Austrian cable car accident - Update
Paxing All Over The World
Now for a tiny fraction of this payout, the cable car company could have closed on the days the loadlifting was done. [edit] Oh well ... they won't do it again
The answer is simple: When enough people die and enough money is lost. Providing, that is, that the root cause can be identified but that is another discussion. So the people that dies in this accident will help to save lives in the future. That is what our species does.
"It's up to the helicopter operator and the authorities, they have to find safe ways".
Of course as one of the helicopter customers, they are the one of the businesses driving the operations, so they should get on board right away to ensure they are represented in the process to resolve this issue. They may not like the outcome otherwise. I would love to read the safety regulations controlling the Austrian cable car operators - anyone got a copy?
TC, you have the irony of this circumstance identified entirely. This will cost someone millions, maybe even their business and career. More ironic, is that it was entirely preventable. It cost 9 innocent victims their lives.
I also want to go back and address another elemental portion of a basic helicopter external load operation. The mechanism to orchestrate and effectively plan a safe operation are actually very simple. It is easy to stage external loads from an area immediately adjacent to the work site. It is (relatively) easy to organise the closing of streets; or controlling traffic; vacating buildings - or affected floors; restricting public access, or shutting down a cable car for a brief period of time. It is simply a part of doing business safely.
The reaction of many posters seems to focus on restricting all helicopter movements, or creating some huge issue of closing entire cities. External loads are flown the shortest distance, minimizing the exposure of the operator and the public from any danger of a dropped load. Helicopter access to the staging area is accomplished without external loads. Incidentally, we treat an empty long line in the exact same manner as a 10,000 pound external load! Safety is easy, practical and essential. There is no alternative way of doing this. The affected area is minimal, and the inconvenience is insignificant and far preferred to the alternatives. Accidents may still occur, but their impact and effect are minimized through an effective and conscious approach and strategy toward safety.
TC, you have summed it up entirely - the cheapest, and more importantly - safest, option was to close the cable car for the duration of the operation. Some agreeable means could be negotiated, to ensure the interests of everyone were addressed. If they couldn't be negotiated, then the job won't happen. The cost in this instance will never be measured in monetary terms, it is measured by the loss of innocent human lives.
I understand that there is a possibility that there may be no breach of any regulations in this specific instance. However, under the regulatory system I work under, if I failed to observe the regulatory structure, I would be subject to FAA sanction including and up to revocation of my operating certificates and personal licenses; massive OSHA fines, sanctions and audits - which could include jail time; charges from local and federal law enforcement - which could include fines and jail time; cancellation of all my insurance policies, plus sky-high renewals if I were even able to get insurance in the future; and law suits lasting years, that could bankrupt my business, myself and everyone and anyone associated with that particular operation.
Strangely enough, that combination has made even the most dubious operator pay serious attention to safety, (well, most all of them)
!
Last edited by Cyclic Hotline; 10th Sep 2005 at 15:16.
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As already pointed out on this thread this was a really really unlucky and tragic accident. Most load lifting pilots have some sort of incident during the course of their careers it is an inherently dangerous job. In my opinion, certainly in Europe, its more dangerous than flying for the police, ambulance, SAR, off-shore support and corporate. Don’t get me wrong all of the jobs listed above have their moments but you are largely protected by the regulators and you are flying twins with take-off and landing profiles designed to keep you safe.
Not so in loadlifting. You are generally in a single and a great deal of time , during the course of you career , is spent deep in the Height/velocity diagram over the heads of people receiving ,hooking or positioning the load.
Competition is fierce between lifting companies and clients safety expectations can vary dramatically, sadly in my experience most would rather the job is done as quickly, cheaply as possible with safety generally falling on deaf ears. Ski areas are normally better than most, as they generally have involvement with mountain rescue/air ambulance.
I do not agree with cyclic hotline over the point of responsibility falling on the operator. If airline companies did not have the Flight Time Limitations to work to as regulated by the Authorities what would happen?
If Authorities did not require that pilots have medicals what would happen?
Lifting pilots do not have the same regulations and limits governing them as they aren’t CAT (public transport) and we all know that no lifting would be done if they were. But there are areas where regs would help.
Eg Ground crew do not have to have any qualifications ….you can grab someone off the street and hand them the hook attached to a helicopter and leave them to it ….nothing to stop it! (what happens in the States /Canada…nothing there is no requirement for formal qualifications as far as I know.)
The Authorities , in my experience will take responsibility for the aircraft but not the load. The Health and Safety Executive won’t take responsibility for the load as its attached to an aircraft or should be, and therefore feel it is the Aviation Authorities responsibility. The lifting companies are left in the middle.
Have I flown over gondolas? Yes. The first time I did this job I asked the client to stop the Gondolas whilst I was operating. They did……everytime I approached the overhead they stopped the Gondolas but……….to my amazement there was still people in them, they would stop them only for the second it took me to fly over. It was impossible to stop the whole operation “absolutely unheard of” and like I say these were good clients (maybe it’ll change now but I’d be surprised). I must admit though if I wanted to release a concrete skip timed to hit a gondola I’d still be trying now…..these guys were so unlucky.
Why did the load release? Was there a crack in the attachment point of the concrete skip or was there hidden corrosion? When was the last stress test on the skip? (do European Authorities require stress testing or will a visual check suffice?) They lay it all on the operator…..where’s the regs?
I’ve had 2 uncommanded load releases … (see here http://www.pprune.org/forums/showthr...hreadid=147001)…. I have never felt so helpless whilst flying just watching the load and lifting gear drop from the belly hook . I filed the incident report…where was the back up,the interviews with engineers ,hook manufacturers ,previous incident reports (either it never happens or no one reports)……..but if I’d killed somebody in the process…….
Not so in loadlifting. You are generally in a single and a great deal of time , during the course of you career , is spent deep in the Height/velocity diagram over the heads of people receiving ,hooking or positioning the load.
Competition is fierce between lifting companies and clients safety expectations can vary dramatically, sadly in my experience most would rather the job is done as quickly, cheaply as possible with safety generally falling on deaf ears. Ski areas are normally better than most, as they generally have involvement with mountain rescue/air ambulance.
I do not agree with cyclic hotline over the point of responsibility falling on the operator. If airline companies did not have the Flight Time Limitations to work to as regulated by the Authorities what would happen?
If Authorities did not require that pilots have medicals what would happen?
Lifting pilots do not have the same regulations and limits governing them as they aren’t CAT (public transport) and we all know that no lifting would be done if they were. But there are areas where regs would help.
Eg Ground crew do not have to have any qualifications ….you can grab someone off the street and hand them the hook attached to a helicopter and leave them to it ….nothing to stop it! (what happens in the States /Canada…nothing there is no requirement for formal qualifications as far as I know.)
The Authorities , in my experience will take responsibility for the aircraft but not the load. The Health and Safety Executive won’t take responsibility for the load as its attached to an aircraft or should be, and therefore feel it is the Aviation Authorities responsibility. The lifting companies are left in the middle.
Have I flown over gondolas? Yes. The first time I did this job I asked the client to stop the Gondolas whilst I was operating. They did……everytime I approached the overhead they stopped the Gondolas but……….to my amazement there was still people in them, they would stop them only for the second it took me to fly over. It was impossible to stop the whole operation “absolutely unheard of” and like I say these were good clients (maybe it’ll change now but I’d be surprised). I must admit though if I wanted to release a concrete skip timed to hit a gondola I’d still be trying now…..these guys were so unlucky.
Why did the load release? Was there a crack in the attachment point of the concrete skip or was there hidden corrosion? When was the last stress test on the skip? (do European Authorities require stress testing or will a visual check suffice?) They lay it all on the operator…..where’s the regs?
I’ve had 2 uncommanded load releases … (see here http://www.pprune.org/forums/showthr...hreadid=147001)…. I have never felt so helpless whilst flying just watching the load and lifting gear drop from the belly hook . I filed the incident report…where was the back up,the interviews with engineers ,hook manufacturers ,previous incident reports (either it never happens or no one reports)……..but if I’d killed somebody in the process…….
arm the floats
very good, that's exactly the situation. I fully agree to you.
In this case the cable car operator try to leave the shooting range without harms. But as i could confirm, they do in front of the job a lot of pressure to the helicopter operators. The competition between the helicopter companies is very very hard, partly unfair. Cyclic thinks a operator have to cancel the job or to pay extra if the client isn't ready to stop his operation due to safety reasons.
Just kidding? I bet under any circumstances the client will find an other helicopter company ready to do the job under the clients conditions. In Austria as example more than 20 helicopter operators with more than 100 ships are ready to haul the concrete. The country is very small!
May be some of you have heard about the floodings in Austria some weeks ago. There are the other operators and the police and army helicopter flying now up to today concrete and construction material to the former flooded areas to rebuild streets and places. They do the job every day and also after this tragedy with flying over public areas.
I'm sure, nearly every pilot is interested in safety. And your words cyclic sounding good, but i don't know in which paradise you fly. And i don't know on what kind of operator. But i believe as described the business in the most european countries goes.
And the authorities doesn't help the single ex employed pilot trying to find some safety culture and a new job. I know some cases the pilots hoped the authority informed by the pilots would have stopped some dark deeds by client and management. Forget it! If it is in public interest...
And the things going mostly allways good because of the low feasibility of such a tragedy.
very good, that's exactly the situation. I fully agree to you.
In this case the cable car operator try to leave the shooting range without harms. But as i could confirm, they do in front of the job a lot of pressure to the helicopter operators. The competition between the helicopter companies is very very hard, partly unfair. Cyclic thinks a operator have to cancel the job or to pay extra if the client isn't ready to stop his operation due to safety reasons.
Just kidding? I bet under any circumstances the client will find an other helicopter company ready to do the job under the clients conditions. In Austria as example more than 20 helicopter operators with more than 100 ships are ready to haul the concrete. The country is very small!
May be some of you have heard about the floodings in Austria some weeks ago. There are the other operators and the police and army helicopter flying now up to today concrete and construction material to the former flooded areas to rebuild streets and places. They do the job every day and also after this tragedy with flying over public areas.
I'm sure, nearly every pilot is interested in safety. And your words cyclic sounding good, but i don't know in which paradise you fly. And i don't know on what kind of operator. But i believe as described the business in the most european countries goes.
And the authorities doesn't help the single ex employed pilot trying to find some safety culture and a new job. I know some cases the pilots hoped the authority informed by the pilots would have stopped some dark deeds by client and management. Forget it! If it is in public interest...
And the things going mostly allways good because of the low feasibility of such a tragedy.
Last edited by tecpilot; 11th Sep 2005 at 08:27.
Some very interesting points are being raised in this discussion. Individual Operators and Pilots approach to Safety. Regulatory control over this aspect of Operation. Commercial pressure and customer expectations. The implementation of JAR-Ops 4, which addresses many of the specific issues involved with this accident.
Let’s review all the parties involved in this accident, to see if we can identify who might be held responsible.
If, as is being stated here, there are no regulations prohibiting this operation, then the responsibility will surely fall back on the Operator, as he is performing the flight. If this load had never been flown, the risk would have never existed. Under the regulatory system I am operating under, the ultimate responsibility lies with the aircraft commander. The aircraft commander is operating under the authority of the Operating Certificate and is thus protected by the conditions specified in the Operations Manual. However if there is no regulatory framework controlling this operation, then ultimately the Operator must shoulder the responsibility for the safety of his operation.
I am quite surprised by the lack of effective safety regulations and practices if this information is indeed correct. The development of an effective Safety Regulation system, is exactly the same as the development of an effective Safety Management System for an operator. There are some essential fundamentals to an effective programme;
1. Risk Assessment – the identification and evaluation of risk.
2. Risk Management – the removal or effective mitigation of risk.
3. Risk decision making – the application of 1 & 2 above.
4. Implementation – the creation of an effective written plan, detailing the system for using 1, 2 & 3 above.
5. Management and Supervision – the training, observance, review and auditing of the plan.
A good safety system has to be easy, practical, simple, but most importantly, effective, in dealing with all the issues. These are not complex, nor necessarily restrictive. Most parts of the safety plan might appear to be common-sense (strange, that), but they detail the hazards and the means for managing them safely. A plan must be comprehensive and provide a means for training and familiarizing everyone involved with the operation for the task at hand. My own safety manual is 125 pages and addresses all the hazards we typically meet in all aspects of our operations (not limited to helicopter operations). This is not to consider it is all encompassing, we still meet challenges that require innovative and creative solutions, additions and changes – but the method for making sound decision are detailed within that plan. Additionally, we have an FAA required and approved Part 133 (external load) operating manual that defines our operating practices and procedures and the means by which we comply with all applicable FAA regulations.
arm the floats raises a couple of good points. If we consider the application and execution of any regulation, you will find that conforming to any rule is the responsibility of the individual operator or pilot. While the regulators created the various rules, it is up to the individual operator or pilot to conform to them. In issuing a licence or Operating Certificate, the Authority, has determined that the company or individual understands the regulation and thus delegates the administration of the rule to them. An approved Operator (or Pilot) is responsible for operating in a safe manner. It will be interesting to see where this investigation goes. Regulators may be responsible for creating and enforcing regulations – but in the interim, YOU are responsible for observing them. Regulation is a neccesary evil in all aspects of life.
There is no requirement for any certification of ground crew members. We do train our crew members with OJT training with experienced crew members. All outside personnel on a lift job, must attend a mandatory safety meeting, and sign an attendance sheet. We would not permit someone who does not know what they are doing to be involved.
Everything below the helicopter belly hook is an external load. Long lines, hooks, rigging, etc, do not require FAA approval. However, our own operations and safety manuals, specify the type and condition of items to be used. Load lifting equipment, is however, subject to full OSHA requirements, including working loads for rigging, hooks and lines. The real grey area, and the one that is always a challenge to external loads, is the rigging of loads. Poorly rigged loads may not fly correctly, nor at speed. Most of this is down to experience – there have been a few threads here about that very subject!
Your own experience with uncommanded load releases is specifically why such caution is deserved with an external load. It is not a part of the aircraft and if they separate from the helicopter, there is no control where they go!
JAR-Ops 4 addresses many of the issues concerning aerial work operations. Indeed as I read it further it addresses precisely the circumstances involved with this accident, and the points being discussed above.
Specifically;
JAR-OPS 4.495 Helicopters
An operator shall
(a) ensure that a helicopter conducting aerial work operations over a congested hostile environment is:
Interpretation: For operations in, or over a built up area, where engine failure accountability is specified. (This text is mainly concerned with operations within a built up area and should not allow gratuitous over-flight with an underslung load.)
ACJ to JAR-OPS 4.495(a)(2)
3. Jettisoning the load is only permitted when prior approval is obtained from the owner(s) of property under the flight path.
Tecpilot, I do sympathise with you if you are having to work in an environment with such a cavalier attitude to safety. Maybe JAR-Ops 4 is timely, necessary and required to inject a realistic and effective approach to safety. Is this attitude consistent throughout the whole industry, or a specific portion of the operating community?
I would thoroughly recommend that any of you operating in this sector, who do not have an existing Operations Manual specifically addressing external load operations, obtain a copy of the HAI Safety Manual. It forms a sound basis for any safety programme and can be modified to meet your specific operational and regulatory requirements. JAR-Ops 4 specifies you will have to create this anyway.
Additionally, with the escalating regulatory requirements, I highly recommend the Safety Courses that are run at the HAI. They provide an absolutely invaluable insight into creating and managing an effective safety programme.
Commercial pressure should never drive safety.
JAR-Ops 4
Let’s review all the parties involved in this accident, to see if we can identify who might be held responsible.
If, as is being stated here, there are no regulations prohibiting this operation, then the responsibility will surely fall back on the Operator, as he is performing the flight. If this load had never been flown, the risk would have never existed. Under the regulatory system I am operating under, the ultimate responsibility lies with the aircraft commander. The aircraft commander is operating under the authority of the Operating Certificate and is thus protected by the conditions specified in the Operations Manual. However if there is no regulatory framework controlling this operation, then ultimately the Operator must shoulder the responsibility for the safety of his operation.
I am quite surprised by the lack of effective safety regulations and practices if this information is indeed correct. The development of an effective Safety Regulation system, is exactly the same as the development of an effective Safety Management System for an operator. There are some essential fundamentals to an effective programme;
1. Risk Assessment – the identification and evaluation of risk.
2. Risk Management – the removal or effective mitigation of risk.
3. Risk decision making – the application of 1 & 2 above.
4. Implementation – the creation of an effective written plan, detailing the system for using 1, 2 & 3 above.
5. Management and Supervision – the training, observance, review and auditing of the plan.
A good safety system has to be easy, practical, simple, but most importantly, effective, in dealing with all the issues. These are not complex, nor necessarily restrictive. Most parts of the safety plan might appear to be common-sense (strange, that), but they detail the hazards and the means for managing them safely. A plan must be comprehensive and provide a means for training and familiarizing everyone involved with the operation for the task at hand. My own safety manual is 125 pages and addresses all the hazards we typically meet in all aspects of our operations (not limited to helicopter operations). This is not to consider it is all encompassing, we still meet challenges that require innovative and creative solutions, additions and changes – but the method for making sound decision are detailed within that plan. Additionally, we have an FAA required and approved Part 133 (external load) operating manual that defines our operating practices and procedures and the means by which we comply with all applicable FAA regulations.
arm the floats raises a couple of good points. If we consider the application and execution of any regulation, you will find that conforming to any rule is the responsibility of the individual operator or pilot. While the regulators created the various rules, it is up to the individual operator or pilot to conform to them. In issuing a licence or Operating Certificate, the Authority, has determined that the company or individual understands the regulation and thus delegates the administration of the rule to them. An approved Operator (or Pilot) is responsible for operating in a safe manner. It will be interesting to see where this investigation goes. Regulators may be responsible for creating and enforcing regulations – but in the interim, YOU are responsible for observing them. Regulation is a neccesary evil in all aspects of life.
There is no requirement for any certification of ground crew members. We do train our crew members with OJT training with experienced crew members. All outside personnel on a lift job, must attend a mandatory safety meeting, and sign an attendance sheet. We would not permit someone who does not know what they are doing to be involved.
Everything below the helicopter belly hook is an external load. Long lines, hooks, rigging, etc, do not require FAA approval. However, our own operations and safety manuals, specify the type and condition of items to be used. Load lifting equipment, is however, subject to full OSHA requirements, including working loads for rigging, hooks and lines. The real grey area, and the one that is always a challenge to external loads, is the rigging of loads. Poorly rigged loads may not fly correctly, nor at speed. Most of this is down to experience – there have been a few threads here about that very subject!
Your own experience with uncommanded load releases is specifically why such caution is deserved with an external load. It is not a part of the aircraft and if they separate from the helicopter, there is no control where they go!
JAR-Ops 4 addresses many of the issues concerning aerial work operations. Indeed as I read it further it addresses precisely the circumstances involved with this accident, and the points being discussed above.
Specifically;
JAR-OPS 4.495 Helicopters
An operator shall
(a) ensure that a helicopter conducting aerial work operations over a congested hostile environment is:
Interpretation: For operations in, or over a built up area, where engine failure accountability is specified. (This text is mainly concerned with operations within a built up area and should not allow gratuitous over-flight with an underslung load.)
ACJ to JAR-OPS 4.495(a)(2)
3. Jettisoning the load is only permitted when prior approval is obtained from the owner(s) of property under the flight path.
Tecpilot, I do sympathise with you if you are having to work in an environment with such a cavalier attitude to safety. Maybe JAR-Ops 4 is timely, necessary and required to inject a realistic and effective approach to safety. Is this attitude consistent throughout the whole industry, or a specific portion of the operating community?
I would thoroughly recommend that any of you operating in this sector, who do not have an existing Operations Manual specifically addressing external load operations, obtain a copy of the HAI Safety Manual. It forms a sound basis for any safety programme and can be modified to meet your specific operational and regulatory requirements. JAR-Ops 4 specifies you will have to create this anyway.
Additionally, with the escalating regulatory requirements, I highly recommend the Safety Courses that are run at the HAI. They provide an absolutely invaluable insight into creating and managing an effective safety programme.
Commercial pressure should never drive safety.
JAR-Ops 4
If, as is being stated here, there are no regulations prohibiting this operation, then the responsibility will surely fall back on the Operator, as he is performing the flight
This accident is under investigation by the highest authorities including the government and they need in any case a guiltier.
1. Lacking laws and regulations -> government and authorities, including JAA because JAR-OPS 4 isn't more than a paper since many years, of course not guilty!
2. Operator -> holds all permits, was before the job in contact with the authorities therefore connected with the authorities, not guilty!
3. Cable car operator -> a public company owned by the local villages, wasn't committed to stop the cable by law, not guilty!
4. Technical malfuction -> sometimes difficult to found in such cases , i hope they found a bug on the dammned hook, but was the pilot able to detect such problem with a better pre-flight check?
5. Poor ape with headset -> no lobby, unexpensive, easy to change -> must be guilty, if he couldn't found guilty he is allways destroyed.
That's the situation i believe to find and no cyclic hotline i haven't "to work in an environment with such a cavalier attitude to safety." because as some of the guys here know, i get my money today to fly with Eurocopter twins and on the safest possible way. But i have flown often with the mates in the Alps, holding all permits including sling load and high mountain operation and knowing the job, the pressure and the operators mostly very well. The accident pilot, unexperienced, coming the hard civil way, with a credit on the neck to become a helicopter pilot, lucky to find a job, is now the underdog and have my sympathies.
JAR-OPS 4 isn't in law and as pointed in some other threads will may be never come. It isn't more than a paper completely without concern in Europe. As also stated in some other threads every country have at the moment own rules to operate helicopters (only aerial work), sometimes every county. That makes things difficult. The public operators, meaning police, army, ... are completely out of the civil laws, but doing sometimes the same job. External load operation is very different. Single engine, twins, with redundancy, without redundancy, with certified components, with selfmade components, only experienced pilots, 300h pilots, with manuals, without manuals,...
I stay on my believe, the tragedy in soelden was a one-in a-million chance but to pay will have the pilot.
Last edited by tecpilot; 12th Sep 2005 at 08:48.
Actually tec, I think you may be absolutely correct. It is pretty sad that the Pilot who is doing what he was tasked by his employer should find himself responsible in this situation. I have never addressed the cause of the load being lost, because it truly is not the issue here - so he could end up responsible for a "random" occurence.
There isn't much point in comparing it to the system I operate under, because, as you have just listed the approvals and permissions were in place, no part of the operation, apparently, is in conflict with any law or regulation.
The only reason I refer to Jar-Ops 4, is because it does represent an attempt at standardisation under the JAA/EASA for this specific arena. The whole JAA/EASA system appears a mess to me. And the conflict between local, national and system wide rules, seems a recipe for disaster to me. I think that the point of arm the floats is indeed pertinent, that there is a regulatory shortfall in a sector that does a lot of work, and if not managed adequately presents a very small, but very high risk circumstance, in the event that a load is lost over people or property.
I do think that regulatory action will be one of the outcomes of this accident - we will just have to watch and see. I guess the inertia and impetus for regulatory change, is, and should be, necessity from the knowledge learned by experience - exactly the same review and audit process that a good safety programme should have.
Out of interest, what do the local media have to say about this accident?
There isn't much point in comparing it to the system I operate under, because, as you have just listed the approvals and permissions were in place, no part of the operation, apparently, is in conflict with any law or regulation.
The only reason I refer to Jar-Ops 4, is because it does represent an attempt at standardisation under the JAA/EASA for this specific arena. The whole JAA/EASA system appears a mess to me. And the conflict between local, national and system wide rules, seems a recipe for disaster to me. I think that the point of arm the floats is indeed pertinent, that there is a regulatory shortfall in a sector that does a lot of work, and if not managed adequately presents a very small, but very high risk circumstance, in the event that a load is lost over people or property.
I do think that regulatory action will be one of the outcomes of this accident - we will just have to watch and see. I guess the inertia and impetus for regulatory change, is, and should be, necessity from the knowledge learned by experience - exactly the same review and audit process that a good safety programme should have.
Out of interest, what do the local media have to say about this accident?
"It's the darkest day in my life, i'm completely destroyed!"
One week after the tragedy the accident pilot have spoken yesterday first time in public.
"I haven't opened the cargo hook, there must be a technical malfunction!
"After ten shuttle flights with the concrete, shortly after 13:00 local time, there was a shudder and i knowed, i lost the load. "
"At first i feared the rope could have damaged the tail rotor and i turned the helicopter."
"I have seen the swinging gondolas and the bodies laying around."
"I pressed the radioknob and ordered help."
"And i swear again, i haven't opened the hook, i keeped the stick on the lower end of the grip to prevent a load release!"
One week after the tragedy the accident pilot have spoken yesterday first time in public.
"I haven't opened the cargo hook, there must be a technical malfunction!
"After ten shuttle flights with the concrete, shortly after 13:00 local time, there was a shudder and i knowed, i lost the load. "
"At first i feared the rope could have damaged the tail rotor and i turned the helicopter."
"I have seen the swinging gondolas and the bodies laying around."
"I pressed the radioknob and ordered help."
"And i swear again, i haven't opened the hook, i keeped the stick on the lower end of the grip to prevent a load release!"
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just arrived a alert from eurocopter i think its about the same problem steve
ALERT TELEX – EUROCOPTER – ALERT TELEX – EUROCOPTER – ALERT TELEX – EUROCOPTER
T.F.S. No. 00000265 dated September 15, 2005
EUROCOPTER – MARIGNANE – TLX 42506F
Page 1 of 5
ALERT TELEX – EUROCOPTER – ALERT TELEX – EUROCOPTER – ALERT TELEX – EUROCOPTER
A L E R T T E L E X
No. 25.12 AIRCRAFT: SA 341/342 Civil Version(s): G, J
Military Version(s): B, C, D, E, F, H,
K, L, L1, M, M1
SUBJECT: EQUIPMENT AND FURNISHINGS
Untimely Firing of Squibs on GOODRICH Electric Hoists
CAUTION
THE INFORMATION AND INSTRUCTIONS CONTAINED IN THIS ALERT TELEX ARE
INTENDED FOR MAINTENANCE PERSONNEL AND CREWS
1. PLANNING INFORMATION
1.A. EFFECTIVITY
1.A.1. Helicopters/Installed equipment: Helicopters equipped with GOODRICH electric hoists
P/N 76370-XXX, not equipped with the AUXILEC motor.
NOTE
The motor manufacturer is indicated on the
identification plate of the motor.
1.A.2. Non-installed equipment: Not applicable.
1.B. ASSOCIATED REQUIREMENTS
Not applicable.
1.C. REASON
To prevent untimely firing of the squib on GOODRICH electric hoists.
ALERT TELEX – EUROCOPTER – ALERT TELEX – EUROCOPTER – ALERT TELEX – EUROCOPTER
T.F.S. No. 00000265 dated September 15, 2005
EUROCOPTER – MARIGNANE – TLX 42506F
Page 2 of 5
ALERT TELEX – EUROCOPTER – ALERT TELEX – EUROCOPTER – ALERT TELEX – EUROCOPTER
1.D. DESCRIPTION
EUROCOPTER has been informed of a case concerning a hoist squib which fired on an AS 355 F2
helicopter, during ground operation, without being triggered by the pilot or the hoist operator.
Following examination of the hoist, it was found that the motor brush power supply wiring was
grounded with the casing of the hoist motor.
This ground caused propagation of a leakage current to the squib firing components, which triggered
the untimely firing of the squib and the cutting of the cable.
The type of hoist installed on the AS 355 F2 is also installed on Gazelle helicopters. Contrary to
AS 355 F2 helicopters, the electrical system of Gazelle helicopters is fitted with a resistor capable of
absorbing the leakage current energy. This resistor reduces the risk of untimely hoist squib firing, but it
does not guarantee full effectiveness.
A modification is being studied in order to preclude any risk of untimely squib firing.
Consequently, as a precaution, and pending this modification, EUROCOPTER renders compliance
with this ALERT TELEX mandatory. It states that you must inhibit the squib function and use hand
shears approved by the regulatory authority.
1.E. COMPLIANCE
EUROCOPTER renders compliance with this ALERT TELEX mandatory.
1.E.1. Compliance at the works
1.E.1.a. On helicopters/installed equipment:
Not applicable.
1.E.1.b. Non-installed equipment:
Not applicable.
1.E.2. Compliance in operation: By the operator.
1.E.2.a. On helicopters/installed equipment:
On receipt of this ALERT TELEX, issued on the date indicated in the header, or before the next
hoisting operation, comply with paragraph 2.B.
Meanwhile, and as long as compliance is not ensured with paragraph 2.B., it is forbidden to carry
out hoisting operations with the GOODRICH electric hoists specified in paragraph 1.A.1.
1.E.2.b. Non-installed equipment:
Not applicable.
ALERT TELEX – EUROCOPTER – ALERT TELEX – EUROCOPTER – ALERT TELEX – EUROCOPTER
T.F.S. No. 00000265 dated September 15, 2005
EUROCOPTER – MARIGNANE – TLX 42506F
Page 3 of 5
ALERT TELEX – EUROCOPTER – ALERT TELEX – EUROCOPTER – ALERT TELEX – EUROCOPTER
1.F. MANPOWER
Qualification: 1 electrician, approximately 1 hour.
1.G. REFERENCES
Standard Practices Manual (MTC): Work Card 20.07.03.406.
2. ACCOMPLISHMENT INSTRUCTIONS
2.A. GENERAL
Not applicable.
2.B. OPERATIONAL PROCEDURE
2.B.1. Installation of suitable cable cutting shears
Procure cable cutting shears and install them on board the helicopter (unless the helicopter is already
fitted with cable cutting shears). The cable cutting shears must be secured on board the helicopter,
and must be readily accessible by the operator (hoist operator), and must be capable of cutting the
hoist cable.
You must get an approval of this equipment and its installation from your local authorities.
2.B.2. Inhibition of the squib function
2.B.2.a. Operations to be carried out on the hoist (Figure 1 Details A and B)
Install the access equipment.
Cut off the electrical power supplies as per MTC Work Card 20.07.03.406.
Remove and save clamp (a) separately.
Disengage cover (b).
Untighten nut (c) and lock-nut (d).
Disconnect lug (e) from squib (f).
Isolate lug (e) with heat-shrink sheath.
Tighten nut (c) and lock-nut (d).
Insert isolated lug (e) in cover (b).
Coil and secure the cover (b) and isolated lug (e) assembly on conductor (g) using a cable tie.
Remove the access equipment.
ALERT TELEX – EUROCOPTER – ALERT TELEX – EUROCOPTER – ALERT TELEX – EUROCOPTER
T.F.S. No. 00000265 dated September 15, 2005
EUROCOPTER – MARIGNANE – TLX 42506F
Page 4 of 5
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2.B.2.b. Operations to be performed in the cockpit and cabin
Produce two labels (red text on white background) with the following wording:
WARNING
ELECTRIC HOIST SQUIB CABLE CUTTER FUNCTION INHIBITED.
IF NECESSARY, CUT THE HOIST CABLE USING THE CABLE
CUTTING SHEARS LOCATED IN THE CABIN.
Position the labels in a visible manner: one on the instrument panel and one near the hoist operator.
2.C. IDENTIFICATION
Record compliance with this ALERT TELEX in the aircraft documents.
2.D. OPERATING AND MAINTENANCE INSTRUCTIONS
2.D.1. Operating instructions
Before each hoisting operation, and at least:
- Make sure that the cable cutting shears are on board the helicopter and are accessible.
- Define a suitable operational procedure, considering that the hoist squib cable cutter function is not
available.
- Ensure a suitable method of communication between the crew members.
NOTE
EUROCOPTER recommends not to hoist persons
during hoisting training, as long as the hoist squib cable
cutter function is inhibited.
2.D.2. Maintenance instructions
Not applicable.
ALERT TELEX – EUROCOPTER – ALERT TELEX – EUROCOPTER – ALERT TELEX – EUROCOPTER
T.F.S. No. 00000265 dated September 15, 2005
EUROCOPTER – MARIGNANE – TLX 42506F
Page 5 of 5
ALERT TELEX – EUROCOPTER – ALERT TELEX – EUROCOPTER – ALERT TELEX – EUROCOPTER
Figure 1 Location of the squib
ALERT TELEX – EUROCOPTER – ALERT TELEX – EUROCOPTER – ALERT TELEX – EUROCOPTER
T.F.S. No. 00000265 dated September 15, 2005
EUROCOPTER – MARIGNANE – TLX 42506F
Page 1 of 5
ALERT TELEX – EUROCOPTER – ALERT TELEX – EUROCOPTER – ALERT TELEX – EUROCOPTER
A L E R T T E L E X
No. 25.12 AIRCRAFT: SA 341/342 Civil Version(s): G, J
Military Version(s): B, C, D, E, F, H,
K, L, L1, M, M1
SUBJECT: EQUIPMENT AND FURNISHINGS
Untimely Firing of Squibs on GOODRICH Electric Hoists
CAUTION
THE INFORMATION AND INSTRUCTIONS CONTAINED IN THIS ALERT TELEX ARE
INTENDED FOR MAINTENANCE PERSONNEL AND CREWS
1. PLANNING INFORMATION
1.A. EFFECTIVITY
1.A.1. Helicopters/Installed equipment: Helicopters equipped with GOODRICH electric hoists
P/N 76370-XXX, not equipped with the AUXILEC motor.
NOTE
The motor manufacturer is indicated on the
identification plate of the motor.
1.A.2. Non-installed equipment: Not applicable.
1.B. ASSOCIATED REQUIREMENTS
Not applicable.
1.C. REASON
To prevent untimely firing of the squib on GOODRICH electric hoists.
ALERT TELEX – EUROCOPTER – ALERT TELEX – EUROCOPTER – ALERT TELEX – EUROCOPTER
T.F.S. No. 00000265 dated September 15, 2005
EUROCOPTER – MARIGNANE – TLX 42506F
Page 2 of 5
ALERT TELEX – EUROCOPTER – ALERT TELEX – EUROCOPTER – ALERT TELEX – EUROCOPTER
1.D. DESCRIPTION
EUROCOPTER has been informed of a case concerning a hoist squib which fired on an AS 355 F2
helicopter, during ground operation, without being triggered by the pilot or the hoist operator.
Following examination of the hoist, it was found that the motor brush power supply wiring was
grounded with the casing of the hoist motor.
This ground caused propagation of a leakage current to the squib firing components, which triggered
the untimely firing of the squib and the cutting of the cable.
The type of hoist installed on the AS 355 F2 is also installed on Gazelle helicopters. Contrary to
AS 355 F2 helicopters, the electrical system of Gazelle helicopters is fitted with a resistor capable of
absorbing the leakage current energy. This resistor reduces the risk of untimely hoist squib firing, but it
does not guarantee full effectiveness.
A modification is being studied in order to preclude any risk of untimely squib firing.
Consequently, as a precaution, and pending this modification, EUROCOPTER renders compliance
with this ALERT TELEX mandatory. It states that you must inhibit the squib function and use hand
shears approved by the regulatory authority.
1.E. COMPLIANCE
EUROCOPTER renders compliance with this ALERT TELEX mandatory.
1.E.1. Compliance at the works
1.E.1.a. On helicopters/installed equipment:
Not applicable.
1.E.1.b. Non-installed equipment:
Not applicable.
1.E.2. Compliance in operation: By the operator.
1.E.2.a. On helicopters/installed equipment:
On receipt of this ALERT TELEX, issued on the date indicated in the header, or before the next
hoisting operation, comply with paragraph 2.B.
Meanwhile, and as long as compliance is not ensured with paragraph 2.B., it is forbidden to carry
out hoisting operations with the GOODRICH electric hoists specified in paragraph 1.A.1.
1.E.2.b. Non-installed equipment:
Not applicable.
ALERT TELEX – EUROCOPTER – ALERT TELEX – EUROCOPTER – ALERT TELEX – EUROCOPTER
T.F.S. No. 00000265 dated September 15, 2005
EUROCOPTER – MARIGNANE – TLX 42506F
Page 3 of 5
ALERT TELEX – EUROCOPTER – ALERT TELEX – EUROCOPTER – ALERT TELEX – EUROCOPTER
1.F. MANPOWER
Qualification: 1 electrician, approximately 1 hour.
1.G. REFERENCES
Standard Practices Manual (MTC): Work Card 20.07.03.406.
2. ACCOMPLISHMENT INSTRUCTIONS
2.A. GENERAL
Not applicable.
2.B. OPERATIONAL PROCEDURE
2.B.1. Installation of suitable cable cutting shears
Procure cable cutting shears and install them on board the helicopter (unless the helicopter is already
fitted with cable cutting shears). The cable cutting shears must be secured on board the helicopter,
and must be readily accessible by the operator (hoist operator), and must be capable of cutting the
hoist cable.
You must get an approval of this equipment and its installation from your local authorities.
2.B.2. Inhibition of the squib function
2.B.2.a. Operations to be carried out on the hoist (Figure 1 Details A and B)
Install the access equipment.
Cut off the electrical power supplies as per MTC Work Card 20.07.03.406.
Remove and save clamp (a) separately.
Disengage cover (b).
Untighten nut (c) and lock-nut (d).
Disconnect lug (e) from squib (f).
Isolate lug (e) with heat-shrink sheath.
Tighten nut (c) and lock-nut (d).
Insert isolated lug (e) in cover (b).
Coil and secure the cover (b) and isolated lug (e) assembly on conductor (g) using a cable tie.
Remove the access equipment.
ALERT TELEX – EUROCOPTER – ALERT TELEX – EUROCOPTER – ALERT TELEX – EUROCOPTER
T.F.S. No. 00000265 dated September 15, 2005
EUROCOPTER – MARIGNANE – TLX 42506F
Page 4 of 5
ALERT TELEX – EUROCOPTER – ALERT TELEX – EUROCOPTER – ALERT TELEX – EUROCOPTER
2.B.2.b. Operations to be performed in the cockpit and cabin
Produce two labels (red text on white background) with the following wording:
WARNING
ELECTRIC HOIST SQUIB CABLE CUTTER FUNCTION INHIBITED.
IF NECESSARY, CUT THE HOIST CABLE USING THE CABLE
CUTTING SHEARS LOCATED IN THE CABIN.
Position the labels in a visible manner: one on the instrument panel and one near the hoist operator.
2.C. IDENTIFICATION
Record compliance with this ALERT TELEX in the aircraft documents.
2.D. OPERATING AND MAINTENANCE INSTRUCTIONS
2.D.1. Operating instructions
Before each hoisting operation, and at least:
- Make sure that the cable cutting shears are on board the helicopter and are accessible.
- Define a suitable operational procedure, considering that the hoist squib cable cutter function is not
available.
- Ensure a suitable method of communication between the crew members.
NOTE
EUROCOPTER recommends not to hoist persons
during hoisting training, as long as the hoist squib cable
cutter function is inhibited.
2.D.2. Maintenance instructions
Not applicable.
ALERT TELEX – EUROCOPTER – ALERT TELEX – EUROCOPTER – ALERT TELEX – EUROCOPTER
T.F.S. No. 00000265 dated September 15, 2005
EUROCOPTER – MARIGNANE – TLX 42506F
Page 5 of 5
ALERT TELEX – EUROCOPTER – ALERT TELEX – EUROCOPTER – ALERT TELEX – EUROCOPTER
Figure 1 Location of the squib
Hopefully, if there is any good to be found in this...European Rules will be amended so that such occurrences can be prevented.
The FAA rule (part 133) follows....and if this rule had been complied with by the operator and the authority....the pilot would not be in the situation he is now.
Title 14: Aeronautics and Space
PART 133—ROTORCRAFT EXTERNAL-LOAD OPERATIONS
Subpart C—Operating Rules and Related Requirements
§ 133.33 Operating rules.
(a) No person may conduct a rotorcraft external-load operation without, or contrary to, the Rotorcraft-Load Combination Flight Manual prescribed in §133.47.
(b) No person may conduct a rotorcraft external-load operation unless—
(1) The rotorcraft complies with §133.19; and
(2) The rotorcraft and rotorcraft-load combination is authorized under the Rotorcraft External-Load Operator Certificate.
(c) Before a person may operate a rotorcraft with an external-load configuration that differs substantially from any that person has previously carried with that type of rotorcraft (whether or not the rotorcraft-load combination is of the same class), that person must conduct, in a manner that will not endanger persons or property on the surface, such of the following flight-operational checks as the Administrator determines are appropriate to the rotorcraft-load combination:
(1) A determination that the weight of the rotorcraft-load combination and the location of its center of gravity are within approved limits, that the external load is securely fastened, and that the external load does not interfere with devices provided for its emergency release.
(2) Make an initial liftoff and verify that controllability is satisfactory.
(3) While hovering, verify that directional control is adequate.
(4) Accelerate into forward flight to verify that no attitude (whether of the rotorcraft or of the external load) is encountered in which the rotorcraft is uncontrollable or which is otherwise hazardous.
(5) In forward flight, check for hazardous oscillations of the external load, but if the external load is not visible to the pilot, other crewmembers or ground personnel may make this check and signal the pilot.
(6) Increase the forward airspeed and determine an operational airspeed at which no hazardous oscillation or hazardous aerodynamic turbulence is encountered.
(d) Notwithstanding the provisions of part 91 of this chapter, the holder of a Rotorcraft External-Load Operator Certificate may conduct (in rotorcraft type certificated under and meeting the requirements of part 27 or 29 of this chapter, including the external-load attaching means) rotorcraft external-load operations over congested areas if those operations are conducted without hazard to persons or property on the surface and comply with the following:
(1) The operator must develop a plan for each complete operation, coordinate this plan with the FAA Flight Standards District Office having jurisdiction over the area in which the operation will be conducted, and obtain approval for the operation from that district office. The plan must include an agreement with the appropriate political subdivision that local officials will exclude unauthorized persons from the area in which the operation will be conducted, coordination with air traffic control, if necessary, and a detailed chart depicting the flight routes and altitudes.
(2) Each flight must be conducted at an altitude, and on a route, that will allow a jettisonable external load to be released, and the rotorcraft landed, in an emergency without hazard to persons or property on the surface.
(e) Notwithstanding the provisions of part 91 of this chapter, and except as provided in §133.45(d), the holder of a Rotorcraft External-Load Operator Certificate may conduct external-load operations, including approaches, departures, and load positioning maneuvers necessary for the operation, below 500 feet above the surface and closer than 500 feet to persons, vessels, vehicles, and structures, if the operations are conducted without creating a hazard to persons or property on the surface.
(f) No person may conduct rotorcraft external-load operations under IFR unless specifically approved by the Administrator. However, under no circumstances may a person be carried as part of the external-load under IFR.
[Doc. No. 24550, 51 FR 40708, Nov. 7, 1986, as amended by Amdt. 133–11, 54 FR 39294, Sept. 25, 1989]
The FAA rule (part 133) follows....and if this rule had been complied with by the operator and the authority....the pilot would not be in the situation he is now.
Title 14: Aeronautics and Space
PART 133—ROTORCRAFT EXTERNAL-LOAD OPERATIONS
Subpart C—Operating Rules and Related Requirements
§ 133.33 Operating rules.
(a) No person may conduct a rotorcraft external-load operation without, or contrary to, the Rotorcraft-Load Combination Flight Manual prescribed in §133.47.
(b) No person may conduct a rotorcraft external-load operation unless—
(1) The rotorcraft complies with §133.19; and
(2) The rotorcraft and rotorcraft-load combination is authorized under the Rotorcraft External-Load Operator Certificate.
(c) Before a person may operate a rotorcraft with an external-load configuration that differs substantially from any that person has previously carried with that type of rotorcraft (whether or not the rotorcraft-load combination is of the same class), that person must conduct, in a manner that will not endanger persons or property on the surface, such of the following flight-operational checks as the Administrator determines are appropriate to the rotorcraft-load combination:
(1) A determination that the weight of the rotorcraft-load combination and the location of its center of gravity are within approved limits, that the external load is securely fastened, and that the external load does not interfere with devices provided for its emergency release.
(2) Make an initial liftoff and verify that controllability is satisfactory.
(3) While hovering, verify that directional control is adequate.
(4) Accelerate into forward flight to verify that no attitude (whether of the rotorcraft or of the external load) is encountered in which the rotorcraft is uncontrollable or which is otherwise hazardous.
(5) In forward flight, check for hazardous oscillations of the external load, but if the external load is not visible to the pilot, other crewmembers or ground personnel may make this check and signal the pilot.
(6) Increase the forward airspeed and determine an operational airspeed at which no hazardous oscillation or hazardous aerodynamic turbulence is encountered.
(d) Notwithstanding the provisions of part 91 of this chapter, the holder of a Rotorcraft External-Load Operator Certificate may conduct (in rotorcraft type certificated under and meeting the requirements of part 27 or 29 of this chapter, including the external-load attaching means) rotorcraft external-load operations over congested areas if those operations are conducted without hazard to persons or property on the surface and comply with the following:
(1) The operator must develop a plan for each complete operation, coordinate this plan with the FAA Flight Standards District Office having jurisdiction over the area in which the operation will be conducted, and obtain approval for the operation from that district office. The plan must include an agreement with the appropriate political subdivision that local officials will exclude unauthorized persons from the area in which the operation will be conducted, coordination with air traffic control, if necessary, and a detailed chart depicting the flight routes and altitudes.
(2) Each flight must be conducted at an altitude, and on a route, that will allow a jettisonable external load to be released, and the rotorcraft landed, in an emergency without hazard to persons or property on the surface.
(e) Notwithstanding the provisions of part 91 of this chapter, and except as provided in §133.45(d), the holder of a Rotorcraft External-Load Operator Certificate may conduct external-load operations, including approaches, departures, and load positioning maneuvers necessary for the operation, below 500 feet above the surface and closer than 500 feet to persons, vessels, vehicles, and structures, if the operations are conducted without creating a hazard to persons or property on the surface.
(f) No person may conduct rotorcraft external-load operations under IFR unless specifically approved by the Administrator. However, under no circumstances may a person be carried as part of the external-load under IFR.
[Doc. No. 24550, 51 FR 40708, Nov. 7, 1986, as amended by Amdt. 133–11, 54 FR 39294, Sept. 25, 1989]
Last edited by SASless; 15th Sep 2005 at 18:15.
Now the last stand of investigations.
Today it was announced the investigators have found "clues" of a technical problem. The hook unit was found absolutely ok after an examination by a group of engineers including 2 from the manufacurer. But the electric of the ship is now in the spot of investigations. A professor of the Vienna Technical University is now instructed to acknowledge these hints. After his analysis the prosecution will inform the public.
Today it was announced the investigators have found "clues" of a technical problem. The hook unit was found absolutely ok after an examination by a group of engineers including 2 from the manufacurer. But the electric of the ship is now in the spot of investigations. A professor of the Vienna Technical University is now instructed to acknowledge these hints. After his analysis the prosecution will inform the public.
Investigations are finished. The tragedy was caused by a failure of the hook opening switch due to abrasion inside the switch. ECF will check now over 1000 helicopters and is prepared to change this switch. The pilot will be come back into the cockpit in the next days. Austrian ministry of traffic: "Operator and pilot aren't guilty and fully released!"
TC, i'm interested to hear how you and your maintenance "maintaining and servicing" a switch? Please understand right, the problem was inside the switch (the switch is closed and sealed) due to abrasion during normal use. They found metal particles inside. The particles closed the electric circuit to tragedy...
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I have read this thread with very mixed emotions. Frequently seething from some of the pompous remarks made; but I make only two points.
Cyclic Hotline says: “Commercial pressure should never drive safety”.
Perhaps unfortunately, in my world, somehow it nearly always does.
SASless says: “Hopefully, if there is any good to be found in this...European Rules will be amended so that such occurrences can be prevented.”
A change of the rules in Europe will not do the job. A change will never take universal effect. There will always be some national authority that will not accept the changes or be 20 years behind everyone else, and even in those places that change the rules it may not even prevent such one-in-a-million occurrences.
It will however reduce the opportunities for helicopter companies to do business, the number of companies able to stay in business, the number of hours flown, the number of helicopters made and sold, as well as the number of pilots and mechanics employed. Off-hand I can’t think of any rule change aimed at preventing some flying activity that has had a positive effect on the economics of our industry.
Cyclic Hotline says: “Commercial pressure should never drive safety”.
Perhaps unfortunately, in my world, somehow it nearly always does.
SASless says: “Hopefully, if there is any good to be found in this...European Rules will be amended so that such occurrences can be prevented.”
A change of the rules in Europe will not do the job. A change will never take universal effect. There will always be some national authority that will not accept the changes or be 20 years behind everyone else, and even in those places that change the rules it may not even prevent such one-in-a-million occurrences.
It will however reduce the opportunities for helicopter companies to do business, the number of companies able to stay in business, the number of hours flown, the number of helicopters made and sold, as well as the number of pilots and mechanics employed. Off-hand I can’t think of any rule change aimed at preventing some flying activity that has had a positive effect on the economics of our industry.
TorqueStripe
I've also heard about this witness. But i couldn't believe in such a scenario. Why?
1. Much more witnesses from the the other gondolas stated the load was lost in a distance to the cable.
2. The cable of the cable car was damaged on the upper sector.
3. The kettle showed no signs of a hauled contact to the cable/condolas.
4. If the slinged load had hit the cable or gondolas direct then the hook, the load steel rope and the helicopter will show signs of overstress. The investigations don't showed signs of overstressed helicopter parts.
After a great and unfair media campaign after the accident day with a lot of pressure to the pilot and the operator without any basics the "end of investigations" message with the technical problem was posted in very small letters or in 5 "on air" seconds. Now the medias have again a lot of time to broadcast the new speculations.
I've also heard about this witness. But i couldn't believe in such a scenario. Why?
1. Much more witnesses from the the other gondolas stated the load was lost in a distance to the cable.
2. The cable of the cable car was damaged on the upper sector.
3. The kettle showed no signs of a hauled contact to the cable/condolas.
4. If the slinged load had hit the cable or gondolas direct then the hook, the load steel rope and the helicopter will show signs of overstress. The investigations don't showed signs of overstressed helicopter parts.
After a great and unfair media campaign after the accident day with a lot of pressure to the pilot and the operator without any basics the "end of investigations" message with the technical problem was posted in very small letters or in 5 "on air" seconds. Now the medias have again a lot of time to broadcast the new speculations.
Helicopter pilot charged over deadly cable car accident
20/03/2006 - 17:15:25
An Austrian state prosecutor today indicted a helicopter pilot involved in a cable car accident that killed nine German skiers last year after his chopper dropped heavy equipment on a ski lift.
Three adults and six youths aged between 12 and 14 died in the accident six months ago near the Austrian alpine resort of Soelden after a mechanical hook beneath the helicopter let go of a tub weighing nearly 700 kilograms used to transport concrete.
The pilot was charged with contravening air transport regulations by flying over the area used by the cable cars.
He was not identified by the prosecutor’s office, but has been named previously by Austrian media as Markus Jaeger.
The tub hit the lift, sending one of its gondolas plunging 30 meters onto a rocky mountainside.
Other victims were catapulted out of two other gondolas. Seven people survived their injuries.
20/03/2006 - 17:15:25
An Austrian state prosecutor today indicted a helicopter pilot involved in a cable car accident that killed nine German skiers last year after his chopper dropped heavy equipment on a ski lift.
Three adults and six youths aged between 12 and 14 died in the accident six months ago near the Austrian alpine resort of Soelden after a mechanical hook beneath the helicopter let go of a tub weighing nearly 700 kilograms used to transport concrete.
The pilot was charged with contravening air transport regulations by flying over the area used by the cable cars.
He was not identified by the prosecutor’s office, but has been named previously by Austrian media as Markus Jaeger.
The tub hit the lift, sending one of its gondolas plunging 30 meters onto a rocky mountainside.
Other victims were catapulted out of two other gondolas. Seven people survived their injuries.