Some very interesting points are being raised in this discussion. Individual Operators and Pilots approach to Safety. Regulatory control over this aspect of Operation. Commercial pressure and customer expectations. The implementation of JAR-Ops 4, which addresses many of the specific issues involved with this accident.
Lets review all the parties involved in this accident, to see if we can identify who might be held responsible.
If, as is being stated here, there are no regulations prohibiting this operation, then the responsibility will surely fall back on the Operator, as he is performing the flight. If this load had never been flown, the risk would have never existed. Under the regulatory system I am operating under, the ultimate responsibility lies with the aircraft commander. The aircraft commander is operating under the authority of the Operating Certificate and is thus protected by the conditions specified in the Operations Manual. However if there is no regulatory framework controlling this operation, then ultimately the Operator must shoulder the responsibility for the safety of his operation.
I am quite surprised by the lack of effective safety regulations and practices if this information is indeed correct. The development of an effective Safety Regulation system, is exactly the same as the development of an effective Safety Management System for an operator. There are some essential fundamentals to an effective programme;
1. Risk Assessment the identification and evaluation of risk.
2. Risk Management the removal or effective mitigation of risk.
3. Risk decision making the application of 1 & 2 above.
4. Implementation the creation of an effective written plan, detailing the system for using 1, 2 & 3 above.
5. Management and Supervision the training, observance, review and auditing of the plan.
A good safety system has to be easy, practical, simple, but most importantly, effective, in dealing with all the issues. These are not complex, nor necessarily restrictive. Most parts of the safety plan might appear to be common-sense (strange, that), but they detail the hazards and the means for managing them safely. A plan must be comprehensive and provide a means for training and familiarizing everyone involved with the operation for the task at hand. My own safety manual is 125 pages and addresses all the hazards we typically meet in all aspects of our operations (not limited to helicopter operations). This is not to consider it is all encompassing, we still meet challenges that require innovative and creative solutions, additions and changes but the method for making sound decision are detailed within that plan. Additionally, we have an FAA required and approved Part 133 (external load) operating manual that defines our operating practices and procedures and the means by which we comply with all applicable FAA regulations.
arm the floats raises a couple of good points. If we consider the application and execution of any regulation, you will find that conforming to any rule is the responsibility of the individual operator or pilot. While the regulators created the various rules, it is up to the individual operator or pilot to conform to them. In issuing a licence or Operating Certificate, the Authority, has determined that the company or individual understands the regulation and thus delegates the administration of the rule to them. An approved Operator (or Pilot) is responsible for operating in a safe manner. It will be interesting to see where this investigation goes. Regulators may be responsible for creating and enforcing regulations but in the interim, YOU are responsible for observing them. Regulation is a neccesary evil in all aspects of life.
There is no requirement for any certification of ground crew members. We do train our crew members with OJT training with experienced crew members. All outside personnel on a lift job, must attend a mandatory safety meeting, and sign an attendance sheet. We would not permit someone who does not know what they are doing to be involved.
Everything below the helicopter belly hook is an external load. Long lines, hooks, rigging, etc, do not require FAA approval. However, our own operations and safety manuals, specify the type and condition of items to be used. Load lifting equipment, is however, subject to full OSHA requirements, including working loads for rigging, hooks and lines. The real grey area, and the one that is always a challenge to external loads, is the rigging of loads. Poorly rigged loads may not fly correctly, nor at speed. Most of this is down to experience there have been a few threads here about that very subject!
Your own experience with uncommanded load releases is specifically why such caution is deserved with an external load. It is not a part of the aircraft and if they separate from the helicopter, there is no control where they go!
JAR-Ops 4 addresses many of the issues concerning aerial work operations. Indeed as I read it further it addresses precisely the circumstances involved with this accident, and the points being discussed above.
Specifically;
JAR-OPS 4.495 Helicopters
An operator shall
(a) ensure that a helicopter conducting aerial work operations over a congested hostile environment is:
Interpretation: For operations in, or over a built up area, where engine failure accountability is specified. (This text is mainly concerned with operations within a built up area and should not allow gratuitous over-flight with an underslung load.)
ACJ to JAR-OPS 4.495(a)(2)
3. Jettisoning the load is only permitted when prior approval is obtained from the owner(s) of property under the flight path.
Tecpilot, I do sympathise with you if you are having to work in an environment with such a cavalier attitude to safety. Maybe JAR-Ops 4 is timely, necessary and required to inject a realistic and effective approach to safety. Is this attitude consistent throughout the whole industry, or a specific portion of the operating community?
I would thoroughly recommend that any of you operating in this sector, who do not have an existing Operations Manual specifically addressing external load operations, obtain a copy of the HAI Safety Manual. It forms a sound basis for any safety programme and can be modified to meet your specific operational and regulatory requirements. JAR-Ops 4 specifies you will have to create this anyway.
Additionally, with the escalating regulatory requirements, I highly recommend the Safety Courses that are run at the HAI. They provide an absolutely invaluable insight into creating and managing an effective safety programme.
Commercial pressure should never drive safety.
JAR-Ops 4