ALL - I cannot get past this all encompassing suggestion that any intimation of inadvertent IMC leading to CFIT was the prime causal factor in this accident AUTOMATICALLY MEANS the crew were to blame.
FL - witnesses on the Mull reported low cloud and poor visibility. The Yachtsman saw the helicopter flying below the cloud! Are you really suggesting the accident happened in VMC!
Bob - I agree 100% re the WX radar BECAUSE I believe it was an IMC CFIT.
Malfunctions - the aircraft had flown a lot that day. No evidence of malfunction was found in wreckage that was assessable. No MAYDAY call. No further HC-2 catastrophic accidents. No significant deviation of flight path ( the TANS evidence had it climbing at 1000 fpm at 150 knots, CONSISTANT with a cruise climb, until the very last moment before impact. Cyclic flare, sharp turn, pancake impact damaging rear fuselage and sponsons, leading to blade strikes and disintegration.
I agree with the review findings. There is insufficient evidence to meet the legal burden of proof for negligence or blame.
I come back to Bobs point and original issue. In most legal battles the first casualty is often the truth. In this case the truth is that military aircraft, certainly at that time, were very poorly equipped for IMC flight. I remember well flying IMC, in a Gazelle, unstabilsed, with only Doppler mini-tans, with VIPs in the back (well, Generals etc).
In the Mull Tragedy, WX Radar and data NAV would have made a huge difference BUT only if you accept the most probable cause was IMC CFIT.
It is therefore a crass disservice to military crew that the review, investigation and the continued crys solely to exonerate the crew, combined, have singularly failed to call for improvements in navigation and avionics equipment fits in military aircraft. I recently had a look at a Merlin. Shocked at the lack of avionics.
In the absence of clear evidence we should consider the principles of Occums razor! The most simplistic explanation is the most probable. Given the evidence available in the report the investigation concluded inadvertent IMC and CFIT. The review does does specifically disagree with this conclusion. it simply identifies that there is no evidence to suggest that the crew were negligent in their duties at the time.
Furthermore the crew were at the end of a long days duty and extending. The report indicates they may not have had current training on the HC-2 and that the Captain had asked to delay the HC -2 into service. Notwithstanding this they accepted the task. This reads like very poor management and culture conspiring to place the crew in unfavourable conditions from the outset.
Like I have consistently stated. I do not blame the crew. They were hand picked special forces pilots of extremely high calibre not prone to recklessness or mistakes. This does not mean that given the right (or wrong) circumstances such crews will not make an unforced error. Tiredness, time pressure, poor training leading to unfamiliarity and an aircraft prone to spurious engine indications in a culture of "get on with it" might just be enough to force an error.
With the exception of deliberate "wazzing" blaming a crew for an accident will always mask the underlying causes and deficiencies in the system.
If the HC-2 was cleared IMC and had its proper (eventual) icing clearance, the safest way to Inverness that day would be IFR at or above safety altitude. This is also missed by the investigation and the review.
Jayteeto - "Privatley many of us who fought thought it was a CFIT". If this is the case what did you believe at the time caused the CFIT.