PHI lose S76 in GOM
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Rick,
Are you certain that the VFR minima is the same for fixed wing and rotary?
You are quoting the (helicopter) Part 91.155(b)(1) Class G minima when, by your reference to 'operators', we might assume that the (helicopter) Part 135.205(b)(1) or (2) might apply - i.e. 1/2 mile by day or 1 mile by night.
It's unfortunate that whilst the alleged 'blog' from the P2 implicitly exudes an air of competence:
the P1's story says something quite different:
It is not clear to me that any device would have saved the day when it appears that distraction was one of the principal factors.
Are you certain that the VFR minima is the same for fixed wing and rotary?
You are quoting the (helicopter) Part 91.155(b)(1) Class G minima when, by your reference to 'operators', we might assume that the (helicopter) Part 135.205(b)(1) or (2) might apply - i.e. 1/2 mile by day or 1 mile by night.
It's unfortunate that whilst the alleged 'blog' from the P2 implicitly exudes an air of competence:
The last call I made we were roughly 400 feet on the radar altimeter, the PIC called for windsheild wipers. I stated "windshield wipers" and reached for the switch. From that point it all seems like a bad dream. As I reached the switch we impacted the water at roughly 100mph.
The PIC estimated moderate rain, while noticing that the floats were not armed and that the rain on the wind shield was obscuring his vision. He asked the first officer again to arm the floats and turn on the wipers. The first officer appeared to be fumbling with the switches as the PIC looked down to see what was happening.
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Helicopter VFR minima are not the same as fixed-wing. There are several differences. In the case of offshore, it depends on the company's ops specs. Most use 300'/2 SM for VFR, but some are lower. The FAA requirements are 'clear of clouds'.
Offshore OSAP approaches require use of radar in addition to GPS. The position of the approach target must agree between the GPS and the radar, and the radar must be operational to insure that there are no other targets in the approach area, or which cannot be missed by at least 1/2 mile. I know of no authorization for an offshore approach using only GPS.
The NTSB report and Crash's blog are certainly different. The term 'ballast' does seem more appropriate when reading the NTSB version. One can now better understand the post on the blog - very self-serving, ISTM, and perhaps not completely accurate.
If this flight had been done IFR from the beginning, it might have finished more happily. But a new crew, perhaps not IFR current, is often reluctant to fly IFR, and the lack of facilities makes it even more difficult. There is no radio or radar contact with ATC past the beach, in essence, and there is no weather reporting in most areas, so OSAP approaches are difficult if not impossible. The alternative is to file to a HEDA (Helicopter Enroute Descent Area), a location previously surveyed for having no obstacles, and descending to VMC there. The minimum descent altitude in a HEDA is 400', and the flight can continue VMC with weather as low as 300' and 2 miles visibility. That wouldn't have helped in this case, but having weather reporting and ATC communications, allowing an IFR approach to the platform, might have. All it takes to allow this is money - money which the government and the oil companies refuse to spend.
Offshore OSAP approaches require use of radar in addition to GPS. The position of the approach target must agree between the GPS and the radar, and the radar must be operational to insure that there are no other targets in the approach area, or which cannot be missed by at least 1/2 mile. I know of no authorization for an offshore approach using only GPS.
The NTSB report and Crash's blog are certainly different. The term 'ballast' does seem more appropriate when reading the NTSB version. One can now better understand the post on the blog - very self-serving, ISTM, and perhaps not completely accurate.
If this flight had been done IFR from the beginning, it might have finished more happily. But a new crew, perhaps not IFR current, is often reluctant to fly IFR, and the lack of facilities makes it even more difficult. There is no radio or radar contact with ATC past the beach, in essence, and there is no weather reporting in most areas, so OSAP approaches are difficult if not impossible. The alternative is to file to a HEDA (Helicopter Enroute Descent Area), a location previously surveyed for having no obstacles, and descending to VMC there. The minimum descent altitude in a HEDA is 400', and the flight can continue VMC with weather as low as 300' and 2 miles visibility. That wouldn't have helped in this case, but having weather reporting and ATC communications, allowing an IFR approach to the platform, might have. All it takes to allow this is money - money which the government and the oil companies refuse to spend.
"Just a pilot"
I think referring to the SIC in this case as "ballast" is uncharitable and undeserved. This individual didn't preform as an SIC, and his lack of offshore experience is telling. But, the post attributed to him may not be his. Even if it was, it was intended for a non-technical audience- a war story.
My impression after reading it is that there was a lot left out. I wondered if the author understood the issues in his story. My second impression was that not only was this guy not a functioning member of the crew. He wasn't even a good switch-flipper, although that took a good bit of empathy in the reading to infer. My eyes would have been out, out, out was I in that seat, lest the water come up and smite me, which it did.
I remember my first offshore days too well. While the GoM isn't the vicious environment I hear attributed to the North Sea, it has all the offshore traps. For instance, I remember well the first time I saw "flying platforms" in a poor horizon situation.
I also remember how tough it was as a new SIC to challenge an experienced PIC, and I inferred that in the SIC's story too. It's the biggest part of the job and the greatest benefit of real CRM.
Ballast? No. Inexperienced, poorly trained, and perhaps not suitable for multi-crew operations- I can't say, I never trained or evaluated pilots for that. He was in over his head in a situation that was largely the company's creation. PHI failed this crew, before and after the event. I'm very unimpressed with the "new PHI".
My impression after reading it is that there was a lot left out. I wondered if the author understood the issues in his story. My second impression was that not only was this guy not a functioning member of the crew. He wasn't even a good switch-flipper, although that took a good bit of empathy in the reading to infer. My eyes would have been out, out, out was I in that seat, lest the water come up and smite me, which it did.
I remember my first offshore days too well. While the GoM isn't the vicious environment I hear attributed to the North Sea, it has all the offshore traps. For instance, I remember well the first time I saw "flying platforms" in a poor horizon situation.
I also remember how tough it was as a new SIC to challenge an experienced PIC, and I inferred that in the SIC's story too. It's the biggest part of the job and the greatest benefit of real CRM.
Ballast? No. Inexperienced, poorly trained, and perhaps not suitable for multi-crew operations- I can't say, I never trained or evaluated pilots for that. He was in over his head in a situation that was largely the company's creation. PHI failed this crew, before and after the event. I'm very unimpressed with the "new PHI".
Last edited by Devil 49; 3rd Nov 2006 at 18:19.
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My use of the term ballast was a quote from more than one PIC who has flown with him in the past. I have not, so I can't say one way or the other, but those PICs do have that opinion of him, right or wrong.
I do agree that PHI failed the crew, by sending them out together with the experience level they had. If an SIC can't even arm the floats, he shouldn't be an SIC. The checkpilot who passed him was apparently negligent, although likely pressured to do it by the company. I hope there aren't more like him out there, but I wouldn't bet my life on it.
I do agree that PHI failed the crew, by sending them out together with the experience level they had. If an SIC can't even arm the floats, he shouldn't be an SIC. The checkpilot who passed him was apparently negligent, although likely pressured to do it by the company. I hope there aren't more like him out there, but I wouldn't bet my life on it.
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Rick,
Are you certain that the VFR minima is the same for fixed wing and rotary?
You are quoting the (helicopter) Part 91.155(b)(1) Class G minima when, by your reference to 'operators', we might assume that the (helicopter) Part 135.205(b)(1) or (2) might apply - i.e. 1/2 mile by day or 1 mile by night.
Are you certain that the VFR minima is the same for fixed wing and rotary?
You are quoting the (helicopter) Part 91.155(b)(1) Class G minima when, by your reference to 'operators', we might assume that the (helicopter) Part 135.205(b)(1) or (2) might apply - i.e. 1/2 mile by day or 1 mile by night.
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I was speaking to a pilot a few days ago who said that PHI gave assurances that in the event of such a "landing", an aircraft would be over the position within 15 minutes, circling the area and ensuring a rescue team were on it's way. Apparently, PHI have a hi-tech tracking system that can pin-point aircraft positions to a high degree of accuracy.
I've not been down to the GOM and I'm not familiar with that kind of system, so I wonder what went wrong? Even if a flight plan had been closed, wouldn't triggering 2 ELT's alert the PHI base that something was wrong?
Is this kind of setup typical for the operators down there?
I've not been down to the GOM and I'm not familiar with that kind of system, so I wonder what went wrong? Even if a flight plan had been closed, wouldn't triggering 2 ELT's alert the PHI base that something was wrong?
Is this kind of setup typical for the operators down there?
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The 'high tech tracking system' is Outerlink. Sometimes it works, sometimes it doesn't. It's often down, either at the Outerlink site, on the phone links between there and PHI, or at PHI's end. Plus the comm specs in LFT have to be paying attention. They don't always do that.
Activating the ELTs would not notify PHI at all, only the underfunded government rescue center. It can take hours for an ELT signal received there to be responded to, partly because there are so many false activations.
Activating the ELTs would not notify PHI at all, only the underfunded government rescue center. It can take hours for an ELT signal received there to be responded to, partly because there are so many false activations.
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GLS-NP is absolutely correct when he says the dispatchers have to be paying attention. When it worked for us, it went like this:
PHI had an Astar crash in New Mexico and the dispatchers actually watched it happen - the map display was tracking the aircraft as it returned to Taos NM and about 5 minutes from base, the track stopped. The dispatchers, who were still based in Albuquerque at the time, then tried to contact the aircraft. Then called the state police, giving them the position next to a nearby highway.
The pilot was picked up and in the Taos NM hospital in about 45 minutes, after walking less than 10 minutes off the mountain. Not too bad - when everyone is paying attention.
Apparently, the S-76 crew was unable to get off the emergency notification on Outerlink. This would probably have helped alert the dispatch center something was wrong.
I have personally tested the emergency function and had PHI dispatchers call within 5 minutes, they also were called from the Outerlink company notifiying them of an emergency signal.
Again, when it works, it seemed to work well.
PHI had an Astar crash in New Mexico and the dispatchers actually watched it happen - the map display was tracking the aircraft as it returned to Taos NM and about 5 minutes from base, the track stopped. The dispatchers, who were still based in Albuquerque at the time, then tried to contact the aircraft. Then called the state police, giving them the position next to a nearby highway.
The pilot was picked up and in the Taos NM hospital in about 45 minutes, after walking less than 10 minutes off the mountain. Not too bad - when everyone is paying attention.
Apparently, the S-76 crew was unable to get off the emergency notification on Outerlink. This would probably have helped alert the dispatch center something was wrong.
I have personally tested the emergency function and had PHI dispatchers call within 5 minutes, they also were called from the Outerlink company notifiying them of an emergency signal.
Again, when it works, it seemed to work well.
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Activating the mayday function on the Outerlink is not the same thing as activating the ELT in the survival vest. I have had to activate the mayday on the Outerlink just to get the comm center's attention to file an inbound flight plan, after trying for about 10 minutes to call on all available frequencies.
It can take hours for an ELT signal received there to be responded to, partly because there are so many false activations.
http://www.sarsat.noaa.gov/phaseout.html
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Aser,
Whilst you are correct in stating that there is a proposal to phase out 121.5 by 2009 in the US, you might have noted that the use of 406 MHz has been the ICAO Standard since 2005
ICAO Annex 10 Volume II
5.1.4 From 1 January 2005, emergency locator transmitters shall operate on 406 MHz and 121.5 MHz simultaneously.
It is more than likely that the EPIRB was transmitting on this frequency - as are all the ELTs of the newer helicopter types that have recently been introduced to the GOM. It is not clear why the EPIRB transmissions were not picked up by the satellite (or picked up and noted). It could be that the absence of compliance with this ICAO Standard in the US means that there is less than wholesale commitment to the system.
One of the important elements of 406 MHz was the introduction of verification; each individual ELT has to be registered with a contact number - the firing of the beacon should have resulted in an immediate call to the registered owner which should have triggered the emergency response. The location of the beacon would have been recorded which should have shortened the search phase.
There is another disturbing element of the accident which has not been discussed so far: having given the deck clear call, why didn't the HLO raise the alarm when the helicopter wasn't with him within a couple of minutes.
Perhaps the the recommendations from this accident should be focused on the safety management systems of operator and oil company. The resulting lessons might impact more on the organisational aspect of both.
JAR-OPS 3.940 Composition of Flight Crew
...
(4) Procedures are established, acceptable to the Authority, to prevent the crewing together of inexperienced flight crew members; (See AMC OPS 3.940(a)(4))
Whilst you are correct in stating that there is a proposal to phase out 121.5 by 2009 in the US, you might have noted that the use of 406 MHz has been the ICAO Standard since 2005
ICAO Annex 10 Volume II
5.1.4 From 1 January 2005, emergency locator transmitters shall operate on 406 MHz and 121.5 MHz simultaneously.
It is more than likely that the EPIRB was transmitting on this frequency - as are all the ELTs of the newer helicopter types that have recently been introduced to the GOM. It is not clear why the EPIRB transmissions were not picked up by the satellite (or picked up and noted). It could be that the absence of compliance with this ICAO Standard in the US means that there is less than wholesale commitment to the system.
One of the important elements of 406 MHz was the introduction of verification; each individual ELT has to be registered with a contact number - the firing of the beacon should have resulted in an immediate call to the registered owner which should have triggered the emergency response. The location of the beacon would have been recorded which should have shortened the search phase.
There is another disturbing element of the accident which has not been discussed so far: having given the deck clear call, why didn't the HLO raise the alarm when the helicopter wasn't with him within a couple of minutes.
Perhaps the the recommendations from this accident should be focused on the safety management systems of operator and oil company. The resulting lessons might impact more on the organisational aspect of both.
JAR-OPS 3.940 Composition of Flight Crew
...
(4) Procedures are established, acceptable to the Authority, to prevent the crewing together of inexperienced flight crew members; (See AMC OPS 3.940(a)(4))
AMC OPS 3.940(a)(4)
Crewing of inexperienced flight crew members
See JAR-OPS 3.940(a)(4)
Crewing of inexperienced flight crew members
See JAR-OPS 3.940(a)(4)
1 An operator should consider that when two flight crew members are required, a flight crew member, following completion of a Type Rating or command course, and the associated line flying under supervision, is inexperienced until either:
a. He has achieved 50 flight hours on the type and/or in the role within a period of 60 days; or
b. He has achieved 100 flight hours on the type and/or in the role (no time limit).
2 A lesser number of flight hours, on the type and/or in the role, may be acceptable to the Authority when:
a. A new operator is commencing operations; or
b. An operator introduces a new helicopter type; or
c. Flight crew members have previously completed a type conversion course with the same operator (re-conversion); and
d. Subject to any other conditions which the Authority may impose.
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Another good reason to move to 406 is the constant risk of other nearby helicopters being jammed on 121.5 by false passenger beacon activations.
There is another disturbing element of the accident which has not been discussed so far: having given the deck clear call, why didn't the HLO raise the alarm when the helicopter wasn't with him within a couple of minutes.
Perhaps the the recommendations from this accident should be focused on the safety management systems of operator and oil company. The resulting lessons might impact more on the organisational aspect of both.
Good point. This has been a farily common failing in past offshore accidents.
Who operates that platform? is it manned or a NUI?
There is another disturbing element of the accident which has not been discussed so far: having given the deck clear call, why didn't the HLO raise the alarm when the helicopter wasn't with him within a couple of minutes.
Perhaps the the recommendations from this accident should be focused on the safety management systems of operator and oil company. The resulting lessons might impact more on the organisational aspect of both.
Who operates that platform? is it manned or a NUI?
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Few of the individual survival vests in PHI have the newer beacons. PHI has apparently been reluctant to spend the money on them. When my vest reached its expiration date in August, only the bladder was replaced, with another used one. The beacon was not replaced. Most of these, and AFAIK all the aircraft beacons, are of the older type which operate on 121.5.
At one time search aircraft would have been launched very quickly. It seems that perhaps SAR aircraft are not available now, and PHI aircraft which might go down might not be able to count on timely rescue.
At one time search aircraft would have been launched very quickly. It seems that perhaps SAR aircraft are not available now, and PHI aircraft which might go down might not be able to count on timely rescue.
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GLSNightPilot
A SAR a/c is available in that area. Last time I was there, Cougar Helicopters had a SAR equiped S-61 sitting in Galliano on contract with BP/Shell.
The greater issue here is why it took so long for PHI to react to the fact that a machine was down or not reporting. I know a customers who use Blue sky tracking and in their case an alarm will sound after 5 min if the a/c is not reporting.
The next question would be why the rad alt was not set by the crew to eg. 150 ft. About 2 years ago another s-76 flew into the water at night down there. The a/c started a gentle descent that was never caught by the crew till they hit the water. In their case i think the rad alt was u/s. February 2005 a crew flew a Bell 222 ? into the water on approach to a ship at night off Galveston.
All 3 these cases was 2 pilot operations, so what is lacking? Not enough training, lack of SOP's or just a failure to follow SOP's.
Reading about incidents like these maybe stresses the point that SOP's are there for a reason. It's a reminder, to me in any case, that short cuts might not always be the best way to get there.
Fly safe and keep the right side up.
A SAR a/c is available in that area. Last time I was there, Cougar Helicopters had a SAR equiped S-61 sitting in Galliano on contract with BP/Shell.
The greater issue here is why it took so long for PHI to react to the fact that a machine was down or not reporting. I know a customers who use Blue sky tracking and in their case an alarm will sound after 5 min if the a/c is not reporting.
The next question would be why the rad alt was not set by the crew to eg. 150 ft. About 2 years ago another s-76 flew into the water at night down there. The a/c started a gentle descent that was never caught by the crew till they hit the water. In their case i think the rad alt was u/s. February 2005 a crew flew a Bell 222 ? into the water on approach to a ship at night off Galveston.
All 3 these cases was 2 pilot operations, so what is lacking? Not enough training, lack of SOP's or just a failure to follow SOP's.
Reading about incidents like these maybe stresses the point that SOP's are there for a reason. It's a reminder, to me in any case, that short cuts might not always be the best way to get there.
Fly safe and keep the right side up.
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oryxs:
1. PHI's Outerlink is supposed to alarm at the aircraft's ETA. Why it apparently did not in this case I don't know, but I do know that it is often out of service.
2. I don't believe PHI will call on another company for SAR until it absolutely has to. It also will not willingly help other companies. The Dir of Ops refused to allow me to launch to search for the Era S76 until Era agreed to pay for the flight.
I was still the first aircraft on the scene, beating the USCG by some time, after an hour delay.
3. I don't know whether the radalt was set or not, or to what altitude. In any case, all that happens when the altitude is reached is that a small light on the radalt illuminates. It's easy to miss that light in the daytime. There is no aural warning in that aircraft, nor in most of the A++ aircraft. A couple have a very faint 'ding', easy to miss. If the pilot isn't looking at the radalt, he will receive no warning. At night, the light is much more noticeable. I also don't have any knowledge about the Central Helicopters 222, other than the NTSB report, nor about their SOPs. Technology can help with this, I think. A simple aural warning when radalt minimums are reached would be easy, but it simply hasn't happened.
1. PHI's Outerlink is supposed to alarm at the aircraft's ETA. Why it apparently did not in this case I don't know, but I do know that it is often out of service.
2. I don't believe PHI will call on another company for SAR until it absolutely has to. It also will not willingly help other companies. The Dir of Ops refused to allow me to launch to search for the Era S76 until Era agreed to pay for the flight.
I was still the first aircraft on the scene, beating the USCG by some time, after an hour delay.3. I don't know whether the radalt was set or not, or to what altitude. In any case, all that happens when the altitude is reached is that a small light on the radalt illuminates. It's easy to miss that light in the daytime. There is no aural warning in that aircraft, nor in most of the A++ aircraft. A couple have a very faint 'ding', easy to miss. If the pilot isn't looking at the radalt, he will receive no warning. At night, the light is much more noticeable. I also don't have any knowledge about the Central Helicopters 222, other than the NTSB report, nor about their SOPs. Technology can help with this, I think. A simple aural warning when radalt minimums are reached would be easy, but it simply hasn't happened.
I don't believe PHI will call on another company for SAR until it absolutely has to. It also will not willingly help other companies. The Dir of Ops refused to allow me to launch to search for the Era S76 until Era agreed to pay for the flight. I was still the first aircraft on the scene, beating the USCG by some time, after an hour delay.
I have always instructed my crews to use their own initiative and discretion to use any company assets in order to provide assistance for any life in danger. Not that it be done in a dangerous or reckless manner, but maintaining the safety of themselves, the crew, the aircraft and the victim, in an organised approach. Certainly offering aircraft and any available assistance if their is an organized rescue effort underway, is the very least a neighbour could do.
I was taught this response by my first ever employer, and have continued it throughout my career. We have directly saved many lives as a result of this policy. One crewmember recieved an international award as a result of his actions. Another saved the life of a contractors employee, by providing CPR all the way to hospital, and certainly saving the life of the victim - only to die himself two days later as the result of a tragic accident. More typical were the opportunities to save lives simply by providing expedient transportation to people who in many cases would not have survived without it.
We never wondered about who would pay, and you know what, I never had anyone who didn't quietly and without fuss arrange to reimburse us for our costs - all at cost! Hey, and if they didn't pay, so what. It is simply not an issue.
What goes around comes around. God forbid someone dies while you figure out who will pay the
bill! It might be you that dies as a result of that indecision!
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I don't believe PHI will call on another company for SAR until it absolutely has to. It also will not willingly help other companies. The Dir of Ops refused to allow me to launch to search for the Era S76 until Era agreed to pay for the flight.
TWITS!!!!!
Industry Insider beat me to it...PHI, ERA, Air Log, Taylor, Chevron... whoever, have ALWAYS responded to another aircraft in trouble - with not the slightest hesitation. Based on GLS's past posts, he tends to "drift" every now and then. The day someone leaves another in the water without a thought or action is the day I get out of the business.
A quick note on SAR - the Cougar aircraft was brought in by BP after the 92 started flying. In the US (GOM) most SAR is provided by the tried and true Coast Guard - with great results. As explained to ME during "ditching school" given the average water temp of the GOM and the network of the CG stations, plus the operator based flight following - the system worked and was approved by the oil companies. Problem came when the CG aircraft could not "rescue" an entire 92 flight - thus the Cougar 61. Put all the spin you want - the GOM is not the North Sea or the EU. Everything is different - but I do not imply that one area is better than the other - only that it is two different environments.
All the new ELT installs, to include the pilot's vest's are equipped with 406 ELT's and registered under PHI. Don't know why GLS doen't have the 406 ELT.
Just my take....
A quick note on SAR - the Cougar aircraft was brought in by BP after the 92 started flying. In the US (GOM) most SAR is provided by the tried and true Coast Guard - with great results. As explained to ME during "ditching school" given the average water temp of the GOM and the network of the CG stations, plus the operator based flight following - the system worked and was approved by the oil companies. Problem came when the CG aircraft could not "rescue" an entire 92 flight - thus the Cougar 61. Put all the spin you want - the GOM is not the North Sea or the EU. Everything is different - but I do not imply that one area is better than the other - only that it is two different environments.
All the new ELT installs, to include the pilot's vest's are equipped with 406 ELT's and registered under PHI. Don't know why GLS doen't have the 406 ELT.
Just my take....
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Reading GLSNightPilot's post, its obvious he was on duty that night. Its obvious that there was a delay in launching the PHI night ship of approximately one hour. I'm sure that's all quite well documented.
I assume there were no mechanical problems delaying the launch, so that leaves some kind of dispatch delay.
It would be interesting to see if PHI actually billed ERA for the night flight.
Substantiating a dispatch delay will neccessitate recollections of phone conversations. I seriously doubt that PHI's management will admit to it - same with ERA. It makes both companies look bad.
So it comes back to the question of why did GLSNightPilot wait an hour before launching when he was ready to go.
I assume there were no mechanical problems delaying the launch, so that leaves some kind of dispatch delay.
It would be interesting to see if PHI actually billed ERA for the night flight.
Substantiating a dispatch delay will neccessitate recollections of phone conversations. I seriously doubt that PHI's management will admit to it - same with ERA. It makes both companies look bad.
So it comes back to the question of why did GLSNightPilot wait an hour before launching when he was ready to go.