Winches on Police/Airambulance helis?
Please bear this in mind when reading my post:
1. The casualty deserves to be sent the most appropriate asset without delay
2. At present, this doesn't always happen
This issue has provoked a lot of discussion, not all of it well-informed...
SAR can and frequently do land to perform rescues, as it avoids the risks inherent in winching, but unlike AAs, SAR can still carry out the rescue expeditiously if the terrain proves unsuitable for landing. But back to the original question...
On this thread, there has been a lot of willy-waving between the respective proponents of SAR and Air Ambulances, but little mention of providing a good service to the person who needs it ie the casualty. Perhaps Crab's original concern was that, should AAs be fitted with winches, they (or their controllers) will try to muscle in on rescue situations even more than they already do (sorry but it's true!), rather than sticking to high-speed taxi jobs to which they are eminently suited (and much better suited, I must say, than wheezing Sea Kings/S61s). Whatever some of the AA proponents have said on this thread, there are countless cases of AA crews wading in to rescue situations when frankly they should steer clear and let a dedicated SAR helicopter do its work.
I may seem to be contradicting myself in the above paragraph (ie if an AA is winch-equipped, why shouldn't it do rescues), but my point is this: even without winches, AA crews are frequently guilty of pressing on with a rescue when it would be more sensible - and, crucially, better for the casualty - to admit defeat and stand aside for a SAR aircraft...if AAs do get winches, they will become even less willing to stand back when the situation is beyond their capability. Even if an AA does get a winch, the winch will not offer the speed, load-lifting ability, or cable length of a full-size SAR helo (and how about the issue of cabin space/casualty accessibility?). The SAR aircraft are also trained and equipped for ops in worse weather than AAs (not to mention night work) - so is it sensible to suggest that AA crews tackle full-blown rescues with their limited winching facility, when a SAR helo would be better placed? As I said, in my experience, too often an AA attempts to deal with a SAR situation, and ends up either coping by using MRT/Coastguards to carry the cas over tricky terrain to the aircraft, or getting stuck and only then requesting a SAR aircraft, which then creates a further delay for the casualty while said SAR aircraft is scrambled. Neither of these scenarios benefits the casualty (or the stretcher-bearers!).
There may well be some caustic reaction to my comments, but the bottom line is this: the casualty's needs are the top priority, so it's important to get the best asset dispatched without delay. Why create more room for confusion and delay by adding a limited winching facility to an Air Ambulance? There are plenty of well-equipped SAR helicopters at numerous bases around the UK already; there are also plenty of non-winch-capable AAs around the country, and both 'fleets' get plenty of trade in their specialities. Why not simply concentrate our efforts on the education of those who need to know about what each asset can offer, rather than trying to confuse the issue by blurring the boundaries further?
1. The casualty deserves to be sent the most appropriate asset without delay
2. At present, this doesn't always happen
This issue has provoked a lot of discussion, not all of it well-informed...
SAR winch because they can't land
SAR can and frequently do land to perform rescues, as it avoids the risks inherent in winching, but unlike AAs, SAR can still carry out the rescue expeditiously if the terrain proves unsuitable for landing. But back to the original question...
On this thread, there has been a lot of willy-waving between the respective proponents of SAR and Air Ambulances, but little mention of providing a good service to the person who needs it ie the casualty. Perhaps Crab's original concern was that, should AAs be fitted with winches, they (or their controllers) will try to muscle in on rescue situations even more than they already do (sorry but it's true!), rather than sticking to high-speed taxi jobs to which they are eminently suited (and much better suited, I must say, than wheezing Sea Kings/S61s). Whatever some of the AA proponents have said on this thread, there are countless cases of AA crews wading in to rescue situations when frankly they should steer clear and let a dedicated SAR helicopter do its work.
I may seem to be contradicting myself in the above paragraph (ie if an AA is winch-equipped, why shouldn't it do rescues), but my point is this: even without winches, AA crews are frequently guilty of pressing on with a rescue when it would be more sensible - and, crucially, better for the casualty - to admit defeat and stand aside for a SAR aircraft...if AAs do get winches, they will become even less willing to stand back when the situation is beyond their capability. Even if an AA does get a winch, the winch will not offer the speed, load-lifting ability, or cable length of a full-size SAR helo (and how about the issue of cabin space/casualty accessibility?). The SAR aircraft are also trained and equipped for ops in worse weather than AAs (not to mention night work) - so is it sensible to suggest that AA crews tackle full-blown rescues with their limited winching facility, when a SAR helo would be better placed? As I said, in my experience, too often an AA attempts to deal with a SAR situation, and ends up either coping by using MRT/Coastguards to carry the cas over tricky terrain to the aircraft, or getting stuck and only then requesting a SAR aircraft, which then creates a further delay for the casualty while said SAR aircraft is scrambled. Neither of these scenarios benefits the casualty (or the stretcher-bearers!).
There may well be some caustic reaction to my comments, but the bottom line is this: the casualty's needs are the top priority, so it's important to get the best asset dispatched without delay. Why create more room for confusion and delay by adding a limited winching facility to an Air Ambulance? There are plenty of well-equipped SAR helicopters at numerous bases around the UK already; there are also plenty of non-winch-capable AAs around the country, and both 'fleets' get plenty of trade in their specialities. Why not simply concentrate our efforts on the education of those who need to know about what each asset can offer, rather than trying to confuse the issue by blurring the boundaries further?
Avoid imitations
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I understand that UK CAA regs require air ambulances to operate under Class A performance requirements at all times. There has been some discussion about this wrt helipad operations.
However, how would AAs be placed in this respect whilst actually winching? Presumably single engine hover would be required. As I understand it, this isn't possible with the aircraft being used.
However, how would AAs be placed in this respect whilst actually winching? Presumably single engine hover would be required. As I understand it, this isn't possible with the aircraft being used.
I have been involved in Air Ambulance (HEMS) works for some 9 years and continue to do so. In that time I have yet to see or hear of the "countless cases of AA crews wading in to rescue situations when frankly they should steer clear and let a dedicated SAR helicopter do its work."
I do recall the GNAA rescuing the trapped driver from his car in the North East and I believe the crew acted because the on-scene experts advised that the driver needed rescuing immediately and there was no time to lose.
I do also recall tasks where a coastal rescue was carried out by the coastguard/beach rescue etc. and the casualty was then transported to hospital by the HEMS aircraft. The cases in mind were all done in less than the deployment time frame of the nearest SAR aircraft I would suggest.
or when
"AA crews are frequently guilty of pressing on with a rescue when it would be more sensible - and, crucially, better for the casualty - to admit defeat and stand aside for a SAR aircraft..." I do hope you don't mean wait and hope the casualty doesn't die before the SAR gets there!!
I don't know too much about SAR and using them for HEMS or Air Ambulance work but I believe it could be something to do with location and reaction times (availability) as well as costs.
Now, I do foresee that in times to come the emergency services helicopters will become better equipped to carry out more 'rescuing' type of work particulary on-shore but possibly rivers, lakes, and near shore.
Like has been said, it's the casualty that comes first.
I will now withdraw quietly from this one and let the willy waving begin.
Oh yes - not all HEMS aircraft go to bed when it gets dark.
I do recall the GNAA rescuing the trapped driver from his car in the North East and I believe the crew acted because the on-scene experts advised that the driver needed rescuing immediately and there was no time to lose.
I do also recall tasks where a coastal rescue was carried out by the coastguard/beach rescue etc. and the casualty was then transported to hospital by the HEMS aircraft. The cases in mind were all done in less than the deployment time frame of the nearest SAR aircraft I would suggest.
or when
"AA crews are frequently guilty of pressing on with a rescue when it would be more sensible - and, crucially, better for the casualty - to admit defeat and stand aside for a SAR aircraft..." I do hope you don't mean wait and hope the casualty doesn't die before the SAR gets there!!
I don't know too much about SAR and using them for HEMS or Air Ambulance work but I believe it could be something to do with location and reaction times (availability) as well as costs.
Now, I do foresee that in times to come the emergency services helicopters will become better equipped to carry out more 'rescuing' type of work particulary on-shore but possibly rivers, lakes, and near shore.
Like has been said, it's the casualty that comes first.
I will now withdraw quietly from this one and let the willy waving begin.
Oh yes - not all HEMS aircraft go to bed when it gets dark.
there are countless cases of AA crews wading in to rescue situations when frankly they should steer clear and let a dedicated SAR helicopter do its work.
Unless you count our one 2 years ago. (Car and unconscious occupant sinking in a river)
(Just previewed this to see that tbc has beaten me to it, so I suppose this counts as a willy wave!)
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Shy Torque -
"During HHO, the helicopter must be capable of sustaining a critical power unit failure with the remaining engine(s) at the appropriate power setting, without hazard to the suspended person(s)/cargo, third parties, or property. (Except for HEMS HHO at a HEMS operating site where the requirement need not be applied)"
Training is a different matter, in this case no exemptions are currently available.
FF
"During HHO, the helicopter must be capable of sustaining a critical power unit failure with the remaining engine(s) at the appropriate power setting, without hazard to the suspended person(s)/cargo, third parties, or property. (Except for HEMS HHO at a HEMS operating site where the requirement need not be applied)"
Training is a different matter, in this case no exemptions are currently available.
FF
Gentleman Aviator
Training is a different matter, in this case no exemptions are currently available.
...there's sensible then ....
You should be aware that HEMS performance was discussed in great detail and put to bed on this thread http://www.pprune.org/forums/showthread.php?t=216776.
As was established there:
Flaxton flyer correctly quotes from Appendix 1 to JAR-OPS 3.005(h) para (d)(1) which establishes that, as with landing at a HEMS Operating Site, there is alleviation from performance requirements when hoisting; but then assumes incorrectly that JAR-OPS 3 contains the same restriction on Hoist Training as is applied by the UK CAA. Hoist training is not regulated by JAR-OPS 3 as it is not considered to be CAT.
I was intrigued by TorqueOfTheDevil's post:
Having sensibly applied objective criteria to the issue he then dismisses solutions other than SAR
Objective criteria is just that - set the objective and not the means of compliance; if the HEMS operator meets all of the requirement of training, qualification and recency, there is no earthly reason why HEMS/HHO should not be Approved and undertaken.
The issue of weather is a red-herring; the HEMS operating minima is set in the HEMS Appendix - there are no additional alleviations for HEMS/HHO.
Jim
As was established there:
Firstly I would recommend reading the regulations for they contain the answer to the question that you have posed. In particular Appendix 1 to JAR-OPS 3.005(d) paragraph (c)(2) and ACJ to Appendix 1 to JAR-OPS 3.005(d) “The HEMS philosophy”.
In practical terms 212man is correct in his statement that you have to meet the standard performance requirement of JAR-OPS 3 - but, as modified by the Appendix referenced above.
The following is therefore permitted:
If operating over a non-hostile environment operations can be conducted in PC3;
at a hospital in a congested hostile environment (city centre); operations conducted in PC1 except when an approval has been given under the Public Interest Site alleviation - which permits exposure on take-off and landing (a modified PC2 with exposure);
at the accident site; no performance requirement but pilots are expected to minimise exposure;
at the operating base; normal performance requirements apply - i.e. PC1, 2 or 3 as required by JAR-OPS 3.470.
As stated in the ACJ referenced above; the operating base is where the crew and helicopter are stationed and from where most sorties are started and ended. Complications occur when the operating base is in a congested hostile environment and specifically at a hospital; if this is the case then the local NAA will have to rule on what the requirement is. Basically, this situation should not occur as the base should have been risk assessed and located with safety in mind.
However, all are aware that as the HEMS helicopter becomes the trauma team mode of transport (see London HEMS), it becomes economical to base the helicopter at the hospital so that the trauma team can be gainfully employed when HEMS is not in action.
In practical terms 212man is correct in his statement that you have to meet the standard performance requirement of JAR-OPS 3 - but, as modified by the Appendix referenced above.
The following is therefore permitted:
If operating over a non-hostile environment operations can be conducted in PC3;
at a hospital in a congested hostile environment (city centre); operations conducted in PC1 except when an approval has been given under the Public Interest Site alleviation - which permits exposure on take-off and landing (a modified PC2 with exposure);
at the accident site; no performance requirement but pilots are expected to minimise exposure;
at the operating base; normal performance requirements apply - i.e. PC1, 2 or 3 as required by JAR-OPS 3.470.
As stated in the ACJ referenced above; the operating base is where the crew and helicopter are stationed and from where most sorties are started and ended. Complications occur when the operating base is in a congested hostile environment and specifically at a hospital; if this is the case then the local NAA will have to rule on what the requirement is. Basically, this situation should not occur as the base should have been risk assessed and located with safety in mind.
However, all are aware that as the HEMS helicopter becomes the trauma team mode of transport (see London HEMS), it becomes economical to base the helicopter at the hospital so that the trauma team can be gainfully employed when HEMS is not in action.
I was intrigued by TorqueOfTheDevil's post:
the bottom line is this: the casualty's needs are the top priority, so it's important to get the best asset dispatched without delay
Why create more room for confusion and delay by adding a limited winching facility to an Air Ambulance?
The issue of weather is a red-herring; the HEMS operating minima is set in the HEMS Appendix - there are no additional alleviations for HEMS/HHO.
Jim
JimL where are the hoist regs laid down then?
Where does it say it is NOT a commercial activity?
Why are the CAA reverting me and other operators to JAR Ops 3 for the HHO regs and quoting they cannot be done during trng without full SSE guarantees?
Where does it say it is NOT a commercial activity?
Why are the CAA reverting me and other operators to JAR Ops 3 for the HHO regs and quoting they cannot be done during trng without full SSE guarantees?
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Hoist training is not regulated by JAR-OPS 3 as it is not considered to be CAT.
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'there are countless cases of AA crews wading in to rescue situations when frankly they should steer clear and let a dedicated SAR helicopter do its work.'
TOTD, Please give us some of these examples so we can all learn from your wealth of experience of UK AA and SAR operations or are you going to just leave these accusations in open forum to try to discredit the UK AA units?
Didn't you say that its whats best for the patient? If you think any AA unit is not conducting itself in a manner condusive to this principal then you should make this know to the local ambulance service, who oversee its operations
'AA crews are frequently guilty of pressing on with a rescue when it would be more sensible - and, crucially, better for the casualty - to admit defeat and stand aside for a SAR aircraft...if AAs do get winches, they will become even less willing to stand back when the situation is beyond their capability.'
TOTD I doubt that your opinion will hold any weight with anyone who knows anything about the UK AA operations which you clearly do NOT. I have the upmost respect for the UK AA charities and the sometimes hazardous tasks they undertake as professionals and they are no less professional than any Mil SAR crew when it comes to recognising their capabilities and when a situation is beyond them.
TOTD, Please give us some of these examples so we can all learn from your wealth of experience of UK AA and SAR operations or are you going to just leave these accusations in open forum to try to discredit the UK AA units?
Didn't you say that its whats best for the patient? If you think any AA unit is not conducting itself in a manner condusive to this principal then you should make this know to the local ambulance service, who oversee its operations
'AA crews are frequently guilty of pressing on with a rescue when it would be more sensible - and, crucially, better for the casualty - to admit defeat and stand aside for a SAR aircraft...if AAs do get winches, they will become even less willing to stand back when the situation is beyond their capability.'
TOTD I doubt that your opinion will hold any weight with anyone who knows anything about the UK AA operations which you clearly do NOT. I have the upmost respect for the UK AA charities and the sometimes hazardous tasks they undertake as professionals and they are no less professional than any Mil SAR crew when it comes to recognising their capabilities and when a situation is beyond them.
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Don't want a winch don't need a winch.On the one occaision I have needed one I called some very nice people who already have one ,to come and help ,which they did.
That said there does seem to be a bit of : The answer is military SAR now what's the question on this thread.
Sorry guys,but the answer isn't always call a sea king.There is nothing wrong with the way the AA 's operate at the moment.Sometimes a sea king is just to big,to land or indeed to stop blowing plod's accident investigation evidence all over the countryside !! (yes you can land expeditiously and for the benefit of the patient and still preserve the scene )
That said there does seem to be a bit of : The answer is military SAR now what's the question on this thread.
Sorry guys,but the answer isn't always call a sea king.There is nothing wrong with the way the AA 's operate at the moment.Sometimes a sea king is just to big,to land or indeed to stop blowing plod's accident investigation evidence all over the countryside !! (yes you can land expeditiously and for the benefit of the patient and still preserve the scene )
Thomas Coupling,
You have to be careful when mixing and matching terminology; my comments were with regard to CAT operations, which ICAO establishes is:
To my knowledge (and it has been some time since I was involved) the ANO does not use the term CAT - preferring instead Public Transport. As you also know, there is a lack of a definition of Crew Member; the reason why some activities - considered by ICAO and Europe to be Aerial Work - are regulated as Public Transport in the UK.
You have to be careful when mixing and matching terminology; my comments were with regard to CAT operations, which ICAO establishes is:
Commercial air transport operation. An aircraft operation involving the transport of passengers, cargo or mail for remuneration or hire.
The last complication is that there is no legal basis for JAR-OPS 3 in the UK; it is permitted to be used as the basis for regulation of operations as an alternative to the ANO. The CAA is the arbiter of exactly what might be applied (or not applied) based upon its perception of what is safe - in accordance with safety targets and policy in the UK.
It is an entirely justifiable stance to insist that hoist training is performed with engine failure accountability - the whole crew is exposed to an engine failure in training on far more occasions than when operating for real; thus the risk is higher. This is not an issue of regulation but one of Risk Assessment and Risk Reduction.
Cyclic,
SAR is specifically included in the ICAO definition of Aerial Work
however ICAO does not provide SARPs for Aerial Work and the State must decide under what regulations it permits the operation. It is not regulated under JAR-OPS 3 and, in view of the diverse nature of SAR in European States, when we produced draft regulations for Aerial Work, we specifically recommended that SAR be excluded from JAR-OPS 4 and left to the individual States.
Aerial work. An aircraft operation in which an aircraft is used for specialized services such as agriculture, construction, photography, surveying, observation and patrol, search and rescue, aerial advertisement, etc.
Jim
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I can understand the current SAR bods not wishing to loose a little of their grip on having a winch fitted.
But lets look at the UK in general,
policing, PCSO's instead of police, council parking attendants instead of traffic wardens, HATO's instead of motorway traffic police.
NHS, minor treatment centres instead of A&E's, single crewed response vehicles instead of double crewed ambulances, volunteer first responders instead of full time crews, charity based air ambulances instead of nationwide NHS paid for coverage
fire brigades, more retainers instead of full time crews.
it seems its the way of the UK government to dilute and devolve tasks, so understandable if winches end up becoming an option open to AA/HEMS and police operators.
But lets look at the UK in general,
policing, PCSO's instead of police, council parking attendants instead of traffic wardens, HATO's instead of motorway traffic police.
NHS, minor treatment centres instead of A&E's, single crewed response vehicles instead of double crewed ambulances, volunteer first responders instead of full time crews, charity based air ambulances instead of nationwide NHS paid for coverage
fire brigades, more retainers instead of full time crews.
it seems its the way of the UK government to dilute and devolve tasks, so understandable if winches end up becoming an option open to AA/HEMS and police operators.
JimL: Were you from DAP in the past? [Jar 4 etc?].
Commercial Air Transport is defined in the SES Common Requirements as:
“any aircraft operation involving the transport of passengers, cargo or mail for remuneration or hire.
Under (UK) Air Law:
In the UK, the term 'public transport' is used instead of 'commercial air transport', and 'public transport' is defined in Article 130(2) of the Air Navigation Order (the 'ANO') as any flight where:
'(a) ... valuable consideration is given or promised for the carriage of passengers or cargo in the aircraft on that flight';
or, subject to minor exceptions, where
'(b) ... any passengers or cargo are carried gratuitously in the aircraft on that flight by an air transport undertaking ...'.
They are one and the same thing therefore.
Secondly:
The CAA have elected in this instance to fall back on JAR Ops 3 for the regulations governing HHO.
I question your stance then:
Quote: Hoist training is not regulated by JAR-OPS 3 as it is not considered to be CAT. Unquote.
It is.....and......it is
That is why we can't winch in the police / AA role...the a/c we choose to fly (EC145 thru to AS355) can't train safely with passengers on board due to the lack of a SSE capability. QED.
Commercial Air Transport is defined in the SES Common Requirements as:
“any aircraft operation involving the transport of passengers, cargo or mail for remuneration or hire.
Under (UK) Air Law:
In the UK, the term 'public transport' is used instead of 'commercial air transport', and 'public transport' is defined in Article 130(2) of the Air Navigation Order (the 'ANO') as any flight where:
'(a) ... valuable consideration is given or promised for the carriage of passengers or cargo in the aircraft on that flight';
or, subject to minor exceptions, where
'(b) ... any passengers or cargo are carried gratuitously in the aircraft on that flight by an air transport undertaking ...'.
They are one and the same thing therefore.
Secondly:
The CAA have elected in this instance to fall back on JAR Ops 3 for the regulations governing HHO.
I question your stance then:
Quote: Hoist training is not regulated by JAR-OPS 3 as it is not considered to be CAT. Unquote.
It is.....and......it is
That is why we can't winch in the police / AA role...the a/c we choose to fly (EC145 thru to AS355) can't train safely with passengers on board due to the lack of a SSE capability. QED.
Thomas,
It was not my aim to promote HHO by the HEMS community, merely to point out the intent of the regulation. Draft JAR-OPS 4 was written by the operational committees of the JAA - not the DAP or the CAA.
JAR-OPS 3 regulates only in the area of CAT; HHO training is not within the designation of CAT because it does not involve the "transport of passengers, cargo or mail for remuneration or hire".
If a State decides that hoist training has to meet the requirements of Appendix 1 to JAR-OPS 3.005(h) it ipso facto does not mean it is CAT - it just means that it has been decided that this text is appropriate for this mode of operations.
I think you are being a little harsh on the small twins - those which are used for hoisting (and I can think of a number) are quite capable of meeting HEC Class D 'performance' at an operational mass (not necessarily at the MCTOM).
Jim
It was not my aim to promote HHO by the HEMS community, merely to point out the intent of the regulation. Draft JAR-OPS 4 was written by the operational committees of the JAA - not the DAP or the CAA.
JAR-OPS 3 regulates only in the area of CAT; HHO training is not within the designation of CAT because it does not involve the "transport of passengers, cargo or mail for remuneration or hire".
If a State decides that hoist training has to meet the requirements of Appendix 1 to JAR-OPS 3.005(h) it ipso facto does not mean it is CAT - it just means that it has been decided that this text is appropriate for this mode of operations.
I think you are being a little harsh on the small twins - those which are used for hoisting (and I can think of a number) are quite capable of meeting HEC Class D 'performance' at an operational mass (not necessarily at the MCTOM).
Jim
Copied all that Jim. I think we are clear then:
The CAA have chosen 3.005(h) as their bench mark for emergency services helicopters in the UK.
And perhaps I should have been more specific re the SSE configuration in that this is rarely achievable because the helicopters APS is too high to start with never mind adding passengers and crew on top!
The CAA have chosen 3.005(h) as their bench mark for emergency services helicopters in the UK.
And perhaps I should have been more specific re the SSE configuration in that this is rarely achievable because the helicopters APS is too high to start with never mind adding passengers and crew on top!
Although this may well be willy-waving, I am responding to a direct challenge...
Before I start, I hope it's obvious from my earlier post that I have nothing but respect and admiration for a person or outfit of any variety who tries to help in an immediate life-or-death situation, especially if they are not ideally equipped to render assistance. The point of my post, as I hoped was clear, was that the casualty should come first - and in a really critical situation, any help is better than none.
No, I don't mean that at all. My grumble is that, in non-life or death situations (which are the vast majority), the casualty is either put at risk, or has their recovery delayed, by an inappropriate asset being sent and not coping (or not coping well). And yes, there can be a delay waiting for a SAR aircraft to arrive - which is why it's important, in a rescue situation, for the rescue aircraft to be tasked asap, rather than waiting for another asset to have a go and only then realize it's beyond them and belatedly call for SAR or another more suitable asset. And no, it's not necessarily the AA crews' fault - the people who call them instead of SAR are often the root cause.
Anyway, here goes:
January 7th this year, Cullernose Point, Northumberland (2 miles north of Boulmer). Climber falls from the cliff, suffering spinal injuries. Boulmer Sea King is 30 mins away, returning from Aberdeen after a previous rescue. SK is informed of the Air Amb en route to Cullernose Point, then Humber CG ask SK how far away they are, and are duly tasked to the incident as well. When less than 10 mins away, the SK is stood down and told to avoid the scene as "the Air Amb has the situation under control". Fair enough (if true), though the SK has to continue towards the scene, as its base is two miles beyond. The SK gives the area a suitable berth, and passes half a mile out to sea; within seconds of the aircraft coming into line of sight of the group on the rocky beach, one of the on-scene coastguards radios "Rescue 131 can you help us, we need your winch". Seems that the only people on scene who thought the AA had the situation under control were the AA crew...had they pressed on with recovering this casualty, the CG would have had to carry the man, in a stretcher, over 150 yards of large wet boulders to where the AA had landed. Can anyone explain to me how this is better for the casualty (never mind the stretcher-bearers) than waiting for the SK which was known to be less than 10 mins away? Besides, with the AA and a road ambulance attending, a large part of Northumberland was denuded of ambulance cover (spread pretty thin in rural areas), while these assets were trying but failing to resolve a situation which the SK could have dealt with on its own.
May 22nd 2005, near Loch Rannoch, canoeist trapped against rocks in the middle of a river, partly underwater. Police, Fire, AA all on scene. A doctor on-scene pronounces death, and an SK is eventually tasked to do a body recovery. When it arrives, what should it find but two people (believed to be the AA crew), on a fireman's ladder laid between the bank and the mid-river rocks, ropes round their waists, crawling out to where the canoe is, trying but failing to extricate the unfortunate occupant. The SK duly deploys the winchman, recovers the canoeist, and takes him to Fort William, where hospital staff continue the crew's attempts to resuscitate him for a further hour before pronouncing death. If there was any chance of the canoeist being alive, why wasn't the SK called sooner? And if those on scene believed the man was dead, why these 'heroics' when a means of recovering the body safely was finally on its way?
July 31st 2004, River Ericht Gorge near Blairgowrie. Fisherman has sustained severe head injuries falling onto rocks on the narrow riverbank at the foot of a 350' gorge. Air Amb is sent, along with various cliff rescue teams, and a Sea King is also dispatched. As the SK is entering the area, it is turned back, on the advice of those already present (ie including the AA crew) that the situation is not suitable for winching; the preferred option is to raise the casualty out of the gorge on ropes, then move him to hospital in the AA. As the SK is so close, it continues so the crew can assess the scene for themselves. Long story short: SK deploys winchman, recovers him plus cas and departs for Dundee in a fraction of the time it would have taken to carry out Plan A. The fact the the casualty died later is unfortunate but irrelevant - the point being that a slightly less critical casualty might have survived the quick winch and transfer, but not a rope raise up 350' before being moved by AA. On this occasion, the erroneous decision to turn the SK back was based on several agencies' total lack of knowledge about what a winch-equipped helicopter can (and can't) do. Tut tut!
Do the three cases mentioned above, spread over nearly three years, constitute 'countless cases'? No of course not, but these are three which I know of and could find details of easily (and details are important, as I'd hate to be accused of not knowing anything about UK AA operations...!). I have heard of several other cases (eg ski mountaineer with broken leg in northern Cairngorms but far from ski slopes, SK given task once AA crew had tried but failed to reach casualty by walking through deep snow over steep ground), and that is just in the part of the country I have worked in, and on days I've been in work. But if you extrapolate my limited knowledge to cover the whole country on every day over the last three years, you would end up with countless cases. No rescue outfit is always beyond reproach, including SAR, and all I'm doing is highlighting what I feel is a worrying trend - I reckon we'd all (including casualties) be better off perfecting our respective niches rather than trying to branch out into other people's field. I could go on, but my willy is getting tired of all this vigorous waving...
Please give us some of these examples
I do hope you don't mean wait and hope the casualty doesn't die before the SAR gets there!!
Anyway, here goes:
January 7th this year, Cullernose Point, Northumberland (2 miles north of Boulmer). Climber falls from the cliff, suffering spinal injuries. Boulmer Sea King is 30 mins away, returning from Aberdeen after a previous rescue. SK is informed of the Air Amb en route to Cullernose Point, then Humber CG ask SK how far away they are, and are duly tasked to the incident as well. When less than 10 mins away, the SK is stood down and told to avoid the scene as "the Air Amb has the situation under control". Fair enough (if true), though the SK has to continue towards the scene, as its base is two miles beyond. The SK gives the area a suitable berth, and passes half a mile out to sea; within seconds of the aircraft coming into line of sight of the group on the rocky beach, one of the on-scene coastguards radios "Rescue 131 can you help us, we need your winch". Seems that the only people on scene who thought the AA had the situation under control were the AA crew...had they pressed on with recovering this casualty, the CG would have had to carry the man, in a stretcher, over 150 yards of large wet boulders to where the AA had landed. Can anyone explain to me how this is better for the casualty (never mind the stretcher-bearers) than waiting for the SK which was known to be less than 10 mins away? Besides, with the AA and a road ambulance attending, a large part of Northumberland was denuded of ambulance cover (spread pretty thin in rural areas), while these assets were trying but failing to resolve a situation which the SK could have dealt with on its own.
May 22nd 2005, near Loch Rannoch, canoeist trapped against rocks in the middle of a river, partly underwater. Police, Fire, AA all on scene. A doctor on-scene pronounces death, and an SK is eventually tasked to do a body recovery. When it arrives, what should it find but two people (believed to be the AA crew), on a fireman's ladder laid between the bank and the mid-river rocks, ropes round their waists, crawling out to where the canoe is, trying but failing to extricate the unfortunate occupant. The SK duly deploys the winchman, recovers the canoeist, and takes him to Fort William, where hospital staff continue the crew's attempts to resuscitate him for a further hour before pronouncing death. If there was any chance of the canoeist being alive, why wasn't the SK called sooner? And if those on scene believed the man was dead, why these 'heroics' when a means of recovering the body safely was finally on its way?
July 31st 2004, River Ericht Gorge near Blairgowrie. Fisherman has sustained severe head injuries falling onto rocks on the narrow riverbank at the foot of a 350' gorge. Air Amb is sent, along with various cliff rescue teams, and a Sea King is also dispatched. As the SK is entering the area, it is turned back, on the advice of those already present (ie including the AA crew) that the situation is not suitable for winching; the preferred option is to raise the casualty out of the gorge on ropes, then move him to hospital in the AA. As the SK is so close, it continues so the crew can assess the scene for themselves. Long story short: SK deploys winchman, recovers him plus cas and departs for Dundee in a fraction of the time it would have taken to carry out Plan A. The fact the the casualty died later is unfortunate but irrelevant - the point being that a slightly less critical casualty might have survived the quick winch and transfer, but not a rope raise up 350' before being moved by AA. On this occasion, the erroneous decision to turn the SK back was based on several agencies' total lack of knowledge about what a winch-equipped helicopter can (and can't) do. Tut tut!
Do the three cases mentioned above, spread over nearly three years, constitute 'countless cases'? No of course not, but these are three which I know of and could find details of easily (and details are important, as I'd hate to be accused of not knowing anything about UK AA operations...!). I have heard of several other cases (eg ski mountaineer with broken leg in northern Cairngorms but far from ski slopes, SK given task once AA crew had tried but failed to reach casualty by walking through deep snow over steep ground), and that is just in the part of the country I have worked in, and on days I've been in work. But if you extrapolate my limited knowledge to cover the whole country on every day over the last three years, you would end up with countless cases. No rescue outfit is always beyond reproach, including SAR, and all I'm doing is highlighting what I feel is a worrying trend - I reckon we'd all (including casualties) be better off perfecting our respective niches rather than trying to branch out into other people's field. I could go on, but my willy is getting tired of all this vigorous waving...
Last edited by TorqueOfTheDevil; 15th Feb 2007 at 15:30. Reason: Typo