Aviator609, it was long and well-written, but I've got to disagree with many of the things you say in your post. You state many things as facts, but it is evident that you don't know much about the GOM. Plus, you speak rather vaguely of "offshore operations." They can vary widely. I would gladly fly a single-engine helicopter offshore in the GOM. But I would not be so eager to do so in Nigeria, where flight-following and rescue capabilities might not be as well-developed.
Nor can you even compare the GOM to the North Sea. The two operations are not similar at all.
Talk about environment. First of all, GOM weather is *not* "some of the most unforgiving." In fact, throughout most of the year it is fairly benign compared to other parts of the world. It never gets extremely hot nor extremely cold. Even the Gulf water itself is only really dangerous (in terms of hypothermia) for only a short time of the year (around February). There are hazards- fog and thunderstorms for two. But they are manageable.
There are conservative operational restrictions in the GOM. All operators observe wind (sea-state) and weather limits. You won't find singles flying in winds over 40 knots. Cross-country minimums are usually 500 foot ceiling and 3 miles vis. While hardly "VFR" as we generally think of it (1000/3) these numbers are safe IF ADHERED TO. Can you successfully and safely circumnavigate thunderstorms and fog banks in 500/3? I did it for many, many years, and while I am not the last word in safety, I would personally have to say yes.
Connections are made between all the accidents in the GOM and these so-called "low-time" pilots that all the operators are hiring. I think that if you look at the real numbers, the accidents are not happening to the low-timers. In fact, according to one study that PHI did (admittedly it was some time ago), the average experience of accident pilots was something like 5,000 hours. I'd be curious to see the most recent numbers, but I'd bet that they have not changed much.
Pilots in the GOM do not work "exceedingly" long duty hours. Yes, they push the FAA FAR part-135 limits in the summer, but I would say from my experience that the majority of GOM pilots do not approach these limits even during the longest months.
While the pay for GOM pilots used to be bad, it has improved greatly in the last few years. However, the "revolving door" situation is more a result of pilots who come down to the GOM and find that they don't particularly care for the lifestyle, or who fully intend to only stay for a little while as they build up to "something better" (read: closer to where they really want to live). It may very well be that there will always be high turnover among the new-hires no matter how much money you throw at them. All the more reason to ensure that longevity is rewarded, which it is now that Air Log and PHI are unionized.
Engine failures are one thing, but how many accidents do they cause? You'd have to show me that singles represent an unreasonably or unacceptably high risk there.
Distance-offshore is a red herring. Offshore is offshore, and once you're in deeper water than six feet, it doesn't matter how far out you are. This latest GOM accident occurred only 8 miles south of Cameron. The one before that was right along the shoreline in a place called Vermilion Bay. In neither case did it matter much. Nor would it if the pilot cannot report his position. Automatic position-reporting linked to GPS would help immensely here. We know this technology is available- most ground package delivery trucks already employ it, even garbage collection trucks do!
Operators are not stupid, nor are they criminally negligent. They look at all of the accidents that have occurred since helicopters began venturing offshore; they examine all the risks and react accordingly. They have determined that it is not unreasonably risky to field day-VFR, single-engine helicopters flown by a sole pilot. An entire industry has built up around this philosophy.
The operators also look at the causes of accidents for common threads. Unfortunately, they're hard to pinpoint. So do we conclude that there is just a general lax safety attitude that could be cured by "more safety?" Do we demand that every helicopter in the GOM have two engines with every bell and whistle and be flown by two high-time, highly-paid instrument-rated pilots? I think you would have a hard time selling that to anybody. Not only that, but for the ships that fly "field ship" jobs in which they do nothing but hop from platform to platform in short flights throughout the day, it simply wouldn't work.
Everybody hates to see accidents and people love to fret about them. I've lost some good friends in GOM accidents. And I wish there was someplace for me to point my finger and say, "Aha! THERE'S the link!" But it's not that easy or simple.