main transmission had restricted lube to the bearings due to "cork" in the oil port (not known until inspected). The vibration of the quill was monitored for one year before the decision was made to overhaul it where the cork was found. The bearings had sufficient damage to cause vibration alerts, but no chip indications.
One reason the 412 quill did not fail is its basic design uses bearings more forgiving to many defects than the type used in the S-92.
Tcabot113
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I feel somewhat cheated with the out of court settlement. I feel that we have been denied the opportunity of having some of the questions answered in public. And no admission of guilt on anyones part.
Not that I want a witch hunt, just for the failures in the system to be highlighted to everyone and steps to be taken to prevent this sort of thing happening again.
At least everyone flying this aircraft now knows that they don't have a 30 minute window and to get it down asap if there is a problem with the MGB.
Hopefully the MGB will be better on the military version Canada 'might' be getting some time soon.
Not that I want a witch hunt, just for the failures in the system to be highlighted to everyone and steps to be taken to prevent this sort of thing happening again.
At least everyone flying this aircraft now knows that they don't have a 30 minute window and to get it down asap if there is a problem with the MGB.
Hopefully the MGB will be better on the military version Canada 'might' be getting some time soon.
I noticed the other week on a new machine that the ACFT CONFIQ. page showed something alongs the lines of "MGB AUX. LUBE", obviously is was not installed, but does anyone know of Sikorsky´s progress with this system?
TiP
TiP