S61 at Humberside, offshore engine failure!
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Most Questions Answered amongst yourselves!
Yes aircraft had fuel jettison available - elected to keep what we had since we could maintain a gentle climb if required and only engine exceedance reported on GOOD engine was a slight prolonged T5 exceedance - we assume that this is due to the possible slight difference between what is displayed on the gauge and what is recorded by Hums and because we were using nearly all the T5 availble to us within Intercon. We flew back at 690-695 Intercon limit T5 - torque was in region of 100% most of way home
Engine question answered by others.
Detailed fuel, HUMs figures - well feel free to PM me for fear of boring you all.
No not all S61s on North Sea have dump - the BIH cab currently working Donegal Doesn't have it! (yes it does work the North Sea at times).
You are right - there was not enough power for a hover landing.
Regards
NT
Engine question answered by others.
Detailed fuel, HUMs figures - well feel free to PM me for fear of boring you all.
No not all S61s on North Sea have dump - the BIH cab currently working Donegal Doesn't have it! (yes it does work the North Sea at times).
You are right - there was not enough power for a hover landing.
Regards
NT
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I sincererly hope that Crab's comment wasn't meant to be taken seriously. Hopefully nobody will heed that advice; I can't think of a more dangerous way of making a single engine approach in a '61.
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Oh Sorry - One more thing!
Sorry but the aircraft wasn't flying agian the next day - it was G BDIJ the ex SAR machine, we took the passengers out the next day - we carefully briefed the oncoming pax at the rig in case they were overly concerned.
On approach back to Humberside we heard a whistling 1R that sounded very benign - like loosing a strip of blade tape on the Sea King. The noise then stopped and became a very slight 1R whistling with NO associated effects on the controls or feedback or change in flying characteristics or power required etc.
Upon inspection on landing we had lost the complete underside of one of the blade pockets - ie you could see the spars and formers!!! That happened much to anyone else???
Is the good Lord trying to tell me something.
NT
On approach back to Humberside we heard a whistling 1R that sounded very benign - like loosing a strip of blade tape on the Sea King. The noise then stopped and became a very slight 1R whistling with NO associated effects on the controls or feedback or change in flying characteristics or power required etc.
Upon inspection on landing we had lost the complete underside of one of the blade pockets - ie you could see the spars and formers!!! That happened much to anyone else???
Is the good Lord trying to tell me something.
NT
One further point before all become weepy-eyed about the capability of the S61; if 'Navy Torque' was flying it and his account is accurate (as I assume he was and it is), an engine failure at 70kts (very close to Vy) and just about 500ft is as benign as it can get.
Without discounting the trauma of any engine failure; there should have been very little droop and, providing the topping was correct (which it seldom is), the power should have settled with little speed adjustment and there should have been 150ft/min climb performance at the intercontingency power.
An engine failure at below 35kts and closer to the rig might have yielded a different outcome.
Regardless, the crew are to be congratulated on performing the drills as required and recovering the aircraft in one piece to Humberside.
Jim
Without discounting the trauma of any engine failure; there should have been very little droop and, providing the topping was correct (which it seldom is), the power should have settled with little speed adjustment and there should have been 150ft/min climb performance at the intercontingency power.
An engine failure at below 35kts and closer to the rig might have yielded a different outcome.
Regardless, the crew are to be congratulated on performing the drills as required and recovering the aircraft in one piece to Humberside.
Jim
Last edited by JimL; 16th Oct 2008 at 16:48.
If you have had a single engine failure in a twin engined machine, you are now a single engined helicopter with poor performance carrying fare-paying passengers. In case the remaining engine quits (and you don't know exactly why the first one stopped) you should fly a profile that allows for that to happen and still permit you to safely enter auto and carry out an EOL.
Now this might not be possible due to weather but I would love to hear the arguments against this course of action when day/VMC.
And no, this is not tongue in cheek.
Now this might not be possible due to weather but I would love to hear the arguments against this course of action when day/VMC.
And no, this is not tongue in cheek.
Crab,
There are profiles in the RFM should there be an engine failure; these are practiced during the OPC and the pilot is recommended to follow them.
If the reliability of the engine is 1:100,000/flight hour (as most of them are), the probability of one of two failing is 2:100,000/flight hour; the probability of one failing followed by the second (from independent causes) is 1 in 10,000,000,000.
Most pilots of twins do not (have to) practice autorotations; if they do they are never flown to the ground (there is no need and it exposes the aircraft and crew to unecessary damage).
Because you are an articulate and experience aviator, most on this site pay attention to what you say; for that reason alone, you should be guarded and considered about any advice you give.
Jim
There are profiles in the RFM should there be an engine failure; these are practiced during the OPC and the pilot is recommended to follow them.
If the reliability of the engine is 1:100,000/flight hour (as most of them are), the probability of one of two failing is 2:100,000/flight hour; the probability of one failing followed by the second (from independent causes) is 1 in 10,000,000,000.
Most pilots of twins do not (have to) practice autorotations; if they do they are never flown to the ground (there is no need and it exposes the aircraft and crew to unecessary damage).
Because you are an articulate and experience aviator, most on this site pay attention to what you say; for that reason alone, you should be guarded and considered about any advice you give.
Jim
What Crab suggested is standard military practice after single engine failure on a twin.
ie after a single failure fly the machine like a single and be prepared for the other engine to stop. (especially if dodgy fuel upload or heavy precipitation is suspected in the cause of the first failure.)
I've only had one single engine failure in a twin . The other engine stopped about 2 minutes later.
ie after a single failure fly the machine like a single and be prepared for the other engine to stop. (especially if dodgy fuel upload or heavy precipitation is suspected in the cause of the first failure.)
I've only had one single engine failure in a twin . The other engine stopped about 2 minutes later.
In case the remaining engine quits (and you don't know exactly why the first one stopped) you should fly a profile that allows for that to happen and still permit you to safely enter auto and carry out an EOL.
skadi
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Have to agree with Skadi. I have enjoyed the priviledge of receiving and then later giving instruction within mil flying circles on single engine failures whilst flying a twin. Whilst I can see up to a point the concern crab raises I do not recall carrying out autorotative approaches during OEI training.
Crab - I would be interested to hear if the CFS training has changed or is this your personal viewpoint?
Crab - I would be interested to hear if the CFS training has changed or is this your personal viewpoint?
Nice to see the old 61's still required in service. Just to cheer CRAB up a bit, it would appear that the AW139 is now, for the time being, day only for SAR and the 61 is standing in. Now that has to put a smile on his face!
Helimutt - that little snippet hadn't escaped my notice and you are absolutely right
Jim - an auto to a flare recovery (ie the hover taxy) should be a basic skill of any helicopter pilot but especially those flying twins since it is the closest they will come to practicing an EOL. One of the first things you learn in helicopter flying is how to autorotate and for very good reason. If you say this is hazardous then the training is wrong because having to complete a real EOL with no idea of the profile is far more hazardous. I am well aware of the arguments about the fatigue that autos impose on the airframe but profit (ie extending the aircraft TBOs) shouldn't affect safety.
If you want to let probability decide for you then be my guest - I am always ready for a single engine failure in my line of work so why shouldn't I be ready for the second one to let go as well (quoting probability in this case is like trusting statistics)
Spanish - the military teach a variety of techniques for single engine approaches but most are within a tactical ie low level remit and the basic SE approach will be from 500' or below trading speed for power until 10% (to pluck a figure from the sky) below your max available to reduce the groundspeed and hence the ground run (useful where space is limited ie not at an airfield). Airmanship, in a non tactical environment, can be superimposed on that teaching and lead you to surmise that floating around at low level on one engine could be a less than ideal scenario - the first thing I encourage people to do is climb to give you time and options.
Jim - an auto to a flare recovery (ie the hover taxy) should be a basic skill of any helicopter pilot but especially those flying twins since it is the closest they will come to practicing an EOL. One of the first things you learn in helicopter flying is how to autorotate and for very good reason. If you say this is hazardous then the training is wrong because having to complete a real EOL with no idea of the profile is far more hazardous. I am well aware of the arguments about the fatigue that autos impose on the airframe but profit (ie extending the aircraft TBOs) shouldn't affect safety.
If you want to let probability decide for you then be my guest - I am always ready for a single engine failure in my line of work so why shouldn't I be ready for the second one to let go as well (quoting probability in this case is like trusting statistics)
Spanish - the military teach a variety of techniques for single engine approaches but most are within a tactical ie low level remit and the basic SE approach will be from 500' or below trading speed for power until 10% (to pluck a figure from the sky) below your max available to reduce the groundspeed and hence the ground run (useful where space is limited ie not at an airfield). Airmanship, in a non tactical environment, can be superimposed on that teaching and lead you to surmise that floating around at low level on one engine could be a less than ideal scenario - the first thing I encourage people to do is climb to give you time and options.
According to Crab's logic (see his first post on this thread), in my single engine helicopter, every flight has to terminate with "an autorotative approach to a flare recovery and running landing" just in case the engine fails - What is this guy on?
Well done to the crew of this flight. I have circa 19,000hrs (99% twin) and am still waiting for my first engine failure. Does that mean the odds for me having an engine failure are much higher and you should avoid flying with me?
Well done to the crew of this flight. I have circa 19,000hrs (99% twin) and am still waiting for my first engine failure. Does that mean the odds for me having an engine failure are much higher and you should avoid flying with me?
Hovering AND talking
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Does that mean the odds for me having an engine failure are much higher and you should avoid flying with me?
Cheers
Whirls
My worst nightmare - having Crab as stude on an EC225 conversion. Can't get a word in for the "when we were in the military we did it like this..." (pauses to tie hankerchief with red spot round brow, enters auto on simulated single engine finals whilst pressing cyclic trigger and muttering dagerdagerdager under his breath). This is of course because the military are only trained to kill people, they are not trained nor allowed to carry fare paying passengers.
But sorry JimL I just have to pick you up on one point - the probablility of a second engine failure after the first one failing is not your further 1 in 100,000 or whatever, its greater than that because now you are running the remaining engine much harder than its used to. Nevertheless its still not that high and certainly doesn't warrant Crab's kamikazi dive.
HC
But sorry JimL I just have to pick you up on one point - the probablility of a second engine failure after the first one failing is not your further 1 in 100,000 or whatever, its greater than that because now you are running the remaining engine much harder than its used to. Nevertheless its still not that high and certainly doesn't warrant Crab's kamikazi dive.
HC
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would be a high level VMC transit followed by an autorotative approach to a flare recovery and running landing.
Practice autos (power recovery) were a feature of our regular base checks (six monthly) and one intrepid C & Ter on a one off basis would purposely "forget" to put the throttles up in the flare so you ended up with a surprise full blown auto to the ground (S-76).
roundwego, you are well overdue
The above was my first full blown chew em up and spit em out failure. About 18 months later had an identical failure in the same aircraft but now the other engine. Although the mechanics of the failure were exactly the same (high power at take off and turbine letting go) this time it was accompanied by just a quiet almost inaudible "pop". And that was at about the 19,000 hour mark. Good luck and may the Gods continue to smile on you.
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Well Done Navy Torque and welcome to the club. In my 14 000 hrs plus of flying S61N,(total time now 19 000hrs) I had 6 engine failures on S61N including a reject at 20500 lbs from the airfield near to the CDP for a modified Group A departure (300ft/45 kts). They used to say I have arse luck but after so many arse luck incidents, I tend to be very careful and cautious!
You were right..and I have always given that a thought. On one engine at intercon power you are lucky to get close to 80/90 kts. in a bad headwind situation, we may not have enough fuel to reach home.
I had one incident which even Sikorsky did not managed to explain.We were cruising along happily at 2000 ft (and condeming the management as usual!) when suddenly the cross hatch symbol appeared on the fuel shut off valve. That means it has gone to a CLOSED position sudddenly(All this while the valve is physically opened). Within a minute the engine flamed out. Now all our manuals says that the fuel shut off valve will "remain in its last energised position no matter what happens..eg total loss of electricity).
The rule of this game is always try and be a good boy scout..BE PREPARED!
You were right..and I have always given that a thought. On one engine at intercon power you are lucky to get close to 80/90 kts. in a bad headwind situation, we may not have enough fuel to reach home.
I had one incident which even Sikorsky did not managed to explain.We were cruising along happily at 2000 ft (and condeming the management as usual!) when suddenly the cross hatch symbol appeared on the fuel shut off valve. That means it has gone to a CLOSED position sudddenly(All this while the valve is physically opened). Within a minute the engine flamed out. Now all our manuals says that the fuel shut off valve will "remain in its last energised position no matter what happens..eg total loss of electricity).
The rule of this game is always try and be a good boy scout..BE PREPARED!