Sikorsky S-92: From Design to Operations
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Undaunted, I shall continue.
The issue of resonance at the filter assembly does deserve to be investigated and us 'newfies' are not the first to make this connection with possible long term fatigue cracking of the studs. Every passenger group that I've spoke with on both sides of the Atlantic has echoed the same sentiments about their experience on the wonderful 21'st century flying 'bus'. Certainly such questions will only be answered by engineers in a lab setting.
On another note how many operators use an auxilliary fuel tank for their normal offshore runs, in the cabin with passengers? And.....how would such a large liquid mass, in addition to sponson fuel affect the ability of the adjacent anti-vibe unit to actually be effective in dampening cabin vibes? Any vibes still prevalent in the cabin structure could be transmitted back through the airframe and contribute to resonance at other locations in the aircraft.
The previous day the crashed helicoptor C-GZCH made two flights to the Hibernia platform. I've spoke with several individuals on those flights and they all say that the vibration on that trip, including the cruise out was the worst they've ever made on an S92. Nobody could read a book for instance so something was not in tune with the vibration cancellation system. Coincidence??
The issue of resonance at the filter assembly does deserve to be investigated and us 'newfies' are not the first to make this connection with possible long term fatigue cracking of the studs. Every passenger group that I've spoke with on both sides of the Atlantic has echoed the same sentiments about their experience on the wonderful 21'st century flying 'bus'. Certainly such questions will only be answered by engineers in a lab setting.
On another note how many operators use an auxilliary fuel tank for their normal offshore runs, in the cabin with passengers? And.....how would such a large liquid mass, in addition to sponson fuel affect the ability of the adjacent anti-vibe unit to actually be effective in dampening cabin vibes? Any vibes still prevalent in the cabin structure could be transmitted back through the airframe and contribute to resonance at other locations in the aircraft.
The previous day the crashed helicoptor C-GZCH made two flights to the Hibernia platform. I've spoke with several individuals on those flights and they all say that the vibration on that trip, including the cruise out was the worst they've ever made on an S92. Nobody could read a book for instance so something was not in tune with the vibration cancellation system. Coincidence??
NL,
I stand to be corrected, and make these comments as personal opinions only, but I still believe you are far off the mark. Imagine the aircraft had been produced with 10 force generators and, from the pax perspective, was smoother than a flying carpet, would we be still be having this conversation? Talk of "naughty seats" by over-unionised Norwegians does little to add technical credibility to the debate, and simply reflects the fact that a particular seat sits on an anti-node that the AVC system does not address.
The fuselage is subjected to vibrational frequencies that are of a very low order - a 4P is only 17 Hz - even taking into account harmonics, and although the structure may behave like a jelly, the componants on the MGB will be largely oblivious to them. They may as well be attached to a metronome.
I stand to be corrected, and make these comments as personal opinions only, but I still believe you are far off the mark. Imagine the aircraft had been produced with 10 force generators and, from the pax perspective, was smoother than a flying carpet, would we be still be having this conversation? Talk of "naughty seats" by over-unionised Norwegians does little to add technical credibility to the debate, and simply reflects the fact that a particular seat sits on an anti-node that the AVC system does not address.
The fuselage is subjected to vibrational frequencies that are of a very low order - a 4P is only 17 Hz - even taking into account harmonics, and although the structure may behave like a jelly, the componants on the MGB will be largely oblivious to them. They may as well be attached to a metronome.
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But just suppose, for argument's sake, that the vibrations caused by the rotors and transmitted to the MRGB do, in fact, create a resonance in the filter assembly - not only would that have helped to cause the failure of the titanium bolts but might do the same to the steel ones
IMHO the root cause issue to the high vibration issue is due to a heavy-duty helo only having 4 main rotor blades. You can call it medium-sized, but that's just a categorisation. This thread has previously highlighted that the AVC was a retro-fit in the early S-92 "teething" days. Using nodal cancelling is not removing the key issue, this chopper shakes like an old roller-coaster, makes excessive blade noise so loud that it limits its speed over populated areas, and generally doesn't make for a comfortable long-haul flight. Is it worse in the cockpit? Would you go for a 3-hour drive in a car that shook like a S-92, or would you get your wheel balancing checked and anything else until you fixed the vibration problem?
Will Sikorsky come forward and prove to us all technically that the MGB lube oil filter housing is actually fit for purpose i.e. M8 steel studs can cope with all operational factors such as background vibration, hydraulic forces from circulating fluids, dis-similar metal thermal contraction/expansion etc. etc. etc. or would that deviate from the "of course it's designed to the best possible standard, we wouldn't have it any other way" attitude. Where do we stop? The FAR29 work around is a classic example of what it appears that this company will do to get round these "difficult" questions. What will they blame the stud failure on this time, or have they run out of excuses? Surely the experts can answer these relatively simple questions...
Here's hoping the TSB report will answer some of our many as yet unanswered questions and put Sikorsky on the spot.
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But will the "Newfie SLF expert panel" actually listen
If this is your interpretation of us PAX then I suggest that you do not attempt to fly for Cougar, you may find the normally very-friendly nature of Newfoundlanders not so forthcoming to you...even though they would probably forgive you for your apparently derogatory comment. Don't forget that if it wasn't for us PAX the helo industry would be rather less in demand.
I myself am a Scotsman, happily living and working in Newfoundland for more than 5 years now. Working with Newfoundlanders and other Canadians has been one of the most enjoyable parts of my emigration, so much so that I've became a permanent resident.
The main reason us PAX are on this thread is to try and gain some knowledge from the collective forum, as well as share our own personal experiences. No one is an expert at everything, we'll leave that area for those in and outside this forum who are recognized as such and trust in their findings. In my own experience a little knowledge can be dangerous, but collectively through sharing we can all learn a bit more.
Unless you're an expert in aviation design, then I would suggest that you do not completely discount vibration being a contributory factor to the MGB stud failures on this helo. I wonder how many other S-92 issues e.g. sponson fuel line damage from abrasion, sensor failures etc. can be possibly linked to an inherent vibration/design issue.
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I am surprised that the mods have not stepped in to some degree to try and control this thread. I am the last person who wants to see any control over opinions but we do seem to have a group of concerned passengers represented here. Obviously, the aviation crews are also concerned about the recent aircraft losses in the North Sea and offshore Canada.
However, if the passenger groups are represented by agents of that group, I am surprised that you do not identify yourselves and your authority to act for that group. It would seem to me that representing that type of group would demand that you seek the best information and not anything haphazard from a rumour forum.
This is no different than the media extracting infromation from these threads and representing it a "gospel".
I do not see many posts on this thread from the operators or the manufacturers in response to many of the questions being asked here. Therefore, if indeed there are real groups of concerned passengers, I would suggest that you automatically have a power that you do not seem to have utilized in acting directly with the regulators, manufacturers and operators. If the suggestion is that you have been rebuffed by those parties, then it would behoove you to examine the strength of your organization and realize what power you do have.
In a recent newspaper article from Newfoundland, it was suggested that pax would have one right of refusal to board offshore flights but it did not say what would happen to the employee who opted for a second refusal.
It would seem to me that we are entering a dangerous area of unqualified information on both sides and until both sides are willing to identify themselves as credible entities, everything supposed and stated here is conjecture and does nothing to advance the delicate situation in which both sides find themselves.
If the pax opt to fly on helicopters which they deem to be unsafe, then they do not have much power or the posters here are not really representative of that group.
Not much has been reported about the meetings between the pax and the opertaors and without knowing that both sides are working together to openly address the problems, this entire thread is rabble rousing.
I have not seen one written article from the operators or the manufacturers to address the concerns of the pax addressed here. And where are the Oil companies with their position? Or is that simply, that you have one right of refusal to board and then you are on your own?
It should also be noted that the operator does not automatically have the best information from the manufacturer. It is after all a multi million dollar business and in many cases, the operator, trying to get their reputation back and their business up and running again is not given the full story from the manufacturer.
carholme
However, if the passenger groups are represented by agents of that group, I am surprised that you do not identify yourselves and your authority to act for that group. It would seem to me that representing that type of group would demand that you seek the best information and not anything haphazard from a rumour forum.
This is no different than the media extracting infromation from these threads and representing it a "gospel".
I do not see many posts on this thread from the operators or the manufacturers in response to many of the questions being asked here. Therefore, if indeed there are real groups of concerned passengers, I would suggest that you automatically have a power that you do not seem to have utilized in acting directly with the regulators, manufacturers and operators. If the suggestion is that you have been rebuffed by those parties, then it would behoove you to examine the strength of your organization and realize what power you do have.
In a recent newspaper article from Newfoundland, it was suggested that pax would have one right of refusal to board offshore flights but it did not say what would happen to the employee who opted for a second refusal.
It would seem to me that we are entering a dangerous area of unqualified information on both sides and until both sides are willing to identify themselves as credible entities, everything supposed and stated here is conjecture and does nothing to advance the delicate situation in which both sides find themselves.
If the pax opt to fly on helicopters which they deem to be unsafe, then they do not have much power or the posters here are not really representative of that group.
Not much has been reported about the meetings between the pax and the opertaors and without knowing that both sides are working together to openly address the problems, this entire thread is rabble rousing.
I have not seen one written article from the operators or the manufacturers to address the concerns of the pax addressed here. And where are the Oil companies with their position? Or is that simply, that you have one right of refusal to board and then you are on your own?
It should also be noted that the operator does not automatically have the best information from the manufacturer. It is after all a multi million dollar business and in many cases, the operator, trying to get their reputation back and their business up and running again is not given the full story from the manufacturer.
carholme
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You know, Carholme makes some good points and I can attest to the fact that the passengers are not receiving much in the way of detailed information in response to their questions. Many of the people who work offshore typically have engineering or technical backgrounds in such areas as rotating machinery and are asking questions that seem right to them. Some vibration is acceptable within strict tolerances in most equipment but I suppose with pilots it is probably very subjective about what passes for normal in a helicopter, even when the folks in the seats behind them are saying..WTF!
As for the power of passenger groups to do anything about the situation I would say that we're up against a wall of authority that has circled the wagons, so to speak. Everyone says the 92 is safe to fly....the certifying authorities, the operators, the manufacturer and the oil companies who employ us. The whole issue of 30 min. dry run capability and the certification debacle is all but forgotten in this debate. What do we have hold up as proof of our claims to the contrary except for the fact that a couple of titanium stud's mysteriously broke in flight and only theories exist to tell us why? Many of the technical and engineering types who work offshore remain unconvinced that the change to steel studs is the answer, especially when the answer to the previous question has not been conclusively found.
I have attended meetings at various levels about the loss of Cougar 491 including one where engineers from 'you know who' were there. They were pressed on the vibration issue by oil company managemnent and did not outright dismiss the possibility of vibrational or bending forces acting on the oil filter housing. However, they were confident that the 130 KPSi strength of the titanium bolts were more than enough to hold the axial loading from the internal gearbox pressure generated by the two pumps. It's still a mystery as to how they broke and so far the only guess is that they were weakened because of galling damage. The change to steel bolts only addresses two issues: 1.-better resistance to galling and 2.-a higher ultimate tensile strength of 160 KPSi. Our concern is that if vibration was a factor will that be enough to ensure that it doesn't happen again?
As for the power of passenger groups to do anything about the situation I would say that we're up against a wall of authority that has circled the wagons, so to speak. Everyone says the 92 is safe to fly....the certifying authorities, the operators, the manufacturer and the oil companies who employ us. The whole issue of 30 min. dry run capability and the certification debacle is all but forgotten in this debate. What do we have hold up as proof of our claims to the contrary except for the fact that a couple of titanium stud's mysteriously broke in flight and only theories exist to tell us why? Many of the technical and engineering types who work offshore remain unconvinced that the change to steel studs is the answer, especially when the answer to the previous question has not been conclusively found.
I have attended meetings at various levels about the loss of Cougar 491 including one where engineers from 'you know who' were there. They were pressed on the vibration issue by oil company managemnent and did not outright dismiss the possibility of vibrational or bending forces acting on the oil filter housing. However, they were confident that the 130 KPSi strength of the titanium bolts were more than enough to hold the axial loading from the internal gearbox pressure generated by the two pumps. It's still a mystery as to how they broke and so far the only guess is that they were weakened because of galling damage. The change to steel bolts only addresses two issues: 1.-better resistance to galling and 2.-a higher ultimate tensile strength of 160 KPSi. Our concern is that if vibration was a factor will that be enough to ensure that it doesn't happen again?
Main and Tail Rotor Tip speeds
The S-92 rotor speed was increased from 100% (258 rpm) to 105% (271 rpm) over the period of it development to accommodate for increases in both empty and maximum gross weights. At the same time the main rotor diameter was increased from 53.66 feet to 56.33 feet. These combined increases in rotor diameter and rotor speed have resulted in a corresponding increase in main and tail rotor tips speeds.
The S-92 in its present configuration have main and tail rotor tip speeds of 799 fps and 719 fps. This is well in excess of what Mr. R. Prouty recommends as a maximum in his text Helicopter Performance Stability and Control due to potential noise problems. At –3 degrees Celsius and 165 knots the S-92 main rotor advancing tip speed approaches mach 1.0 . This would require that the S-92 be operated at a reduced airspeeds during winter operations in noise sensitive areas.
By comparison the main and tail rotor tip speeds for the Super Puma are 738 fps and 691 fps and the main rotor tip speeds for MD902 and EC135 are approximately 690 fps. The later two meeting the world's latest helicopter noise signature requirements
The S-92 in its present configuration have main and tail rotor tip speeds of 799 fps and 719 fps. This is well in excess of what Mr. R. Prouty recommends as a maximum in his text Helicopter Performance Stability and Control due to potential noise problems. At –3 degrees Celsius and 165 knots the S-92 main rotor advancing tip speed approaches mach 1.0 . This would require that the S-92 be operated at a reduced airspeeds during winter operations in noise sensitive areas.
By comparison the main and tail rotor tip speeds for the Super Puma are 738 fps and 691 fps and the main rotor tip speeds for MD902 and EC135 are approximately 690 fps. The later two meeting the world's latest helicopter noise signature requirements
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It is worth watching the video on the home page of www.cougar.ca on the evaluations before operations recontinued.
Further media discussion here: The Telegram - St. John's, NL: Columns | Offshore workers face fear of flying
Sikorsky's reputation has been badly dented.
Further media discussion here: The Telegram - St. John's, NL: Columns | Offshore workers face fear of flying
Sikorsky's reputation has been badly dented.
Offshore workers face fear of flying
There wasn't much fanfare this week when helicopter flights resumed to the offshore oil platforms.
People who don't work in the oil industry are probably understandably glad they don't face the decision that has to be made by offshore workers: whether or not to get aboard a Sikorsky S-92A helicopter.
Even the province's most avid booster of the glories of offshore oil, Premier Danny Williams, has said publicly that, if given an option, he would choose not to get on a Sikorsky.
The premier made that comment to reporters six weeks ago. Perhaps his hesitation has softened, due to the proclamations by the Transportation Safety Board (TSB) and the U.S. Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), and subsequent changes made to every helicopter in the Sikorsky S-92A fleet worldwide.
Even so, the prospect of having to get on a Sikorsky every three weeks to go to or from your workplace cannot be an easy thing to face.
Providing choice
The oil companies have not explained publicly why they won't give offshore workers the option of going to the platforms aboard a supply ship rather than on a helicopter.
"There are a significant number of people who would like to do that," Sheldon Peddle, president of Local 2121 of the Communications, Energy and Paperworkers' union, told me this week during a telephone interview from the Hibernia platform.
But even if that option were available, it couldn't be year-round, he said.
"We would only be able to do vessel transfers in the better months of the year."
Rough seas and bad weather are also an issue offshore, and there are some workers who would still prefer to fly, Peddle said, adding that he finds it "bewildering."
"I've learned a lot of things about this helicopter that I wish I didn't know," he said of the numerous findings by the TSB, FAA and European Aviation Authority about the Sikorsky S-92A. "From the get-go, it's had issues."
Peddle said he has worked offshore since 1997, and didn't mind flying on Super Puma helicopters.
Two Super Pumas recently crashed in the North Sea. An April crash killed 16 people. That helicopter was an older model of Super Puma, Peddle explained, and the one that ditched in February, with no fatalities, was due to pilot error.
Most offshore workers in Newfoundland would prefer to fly in a helicopter other than a Sikorsky, he said.
"We don't have the choice to pick what helicopter we use to fly offshore."
Last week, offshore workers attended town hall meetings with oil company representatives. Peddle said that, so far, he knows of two workers who intend to quit rather than get back on a Sikorsky S-92A.
Right of refusal
Offshore workers have the right to refuse dangerous work, according to the Safety Plan Guidelines of the Canada-Newfoundland and Labra-dor Offshore Petroleum Board (CNLOPB).
With the tragedy of Cougar Helicopters Flight 491 and the subsequent revelations by various aviation authorities, you have to wonder whether some offshore workers will invoke that right, and refuse to get on a helicopter.
"We haven't, at this stage, heard of any (refusals)," Sean Kelly, CNLOPB manager of public relations, told me on Wednesday.
But some workers have expressed their concerns to the CNLOPB.
"Since the crash, the CNLOPB received only a few letters and e-mails from workers voicing concerns about helicopter safety," Kelly told me via e-mail.
It's unclear how, or if, the right to refuse dangerous work will apply to travel by helicopter, Peddle said.
The CNLOPB is satisfied that the helicopters meet safety requirements, Kelly said. "The Sikorsky S-92 is a Transport Canada-approved helicopter," he said.
When I spoke to Peddle, he was awaiting transport for his rotation home - by boat, this time.
"I think I'll be flying again, myself," he said. "It's certainly going to be a different feeling, getting aboard a helicopter."
Brian Jones is a desk editor at The Telegram. He can be reached by e-mail at [email protected]
There wasn't much fanfare this week when helicopter flights resumed to the offshore oil platforms.
People who don't work in the oil industry are probably understandably glad they don't face the decision that has to be made by offshore workers: whether or not to get aboard a Sikorsky S-92A helicopter.
Even the province's most avid booster of the glories of offshore oil, Premier Danny Williams, has said publicly that, if given an option, he would choose not to get on a Sikorsky.
The premier made that comment to reporters six weeks ago. Perhaps his hesitation has softened, due to the proclamations by the Transportation Safety Board (TSB) and the U.S. Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), and subsequent changes made to every helicopter in the Sikorsky S-92A fleet worldwide.
Even so, the prospect of having to get on a Sikorsky every three weeks to go to or from your workplace cannot be an easy thing to face.
Providing choice
The oil companies have not explained publicly why they won't give offshore workers the option of going to the platforms aboard a supply ship rather than on a helicopter.
"There are a significant number of people who would like to do that," Sheldon Peddle, president of Local 2121 of the Communications, Energy and Paperworkers' union, told me this week during a telephone interview from the Hibernia platform.
But even if that option were available, it couldn't be year-round, he said.
"We would only be able to do vessel transfers in the better months of the year."
Rough seas and bad weather are also an issue offshore, and there are some workers who would still prefer to fly, Peddle said, adding that he finds it "bewildering."
"I've learned a lot of things about this helicopter that I wish I didn't know," he said of the numerous findings by the TSB, FAA and European Aviation Authority about the Sikorsky S-92A. "From the get-go, it's had issues."
Peddle said he has worked offshore since 1997, and didn't mind flying on Super Puma helicopters.
Two Super Pumas recently crashed in the North Sea. An April crash killed 16 people. That helicopter was an older model of Super Puma, Peddle explained, and the one that ditched in February, with no fatalities, was due to pilot error.
Most offshore workers in Newfoundland would prefer to fly in a helicopter other than a Sikorsky, he said.
"We don't have the choice to pick what helicopter we use to fly offshore."
Last week, offshore workers attended town hall meetings with oil company representatives. Peddle said that, so far, he knows of two workers who intend to quit rather than get back on a Sikorsky S-92A.
Right of refusal
Offshore workers have the right to refuse dangerous work, according to the Safety Plan Guidelines of the Canada-Newfoundland and Labra-dor Offshore Petroleum Board (CNLOPB).
With the tragedy of Cougar Helicopters Flight 491 and the subsequent revelations by various aviation authorities, you have to wonder whether some offshore workers will invoke that right, and refuse to get on a helicopter.
"We haven't, at this stage, heard of any (refusals)," Sean Kelly, CNLOPB manager of public relations, told me on Wednesday.
But some workers have expressed their concerns to the CNLOPB.
"Since the crash, the CNLOPB received only a few letters and e-mails from workers voicing concerns about helicopter safety," Kelly told me via e-mail.
It's unclear how, or if, the right to refuse dangerous work will apply to travel by helicopter, Peddle said.
The CNLOPB is satisfied that the helicopters meet safety requirements, Kelly said. "The Sikorsky S-92 is a Transport Canada-approved helicopter," he said.
When I spoke to Peddle, he was awaiting transport for his rotation home - by boat, this time.
"I think I'll be flying again, myself," he said. "It's certainly going to be a different feeling, getting aboard a helicopter."
Brian Jones is a desk editor at The Telegram. He can be reached by e-mail at [email protected]
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Not much has been reported about the meetings between the pax and the opertaors and without knowing that both sides are working together to openly address the problems, this entire thread is rabble rousing
I only speak for myself in this forum, but know that a lot of my fellow colleagues are seeking clarification/information through this forum due to the fact that the official paths open to us appear to be at a relative stalemate.
You raise a lot of good points, but as other thread contributors have stated we are currently against a wall of compliance statements, which does nothing to alleviate our concerns with this helo.
We can all conjecture on the reasons for the deafening silence from the manufacturer, but that will not change the current status quo.
Wrt. our right to refuse dangerous work and the potential inclusion of the S-92a within that criteria, that is a very grey and political area right now.
In my own mind I keep going back to the safety statement that all work should be made as safe as reasonably practicable (ALARP). This includes travel to/from the workplace and IMO the S-92a safety capabilities can be improved upon, compliance with the current applicable regulations does not allow for this. Improvement in this area will not happen without the collective support of the oil companies, operators, pilots and PAX. A smart manufacturer would also embrace this concept and thus improve their currently perceived image...
Hopefully the TSB report upon release will provide a catalyst to this requirement and assist all parties in moving this issue forward. In the meantime and being realistic we will have to just get on with it, as is the case with many other examples in life of where safety is compromised by cost impact. The key point is to keep actively debating the issue and being pro-active, which sometimes means accepting both positive and negative albeit constructive criticism.
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Maxwelg2;
Sir;
Thanks for your thoughtful response, however if you are being held to such secrecy by the presumably, Oil companies, it would seem that:
a) your jobs are being used as a means to keep you quiet or
b) your group has a majority who have accepted the explanations of the oil companies, operators and manufacturer thus removing the use of your group power to refuse to fly in equipment which you deem unsafe.
I hope for you all that things improve and the S92 moves forward to take a place as brilliant as her older mainstay and that each of you as pax find a measure of security to make your journies more comfortable and relaxing.
After all, it is transporting your group which makes the aircraft a requirement.
Regards
carholme
Sir;
Thanks for your thoughtful response, however if you are being held to such secrecy by the presumably, Oil companies, it would seem that:
a) your jobs are being used as a means to keep you quiet or
b) your group has a majority who have accepted the explanations of the oil companies, operators and manufacturer thus removing the use of your group power to refuse to fly in equipment which you deem unsafe.
I hope for you all that things improve and the S92 moves forward to take a place as brilliant as her older mainstay and that each of you as pax find a measure of security to make your journies more comfortable and relaxing.
After all, it is transporting your group which makes the aircraft a requirement.
Regards
carholme
...we are officially not allowed to disclose any information regarding the answers to the questions that we collectively submitted to the combined offshore/operator task force...
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Maxwelg2,
The passengers' perspective is not often considered, so it's interesting to know your concerns. However, a consideration which may give you some comfort is that while you may spend an hour or so every two or three weeks traveling in a helicopter, your pilots will accumulate perhaps 50 hours or more in that same machine each month.
Therefore, we have every bit as much of a vested interest as our passengers in the safe outcome of each and every flight. I won't try to tell you that every possible failure mode has been identified and eliminated, but having seen the process of correcting serious faults work successfully in the past, I'm confident in the safety of the S-92. And, I'm willing to put my money where my mouth is whenever my company sees fit to schedule me in that aircraft.
-Stan-
The passengers' perspective is not often considered, so it's interesting to know your concerns. However, a consideration which may give you some comfort is that while you may spend an hour or so every two or three weeks traveling in a helicopter, your pilots will accumulate perhaps 50 hours or more in that same machine each month.
Therefore, we have every bit as much of a vested interest as our passengers in the safe outcome of each and every flight. I won't try to tell you that every possible failure mode has been identified and eliminated, but having seen the process of correcting serious faults work successfully in the past, I'm confident in the safety of the S-92. And, I'm willing to put my money where my mouth is whenever my company sees fit to schedule me in that aircraft.
-Stan-
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Max, if you and your compatriots are so terrified of helicopters, why not refuse to ride them, and just take a boat to and from the platforms?
Most pilots are not suicidal, and will refuse to fly any aircraft they feel is unsafe, and they know a great deal more about it than you do, or ever will. If they're willing to fly an aircraft for many hours every day, they clearly don't feel it is about to fall out of the sky.
Most pilots are not suicidal, and will refuse to fly any aircraft they feel is unsafe, and they know a great deal more about it than you do, or ever will. If they're willing to fly an aircraft for many hours every day, they clearly don't feel it is about to fall out of the sky.
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I have got to agree with the previous two posts. As an S92 pilot, I was as concerned as anyone else about some of the issues, and have followed the progress of the channels to rectify the faults very closely. These have been both manufacturer and operator driven. I am entirely satisfied that what has been done, is sufficient, and I have no problems whatsoever flying the machine day in day out. New procedures have been introduced, checklists have been modified, and servicing procedures and inspections have been modified. There are still areas for improvement, but overall things are going in the right direction. We are far more aware now of the potential problems, as pilots and engineers and we will not fly if we have the slightest suspicion that something is not right. All helicopters have a degree of danger, but on balance I would rather be in the S92 than pretty much anything else. Of the 8 types i have flown in the past, this is still by far the safest IMO, but there is always room for improvement.
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Max, if you and your compatriots are so terrified of helicopters, why not refuse to ride them, and just take a boat to and from the platforms?
Wrt. selecting a vessel transfer option, that is not available unless weather conditions (i.e. fog) do not allow flight operations for an extended period. The boat trip can be an unpleasant experience, is time-consuming and most likely more costly to the oil companies. Helicopter transfer to/from work is the preferred mode of transport, and as such is part of the job. Refusal to fly would generally mean refusal to work unless you can categorically prove that a serious safety issue is your reason for refusing to fly. This industry is not for everyone.
Rest assured, if I thought the pilots were suicidal I would have been working in a different industry for the last 19 years! As I have said before in this thread, I trust the pilot first, then the aircraft. The S-92a hurt everybody's confidence all too recently, but my main issue is that even the pilots didn't appear to be fully aware of this helo's capabilities/limitations wrt. no 30-minute run-dry. This is now crystal clear, which has raised the issues of SS6 and flight suit effectiveness, both issues I deem to be safety features that can be and should be updated on this helo for use in the Grand Banks.
IMO better communication is required between the pilots and the PAX during the flight briefing, there should be no doubt in anybody's mind on the chain of events that would preclude and necessitate a ditching. IMO the flight safety briefing is becoming too complacent an event, much like a regular fixed wing flight safety video we hear in the background as we read our newspapers or otherwise ignore.
I'm not trying to scare-monger PAX, just be realistic, we should be aware of all hazards involved in our jobs so that we can make our own personal decision if we wish to accept them or not. I'm sure all pilots do the same, but again that is their personal decision.
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This is a rumor (rumour) network, and almost everyone hides behind aliases. You won't necessarily find a lot of truth here. It is very difficult to know the experience and knowledge of posters unless you have experience yourself and read the forum over a fairly long term. Reading this forum for critical information, when you aren't an experienced pilot, can be a dangerous thing. My advice would be to listen to, and respect, the pilots who are flying you. They are the only ones you can trust to know anything about the aircraft they're flying. The oil companies will lie to you, and the helicopter operators will lie to you, but the pilots are putting their lives on the line every day. Perhaps they should talk to you more, but they have schedules to keep, and aren't necessarily good at talking and explaining. If they start up the engines and take off, you can be sure that they believe that they will return safely and have no fear of the aircraft.
I understand your concerns, but they won't be satisfied here. Not all the posts on this thread, nor on any other, are from pilots who know what they're talking about, and you may get false information from someone who claims to know a lot, but really doesn't. The pilots who fly you in and out know about the aircraft, and about the specifics of the aircraft. Flying an aircraft for hours every day over very hostile terrain does wonders for teaching one about it, and I'm sure that any complacency that might have existed prior to the accident is gone.
I understand your concerns, but they won't be satisfied here. Not all the posts on this thread, nor on any other, are from pilots who know what they're talking about, and you may get false information from someone who claims to know a lot, but really doesn't. The pilots who fly you in and out know about the aircraft, and about the specifics of the aircraft. Flying an aircraft for hours every day over very hostile terrain does wonders for teaching one about it, and I'm sure that any complacency that might have existed prior to the accident is gone.
Last edited by Gomer Pylot; 25th May 2009 at 14:51. Reason: typos
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Yep, I know, I've only been reading this forum and specific threads since March 12 after initially looking for some historic reliability information/supposition on the S-92. In that relatively short time I've also personally got a better feel on how you pilots weigh up the risks and how these helos are maintained, warts and all.
For that I commend you all, I take pride and professionalism in my own job very seriously and can see the synergies in your vocations.
I also can read between the lines and interpret who are the more trusted sources, but always use my own discretion and common sense when deciding who or what to believe.
I'll continue to read this forum, hopefully see some positive rumours in the future such as new flight suits and other improvements to flight safety in the future.
Safe flying wishes to you all.
Max
For that I commend you all, I take pride and professionalism in my own job very seriously and can see the synergies in your vocations.
I also can read between the lines and interpret who are the more trusted sources, but always use my own discretion and common sense when deciding who or what to believe.
I'll continue to read this forum, hopefully see some positive rumours in the future such as new flight suits and other improvements to flight safety in the future.
Safe flying wishes to you all.
Max
Peddle said he has worked offshore since 1997, and didn't mind flying on Super Puma helicopters.
Two Super Pumas recently crashed in the North Sea. An April crash killed 16 people. That helicopter was an older model of Super Puma, Peddle explained
Two Super Pumas recently crashed in the North Sea. An April crash killed 16 people. That helicopter was an older model of Super Puma, Peddle explained
Ignorance is bliss
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I am entirely satisfied that what has been done, is sufficient, and I have no problems whatsoever flying the machine day in day out. New procedures have been introduced, checklists have been modified, and servicing procedures and inspections have been modified. There are still areas for improvement, but overall things are going in the right direction.
New checks and procedures are hardly a substitute for a decent MRGB! The new checklist will be great at telling you your time is up and you really should be on the ground.
Revised servicing procedures and inspections are great if you know exactly what caused the bolts to fail.
There is an answer to the S-92's weakness - fit an ELS and then do something about the vibration.
Revised servicing procedures and inspections are great if you know exactly what caused the bolts to fail.
There is an answer to the S-92's weakness - fit an ELS and then do something about the vibration.