Flying Lawyer

©The Lafayette Daily Advertiser, Louisiana
July 20, 2004

Quote:

Helicopter crash 38th since 2000
Experts: Traffic, not safety faults, accounts for large number of accidents.

LAFAYETTE

Some interesting stats there:
7,000+ passengers on 3,600+ flights per day which is 25% of the total helicopter traffic in the US, but the number of accidents per 100,000 hours compares very favourably - 2.3 compared with 9 nationally.
However, we don't have the stats for fatal accidents. Does anyone know them? The number of fatal accidents is more relevant than the number of fatalities because there are likely to be more passengers on flights in the Gulf than nationally.

The chances of having an accident in the GoM are much lower than elsewhere but, if it does occur, the chance of it being fatal is much higher because of the unforgiving terrain.

The NTSB says the causes are the same as elsewhere - pilot error, maintenance problems and equipment failures.
Are the minimum hours and/or flying background requirements sufficient given the type of work and weather conditions?
Would prohibiting single engine ops offshore make a big difference, some or no difference?
Or requiring two pilots for all flights offshore?
Or restricting offshore flights to instrument rated pilots in full IFR equipped helicopters?

Should the FAA go all the way and require that all offshore flights are conducted by two IR pilots in twin-engine IFR-equipped helicopters?


I'm not expressing any opinions - I don't have either the qualifications or experience to do so - but I'd be interested to read the opinions of the professionals on the forum.


Tudor Owen

S76Heavy

If we had 5 crashes in a year on the North Sea (even if they were split among all the North Sea states) I'm sure that the workers and pilots unions would stop the flying. I do not believe that the industry in Europe would be allowed to shrug it of as "statistics".

Even by their own admission "water bodies do present their own peculiar dangers" and "if something goes wrong, there is often nowhere to land but in the water"
Yet they continue to operate single engine VFR machines that lack any capability for adopting a proper Plan B when things don't turn out as planned.

Besides, I'd like to see what elements are used to compose the national accident rate. Does it include GA and homebuilds, for instance?
Remember, there are lies, damned lies and statistics.

Droopy

UK Public transport [which the CAA describes loosely as "the majority" being offshore] rates for 1992-2001 are 0.83 reportable per 100,000 flights - turgid details here

Looking closely at the individual accident reports, UK offshore to onshore would seem to bear about the same 1:3 ratio as GOM.

I assume a much higher proportion of GOM flights are short inter-platform transfers than those on the N. Sea?

Aviator609

We ask ourselves why there are so many accidents in the GOM. Granted, it is one of the busiest offshore arenas in the world, but there are other factors too. One of the reasons are because the helicopter companies are hiring low time, inexperienced pilot’s and paying them peanuts, just to show great profits. The majority of companies require between 1000 -1500 hours total time, B206 time required, Instrument rating preferred and in some cases a requirement for offshore time.

This all with the blessing of the helicopter companies client’s in the oil industry, who doesn’t want to know about pilot’s shortages or pilots striking due to poor working conditions, as this affects their productivity and their bottom line and they in turn don’t want to upset their share holders.

The pilots in the GOM are forced by helicopter operators to work in some of the most unforgiving weather conditions, doing exceedingly long working hours with limited or no IFR experience in old, high time, single engine helicopters. As single engine helicopters, they are not designed or allowed to operate under IFR conditions or even equipped for basic IFR. Often they aren’t even 100% serviceable for that matter, and they fly a long, long way offshore. This sounds like the ideal recipe for helicopters falling and disappearing into the deep blue water. Out of sight out of mind and calling it pilot error, is usually the easiest solution.

Factors affecting safety in the offshore industry:

1. Single engine helicopters offshore.

As long as the oil companies allow poorly equipped, single engine helicopters to work the offshore market, both in GOM and in Nigeria, the higher risk will always be there.

2. Maximum monetary gain for minimum expenditure.

Our helicopter operators are saying that they don’t care about human life, money talks, as they are well insured and that the direct operating costs is more dear than that of a human life when it’s compared to the cost of new, well equipped multi engine helicopter and a properly trained multi crew. The oil industry just looks the other way, also wanting maximum effort, to get the guys out there onto the rigs with minimum costs, instead of demanding safer conditions. Cutting costs are in the order of the day, but doing it in the wrong places is costing valuable human lives and is hurting the industries good name.

3. Pilot shortages = lack of experience.

We are facing a serious pilot shortage crisis in the offshore market, which is becoming more evident everyday. Very few helicopter companies are prepared to lay out money to train new pilots for the future. Looking at the age of the average offshore pilot, many of them are in their 50’s. The last of the Vietnam era is reaching their 60’s, which is currently the cut off age, by offshore oil companies request and various Civil Aviation Agencies around the world. The shortage will be devastating and unless addressed will widen rapidly and adversely affect the industry in the future. Raising the retirement age will ease the problem and this should not be a big issue in the multi crew, multi engine environment.

Air Forces around the world do not train as many helicopter pilots post Cold War as they used to and they are paying better to retain their pilots. And lastly, civilian training is very expensive and the costs highly restrictive and out of reach of most of the average young people that are interested in becoming helicopter pilots. Thus we will continue having shortages and because of these shortages in the offshore industry inexperienced pilots will be hired, increasing the risks of accidents once more. Training is vital, and training pilots to fly as co-pilots, and so gaining experience, on task should be a top priority.

4. Vicious circle - Poor Salaries=high turn over of pilots=poor training=low experience levels=poor salaries.

We are trapped in a vicious circle due to helicopter companies not paying well. Why are Boeing 747 captains paid so well and a helicopter offshore captain on a S61 or a Super Puma not? We have the same responsibilities; the weather is as bad at Heathrow as it is 100 nm’s offshore. Maybe not 300 people at a time, but an offshore accident attracts as much attention as a Boeing accident, and the insurance costs to the industry not something we can really afford in addition to post the 9/11 tragedy.

Poorly paid pilots are unhappy pilots. They will look for work elsewhere. They are travellers, otherwise they would not have become pilots. Thus this causes a high turnover of pilots which the helicopter companies in turn are not prepared to train well as it costs money and affects their bottom line. Any investment is seen as futile and this is usually remedied by hiring less experienced, often poorly or inadequately trained pilots for the job at lower salaries. This however increases the risk. The chain has to be broken somewhere to ensure safer flight operations!

Do you have problems with wondering pilots, throw money at them! That won’t just attract more pilots, but leaves the helicopter company with an opportunity to be fussy about whom and with what experience level they choose to hire. Picking the cream from the crop and in so doing making your operations safer.

In turn you can train them to a higher standard and they will most likely stay and you as the helicopter operator should get the return on your hard earned money, not just in savings on insurances etc, but much more. The fixed wing commercial market has realised this and in keeping their pilots and thus their experience levels high, they save themselves a lot of trouble. Accidents doesn’t just kill people, it ruins reputations and is more expensive than the average person estimates.

These are just a few issues we face in the industry at this time. We need proactive, forward thinking individuals and helicopter company managers to prevent GOM syndrome and the disasters that go hand in hand with it.

But as long as they are blinded by profits only, it might be a challenge not met in the foreseeable future.

SASless

I was told by a very senior Air Log Captain, that Air Log has a turnover rate of about 30-35% in pilots per year....as I recall his numbers....he said the company had hired, trained, and put on line almost 300 pilots in three years and maintains a pilot roster of approximately 325 pilots without being able to increase the roster. The company continues to fight a pilot pay increase and has announced they are losing business because they cannot hire pilots due to the unfinished collective bargaining agreement. Air Log had a very bad year not so long ago....losing aircraft one right after another....it was PHI's turn recently....and now it seems to be some of the other operators that are losing aircraft due to crashes.

I do not care how you describe it...the Gulf of Mexico gets cold in the winter, flying over the sea with sea state conditions in excess of the capability of the aircraft float system, combined with the lack of Coast Guard search and rescue capability as you get well off shore, the lack of weather reporting, ATC flight following for IFR flights....the absolute inability of the operators to operate on a single common frequency for traffic separation in the fields...all this combined with operating in single engine aircraft for the most part....makes it a very dodgy proposition.

The question I want answered is simple...."How many people have died during ditchings of single engined helicopters following engine failures in the cruise?" The second question I want answered is "How many single engine, single pilot, VFR aircraft have crashed due to flying into inclement weather.....and how many people have died as a result of that?"

Then....I want to compare those numbers to the UK North Sea operations......and please correct me if I am wrong....except for the Bristow S-76 that shed a blade a short while ago.....that has been the only fatal accident on the North Sea for some very long time.

I flew on the North Sea...and got spoiled by that experience....my stock response when asked if I had ever flown in the Gulf of Mexico used to be...."NO, I never got that hungry."

I still laugh when I recall a story told of an American Aramco pilot...when asked by Denny Fenlon (the Aramco Chief Pilot) if he had ever flown for PHI...the pilot over his dinner answered...."Not until I came here."

That sums it up to me.....people are dying in the Gulf of Mexico....and the oil companies do not care. The helicopter companies do not care.....and for our North Sea brethren....the Gulf of Mexico , except for the Air Log and PHI pilot's union....is a union free workplace.

gasax

This tends to be a pretty emotive subject but although the statistics are only just so trustworthy they are worth thinking about.

The fatal accident rate for helicopter flying in the GOM is lower than the N.Sea and from memory virtually all other areas.

The fatal accident rate for single engine helicopters worldwide is better than for complex twins. (Remember the B206 is the most reliable single engined aircraft - including fixed wing!).

Certainly the present accident rate shows a big increase and I'm sure that the causes are probably directly linked to the factors Aviator609 lists. But that still makes helicopter flying in the GoM no more dangerous than elsewhere - and that probably has a lot to do with the authorities response, of lack of it!

It is all too easy to try and play the safety card to address other issues which whilst they are certainly valid issues may not have direct links to safety performance.

We have carried out a number of helicopter safety assessments and the conclusions are perhaps a little surprising;


Fly the smallest helicopters possible for the duty (remember that the N.Sea fatal accident rate is totalled dominated by a single Chinook accident - 40 plus deaths out of the near 100. Other areas have the same issues when they use ex Soviet large machines, any single accident has a large toll - which totally skews the rates).

Fly the helicopters over clement land conditions or if it has to be water, warm-ish water - the survival rates for non-fatal crashes are then quite good.

Have a lot of other helicopter traffic around - improves search and rescue and hence survival rates.

Do not fly small IFR twins - they have the worst accident rates!


The real problems are that so long as the underlying safety performance of single engined helicopters is better than twin engined IFR machines there is never going to be a good argument to upgrade the machines or the pilots. The prevailing conditions in the GoM are much better than many other parts of the world, so the justification for high specifications is simply not there. Then there is the competition aspect to ensure prices are low - so again higher specs simply cannot be justified.

However speaking as a fixed wing pilot I do think that pushing the conditions and long working hours must have an impact and a responsible regulator would look carefully at those aspects - however that is a European type approach, the American regulatory approach is usually prove there is a problem and then we'll do something about it. It would seem that the demonstration of the problem is now occuring.

Mars

gasaxYou are wrong, the accident rate and the fatal accident rate for the GOM 2003 was the worst of all of the offshore patches and was probably the worst on record for the GOM.

I have no figures for the Bell 206 v fixed wing but would be interested in the statistical basis for that statement.

If you need further proof of the oil industry records, visit the OGP data-base for accidents - world-wide and GOM.

I have seldom seen such a galaxy of false statements. Who are the we that performed these helicopter safety assessments?

Gomer Pylot

I don't have any exact numbers, but I've been flying down here for well over 20 years, and I don't recall a single instance. If the autorotation was successful, nobody got hurt. Wet, maybe, but swimming in the Gulf of Mexico is rarely fatal if you have a life jacket.

Now we're getting to the real issue. Again, I haven't searched the NTSB reports thoroughly, but my estimate is that this, added to catastrophic mechanical failures, accounts for almost all fatalities, and the majority by itself. The weather minimums are far too low for these machines. The FAA requirements are clear of clouds, period. Individual operators may have higher requirements, but those are voluntary, and still far too low. I've survived by pure luck and supernatural skill, I think. More times than I like to think about I have been flying around in bare minimum weather and had it go to nothing, with no warning at all. I've ended up flying in far less than a mile visibility, no ceiling, and praying to see anything at all to land on. And I've seen others flying down the beach, in the dark, in fog so thick they were almost hovering, blowing dirt and debris across the road I was trying to drive home on on break night, because there was no bed for me at the base after my hitch was over.

Single engine helicopters are probably less safe than twins, but it's hard to prove. But flying either in poor weather, with a fatigued, inexperienced pilot, is completely unsafe. I don't agree that water is all that more dangerous as terrain than land - at least it's flat (most of the time) and there are no 2000' towers sticking up. The EMS industry is proof that people can die flying over land. Flying single-pilot VFR at night is more dangerous, IMO, than flying over water will ever be.

But I agree that it all comes down to the bottom line. All any company is interested in now is short-term profits. With CEOs making hundreds of times the salary of ordinary employees, and that salary tied to stock performance for the quarter, what else can result? All the CEO and other senior management care about is maximizing short-term profits, regardless of what happens in the long run, because they may be elsewhere in a year or more. If someone gets killed, well, that's just too bad, but the lawsuit will take years to be settled, and probably won't be that expensive anyway. So why worry about it? And we keep doing it to ourselves - getting the job done at any cost, just to make a little more money for corporations that already make more in pure annual profit than the gross national product of most countries in the world. Just so we can fly.

Mars

Gomer Pylot:

Here is one fatal that occured in the GOM because the engine failed:Not entirely unexpected considering the state of the weather!

PPRUNE FAN#1

Aviator609, it was long and well-written, but I've got to disagree with many of the things you say in your post. You state many things as facts, but it is evident that you don't know much about the GOM. Plus, you speak rather vaguely of "offshore operations." They can vary widely. I would gladly fly a single-engine helicopter offshore in the GOM. But I would not be so eager to do so in Nigeria, where flight-following and rescue capabilities might not be as well-developed.

Nor can you even compare the GOM to the North Sea. The two operations are not similar at all.

Talk about environment. First of all, GOM weather is *not* "some of the most unforgiving." In fact, throughout most of the year it is fairly benign compared to other parts of the world. It never gets extremely hot nor extremely cold. Even the Gulf water itself is only really dangerous (in terms of hypothermia) for only a short time of the year (around February). There are hazards- fog and thunderstorms for two. But they are manageable.

There are conservative operational restrictions in the GOM. All operators observe wind (sea-state) and weather limits. You won't find singles flying in winds over 40 knots. Cross-country minimums are usually 500 foot ceiling and 3 miles vis. While hardly "VFR" as we generally think of it (1000/3) these numbers are safe IF ADHERED TO. Can you successfully and safely circumnavigate thunderstorms and fog banks in 500/3? I did it for many, many years, and while I am not the last word in safety, I would personally have to say yes.

Connections are made between all the accidents in the GOM and these so-called "low-time" pilots that all the operators are hiring. I think that if you look at the real numbers, the accidents are not happening to the low-timers. In fact, according to one study that PHI did (admittedly it was some time ago), the average experience of accident pilots was something like 5,000 hours. I'd be curious to see the most recent numbers, but I'd bet that they have not changed much.

Pilots in the GOM do not work "exceedingly" long duty hours. Yes, they push the FAA FAR part-135 limits in the summer, but I would say from my experience that the majority of GOM pilots do not approach these limits even during the longest months.

While the pay for GOM pilots used to be bad, it has improved greatly in the last few years. However, the "revolving door" situation is more a result of pilots who come down to the GOM and find that they don't particularly care for the lifestyle, or who fully intend to only stay for a little while as they build up to "something better" (read: closer to where they really want to live). It may very well be that there will always be high turnover among the new-hires no matter how much money you throw at them. All the more reason to ensure that longevity is rewarded, which it is now that Air Log and PHI are unionized.

Engine failures are one thing, but how many accidents do they cause? You'd have to show me that singles represent an unreasonably or unacceptably high risk there.

Distance-offshore is a red herring. Offshore is offshore, and once you're in deeper water than six feet, it doesn't matter how far out you are. This latest GOM accident occurred only 8 miles south of Cameron. The one before that was right along the shoreline in a place called Vermilion Bay. In neither case did it matter much. Nor would it if the pilot cannot report his position. Automatic position-reporting linked to GPS would help immensely here. We know this technology is available- most ground package delivery trucks already employ it, even garbage collection trucks do!

Operators are not stupid, nor are they criminally negligent. They look at all of the accidents that have occurred since helicopters began venturing offshore; they examine all the risks and react accordingly. They have determined that it is not unreasonably risky to field day-VFR, single-engine helicopters flown by a sole pilot. An entire industry has built up around this philosophy.

The operators also look at the causes of accidents for common threads. Unfortunately, they're hard to pinpoint. So do we conclude that there is just a general lax safety attitude that could be cured by "more safety?" Do we demand that every helicopter in the GOM have two engines with every bell and whistle and be flown by two high-time, highly-paid instrument-rated pilots? I think you would have a hard time selling that to anybody. Not only that, but for the ships that fly "field ship" jobs in which they do nothing but hop from platform to platform in short flights throughout the day, it simply wouldn't work.

Everybody hates to see accidents and people love to fret about them. I've lost some good friends in GOM accidents. And I wish there was someplace for me to point my finger and say, "Aha! THERE'S the link!" But it's not that easy or simple.

rotordk

PP#1 :They have determined that it is not unreasonably risky to field day-VFR, single-engine helicopters flown by a sole pilot. An entire industry has built up around this philosophy.

Doesn't this whole subject start around the fact that it is not so ?
The "GOM "industry philosophy of yours is killing not just their pilots, but their customers.......

Hippolite

PPrune Fan has given a very balanced reply.

Operators do have weather limits in the GOM and these are constantly being reviewed for their applicability by both customers and helicopter operators.

The average experience for pilts in accidents is around 5000 hours, industry wide according to HSAC (Helicopter Safety Advisory Committee) Most accidents occur around mid day also according to HSAC so fatigue shouldn't be a big problem.

GOM pilots work equal time (7 and 7 or 14 and 14), I bet many NS pilots wish they did that. The pay could be better but has improved over the last 3 years.

Most operators do not fly SE aircraft over 50 miles offshore unless they are under greater operational control (wind, sea state, weather, SAR etc)

Helicopter operators in the GOM do not make obscene profits, that's why many of them fly older aircraft. It is highly competitive and all the operators would love to have new equipment. You will see S-92s (PHI) and C+s (PHI AirLog) as well as new EC135s (soon) EC120s etc.

PHI and AirLog require instrument ratings for new pilots. PHI and AirLog use simulators and FTDs to a larger extent than the North Sea operators, every time a pilot goes for refresher training.

Many aircraft ARE equipped with satellite reporting systems, PHI will be doing its whole fleet eventually.

There are SOME problems in the GOM. Lack of regulation of the heleideck envirionment by the FAA (unlike the North Sea) is a MAJOR problem with obstacles etc. Poor weather reporting and a lack of automated stations in another problem.

So, Mr 609, as PPrune fan says, you have little knowledge of the GOM. A thought provoking post though.

rotordk

Northsea operators always use sims every 6 months for pilot training. S76 - Dauphin guy's don't .

I agree there is much information out there. But how come it's not put to use ?

I couldn't care less if the operator is not making a huge profit, when the pilots are dying.
And if they did make a profit, would they tell you ?
It all boils down to profit. And bad legislation.

PPRUNE FAN#1

I wrote:Rotordk replied:No, that was not FLying Lawyer's premise at all. He merely quoted some statistics, made some observations and asked some questions. Pilots and passengers die in helicopters all over the U.S. every year. Let's zoom in and focus on the GOM, shall we?

I guess it comes down to "show me the actual numbers." If, as the Lafayette, Louisiana newspaper says, there have been 38 accidents so far since the year 2000, then that seems like a lot. But how many people have died? Then compare that number to the number of flight hours...or maybe the number of aircraft...or maybe the number of takeoffs and landings. To be fair, we have to look back ten years. Five isn't enough to really spot any trends.

Believe me when I tell you, the oil companies are extremely conscious of the liability exposure they open themselves up to. They have really deep pockets, dontchaknow. Their lawyers watch things very, very carefully. If there was statistical support that GOM helicopters would be "safer" with two engines or two of anything, they would require it in a heartbeat.

There will always be those who claim that zero-accidents or zero-fatalities is possible, and they will loudly denigrate those of us who live in the real world and admit that as long as humans operate machinery those humans will make (sometimes fatal) mistakes. (We're not talking just pilots here...engineers too.) But how far do we go...what duty of care do we have? Yes of course, we try to make things as "safe as possible," but what does that mean? Would requiring two engines guarantee that things would be safer, or that there would be fewer accidents? Somehow, I doubt it.

When I was flying a little 206B that was based for seven days on an oil platform 80 miles south of what passes for land in south Lousiana, I used to think about safety. I used to think about it a LOT on days when the wind was blowing 39.5 knots and I'd look down at the waves and think to myself, "Dear God, please don't let it quit today." I used to ask myself if what I was doing was needlessly risky? I mean, I'm not an idiot, and I don't particularly enjoy putting my life at risk when I don't have to.

I came to the conclusion that the operation I was performing with the helicopter was not any riskier than some of the other, land-based things I'd done in a helicopter for money. However, when my employer plunked me down into the right seat of a helicopter with two Allison engines, I did not fight or complain. Whether it was technically safer or not, it gave me greater peace of mind.

What I do now involves a different kind of risk- sometimes quite a bit more of it in that there are so many things that I cannot control now. And I do admit that there are days when I wish I was still doing the relatively low-risk GOM stuff.

It is easy to look at the hard, cold numbers and pontificate endlessly - as Aviator609 did - on any subject without really knowing much about it. To understand the GOM one must come over and study it first-hand. ...Or at least, more thoroughly than merely looking at some accident reports. Only then will one be able to make valid, worthwhile suggestions as to how to improve any given area.

It's not enough to say, "The GOM operators are all greedy bastards who care not a bit about human life." That is simply not true. PHI would go to any length to prevent their next accident if they could predict it. But realistically, it could just as easily happen to one of their IFR, two-crew twins on a beautiful CAVU day as one of their 206's.

SASless

Now let me get this straight.....If I raise my rates....the competition will continue to charge their same rate....and not raise theirs too? Yes, right! When the union movement brought about the pay raises....the operators said they would go broke....that the oil companies would not pay the increased rates. They raised rates...the oil companies never even squeaked...the companies began to buy new aircraft and even bragged in trade publications that was the reason they could afford new aircraft. They have raised rates several times without giving a pay raise to the pilots.....now where is that money going if they are not buying new aircraft now?

The oil companies are run by accountants....as long as helicopter transportation remains cheaper than the costs of doing crew changes by boat....then they will pay the difference.....and by costs of boats I mean all the costs, not just boat, crew, and diesel. Factor in rig crew time, salaries, morale....etc.

Why is it....Texaco specified twins....but when Chevron took over they reverted to singles? Was it increased safety in singles or costs? Ask the boys at Bristow Texaco and Pan African Chevron in Nigeria?

gasax

Thanks Mars - I know the 2003 rate in GoM is greater than the N.Sea - that is after all what started this thread. However this higher rate is a very recent development.

To my knowledge the machinery, operating conditions and contracts have not changed significantly and so any root cause analysis will not identify a smoking gun - hence the present response from the regulator.

Accidents tend to be pretty much like buses, you stand around for a long time waiting and then a couple come along at once. In the case of buses its bad organisation, in the case of accidents which have any element of randomness its just luck.

From a pilot's viewpoint all accidents have a cause and so can be avoided, from a statisticians viewpoint that cause is largely irrelevant, pilots will lose control, winds will blow, parts will break etc. Pilots don't want to be in accidents, others accept that they will happen, the rates simply have to be kept at acceptable rates. The recent rate obviously isn't - but leaping onto your favourite hobby horse and assigning that as the cause is going to achieve nothing. I would be amazed if the FAA were not quietly reviewing all these accidents and attempting to find common causative elements - those are likely to be experience, weather limits, workload. They are not going to justify IFR twins and all that otehr sexy hardware.

You will recall I suggested caution with any of the numbers, we (and I cannot say who, but an international risk management and advisory consultancy) have looked in detail at OGP versus CAA figures for the N.Sea - there are significant differences and it is a shame that FAA/NTSB figures cannot be used to 'validate' OGP's GoM data in a similar way - because I suspect there is a significant level of optimism in their (OGP) data.

Nonetheless the argument still holds that in the right environment single engine non-IFR helicopters are safer than complex twins. From the fatal accident rate the critical parameter is how many people are on the helicopter, small helicopters cannot kill many people. From a simple enginering standpoint complex twin engined helicopters still have multiple single point failure modes and require high levels of skill and training - it stands to reason that verus the KISS of a B206 they are unlikely to shine.

The argument for sophisicated aircraft is always difficult to make on this basis, B206 4 passengers, Chinook 44 passengers, A332 18 passengers - so the Chinook needs to be 11 times safer, the 332, 41/2 times to keep the same fatal accident rate as the 206. Which if nothing else suggest fatal accident rates are perhaps not the best way of deciding what type of aircraft to fly. But the impact of a single S76 (full of passengers) crash on N.Sea accident rates in the last 10 years has been enough to show no improvement in that fatal rate, inspite of the number of crashes being an all time low.

I'm always disappointed at how people love the numbers when they support their argument and dismiss they when they don't. Thankfully regulators (and some extent the oil companies) are a little more dispassionate.

Hippolite

rotordrk

The 2 major GOM operators are PHI and AirLog both of which are publicly traded companies. Their profits are, therefore, a matter of public record.

SASless

Points well taken BUT if you look at the fatal accidents in Nigeria and Angola (in both places, Chevron uses singles and each aircraft does 70-80 take off and landings EVERY DAY) you will find that the safety record isvery good. Empirically it shows that singles are not necessarliy less safe than twins.

Not all GOM fatal accidents have been caused by either engine related or weather related issues. Some have been caused by poor helideck conditions (not legislated in the GOM so everybody does their own thing) and some have been caused by pilots trying to take off with the aircraft still tied down.

No matter how much a company SOP specifies walk arounds, pre flights, socks on the cyclic etc. and obstacle clearance around helidecks, there will always be those momentary lapses in concentration and a lack of situational awareness that will cause an accident.

Strict enforement of weather minima through operational control, adherence to standard procedures and SOP, helideck regulation, improved weather reporting and communications will go a long way to improving Single Engine accident rates in the GOM. Singles should be able to safely operate in a benign environment within a certain distance from the beach under the majority of weather conditions. For those areas and conditions which fall outside certain parameters, twins should be used with 2 pilots.

Placing a twin into an environment without carefully considering why one is doing it will not necessarily save lives or accidents.

rotordk

They ARE making a profit.....so it seem's their excuses have no merit for not changing their ways, when it could save lifes.

Shawn Coyle

I'm sure there is somewhere some data that could be crunched to see what effect the level of complexity has on accidents, and the types of accidents that happen.
80% of accidents are human error cause factor- but is this true across the board? Do more complex aircraft have more technical cause factor accidents because the crew is more highly trained and less likely to put themselves in situations where a simple screw up can cause an accident?
I don't know, but I'd be interested in hearing what others have to say.
For example, a simple helicopter is easy to operate, and thus relatively easy to get quite familiar with. Does this lull the operators into a false sense of capability and security that a two man crew in a more complex machine might avoid?
with turbine engines achieving pretty remarkable levels of reliability, the twin vs. single argument may not be the thing we should be focusing on.
Sorry to ramble on, but somewhere out there is an insight into this that might help to make things safer.

SASless

Hippo...

I do not recall an accident at the Texaco operation...but I do know of accidents at the Chevron operation before the takeover by OLOG. That alone suggests something....maybe more about the standards of operations and less about the single-twin argument....but still the point is "safety concerns" should drive the decisions...not mere economics. Sometimes cheap is not the right answer....lord knows it isn't going to impact the cost of petrol any.

I have heard (no empirical data) that the total tranportation budget of an average oil company is about 2% of the operating budget....that includes cars, trucks, helicopters, airplanes, tankers...etc.....if that is the case....helicopter rates are truely insignificant in the overall scheme of things. Only to the mid-level accountants and MBA types running the company and the effect rates have upon their bonus check...does the helicopter costs matter. IMHO.