Flying at Night
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Hey Horror box, why non-starter?? If all offshore helicopter operators agreed to stop flying at night due to safety,what will the customers do??? Stop flying to rigs???
Number one issue is safety,and as special 25 said, and I agree, I can't offer the same level off safety at night as in the daytime...S76 off an NUI at max gross,night,ltd viz
Number one issue is safety,and as special 25 said, and I agree, I can't offer the same level off safety at night as in the daytime...S76 off an NUI at max gross,night,ltd viz
Second - we can and do fly safely at night. We CAN remain Perf Class 1 throughout. We CAN train for SD. We CAN improve technology to increase our margins. We CAN operate to realistic minima.
I feel the idea of not being able to offer the same degree of safety at night must be examined, and is not as straight forwards as it appears. I would agree, in certain circumstances the margins are greatly reduced, but not all.
A clear moonlit night with 15kts, and low AUW, good horizon is not a huge problem. Nor is flying in the cruise day or night. I would argue that this situation is better than day, 1.5k viz, in fog/heavy mist or drizzle, no wind, cloud 200', and heavy - yet we are not arguing that we shouldn't fly in these conditions with an ARA down to minima and we do it regularly. I can clearly not GUARANTEE the same safety in this situation as day vmc, nor good night vmc for that matter. The point I am trying to make is that we fly in different conditions all the time - some times it is more difficult than others, and therefore more dangerous. We cannot just make one statement about the level of safety all the time. We take risk, and we accept risk all the time, the key is where is the border - when is it unacceptable and make a statement about that level. That is the line, and we do not cross it. Yes night flying can be more dangerous - therefore identify the highest risk areas compared with all other phases of flight, and put controls in place to mitigate or reduce that risk. Weather is probably the greatest factor here so increasing the wx minima or currency reqs may be a way forward, but just abandoning night flying all together is too simplistic an approach IMO.
Thread Starter
Well, this is a list of 20 accidents in the North Sea over the last 35 years. It may not be complete, so I apologise if there are errors, but nothing has been deliberately left out or put in to skew the figures !!
What does it tell us ? Well firstly, quite a pat on the back to all the pilots and engineers who have contributed to this list being as short as it is. Given what we do, what we do it with, and the environment we do it in, its quite remarkable that when trying to get this list together, I felt like I had a personal knowledge of most of these accidents, either through experience or CRM debriefs. I thought I'd probably find many that I had never heard of, but it is true to say that in the past 18 years we have only had 6 accidents in the UK aircraft, which is probably less than I would have expected, and three of those everyone walked (or swam) away.
As you can see, most of the early incidents are mechanical, and I guess I want to focus on post Chinook disaster, 1990 and beyond, being my experience on the North Sea when most of the rules we live under today were in place. In those 18 years we've had about 8 offshore aircraft accidents / ditchings. Only 2 of those have been put down to mechanical failure, and one to weather. I guess we have to praise the huge advances in aircraft design and engineering practices.
Of the other five, two have no formal explanation. The first was where the crew were forced to ditch at night due to a perceived engine / control problem that to my knowledge has not been identified. The final one was the tragic loss of the Dauphin in Morcambe Bay with 9 on board which would appear to be a disorientation at night.
I have appended the incidents that were not mechanical failure with Day or Night, and all except the Den Helder incident occurred in or around a rig, most often on approach. In the case of the Cormorant Alpha, during a shuttle and the 212 accident in 1991 was during heli work on the Ekofisk, so was outwith the normal passenger flight proceedures.
1 Sikorsky S61 1973 Near Stavanger, Norway Tail rotor failure and ditch
2 Sikorsky S61 1974 North Sea, Netherlands Main rotor failure and crash
3 Sikorsky S58 1976 Forties Field Tail rotor/gearbox failure and crash
4 Sikorsky S61 1977 Near Stavanger, Norway Main rotor gearbox failure and crash
5 Sikorsky S61 1978 Near Bergen, Norway Main rotor gearbox failure and crash
6 Westland Wessex Mk 60 1981 Off Bacton, UK Main rotor gearbox power loss and crash
7 Bell 212 1981 Near Dunlin, UK Pilot disorientation and crash --- IMC
8 Sikorsky S76 1981 Near Peterhead, UK Rotor failure and aircraft break-up
9 Eurocopter AS332 (Super Puma) 1982 Aberdeen Airport, UK Engine failure and crash
10 Bell 212 1984 Humber, UK Cause of crash unknown --- Night
11 Bell 212 1984 Dan Field, Denmark Tail rotor/gearbox failure and crash
12 Boeing BV234 (Chinook) 1986 Near Sumburgh, UK Main rotor/gearbox failure and crash
13 Sikorsky S61 1990 Brent Spar Helideck Collision and crash --- Day
14 Bell 212 1991 Ekofisk Main rotor struck flare --- Day
15 Eurocopter AS332 (Super Puma) 1992 Near Cormorant 'A', UK Stall and crash --- Night
16 Eurocopter AS332 (Super Puma) 1995 Near Brae Platform Lightning Strike, Tail Rotor Loss, Ditched
17 Eurocopter AS332 (Super Puma) 1997 Near Norne FPU, Norway Engine failure and loss of control
18 Sikorsky S76A (Modified) 2002 Leman Field, UK Main rotor failure and crash
19 Eurocopter AS332L2 2006 Den helder Aircraft Ditched - Under Investigation --- Night
20 Eurocopter SA365N (Dauphin) 2006 Morecambe Bay, UK Under investigation --- Night
So, in conclusion, whilst as I guessed would be the case, there are no clear cut answers here, I suppose these figures broadly support my belief that night flying does account for a disproportionate amount of offshore accidents, and how while we have made large safety improvements in other areas, night flying has not been addressed. It is also clear that as mechanical failures have become improved dramatically, the pilot errors stand out more than previously.
Of the 20 accidents, 13 were due to mechanical failure or mechanical failure following lightning. Of the remaining 7, which would not appear to be mechanical (Den Helder incident unsure), 4 of those occured at night, 1 in poor viz at 04:35 in the morning (summer time so officially daylight) and 2 in daylight. Of those two, one was heli-lifting so could perhaps be explained as unusual flying and the other is the Brent Spar incident - The only one I can find that defies usual reasoning. The only occasion we have where a serviceable helicopter was crashed during daylight operations - This alone speaks volumes for the quality of training and operational professionalism.
So, when night flying only makes up about 5% of offshore hours, surely those 4 out of 7 accidents are disproportionate ??
What does it tell us ? Well firstly, quite a pat on the back to all the pilots and engineers who have contributed to this list being as short as it is. Given what we do, what we do it with, and the environment we do it in, its quite remarkable that when trying to get this list together, I felt like I had a personal knowledge of most of these accidents, either through experience or CRM debriefs. I thought I'd probably find many that I had never heard of, but it is true to say that in the past 18 years we have only had 6 accidents in the UK aircraft, which is probably less than I would have expected, and three of those everyone walked (or swam) away.
As you can see, most of the early incidents are mechanical, and I guess I want to focus on post Chinook disaster, 1990 and beyond, being my experience on the North Sea when most of the rules we live under today were in place. In those 18 years we've had about 8 offshore aircraft accidents / ditchings. Only 2 of those have been put down to mechanical failure, and one to weather. I guess we have to praise the huge advances in aircraft design and engineering practices.
Of the other five, two have no formal explanation. The first was where the crew were forced to ditch at night due to a perceived engine / control problem that to my knowledge has not been identified. The final one was the tragic loss of the Dauphin in Morcambe Bay with 9 on board which would appear to be a disorientation at night.
I have appended the incidents that were not mechanical failure with Day or Night, and all except the Den Helder incident occurred in or around a rig, most often on approach. In the case of the Cormorant Alpha, during a shuttle and the 212 accident in 1991 was during heli work on the Ekofisk, so was outwith the normal passenger flight proceedures.
1 Sikorsky S61 1973 Near Stavanger, Norway Tail rotor failure and ditch
2 Sikorsky S61 1974 North Sea, Netherlands Main rotor failure and crash
3 Sikorsky S58 1976 Forties Field Tail rotor/gearbox failure and crash
4 Sikorsky S61 1977 Near Stavanger, Norway Main rotor gearbox failure and crash
5 Sikorsky S61 1978 Near Bergen, Norway Main rotor gearbox failure and crash
6 Westland Wessex Mk 60 1981 Off Bacton, UK Main rotor gearbox power loss and crash
7 Bell 212 1981 Near Dunlin, UK Pilot disorientation and crash --- IMC
8 Sikorsky S76 1981 Near Peterhead, UK Rotor failure and aircraft break-up
9 Eurocopter AS332 (Super Puma) 1982 Aberdeen Airport, UK Engine failure and crash
10 Bell 212 1984 Humber, UK Cause of crash unknown --- Night
11 Bell 212 1984 Dan Field, Denmark Tail rotor/gearbox failure and crash
12 Boeing BV234 (Chinook) 1986 Near Sumburgh, UK Main rotor/gearbox failure and crash
13 Sikorsky S61 1990 Brent Spar Helideck Collision and crash --- Day
14 Bell 212 1991 Ekofisk Main rotor struck flare --- Day
15 Eurocopter AS332 (Super Puma) 1992 Near Cormorant 'A', UK Stall and crash --- Night
16 Eurocopter AS332 (Super Puma) 1995 Near Brae Platform Lightning Strike, Tail Rotor Loss, Ditched
17 Eurocopter AS332 (Super Puma) 1997 Near Norne FPU, Norway Engine failure and loss of control
18 Sikorsky S76A (Modified) 2002 Leman Field, UK Main rotor failure and crash
19 Eurocopter AS332L2 2006 Den helder Aircraft Ditched - Under Investigation --- Night
20 Eurocopter SA365N (Dauphin) 2006 Morecambe Bay, UK Under investigation --- Night
So, in conclusion, whilst as I guessed would be the case, there are no clear cut answers here, I suppose these figures broadly support my belief that night flying does account for a disproportionate amount of offshore accidents, and how while we have made large safety improvements in other areas, night flying has not been addressed. It is also clear that as mechanical failures have become improved dramatically, the pilot errors stand out more than previously.
Of the 20 accidents, 13 were due to mechanical failure or mechanical failure following lightning. Of the remaining 7, which would not appear to be mechanical (Den Helder incident unsure), 4 of those occured at night, 1 in poor viz at 04:35 in the morning (summer time so officially daylight) and 2 in daylight. Of those two, one was heli-lifting so could perhaps be explained as unusual flying and the other is the Brent Spar incident - The only one I can find that defies usual reasoning. The only occasion we have where a serviceable helicopter was crashed during daylight operations - This alone speaks volumes for the quality of training and operational professionalism.
So, when night flying only makes up about 5% of offshore hours, surely those 4 out of 7 accidents are disproportionate ??
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"Second - we can and do fly safely at night. We CAN remain Perf Class 1 throughout".
Hmmmm...you have never flown a S76 then horror box....class 2 offshore...only class one when we are empty, it's -20 degrees blowing gale force 8
.....
Fly safe..
PH.
Hmmmm...you have never flown a S76 then horror box....class 2 offshore...only class one when we are empty, it's -20 degrees blowing gale force 8
.....Fly safe..
PH.
S25,
Which of those was the shuttle flight into the water that you referred to on page 1? I left the Brent in 79, so all were well after my time.
Re the Bristow Oz Puma accident, ISTR that Paddy was being checked, and there was quite some concern from him about the requirement for a steep approach to the platform, which of course resulted in VR. A long time ago, so I'm not 100% on the details, but having objected to the approach and been overruled, Paddy was able to take the High Ground at the subsequent BOE
Not quite as simple as it seems, I believe.
Going through the responses, and allowing for the modern safety analysis culture, I tend to agree with Horror box: there is little or Buckley's chance of banning night pax flights, but a more thorough regime whereby weather, currency, deck standards and crew proficiency (not the same as currency) must all be factored into a go/no go decision.
ps S25, are you really 35? Your references almost imply that you have been in the NS that long
Which of those was the shuttle flight into the water that you referred to on page 1? I left the Brent in 79, so all were well after my time.
Re the Bristow Oz Puma accident, ISTR that Paddy was being checked, and there was quite some concern from him about the requirement for a steep approach to the platform, which of course resulted in VR. A long time ago, so I'm not 100% on the details, but having objected to the approach and been overruled, Paddy was able to take the High Ground at the subsequent BOE
Not quite as simple as it seems, I believe.Going through the responses, and allowing for the modern safety analysis culture, I tend to agree with Horror box: there is little or Buckley's chance of banning night pax flights, but a more thorough regime whereby weather, currency, deck standards and crew proficiency (not the same as currency) must all be factored into a go/no go decision.
ps S25, are you really 35? Your references almost imply that you have been in the NS that long
Thread Starter
John,
In answer to the above, there were two accidents (I think) during the period we were shuttling offshore - One in 1981 near the Dunlin where one passenger died, and another in 1982 where 6 crew members were killed near the Murchison when the aircraft flew into the water at night. I left this one out of the statistics as although it was the regular Offshore shuttle aircraft, they were engaged on a Search & Rescue call out, so I didn't want to skew the figures. So, the one I was referring to was the Dunlin accident, very early in the morning, just about daylight, poor viz.
Regarding the Oz accident, I didn't know the details or even the company involved. I saw it mentioned in an offshore safety report and I was just using it as an example of a bad approach the wasn't picked up at night, even by an experienced training captain. Also the idea that 'both pilots were 'comfortable' with this sort of approach' which I am sure is not talking about over-confidence or complacency, but about crew that have made lots of night landings without incident, but are as likely as anyone else to be caught out when it suddenly goes wrong. I'm sure you are right that there were all sorts of issues involved, but my only point is 'Things will happen' and its no point saying "he was a bad pilot", "they flew a bad approach", "the helideck lighting was bad" - We need to regulate as tightly as possible to ensure that when these inevitable things happen, we can pick them up, correct or fly away safely. Fortunately in that incident, both pilots were OK.
Could we ever ban night flying - I don't see why not. As argued above, there is no real necessity for offshore operations at night. According to the HSE report of offshore flying (from which most of my 'facts' were gleaned) this covers UK flying from 1977 to 2006 and suggests that while offshore sectors peaked in 1990 at about 360,000 flight sectors per year, by 2002 that figure had dwindled to about 160,000 sectors - A figure that remained fairly constant through until 2006.
The Chinook accident in 1986 throws all the figures out as horrendously 45 people were killed in one accident, but it was the catalyst for a lot of change in the industry. Looking at our operations since that time, we have had just 4 fatal accidents resulting in 35 deaths.
11 - Result of Mechanical failure ( 1 Accident - S76 Norwich)
6 - Accident on landing in daylight ( 1 Accident - S-61 Brent Spar)
18 - Flown into the water at night (2 Accidents, 332 Cormorant, Dauphin Morcambe Bay)
Obviously statistics can read whatever you want them to read, but sadly those are the facts - Half of all fatalities in UK Offshore operations would not have happened (in my oh so humble opinion) during daylight ops. It makes no direct mention of night flying, but is an interesting report, so don't take my word for it - Have a look
http://www.oilandgasuk.co.uk/issues/..._1976-2006.pdf
In answer to the above, there were two accidents (I think) during the period we were shuttling offshore - One in 1981 near the Dunlin where one passenger died, and another in 1982 where 6 crew members were killed near the Murchison when the aircraft flew into the water at night. I left this one out of the statistics as although it was the regular Offshore shuttle aircraft, they were engaged on a Search & Rescue call out, so I didn't want to skew the figures. So, the one I was referring to was the Dunlin accident, very early in the morning, just about daylight, poor viz.
Regarding the Oz accident, I didn't know the details or even the company involved. I saw it mentioned in an offshore safety report and I was just using it as an example of a bad approach the wasn't picked up at night, even by an experienced training captain. Also the idea that 'both pilots were 'comfortable' with this sort of approach' which I am sure is not talking about over-confidence or complacency, but about crew that have made lots of night landings without incident, but are as likely as anyone else to be caught out when it suddenly goes wrong. I'm sure you are right that there were all sorts of issues involved, but my only point is 'Things will happen' and its no point saying "he was a bad pilot", "they flew a bad approach", "the helideck lighting was bad" - We need to regulate as tightly as possible to ensure that when these inevitable things happen, we can pick them up, correct or fly away safely. Fortunately in that incident, both pilots were OK.
Could we ever ban night flying - I don't see why not. As argued above, there is no real necessity for offshore operations at night. According to the HSE report of offshore flying (from which most of my 'facts' were gleaned) this covers UK flying from 1977 to 2006 and suggests that while offshore sectors peaked in 1990 at about 360,000 flight sectors per year, by 2002 that figure had dwindled to about 160,000 sectors - A figure that remained fairly constant through until 2006.
The Chinook accident in 1986 throws all the figures out as horrendously 45 people were killed in one accident, but it was the catalyst for a lot of change in the industry. Looking at our operations since that time, we have had just 4 fatal accidents resulting in 35 deaths.
11 - Result of Mechanical failure ( 1 Accident - S76 Norwich)
6 - Accident on landing in daylight ( 1 Accident - S-61 Brent Spar)
18 - Flown into the water at night (2 Accidents, 332 Cormorant, Dauphin Morcambe Bay)
Obviously statistics can read whatever you want them to read, but sadly those are the facts - Half of all fatalities in UK Offshore operations would not have happened (in my oh so humble opinion) during daylight ops. It makes no direct mention of night flying, but is an interesting report, so don't take my word for it - Have a look
http://www.oilandgasuk.co.uk/issues/..._1976-2006.pdf
Last edited by Special 25; 30th Jun 2009 at 19:35.
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"Second - we can and do fly safely at night. We CAN remain Perf Class 1 throughout".
Hmmmm...you have never flown a S76 then horror box....class 2 offshore...only class one when we are empty, it's -20 degrees blowing gale force 8.....
Fly safe..
PH.
Hmmmm...you have never flown a S76 then horror box....class 2 offshore...only class one when we are empty, it's -20 degrees blowing gale force 8.....
Fly safe..
PH.
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The Den Helder & Morecombe Bay reports can be expected between October & Christmas.
I believe HOMP has the potential to do for operational issues what HUMS has done for mechanical failures.
On the VRS Puma in Australia:
Puma SA 330J Helicopter VH-WOF, Mermaid Sound WA, 12 May 1991
199100126
ATSB Abstract:
The aircraft was tasked to carry out a marine pilot pick-up from a departing tanker. The flight was conducted by two pilots operating under night visual flight rules. Conditions were a moonless night with no defined horizon, no outside lighting other than from the ship, and a surface wind that was light and variable. The ship was steaming in a northerly direction at 12.5 kts. The flight proceeded normally until the aircraft was established on final approach to the helideck. As the aircraft descended through 500 ft the rate of descent had increased to about 1,000 ft/min. Although the pilot in command increased main rotor pitch, the aircraft's rate of descent continued to increase until just prior to impact with the water. Both occupants were rescued approximately 1 h after they evacuated the helicopter. The report concludes that the standard approach technique used by the pilots, coupled with the prevailing weather conditions, caused the aircraft to enter a high rate of descent shortly after the aircraft started its normal final approach to the deck. The high rate of descent was probably the result of entry to the incipient stage of Vortex-ring state'. A lack of visual cues and inadequate management of cockpit resources prevented the crew from recognising the abnormal situation until the aircraft was well into the descent. Recovery action was commenced too late to prevent impact with the water.
I believe HOMP has the potential to do for operational issues what HUMS has done for mechanical failures.
On the VRS Puma in Australia:
Puma SA 330J Helicopter VH-WOF, Mermaid Sound WA, 12 May 1991
199100126
ATSB Abstract:
The aircraft was tasked to carry out a marine pilot pick-up from a departing tanker. The flight was conducted by two pilots operating under night visual flight rules. Conditions were a moonless night with no defined horizon, no outside lighting other than from the ship, and a surface wind that was light and variable. The ship was steaming in a northerly direction at 12.5 kts. The flight proceeded normally until the aircraft was established on final approach to the helideck. As the aircraft descended through 500 ft the rate of descent had increased to about 1,000 ft/min. Although the pilot in command increased main rotor pitch, the aircraft's rate of descent continued to increase until just prior to impact with the water. Both occupants were rescued approximately 1 h after they evacuated the helicopter. The report concludes that the standard approach technique used by the pilots, coupled with the prevailing weather conditions, caused the aircraft to enter a high rate of descent shortly after the aircraft started its normal final approach to the deck. The high rate of descent was probably the result of entry to the incipient stage of Vortex-ring state'. A lack of visual cues and inadequate management of cockpit resources prevented the crew from recognising the abnormal situation until the aircraft was well into the descent. Recovery action was commenced too late to prevent impact with the water.
Though we have been around this bush many times, and I am not offshore qualified......
Why do we not fit or mandate an Enhanced Vision System "EVS" (uncooled IR)?
Less than $20K USD. Sees what is there, not what some computer modeler thinks.
Seems ideally suited to offshore work that requires forward viz above all else - where say EMS need things like NVG so they can look around the place and recce the HLS.
Why do we not fit or mandate an Enhanced Vision System "EVS" (uncooled IR)?
Less than $20K USD. Sees what is there, not what some computer modeler thinks.
Seems ideally suited to offshore work that requires forward viz above all else - where say EMS need things like NVG so they can look around the place and recce the HLS.
Last edited by helmet fire; 29th Sep 2008 at 05:59.
Interesting conclusion of VRS for that accident when it was more likely that the pilots let the speed drop below ETL and didn't have the visual cues to respond to the increased RoD. RNF approaches over water with no rate of closure information are notorious for ending up in high hover or hover-taxi conditions - this sounds like just such an incident.
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Ref the Bristow accident, although both pilots were very experienced check pilots, Paddy was not under check. I'm told most of the pilots did not do the so called standard company approach as it was considered a bad procedure. Because there were 2 check pilots flying, Paddy thought it prudent to follow company procedures with subsequent disasterous results. I was also told it took about 16 seconds from 500 ft to ditching. It took the best part of 2 years to clear their name as it was considered the company procedure was at fault.
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At the risk of being branded a reactionary - look at FW instrument approaches. All of them are now 'ILS like' so that every approach is flown the same way. Lots of good information about closure rates (thanks to having to maintain an airspeed to avoid stalling), knowing where the runway is, and so on.
What we need is a consistent approach methodology (with rate of descent and closure rate information coming from something other than visual cues) that will take us down to some very low height above the landing zone (50'? 100'?) so that then we can take over and land comfortably all the time. Repeat - all the time!
Differential GPS? WAAS GPS in the USA? Something out there will work.
Let's start pressuring for it.
What we need is a consistent approach methodology (with rate of descent and closure rate information coming from something other than visual cues) that will take us down to some very low height above the landing zone (50'? 100'?) so that then we can take over and land comfortably all the time. Repeat - all the time!
Differential GPS? WAAS GPS in the USA? Something out there will work.
Let's start pressuring for it.
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I remember shuttling at night on the Southern North Sea, low decks, often no horizon and slack winds. Not only were the decks low, but small as well and we were in a S61. It used to scare me to death. Non-handler was completely unsighted for most of the approach and this was where young P2s were sent to built deck landing practise. Speed control was utterly vital. Setting yourself off at 500' with the correct speed could avoid no end of problems caused by ridiculous flaring at the bottom.
Nowadays the winter brings the joys of the same conditions landing in a field on a T on Exmoor. Often the only lights are the T so there is nothing else to give a relative movement reference. Sometimes you may be able to see a village in the distance, normally too far away to be of help and despite a ground visit in daylight perceptions play tricks on your senses. The T appears in the screen in the right place, the speed is right, but there is nothing else to see. The "leans" are a distinct possibility. A huge level of trust is placed in the hands of the man who sets the T up (he really earns his money) The passengers tend to be of the ilk where a broken nail will get them in the papers, get the approach wrong and go splat into something and you are going to be briefly (and probably posthumously) very famous.
Those nights I hate with a passion.
VH
Nowadays the winter brings the joys of the same conditions landing in a field on a T on Exmoor. Often the only lights are the T so there is nothing else to give a relative movement reference. Sometimes you may be able to see a village in the distance, normally too far away to be of help and despite a ground visit in daylight perceptions play tricks on your senses. The T appears in the screen in the right place, the speed is right, but there is nothing else to see. The "leans" are a distinct possibility. A huge level of trust is placed in the hands of the man who sets the T up (he really earns his money) The passengers tend to be of the ilk where a broken nail will get them in the papers, get the approach wrong and go splat into something and you are going to be briefly (and probably posthumously) very famous.
Those nights I hate with a passion.
VH
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Fixed-wing aircraft can fly identical approaches because they always land to a prepared, lighted runway already surveyed for obstacles. Helicopters don't have that luxury.
I am with Shawn here (again!).
Our little BK117 and A109 does a cracking hands off ILS down to a level off at 50ft! Everytime. Day/night/wind independant.
Is it REALLY that hard to design a GPS approach with WAAS and make the autopilot level off at say 100ft? Have the entire finals as a straight line after the IAF and add the EVS so you can see what is actually in front of you.
That way you get around several off shore issues that seem to be frustrating you all with standard minimums and EGPWS, etc.
How about these ideas for a standard GPS approach (with vertical guidance/glide path):
For approaches to ships at sea (i.e. that do not have a permanent approach set up as they are on the move, it would already be possible to design an overwater approach in the same manner as described above. You could simply select the "Overwater" approach on the GPS, then it might ask for a destination lat/long and the wind direction as the only two inputs, but I think it would not be hard to also program boat speed and direction for better FAF to MAPWPt calculations and guidance. It can then construct the approach (including vertical guidance) IAW a standard design. It should even be able to compare the ground speed Vs IAS to tell you before the FAF if you have selected the incorrect wind (perhaps not allowing descent past the FAF if there is too much of an anomaly).
In the same manner as the rig approach above, the minima could be set to XXX ft after which a clear EVS image and visual met conditions are required. The approach could always aim to bring you out to the portside approach point at 1000m or so and again you get the warning with option for go-around or hand fly decel and approach.
These calculations should be able to made with today's technology. We have all the data collection points needed already. We have autopilots that are reliable enough to do it.
then again, maybe we should just keep spending money on PC1 and CatA performance!!
Our little BK117 and A109 does a cracking hands off ILS down to a level off at 50ft! Everytime. Day/night/wind independant.
Is it REALLY that hard to design a GPS approach with WAAS and make the autopilot level off at say 100ft? Have the entire finals as a straight line after the IAF and add the EVS so you can see what is actually in front of you.
That way you get around several off shore issues that seem to be frustrating you all with standard minimums and EGPWS, etc.
How about these ideas for a standard GPS approach (with vertical guidance/glide path):
- Must be straight in from the IAF.
- Slow the helicopter to 50 or 60 before he FAF.
- Have the weather actual minimum higher than the 100 or 150 ft to cope with transient shipping and other temporary and permanent obstacles, say at 250 ft or so, and 400ft or more for no WAAS.
- Ensure that descent below that point must be accompanied by visual conditions and a clear EVS picture, and a serviceable autopilot level off.
- Autopilot levels off at designated hight with clear EVS image and visual met conditions, all coupled up.
- At missed approach point that would be in a standard position from the rig each time: say at the 1:30 at 1000m a warning flshes. Action here is either press go-around mode OR hand fly deceleration and finals.
For approaches to ships at sea (i.e. that do not have a permanent approach set up as they are on the move, it would already be possible to design an overwater approach in the same manner as described above. You could simply select the "Overwater" approach on the GPS, then it might ask for a destination lat/long and the wind direction as the only two inputs, but I think it would not be hard to also program boat speed and direction for better FAF to MAPWPt calculations and guidance. It can then construct the approach (including vertical guidance) IAW a standard design. It should even be able to compare the ground speed Vs IAS to tell you before the FAF if you have selected the incorrect wind (perhaps not allowing descent past the FAF if there is too much of an anomaly).
In the same manner as the rig approach above, the minima could be set to XXX ft after which a clear EVS image and visual met conditions are required. The approach could always aim to bring you out to the portside approach point at 1000m or so and again you get the warning with option for go-around or hand fly decel and approach.
These calculations should be able to made with today's technology. We have all the data collection points needed already. We have autopilots that are reliable enough to do it.
then again, maybe we should just keep spending money on PC1 and CatA performance!!
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Helmet fire - thanks for the support. We have the technology, but seem to lack the political will to demand it.
What about the large oil companies? Shell, etc.? Might they be interested?
What about the large oil companies? Shell, etc.? Might they be interested?
You are right - we, as a group lack the will to fix such things, and I believe that will is as a direct consequence of the market forces that surround most of our thinking.
Very rarely does the appearance of a new technology get implemented without some regulatory requirement or some contractors requirement. Very rarely to we go into the bidding process with a much more expensive model due to the improved technologies fitted on board our aircraft knowing that the competitor will be cheaper and thus significantly more likely to win the contract. These are the issues that emerge as a feeling that we lack the will as a group to implement the solutions. There is NO better example than the American EMS industry.
Pprune is a very good place to share ideas, but so many people take it emotively and demonstrate quite easily that the "industry" is not a group per se, it is a fractured and competitive set of tribal groups based on background or company - and rarely can we gain a quorum - indeed I have yet to see one!
10 pilots = 11 opinions, all emotively defended!
But..at least if people keep sharing the info and discussing the issues we can edge toward a safer future. Look at NVG as an example. All the emotive arguments were played out time and time again on the prune, but the technology is inevitably seeping into our futures to make it considerably safer to fly at night. Despite all the arguments and ill-feeling. Even though an international panel of SME established the basis for safe civilian NVG flight in 1996 (see the RTCO SC-96 reports DO 275, & 268), few if any countries have adopted this standard. Many are still arguing over it. That is unfortunately as close as we seem to get! But we are getting there...
Very rarely does the appearance of a new technology get implemented without some regulatory requirement or some contractors requirement. Very rarely to we go into the bidding process with a much more expensive model due to the improved technologies fitted on board our aircraft knowing that the competitor will be cheaper and thus significantly more likely to win the contract. These are the issues that emerge as a feeling that we lack the will as a group to implement the solutions. There is NO better example than the American EMS industry.
Pprune is a very good place to share ideas, but so many people take it emotively and demonstrate quite easily that the "industry" is not a group per se, it is a fractured and competitive set of tribal groups based on background or company - and rarely can we gain a quorum - indeed I have yet to see one!
10 pilots = 11 opinions, all emotively defended!
But..at least if people keep sharing the info and discussing the issues we can edge toward a safer future. Look at NVG as an example. All the emotive arguments were played out time and time again on the prune, but the technology is inevitably seeping into our futures to make it considerably safer to fly at night. Despite all the arguments and ill-feeling. Even though an international panel of SME established the basis for safe civilian NVG flight in 1996 (see the RTCO SC-96 reports DO 275, & 268), few if any countries have adopted this standard. Many are still arguing over it. That is unfortunately as close as we seem to get! But we are getting there...
Helmet fire,
Firstly before anyone says it I know bugger all about landing on boats or rigs.
However I do know a bit about designing computerised things. Your suggestions seem very sensible to me, but in this day and age why should the pilots even by be worried about inputing lat longs and wind. A little bit of electronic communication between the vessel and the gubbins in the aircraft and you have sent to you the vessels GPS position and then fly your overwater approach with the GPS onboard calculating the wind for you [if you need it during the automatic phase of the approach]. Sounds easy to do, harder to achieve and certify in practice but surely something like this could save some hassles (perhaps even lives)
You could even couple up obstacle or terrain aware databases to help prevent you from running into known obstructions (of which I am told there are a few).
With regards to NVGs they'd make my life easier but how does a non exmil type like me get trained in the use (particularly in the UK ?). I am sure there may
even be people using them now in the UK , who perhaps not with approval of the authority have made their own jobs a bit safer.
I get the impresson that most of this comes down to cost and its impact on profits.
Just my early morning Wednesday thoughts.
GS
Firstly before anyone says it I know bugger all about landing on boats or rigs.
However I do know a bit about designing computerised things. Your suggestions seem very sensible to me, but in this day and age why should the pilots even by be worried about inputing lat longs and wind. A little bit of electronic communication between the vessel and the gubbins in the aircraft and you have sent to you the vessels GPS position and then fly your overwater approach with the GPS onboard calculating the wind for you [if you need it during the automatic phase of the approach]. Sounds easy to do, harder to achieve and certify in practice but surely something like this could save some hassles (perhaps even lives)
You could even couple up obstacle or terrain aware databases to help prevent you from running into known obstructions (of which I am told there are a few).
With regards to NVGs they'd make my life easier but how does a non exmil type like me get trained in the use (particularly in the UK ?). I am sure there may
even be people using them now in the UK , who perhaps not with approval of the authority have made their own jobs a bit safer.I get the impresson that most of this comes down to cost and its impact on profits.
Just my early morning Wednesday thoughts.
GS
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That way you get around several off shore issues that seem to be frustrating you all with standard minimums and EGPWS, etc.
How about these ideas for a standard GPS approach (with vertical guidance/glide path):
Must be straight in from the IAF.
Slow the helicopter to 50 or 60 before he FAF.
Have the weather actual minimum higher than the 100 or 150 ft to cope with transient shipping and other temporary and permanent obstacles, say at 250 ft or so, and 400ft or more for no WAAS.
Ensure that descent below that point must be accompanied by visual conditions and a clear EVS picture, and a serviceable autopilot level off.
Autopilot levels off at designated hight with clear EVS image and visual met conditions, all coupled up.
At missed approach point that would be in a standard position from the rig each time: say at the 1:30 at 1000m a warning flshes. Action here is either press go-around mode OR hand fly deceleration and finals.
How about these ideas for a standard GPS approach (with vertical guidance/glide path):
Must be straight in from the IAF.
Slow the helicopter to 50 or 60 before he FAF.
Have the weather actual minimum higher than the 100 or 150 ft to cope with transient shipping and other temporary and permanent obstacles, say at 250 ft or so, and 400ft or more for no WAAS.
Ensure that descent below that point must be accompanied by visual conditions and a clear EVS picture, and a serviceable autopilot level off.
Autopilot levels off at designated hight with clear EVS image and visual met conditions, all coupled up.
At missed approach point that would be in a standard position from the rig each time: say at the 1:30 at 1000m a warning flshes. Action here is either press go-around mode OR hand fly deceleration and finals.