Offshore Helideck Ops
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Rotorbike.
The problem of being at the deck edge is that you lose your ground cushion. Assuming you wish to be at max weight for that flight, you will need more power which by definition is not available. Also depending on the deck design, i.e. is there an accomodation block below?, any wind above 10 knots could give you unpleasant turbulence which by being further back and climbing to 20 feet could possibly keep you out of it.
Red Wine.
Enough of the "old" ! There's nothing wrong with my wheel chair!Using 15 degrees when at max weight tends to lose height faster than you are gaining airspeed whilst still over the deck. Once clear or if light, by all means go to 15 if you have sufficient height to play with.
Coyote.
Using the same technique day and night gives greater consistency of performance plus the non flying pilot will know exactly what you are trying to achieve. Level take offs just because you are low is not the best way. The deck height doesn't really matter; you adjust your weight accordingly to get the performance you need. At low level, speed is generally more important than height. Look at HV charts. Losing an engine at 60 kts at 50 feet is not a problem, try doing that in a 50 ft hover.
If you do lose an engine seconds after rotation, then you will need more than 10 degrees, possibly up to 25 degrees height permitting. At this point you are looking for speed, not altitude.
Bit hard to explain without having a helicopter to demonstrate what I'm trying to say!
The problem of being at the deck edge is that you lose your ground cushion. Assuming you wish to be at max weight for that flight, you will need more power which by definition is not available. Also depending on the deck design, i.e. is there an accomodation block below?, any wind above 10 knots could give you unpleasant turbulence which by being further back and climbing to 20 feet could possibly keep you out of it.
Red Wine.
Enough of the "old" ! There's nothing wrong with my wheel chair!Using 15 degrees when at max weight tends to lose height faster than you are gaining airspeed whilst still over the deck. Once clear or if light, by all means go to 15 if you have sufficient height to play with.
Coyote.
Using the same technique day and night gives greater consistency of performance plus the non flying pilot will know exactly what you are trying to achieve. Level take offs just because you are low is not the best way. The deck height doesn't really matter; you adjust your weight accordingly to get the performance you need. At low level, speed is generally more important than height. Look at HV charts. Losing an engine at 60 kts at 50 feet is not a problem, try doing that in a 50 ft hover.
If you do lose an engine seconds after rotation, then you will need more than 10 degrees, possibly up to 25 degrees height permitting. At this point you are looking for speed, not altitude.
Bit hard to explain without having a helicopter to demonstrate what I'm trying to say!
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All the speculation on best OEI procedures is interesting, but without test or an approved procedure it is all just speculation.
A vertical rise above the deck with a nose down acceleration is the only way to assure avoiding striking the deck edge if an engine quits during the takeoff. How high to go depends on the aircraft, weight and OEI power left, and is not one-height-fits-all.
The most critical time in an elevated deck takeoff is the first few feet, where you most get clear of the platform and netting. A failure there is nearly catastrophic, with a tumble down to the sea likely while just half off the rig. Any procedure that cuts your time there is the best one. We do a vertical procedure in zero exposure operations, which means going up to a height above the pad, then diving to clear the pad lip. If loaded to the wat curve, a failure anywhere during the takeoff results in a landback or a dive away and climb. The critical measurement is tail clearance from the rig during the OEI dive away.
The actual exposure time is only about 5 seconds or so, and the probability of engine failure in that tiny window is truly nil. For the T700 family, the US Army experiences 1 failure each 500,000 hours of operation, so if the 5 seconds of exposure were repeated each hour, and you fly 1000 hours per year, and you have Cat A stay-up ability otherwise, the probability of an engine failure occuring to you during the takeoff exposure window would be about 0.000000000005. Typical rig engine failure experience bears this out.
We debate engine failure, practice for it, work like fiends to polish the procedures, and meanwhile ignore the common fly-into-the-water cause of 1/2 of our fatal mishaps! We are like some ancient religion praying to the engine failure god while each night another beast comes along and steals our best. We don't even recognize his existence!
See the OGP report for a summary of fatal accident causes for twins offshore. 45% is CFIT, 22% Mid air, 22% control problems. Let's debate the real causes, not just the ones we can practice!
http://www.ogp.org.uk/pubs/300.pdf
Nick
A vertical rise above the deck with a nose down acceleration is the only way to assure avoiding striking the deck edge if an engine quits during the takeoff. How high to go depends on the aircraft, weight and OEI power left, and is not one-height-fits-all.
The most critical time in an elevated deck takeoff is the first few feet, where you most get clear of the platform and netting. A failure there is nearly catastrophic, with a tumble down to the sea likely while just half off the rig. Any procedure that cuts your time there is the best one. We do a vertical procedure in zero exposure operations, which means going up to a height above the pad, then diving to clear the pad lip. If loaded to the wat curve, a failure anywhere during the takeoff results in a landback or a dive away and climb. The critical measurement is tail clearance from the rig during the OEI dive away.
The actual exposure time is only about 5 seconds or so, and the probability of engine failure in that tiny window is truly nil. For the T700 family, the US Army experiences 1 failure each 500,000 hours of operation, so if the 5 seconds of exposure were repeated each hour, and you fly 1000 hours per year, and you have Cat A stay-up ability otherwise, the probability of an engine failure occuring to you during the takeoff exposure window would be about 0.000000000005. Typical rig engine failure experience bears this out.
We debate engine failure, practice for it, work like fiends to polish the procedures, and meanwhile ignore the common fly-into-the-water cause of 1/2 of our fatal mishaps! We are like some ancient religion praying to the engine failure god while each night another beast comes along and steals our best. We don't even recognize his existence!
See the OGP report for a summary of fatal accident causes for twins offshore. 45% is CFIT, 22% Mid air, 22% control problems. Let's debate the real causes, not just the ones we can practice!
http://www.ogp.org.uk/pubs/300.pdf
Nick
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I had a single engine failure in a Bell 212 just after rotation, going off a helideck on a drill ship in Egypt many years ago. It was around 38 degrees C and I think I was around 10600 lbs. We used to use the technique of rotor tips just inside the deck edge, pull hover torque + 15% (or full power, if less) and rotate at 10 feet or when RoC started to fall. The engine failed just after rotation, then caught fire and the deck was around 50 feet elevation. I used nearly 15 degrees nose down, avoided the deck edge but was still only just over 30 knots at around 10 feet. However, the good old 212 did mange to start climbing shortly thereafter and got us safely back to shore. The Nr was pretty low though (around 85%). I don't think a low inertia rotor rotor machine would have fared as well.
Thread Starter
Shawn,
I described the "modified Cat A" takeoff in my post and for a quick repeat....the operator and the oil company mutually agreed to the modification and led the local DCAA to believe all was well. Thus your concern with compliance with the letter of the law was taken care of.
The salient point of my post was to take issue with the idea that accepting a rejected takeoff to a river or canal constitutes knowingly and with malice aforethought....what would in any other situation be known as an "emergency ditching".
That decision was predicated upon the customer's objection to spending the money required to bulldoze and grade the appropriate area for reject areas while at the same time claiming to be using Cat A performance.
As a Test Pilot and Instructor of Test Pilots, I would think you would be more immediately concerned with actual performance versus theoretical performance, and constructing your test flights to conform to test parameters in order to be able to determine if the aircraft is operating as designed or expected.
To declare the use of rivers and canals as reject areas flys in the face of the normal criteria used to define reject areas....ie..firm, smooth, even surfaces.
Last time I checked...4-5 degrees above the equator at sea level and an average temperature variation of 30 degrees C plus or minus 10 degrees...water remains unfirm .
So, Shawn....what's a working pilot to do, when confronted with such issues....letter of the law met, company SOP and Ops Manual dictates the procedure, checkrides require compliance, and the whole time, both customer safety staff and company safety staff sign off on the procedures?
Or...am I completely missing the point and intentional landings in a river or canal while conducting Cat A operations with emergency float equipped aircraft are both safe and acceptable under the constructs and criterion for Cat A operations? (as defined by that particular DCAA, oil company, and helicopter operator)
I described the "modified Cat A" takeoff in my post and for a quick repeat....the operator and the oil company mutually agreed to the modification and led the local DCAA to believe all was well. Thus your concern with compliance with the letter of the law was taken care of.
The salient point of my post was to take issue with the idea that accepting a rejected takeoff to a river or canal constitutes knowingly and with malice aforethought....what would in any other situation be known as an "emergency ditching".
That decision was predicated upon the customer's objection to spending the money required to bulldoze and grade the appropriate area for reject areas while at the same time claiming to be using Cat A performance.
As a Test Pilot and Instructor of Test Pilots, I would think you would be more immediately concerned with actual performance versus theoretical performance, and constructing your test flights to conform to test parameters in order to be able to determine if the aircraft is operating as designed or expected.
To declare the use of rivers and canals as reject areas flys in the face of the normal criteria used to define reject areas....ie..firm, smooth, even surfaces.
Last time I checked...4-5 degrees above the equator at sea level and an average temperature variation of 30 degrees C plus or minus 10 degrees...water remains unfirm .
So, Shawn....what's a working pilot to do, when confronted with such issues....letter of the law met, company SOP and Ops Manual dictates the procedure, checkrides require compliance, and the whole time, both customer safety staff and company safety staff sign off on the procedures?
Or...am I completely missing the point and intentional landings in a river or canal while conducting Cat A operations with emergency float equipped aircraft are both safe and acceptable under the constructs and criterion for Cat A operations? (as defined by that particular DCAA, oil company, and helicopter operator)
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Sasless,
The point of view that "knowingly" operating without full Cat A capability is some how wrong or unethical is baseless, and Shawn (a friend and a very capable guy!) knows that too.
Operating rules are in place that allow limited exposure to engine failure in virtually every place on earth (does anyone know of a requirement for Hard Cat A in commercial oil operations?)
If a sudden requirement for hard Cat A were implimented, the operating world would stop, and safety would not improve to any measurable degree. There is much controversy brewing as the JAR Ops requirement clock ticks down, and also some rumor of ICAO adaption of that standard (these rumors are not true).
Engine failure is not our problem, not according to our history, and the blind implimentation of hard Cat A criteria would actually hinder the improvement of safety (because it would spend money and regulatory horsepower where it is not needed, and divert same from where it is.) See my above post for the pointer to the real data.
Keep plugging, Sasless, Shawn, let's rumble!!
Nick
The point of view that "knowingly" operating without full Cat A capability is some how wrong or unethical is baseless, and Shawn (a friend and a very capable guy!) knows that too.
Operating rules are in place that allow limited exposure to engine failure in virtually every place on earth (does anyone know of a requirement for Hard Cat A in commercial oil operations?)
If a sudden requirement for hard Cat A were implimented, the operating world would stop, and safety would not improve to any measurable degree. There is much controversy brewing as the JAR Ops requirement clock ticks down, and also some rumor of ICAO adaption of that standard (these rumors are not true).
Engine failure is not our problem, not according to our history, and the blind implimentation of hard Cat A criteria would actually hinder the improvement of safety (because it would spend money and regulatory horsepower where it is not needed, and divert same from where it is.) See my above post for the pointer to the real data.
Keep plugging, Sasless, Shawn, let's rumble!!
Nick
Thread Starter
Nick,
I understand your concerns about the adoption of Cat A requirements by ICAO and JAA. My position was....and is....the claim was to be operatiing under Cat A when in reality the decision to withhold the proper reject areas in actuality made the operation non-Cat A. The point being....call it what it really is...non Cat A with all that means.
With the JAA/ICAO crisis coming....maybe the old Wessex with twin Gnomes will become in vogue again!
I understand your concerns about the adoption of Cat A requirements by ICAO and JAA. My position was....and is....the claim was to be operatiing under Cat A when in reality the decision to withhold the proper reject areas in actuality made the operation non-Cat A. The point being....call it what it really is...non Cat A with all that means.
With the JAA/ICAO crisis coming....maybe the old Wessex with twin Gnomes will become in vogue again!
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SASless,
There has never been any deception about Cat A procedures and exposure windows at rigs, the issue has been known and understood since the beginning by regulatory agencies, operators and manufacturers. Welcome to the group, Sasless! There were even modified Cat B procedures to allow zero rate of climb enroute, and add a few hundred pounds more payload, with full CAA approval.
What I am concerned with is the blind adaption of a requirement because it is "complete" or "neat" without a real justification, while ignoring the real causes of accidents (why not mandatory EGPWS?)
So, let's declare all offshore helos obsolete, toss them out and replace them! I am sure that money spent on new helicopters is just laying around out there, unspent right now and available. It will not mean any reduced operating budgets, fewer aircraft, fewer contracts. It will not make fewer jobs. Of course, all that is not true, it will cost all other parts of the industry to suck up the differrance. What can be said is that it will NOT cause any measurable rise in offshore safety. That is guaranteed.
It is in the best interest of my company to support the new operational requirements, since the S-92 is "hard" Cat A from a rig with full pax and enough gas to go about 350 NM with JAR reserve.
There has never been any deception about Cat A procedures and exposure windows at rigs, the issue has been known and understood since the beginning by regulatory agencies, operators and manufacturers. Welcome to the group, Sasless! There were even modified Cat B procedures to allow zero rate of climb enroute, and add a few hundred pounds more payload, with full CAA approval.
What I am concerned with is the blind adaption of a requirement because it is "complete" or "neat" without a real justification, while ignoring the real causes of accidents (why not mandatory EGPWS?)
So, let's declare all offshore helos obsolete, toss them out and replace them! I am sure that money spent on new helicopters is just laying around out there, unspent right now and available. It will not mean any reduced operating budgets, fewer aircraft, fewer contracts. It will not make fewer jobs. Of course, all that is not true, it will cost all other parts of the industry to suck up the differrance. What can be said is that it will NOT cause any measurable rise in offshore safety. That is guaranteed.
It is in the best interest of my company to support the new operational requirements, since the S-92 is "hard" Cat A from a rig with full pax and enough gas to go about 350 NM with JAR reserve.
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Nick,
My engine fire and failure was caused by the engine oilf filler cap coming off after the retaining nut on its locking plate sheared off. I'd been flying for about 3 hours on a crew change at the time.
My engine fire and failure was caused by the engine oilf filler cap coming off after the retaining nut on its locking plate sheared off. I'd been flying for about 3 hours on a crew change at the time.
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Oil Rig Take-Offs
Under FAA we are allowed to violate the H/V limitations during an offshore take-off or landing by 14 CFR 91.9(d). PHI has had the H/V limitations removed for all Transport Category Rotorcraft (Part 29) at PHI.
Jack
Jack
offshore helideck design
I would like to have your opinions about an offshore production platform helicopter refuelling installation.
To make it short,the flare on this rig, is obviously too close from helideck and its fueling system, the radiating temperature on the deck surface is commonly measured at 47°C and is about the same on helicopter skin after a short st.by. Depending upon the wind, small drops of burning crude oil spill everywhere in the vicinity, a shield of (salted) water doesn't change these figures a lot.
Untill now we are not happy to approve this new refuelling installation and to stand by here but we cannot find any regulation dealing with this matter.
The platform's engineering service keeps telling us there is nothing wrong in their design.
Does somedy here knows something about this ?
Waiting your answers before everything ends up in ashes
Thanks !
To make it short,the flare on this rig, is obviously too close from helideck and its fueling system, the radiating temperature on the deck surface is commonly measured at 47°C and is about the same on helicopter skin after a short st.by. Depending upon the wind, small drops of burning crude oil spill everywhere in the vicinity, a shield of (salted) water doesn't change these figures a lot.
Untill now we are not happy to approve this new refuelling installation and to stand by here but we cannot find any regulation dealing with this matter.
The platform's engineering service keeps telling us there is nothing wrong in their design.
Does somedy here knows something about this ?
Waiting your answers before everything ends up in ashes
Thanks !
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CPT..............
Look up ICAO Annexe 14.................
If you have an incident/accident.......please be assured your Insurance Company will know every aspect of Annexe 14 that you decided not to enforce.
If you have an incident/accident.......please be assured your Insurance Company will know every aspect of Annexe 14 that you decided not to enforce.
Thank you for your answer "old man rotor" but on the ICAO 14 doc I have, there is nothing about refuelling installations and minimum distances from open flames ( as with a flare). It's just our common sense that tells us it's too close and too hot for a safe refuelling.
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Ok....give me a few days and I will hunt the reference up for you......
However I can't remember any reference to the flume of fumes, heat, flares or smoke etc.....
But certainly to the 180 degrees approach and 150 degrees 5:1 drop off ratio on departure....
Also the splay outward from the side of the "D" value.......lights, markings, fire equipment etc.
The UK have their own reference to ICAO Annexe 14.....from memory its CAP 243 or 432.....maybe 342...Bingo.!!
I will do my best to dig into my files for you.
Can anyone help with the correct UK CAP??
However I can't remember any reference to the flume of fumes, heat, flares or smoke etc.....
But certainly to the 180 degrees approach and 150 degrees 5:1 drop off ratio on departure....
Also the splay outward from the side of the "D" value.......lights, markings, fire equipment etc.
The UK have their own reference to ICAO Annexe 14.....from memory its CAP 243 or 432.....maybe 342...Bingo.!!
I will do my best to dig into my files for you.
Can anyone help with the correct UK CAP??
Last edited by Old Man Rotor; 7th May 2003 at 21:42.
CAP 437 states that when helideck temperature rises by 2ºC over the ambient temperature, the BHAB (British Helicopter Advisory Board) should be notified.
BHAB is the body in which the CAA discharges its regulatory responsibilities regarding offshore helidecks. Therefore, BHAB is the authority in this respect.
I used to inspect helidecks on behalf of BHAB, and in most cases when there was a rise in the helideck temperature it was due to hot exhausts. In any case, there was never a difference greater than 4ºC. In such circumstances the procedure in place was that radio room should pass on to the helicopter both OAT and helideck temperature, so that the crew were aware of the possible loss of performance once close to the deck.
CAP 437 also states that cold vent, exhaust and flare systems should be designed to terminate and discharge at a location on the installation as far from the helideck environs as possible. The potential release volumes, flammable concentration, and dispersal characteristics should be quantified, so that -if required- a 'no fly zone' around the hazardous area could be applied.
By the sound of it, the standards in the installation you mentioned above are nonexistent.
If you need more information about CAP 437, please let me know.
PS: There is a set of comprehensive studies (M E Davies - 1977 to 1979 - Local atmospheric environment of offshore installations), which was used at the time of amending CAP 437 in 1998. I don't have access to it now, but I guess it could be a very valuable source of information.
BHAB is the body in which the CAA discharges its regulatory responsibilities regarding offshore helidecks. Therefore, BHAB is the authority in this respect.
I used to inspect helidecks on behalf of BHAB, and in most cases when there was a rise in the helideck temperature it was due to hot exhausts. In any case, there was never a difference greater than 4ºC. In such circumstances the procedure in place was that radio room should pass on to the helicopter both OAT and helideck temperature, so that the crew were aware of the possible loss of performance once close to the deck.
CAP 437 also states that cold vent, exhaust and flare systems should be designed to terminate and discharge at a location on the installation as far from the helideck environs as possible. The potential release volumes, flammable concentration, and dispersal characteristics should be quantified, so that -if required- a 'no fly zone' around the hazardous area could be applied.
By the sound of it, the standards in the installation you mentioned above are nonexistent.
If you need more information about CAP 437, please let me know.
PS: There is a set of comprehensive studies (M E Davies - 1977 to 1979 - Local atmospheric environment of offshore installations), which was used at the time of amending CAP 437 in 1998. I don't have access to it now, but I guess it could be a very valuable source of information.
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Cpt
Send me your e-mither adress and I will let you have acopy of Civil Aviation Publication No 437 (CAP 437)
What is the geographical location of the helideck (governing Authority)?
Send me your e-mither adress and I will let you have acopy of Civil Aviation Publication No 437 (CAP 437)
What is the geographical location of the helideck (governing Authority)?
Many thanks for your answers, my email is [email protected]
This helideck is located in the Gulf of Guinea and the governing Authority here doesn't say much about helicopters in general, therefore we use to comply with ICAO or country of registration regulations.
Until now we don't intend to use this refuelling facility but it is embarassing not to be able to show a regulation who could help our customer to solve this problem.
This helideck is located in the Gulf of Guinea and the governing Authority here doesn't say much about helicopters in general, therefore we use to comply with ICAO or country of registration regulations.
Until now we don't intend to use this refuelling facility but it is embarassing not to be able to show a regulation who could help our customer to solve this problem.
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CPT.....
Just be aware that ICAO 14 gives guidance to all member states [countries]...........
States can then vary the standard Annexe 14 with some of their owns rules and standards.....hence the UK call their equivilant of Annexe 14, CAP 437. The US will have theirs and so on and so on....
By the sound of your area of ops.....who knows what standard would apply.
States can then vary the standard Annexe 14 with some of their owns rules and standards.....hence the UK call their equivilant of Annexe 14, CAP 437. The US will have theirs and so on and so on....
By the sound of your area of ops.....who knows what standard would apply.
Offshore "Point in Space" IFR approach
POINT IN SPACE (offshore) IFR approach
(Offshore Cloud break procedure)
We currently have a small dilemma here in China which I would like to see rectified. We have CAAC approval for the standard NDB/ARA approach to the rig , albeit to slightly higher minima. This serves us well for the outbound trip.
Inbound , if the weather is really ugly then we have access to an ILS at destination but it requires some extra off route flying time.
Our track from the field to helibase (which is for all practical purposes , on the beach) , takes us over a small island located 5 miles offshore (highest point 600 feet)
Invariably ATC has us descend to 1000 feet and report that we have this island in sight before he will give us clearance to make a VFR approach. Fair enough.
The “ugly” weather here in the tropics is very rarely cloud base below 500 feet. (Visibility is another matter. When the rain starts it can drop the visibility down to damn near zero.)
For those days when the Wx is not ILS ugly (but am in cloud at normal cruising 2000 feet) , I would sooner letdown , on track to say 500 feet but 5 miles back from the previously mentioned island and motor in to say 2 miles (Chinese VFR requires 1.6 nm vis). If I cannot see the island at this juncture then it is time to turn around and request clearance to the ILS.
This let down as mentioned above would be with the aid of NDB , DME , GPS and Wx radar.
When I was with Shell Brunei many moons ago , they had a “point in space” approach that allowed just such a let down.
Now here is my request from all you folk out there. I have a better chance of getting a CAAC approval IF I can show that other civil aviation authorities regularly give such approvals to IFR heli ops.
Could you please send me your ideas but better still your “point in space” cloud break procedures if you have them.
Tanks muchly
Peter
(Offshore Cloud break procedure)
We currently have a small dilemma here in China which I would like to see rectified. We have CAAC approval for the standard NDB/ARA approach to the rig , albeit to slightly higher minima. This serves us well for the outbound trip.
Inbound , if the weather is really ugly then we have access to an ILS at destination but it requires some extra off route flying time.
Our track from the field to helibase (which is for all practical purposes , on the beach) , takes us over a small island located 5 miles offshore (highest point 600 feet)
Invariably ATC has us descend to 1000 feet and report that we have this island in sight before he will give us clearance to make a VFR approach. Fair enough.
The “ugly” weather here in the tropics is very rarely cloud base below 500 feet. (Visibility is another matter. When the rain starts it can drop the visibility down to damn near zero.)
For those days when the Wx is not ILS ugly (but am in cloud at normal cruising 2000 feet) , I would sooner letdown , on track to say 500 feet but 5 miles back from the previously mentioned island and motor in to say 2 miles (Chinese VFR requires 1.6 nm vis). If I cannot see the island at this juncture then it is time to turn around and request clearance to the ILS.
This let down as mentioned above would be with the aid of NDB , DME , GPS and Wx radar.
When I was with Shell Brunei many moons ago , they had a “point in space” approach that allowed just such a let down.
Now here is my request from all you folk out there. I have a better chance of getting a CAAC approval IF I can show that other civil aviation authorities regularly give such approvals to IFR heli ops.
Could you please send me your ideas but better still your “point in space” cloud break procedures if you have them.
Tanks muchly
Peter