When would you wrest control?
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A Ryanair Boeing 737 captain involved in a serious incident during a thunderstorm near Rome was psychologically unfit to fly and his co-pilot, who had no experience of flying in bad weather, could not navigate the aircraft properly, an inquiry by Italian air accident investigators has found.
The captain, a Polish national, had attended the funeral of his infant son only a few days previously and told investigators he didn’t take extra leave because he feared losing his job.
The flight got lost in its attempts to land at Rome’s Fiumicino airport after it aborted an attempt to land at another Rome airport, Ciampino, during a thunderstorm.
Air traffic controllers were forced to intervene to prevent the possibility of mid-air collisions as the Ryanair jet either ignored controllers’ instructions or else failed to pick them up because they were on the wrong radio frequency, the Italian report concluded.
At one stage the aircraft flew at more than 322km/h just 450ft above the ground, when it should have been much higher. It also descended below a safe height near hills. At one stage during the incident, the Ryanair aircraft continued flying straight despite being instructed by controllers to turn right.
The incidents occurred on a daytime flight from Niederrhain, 70 km from Dusseldorf, to Rome’s Ciampino airport in September 2005 but it was almost four months before Italian investigators were told of it by the Irish Air Accident Investigation Branch. The report by the Italian government’s air accident investigation branch, the ANSV, has only recently been published.
Co-operation between the captain and co-pilot was poor, the report added. In addition, the inexperienced Dutch co-pilot was entering severe weather for the first time in his 475 flying hours of which just 300 hours had been spent in the cockpit of a Boeing 737. Investigators said he couldn’t cope with navigating the aircraft and programming the flight management computer. However he was credited with taking the decision to abort the approach and divert to a third Rome airfield, Pescaro, where they landed without further incident. The captain left Ryanair two years later. The co-pilot has since been promoted to captain.
The pilots also failed to preserve the flight’s records in the aircraft’s black boxes as required by Ryanair regulations.
Reconstruction of the incident, described as “serious” by Italian investigators, was only made possible by the radar records and air traffic tapes which showed the aircraft meandering around the skies above the airport and failing to line up properly with the runway.
The incident happened on their fourth flight of an 8.5 hour day which had started before 4am and investigators suggested fatigue may have been a contributory factor. Rome air traffic controllers were also faulted for failing to give the crew timely warnings of weather changes and using confusing phraseology. Investigators also called for improvements in local radar coverage.
When asked by investigators why he went back to work within days of burying his young son, who died after a three-month illness, the captain said he feared he would be sacked by Ryanair if he took any more leave. Ryanair yesterday said the man had no basis for saying this.
Both pilots were grounded when Ryanair learned of the incident and were given counselling and training, according to a statement by the Irish Aviation Authority (IAA). “Actions taken by them following their own investigation was prompt and provided all necessary support, guidance and training to the pilots.” The incident was also investigated by the IAA which determined it was the result of “an unfortunate human factors incident which should not have arisen” according to the IAA statement.
The Irish Airline Pilots Association said the IAA, which regulates Ryanair, should take part of the responsibility for the incident. “This serious incident focuses attention on a particular corporate culture in Irish aviation,” said association president Evan Cullen. “The very fact that an individual at the front line of a safety critical industry, is operating in fear of losing his job so soon after the death of his child raises serious concerns about the ability of the Irish Aviation Authority to regulate this industry.”
Source: Irish Times
The captain, a Polish national, had attended the funeral of his infant son only a few days previously and told investigators he didn’t take extra leave because he feared losing his job.
The flight got lost in its attempts to land at Rome’s Fiumicino airport after it aborted an attempt to land at another Rome airport, Ciampino, during a thunderstorm.
Air traffic controllers were forced to intervene to prevent the possibility of mid-air collisions as the Ryanair jet either ignored controllers’ instructions or else failed to pick them up because they were on the wrong radio frequency, the Italian report concluded.
At one stage the aircraft flew at more than 322km/h just 450ft above the ground, when it should have been much higher. It also descended below a safe height near hills. At one stage during the incident, the Ryanair aircraft continued flying straight despite being instructed by controllers to turn right.
The incidents occurred on a daytime flight from Niederrhain, 70 km from Dusseldorf, to Rome’s Ciampino airport in September 2005 but it was almost four months before Italian investigators were told of it by the Irish Air Accident Investigation Branch. The report by the Italian government’s air accident investigation branch, the ANSV, has only recently been published.
Co-operation between the captain and co-pilot was poor, the report added. In addition, the inexperienced Dutch co-pilot was entering severe weather for the first time in his 475 flying hours of which just 300 hours had been spent in the cockpit of a Boeing 737. Investigators said he couldn’t cope with navigating the aircraft and programming the flight management computer. However he was credited with taking the decision to abort the approach and divert to a third Rome airfield, Pescaro, where they landed without further incident. The captain left Ryanair two years later. The co-pilot has since been promoted to captain.
The pilots also failed to preserve the flight’s records in the aircraft’s black boxes as required by Ryanair regulations.
Reconstruction of the incident, described as “serious” by Italian investigators, was only made possible by the radar records and air traffic tapes which showed the aircraft meandering around the skies above the airport and failing to line up properly with the runway.
The incident happened on their fourth flight of an 8.5 hour day which had started before 4am and investigators suggested fatigue may have been a contributory factor. Rome air traffic controllers were also faulted for failing to give the crew timely warnings of weather changes and using confusing phraseology. Investigators also called for improvements in local radar coverage.
When asked by investigators why he went back to work within days of burying his young son, who died after a three-month illness, the captain said he feared he would be sacked by Ryanair if he took any more leave. Ryanair yesterday said the man had no basis for saying this.
Both pilots were grounded when Ryanair learned of the incident and were given counselling and training, according to a statement by the Irish Aviation Authority (IAA). “Actions taken by them following their own investigation was prompt and provided all necessary support, guidance and training to the pilots.” The incident was also investigated by the IAA which determined it was the result of “an unfortunate human factors incident which should not have arisen” according to the IAA statement.
The Irish Airline Pilots Association said the IAA, which regulates Ryanair, should take part of the responsibility for the incident. “This serious incident focuses attention on a particular corporate culture in Irish aviation,” said association president Evan Cullen. “The very fact that an individual at the front line of a safety critical industry, is operating in fear of losing his job so soon after the death of his child raises serious concerns about the ability of the Irish Aviation Authority to regulate this industry.”
Source: Irish Times
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The two crew stuff is interesting, but as a mere PPL who doesn't fly in such an environment.. I rather thought that was the whole point - monitoring and checking, with intervention if necessary. The terrorism bit is kinda funny; sadly in this day and age, I can see a 'hostile' takeover being treated as such, but really it's rather silly. Unlawful perhaps, but take a look at a dictionary definition of terrorism - it's not 'anything you don't like'!
What prompted this was a debate about being uncomfortable flying with other people, Fuji opined he'd be more concerned about the aeroplane because he could take over if necessary. Going back to the 'private flying', regime, for me PilotDAR's first post, first and last paragraphs pretty much hit the nail on the head.
I'm struggling to think of a scenario for the normal 'private flying' kind of activity where an immediate intervention would be required, rather than starting with 'is this really a good idea'.
I always ask pilots (and non pilots, for different reasons) flying with me to speak up early if there's anything that's making them uncomfortable. We can then and avoid dramatic actions at the last minute. I'd rather set them up as an ally, it's entirely possible they catch something I missed. I would however most likely be pretty upset if someone just grabbed the controls. I can only think of one occasion when someone's taken the controls from me because it's all going wrong, in that case he was my instructor, and to this day I can't explain why I was sat fat and happy in a 3 point attitude waiting for the wheels to touch at +20ft.. 1/2 a second later I was very relieved and somewhat embarrassed.
Again in the private / single pilot regime I believe that expectations are key - I am not comfortable with people who add knots for crosswind, family, and every excuse under the sun, then fly a warrior in at a high speed, usually on a long, flat approach with lots of power. They on the other hand would probably have a fit at me sideslipping in at idle with a considerably lower speed and high ROD. To a large extent, that's a product of the flying I've done, and the flying they've done. Neither is an excuse for a jump at the controls.
What prompted this was a debate about being uncomfortable flying with other people, Fuji opined he'd be more concerned about the aeroplane because he could take over if necessary. Going back to the 'private flying', regime, for me PilotDAR's first post, first and last paragraphs pretty much hit the nail on the head.
I'm struggling to think of a scenario for the normal 'private flying' kind of activity where an immediate intervention would be required, rather than starting with 'is this really a good idea'.
I always ask pilots (and non pilots, for different reasons) flying with me to speak up early if there's anything that's making them uncomfortable. We can then and avoid dramatic actions at the last minute. I'd rather set them up as an ally, it's entirely possible they catch something I missed. I would however most likely be pretty upset if someone just grabbed the controls. I can only think of one occasion when someone's taken the controls from me because it's all going wrong, in that case he was my instructor, and to this day I can't explain why I was sat fat and happy in a 3 point attitude waiting for the wheels to touch at +20ft.. 1/2 a second later I was very relieved and somewhat embarrassed.
Again in the private / single pilot regime I believe that expectations are key - I am not comfortable with people who add knots for crosswind, family, and every excuse under the sun, then fly a warrior in at a high speed, usually on a long, flat approach with lots of power. They on the other hand would probably have a fit at me sideslipping in at idle with a considerably lower speed and high ROD. To a large extent, that's a product of the flying I've done, and the flying they've done. Neither is an excuse for a jump at the controls.
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Mark,
While the thread premise addresses a crew cockpit environment, certainly this has direct application to the private pilot, as well.
I flew tours in the Grand Canyon, mostly in Cessna 206's and 207's. I was with a load of tourists in a 207 one day, and noticed that every time I'd divert my attention outside for a few minutes, my power setting kept changing. I had the friction lock set, and it wasn't just the manifold pressure that was changing. The fuel flow varied as did the RPM.
I spied a passenger, sitting in the front right seat, wait until I was looking away, and then tweaking the power setting. I caught him doing it, and asked what he thought he was doing. Bearing in mind that we're in a heavily loaded single engine airplane over some very rough terrain with a lot of turbulence and often wind, I really didn't need someone else playing with my engine. The passenger told me that he owned a Cessna 206, and knew from his ownership that the airplane would operate much better at the power settings he was applying. I politely asked him not to do that any more.
A few moments later he did it again. I politely told him that if he touched the controls again, I would break his fingers.
Setting aside the legalities (it's illegal for him to manipulate the controls in that airplane in that operation), I didn't have time to discuss his mountain flying background, his 207 experience, his turbocharged experience, his high density altitude operations experience in type, and I really didn't care. At high power settings in the turbo 210, one can do serious damage to the engine in short order by improper leaning. Conversely, one can impact the fuel flow by changing the power settings, affecting my fuel reserve for the trip. I managed power with an eye to cylinder head temperatures as well; always a concern in that neck of the woods in the summer. If he caused me to have engine trouble, the consequences could be very dire. Moreover, I was trained and employed to do that job,and experienced doing it; he was not part of that operation, and had not met the requirements to be there.
That is nearly the exact opposite of the situations we've been discussing, but still an applicable tangent. Rather than taking control of someone else's show, this was a passenger improperly taking some measure of control with my own operation. Very inappropriate. This was a case in which the non-flying pilot/passenger (client, if you will; also client if you will not) needing to be controlled.
This wasn't a terrorist act, and it wasn't air piracy. It was an individual who acted beyond his appropriate bounds. What he may not have known about the 200 series Cessnas is that one can cause fuel flow fluctuations and ultimately engine failure by increasing the fuel flow too much, bypassing too much hot fuel to the wing root fuel kidney sump, which then passes hot vapor up the supply line from the wing and stops fuel flow to the selector, pump, and engine. Most pilots who fly 200 series Cessnas don't know this, including most owners. It's applicable to the 205, 206, 207, and 210. He acted in ignorance, and needed to be controlled.
Many years ago in Oklahoma, I taught a group of scouts their aviation merit badge,and promised each one an airplane ride if they completed the assignments. Each proudly completed their work, so on a Saturday morning we met at a grass airstrip, and I took each one for a ride in a Cessna 150.
I briefed them as a group before hand that I would do the takeoff, that they would get to fly the airplane once we were up and away, and I would do the landing. I encouraged them to follow through. The scoutmasters son was very short. He couldn't reach the rudder pedals. With his seatbelt fastened, he had to lean forward. During the takeoff roll, he leaned forward, wrapped both arms around the yoke, and hugged it to his chest. He sat back quickly, pulling the control yoke fully aft rapidly, and slappin the empennage against the grass runway. I pulled the throttle to idle quickly and stopped on the runway.
I found a channel carved in the grass, with a large divot of grass and mud jammed up between the rudder and empennage. An examination revelaed no damage, and we had a little talk,then went flying. He thoroughly enjoyed the flight, and left the airport with a positive experience.
There are various situations in flight in which you may encounter yourself faced with a passenger who panics, assumes control, blocks controls, reacts improperly, or does any number of things that are not expected, yet require your intervention during the flight.
During an evening IFR flight in a Seneca II, a passenger in the right seat experienced a heart attack, and slumped forward into the controls. He certainly wasn't a terrorist, and he wasn't attempting to cause me to experience control difficulties with the aircraft, yet he did.
On another occasion, the pilot flying in a Cessna 182 experienced a seat lock failure, with his seat rapidly sliding aft. He pitched up, holding onto the control yoke as he went. By taking control of the airplane quickly and blocking further aft movement of the control column, I was able to ensure a control loss or difficult situation didn't occur. This wasn't a matter of a terrorist, and it wasn't a matter of improperly seizing or "wresting" the airplane away. I simply physically took it from the other pilot, prevented the airplane from stalling or departing controlled flight, and gave it back when he had his situation again under control.
On another occasion as I taxied at night, again in a Seneca, my seatback failed. I fell backward, flat on my back. My feet came off the rudder pedals, and I couldn't see anything but the aircraft interior headliner. Fortunately this happened during a fairly low speed taxi. Had it been in flight, it would have been an excellent time for someone riding along to take the airplane quickly before something happened.
A month ago while flying into Kabul at night, we were descending and maneuvering for the localizer. I was not the pilot flying, but I observed the control column begin to vibrate rapidly, then heard several clicks behind me and to the right (circuit breakers opening as generators and busses went offline), and got a disconnect tone for the autopilot. The cockpit went dark, and the displays on one side of the cockpit went out. I took the controls briefly while we began to coordinate the problem, run checklists, and stabilize the situation while joining the localizer to land. Again, not a situation of terrorism or piracy, simply seeing a need, and filling it. Each crewmember addressed immediate action items, each did what needed to be immediately done, we communicated, we worked together, and shortly thereafter we were on the ground where we could troubleshoot more thoroughly.
You may be flying a light airplane which is served by a wing-leveler or simple autopilot. Many light airplanes do. The autopilot may be turned on, and you may be flying the airplane by operating the autopilot. I've experienced a number of runaways of autopilots, especially in ones installed in light airplanes. The autopilot may do that to you; taking control decisively before the trim is run all the way nose up or down, or even taking it and flying the airplane with the trim run to it's extreme limits, is a distinct possibility that shouldn't cause pause or hesitation.
You rent an airplane for the day, and take your friends and family along. You let them fly. You see a point during the flight when you must take control, and you do.
There is a nearly unending number of scenarios we could pull up to show that these types of things apply as equally to you as a private pilot in a light airplane, but I believe you get the point.
One area that private pilots generally don't tend to get any training is cockpit communication and resource management. You can have a passenger work for or against you, or simply be ballast. Personally, I like to use my passengers to help look for traffic, sometimes hold charts, and even act as impromptu autopilots. Often they're thrilled. It's possible that the passenger may do something wrong, perhaps completely unaware, perhaps intentionally, perhaps as an honest mistake. Passengers may get in over their head. They may get airsick. They may experience medical prolems, panic attacks, or any other number of situations one doesn't expect. I once was asked to fly a large woman from the Hopi Indian reservation to a hospital. She was very quiet, and while I waited for an ambulance to pick her up at the destination, I learned that it wasn't a simple transportation. She was a suicide patient. I hadn't been given that information, but she was twice my weight, and spent the flight in that light twin sitting next to me in the right seat. As you can imagine, I wasn't pleased.
During a landing on morning in a small twin turboprop, the young man in the right seat got ambitious and attempted to get stopped too soon on the runway. The airplane didn't have any antiskid, and he managed to nicely lock up both carbon brake assemblies and begin a reverberated rubber hydroplane that caused us to rapidly drift to one side of the runway. I yelled at him to get off the brakes, and he released his hands from the controls, but kept his feet on the brakes. He yelled "I'm off!" but kept applying the brakes. I took control of the airplane, yelled again to release the brakes, and ye replied that he was off the brakes, when he wasn't. I physically removed him from the controls and forced him back, while stopping the airplane before it left the edge of the runway.
In that particular case he was a copilot in a fractional charter operation. Instead of being a small turboprop, it could easily have been a small piston twin, and instead of a first officer he could have been a passenger, a buddy going for a flight with you, or any other scenario you could care to imagine. Who doesn't like to take their friends flying? Who doesn't like to split the cost of flying and share the flight with another flying buddy? Ever have someone do something unexpected?
One night as a private pilot, I split some time with another private pilot in a light single. We were doing some instrument flying, taking turns being safety pilot alternating with flying under a hood. It was very late at night, and we were in a remote area with few references. With or without the hood, we were flying on instruments. I was flying, and began to get warm. I had on a flight jacket, and attempted to remove it. In an acrobatic move I have yet to manage to duplicate to this day, I succeeded in getting my arms pinned back and stuck. It should have been a deft slipping off of the jacket, but I found myself unable to move, which naturally translated to being unable to fly the airplane.
Had I been single pilot, this boneheaded move on my part would have proven costly and potentially fatal. Fortunately, some quick communication lead to my safety pilot taking control of the airplane while I sorted out my new mentally-challenged escape trick. I knew of pilot who did that trick when he was flying a single seat crop duster, and it killed him. Again, you can see that the scenarios involving a change of control of the aircraft, an intervention, or handling of cargo, passengers, or any other number of situations are about as limited as your imagination; if you have a good imagination, then the possibilities are nearly endless.
One day while taking off in a 172 with a gentleman to whom I was giving a check-out for a flying club, we encountered something unusual at 150'. A large bumblebee flew out of the air vent, and began making it's rounds in the cockpit. The individual flying gave up flying the airplane, and began screaming, swatting, and of all things, throwing his very large, overstuffed wallet at the bee. In the meantime, I opened my side window and tried to usher the bee back to freedom. As you can guess, it was a very short time before the leather wallet full of cash and credit cards went flying out the window, though the bee remained.
The individual was very allergic to bees. I had no choice during the event but to take control, and while I was doing that, prevent his panic from interfering with the controls. The object was to get back on the ground in short order without causing a hazard, and to avoid his flying hands and fists. At the same time, I searched his gear for an epi-pen to give an injection in the event he did get stung. He was past rational thought and handling the situation; he wasn't thinking.
You can see that such a situation on his own, or with passengers, could have proven disasterous. Fortunately he had a flight instructor with him. A few months ago a pilot lost consciousness in a King Air, and a passenger took control and landed. These things happen. We hear about them from time to time. Rest assured that the scenarios, and particularly the principles that we're discussing most certainly apply to you, more directly than you might realize. I think that if you think about it, you'll come up with ample scenarios in which you could find yourself, in which these things surely do apply.
While the thread premise addresses a crew cockpit environment, certainly this has direct application to the private pilot, as well.
I flew tours in the Grand Canyon, mostly in Cessna 206's and 207's. I was with a load of tourists in a 207 one day, and noticed that every time I'd divert my attention outside for a few minutes, my power setting kept changing. I had the friction lock set, and it wasn't just the manifold pressure that was changing. The fuel flow varied as did the RPM.
I spied a passenger, sitting in the front right seat, wait until I was looking away, and then tweaking the power setting. I caught him doing it, and asked what he thought he was doing. Bearing in mind that we're in a heavily loaded single engine airplane over some very rough terrain with a lot of turbulence and often wind, I really didn't need someone else playing with my engine. The passenger told me that he owned a Cessna 206, and knew from his ownership that the airplane would operate much better at the power settings he was applying. I politely asked him not to do that any more.
A few moments later he did it again. I politely told him that if he touched the controls again, I would break his fingers.
Setting aside the legalities (it's illegal for him to manipulate the controls in that airplane in that operation), I didn't have time to discuss his mountain flying background, his 207 experience, his turbocharged experience, his high density altitude operations experience in type, and I really didn't care. At high power settings in the turbo 210, one can do serious damage to the engine in short order by improper leaning. Conversely, one can impact the fuel flow by changing the power settings, affecting my fuel reserve for the trip. I managed power with an eye to cylinder head temperatures as well; always a concern in that neck of the woods in the summer. If he caused me to have engine trouble, the consequences could be very dire. Moreover, I was trained and employed to do that job,and experienced doing it; he was not part of that operation, and had not met the requirements to be there.
That is nearly the exact opposite of the situations we've been discussing, but still an applicable tangent. Rather than taking control of someone else's show, this was a passenger improperly taking some measure of control with my own operation. Very inappropriate. This was a case in which the non-flying pilot/passenger (client, if you will; also client if you will not) needing to be controlled.
This wasn't a terrorist act, and it wasn't air piracy. It was an individual who acted beyond his appropriate bounds. What he may not have known about the 200 series Cessnas is that one can cause fuel flow fluctuations and ultimately engine failure by increasing the fuel flow too much, bypassing too much hot fuel to the wing root fuel kidney sump, which then passes hot vapor up the supply line from the wing and stops fuel flow to the selector, pump, and engine. Most pilots who fly 200 series Cessnas don't know this, including most owners. It's applicable to the 205, 206, 207, and 210. He acted in ignorance, and needed to be controlled.
Many years ago in Oklahoma, I taught a group of scouts their aviation merit badge,and promised each one an airplane ride if they completed the assignments. Each proudly completed their work, so on a Saturday morning we met at a grass airstrip, and I took each one for a ride in a Cessna 150.
I briefed them as a group before hand that I would do the takeoff, that they would get to fly the airplane once we were up and away, and I would do the landing. I encouraged them to follow through. The scoutmasters son was very short. He couldn't reach the rudder pedals. With his seatbelt fastened, he had to lean forward. During the takeoff roll, he leaned forward, wrapped both arms around the yoke, and hugged it to his chest. He sat back quickly, pulling the control yoke fully aft rapidly, and slappin the empennage against the grass runway. I pulled the throttle to idle quickly and stopped on the runway.
I found a channel carved in the grass, with a large divot of grass and mud jammed up between the rudder and empennage. An examination revelaed no damage, and we had a little talk,then went flying. He thoroughly enjoyed the flight, and left the airport with a positive experience.
There are various situations in flight in which you may encounter yourself faced with a passenger who panics, assumes control, blocks controls, reacts improperly, or does any number of things that are not expected, yet require your intervention during the flight.
During an evening IFR flight in a Seneca II, a passenger in the right seat experienced a heart attack, and slumped forward into the controls. He certainly wasn't a terrorist, and he wasn't attempting to cause me to experience control difficulties with the aircraft, yet he did.
On another occasion, the pilot flying in a Cessna 182 experienced a seat lock failure, with his seat rapidly sliding aft. He pitched up, holding onto the control yoke as he went. By taking control of the airplane quickly and blocking further aft movement of the control column, I was able to ensure a control loss or difficult situation didn't occur. This wasn't a matter of a terrorist, and it wasn't a matter of improperly seizing or "wresting" the airplane away. I simply physically took it from the other pilot, prevented the airplane from stalling or departing controlled flight, and gave it back when he had his situation again under control.
On another occasion as I taxied at night, again in a Seneca, my seatback failed. I fell backward, flat on my back. My feet came off the rudder pedals, and I couldn't see anything but the aircraft interior headliner. Fortunately this happened during a fairly low speed taxi. Had it been in flight, it would have been an excellent time for someone riding along to take the airplane quickly before something happened.
A month ago while flying into Kabul at night, we were descending and maneuvering for the localizer. I was not the pilot flying, but I observed the control column begin to vibrate rapidly, then heard several clicks behind me and to the right (circuit breakers opening as generators and busses went offline), and got a disconnect tone for the autopilot. The cockpit went dark, and the displays on one side of the cockpit went out. I took the controls briefly while we began to coordinate the problem, run checklists, and stabilize the situation while joining the localizer to land. Again, not a situation of terrorism or piracy, simply seeing a need, and filling it. Each crewmember addressed immediate action items, each did what needed to be immediately done, we communicated, we worked together, and shortly thereafter we were on the ground where we could troubleshoot more thoroughly.
You may be flying a light airplane which is served by a wing-leveler or simple autopilot. Many light airplanes do. The autopilot may be turned on, and you may be flying the airplane by operating the autopilot. I've experienced a number of runaways of autopilots, especially in ones installed in light airplanes. The autopilot may do that to you; taking control decisively before the trim is run all the way nose up or down, or even taking it and flying the airplane with the trim run to it's extreme limits, is a distinct possibility that shouldn't cause pause or hesitation.
You rent an airplane for the day, and take your friends and family along. You let them fly. You see a point during the flight when you must take control, and you do.
There is a nearly unending number of scenarios we could pull up to show that these types of things apply as equally to you as a private pilot in a light airplane, but I believe you get the point.
One area that private pilots generally don't tend to get any training is cockpit communication and resource management. You can have a passenger work for or against you, or simply be ballast. Personally, I like to use my passengers to help look for traffic, sometimes hold charts, and even act as impromptu autopilots. Often they're thrilled. It's possible that the passenger may do something wrong, perhaps completely unaware, perhaps intentionally, perhaps as an honest mistake. Passengers may get in over their head. They may get airsick. They may experience medical prolems, panic attacks, or any other number of situations one doesn't expect. I once was asked to fly a large woman from the Hopi Indian reservation to a hospital. She was very quiet, and while I waited for an ambulance to pick her up at the destination, I learned that it wasn't a simple transportation. She was a suicide patient. I hadn't been given that information, but she was twice my weight, and spent the flight in that light twin sitting next to me in the right seat. As you can imagine, I wasn't pleased.
During a landing on morning in a small twin turboprop, the young man in the right seat got ambitious and attempted to get stopped too soon on the runway. The airplane didn't have any antiskid, and he managed to nicely lock up both carbon brake assemblies and begin a reverberated rubber hydroplane that caused us to rapidly drift to one side of the runway. I yelled at him to get off the brakes, and he released his hands from the controls, but kept his feet on the brakes. He yelled "I'm off!" but kept applying the brakes. I took control of the airplane, yelled again to release the brakes, and ye replied that he was off the brakes, when he wasn't. I physically removed him from the controls and forced him back, while stopping the airplane before it left the edge of the runway.
In that particular case he was a copilot in a fractional charter operation. Instead of being a small turboprop, it could easily have been a small piston twin, and instead of a first officer he could have been a passenger, a buddy going for a flight with you, or any other scenario you could care to imagine. Who doesn't like to take their friends flying? Who doesn't like to split the cost of flying and share the flight with another flying buddy? Ever have someone do something unexpected?
One night as a private pilot, I split some time with another private pilot in a light single. We were doing some instrument flying, taking turns being safety pilot alternating with flying under a hood. It was very late at night, and we were in a remote area with few references. With or without the hood, we were flying on instruments. I was flying, and began to get warm. I had on a flight jacket, and attempted to remove it. In an acrobatic move I have yet to manage to duplicate to this day, I succeeded in getting my arms pinned back and stuck. It should have been a deft slipping off of the jacket, but I found myself unable to move, which naturally translated to being unable to fly the airplane.
Had I been single pilot, this boneheaded move on my part would have proven costly and potentially fatal. Fortunately, some quick communication lead to my safety pilot taking control of the airplane while I sorted out my new mentally-challenged escape trick. I knew of pilot who did that trick when he was flying a single seat crop duster, and it killed him. Again, you can see that the scenarios involving a change of control of the aircraft, an intervention, or handling of cargo, passengers, or any other number of situations are about as limited as your imagination; if you have a good imagination, then the possibilities are nearly endless.
One day while taking off in a 172 with a gentleman to whom I was giving a check-out for a flying club, we encountered something unusual at 150'. A large bumblebee flew out of the air vent, and began making it's rounds in the cockpit. The individual flying gave up flying the airplane, and began screaming, swatting, and of all things, throwing his very large, overstuffed wallet at the bee. In the meantime, I opened my side window and tried to usher the bee back to freedom. As you can guess, it was a very short time before the leather wallet full of cash and credit cards went flying out the window, though the bee remained.
The individual was very allergic to bees. I had no choice during the event but to take control, and while I was doing that, prevent his panic from interfering with the controls. The object was to get back on the ground in short order without causing a hazard, and to avoid his flying hands and fists. At the same time, I searched his gear for an epi-pen to give an injection in the event he did get stung. He was past rational thought and handling the situation; he wasn't thinking.
You can see that such a situation on his own, or with passengers, could have proven disasterous. Fortunately he had a flight instructor with him. A few months ago a pilot lost consciousness in a King Air, and a passenger took control and landed. These things happen. We hear about them from time to time. Rest assured that the scenarios, and particularly the principles that we're discussing most certainly apply to you, more directly than you might realize. I think that if you think about it, you'll come up with ample scenarios in which you could find yourself, in which these things surely do apply.
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For others, to be clear, what I said was that IF the pilot did anything dangerous then the option existed to resolve the situation, whereas if you agree to fly in a poorly maintained aircraft there is little you can do when it breaks in the air.
I dont think in regard to this thread the grounds are that much different between any "multi crew" enviroment be it two PPLs flying together in a SEP (not multi crew in the legal sense) or two commercial pilots flying together in a jet. SNS3Guppy made a good point in noting that in the true multi crew enviroment procedures are in place to deal with just such circumstances; the same procedures would serve two PPLs equally as well.
I suspect some of the reservations expressed on this thread stem from overbearing instructors who want to take control at every opportunity or reservations about why the chap in the right seat should "be better" than me - the flying pilot. I think this can be dangerous.
I related an example where the pilot "refused" to execute a go around despite having descended below DH and not establishing visual. It turns out he thought he would very soon become visual based on the ATIS and could safely conclude the flight. Presumably that is exactly what he would have attempted had he been on his own. The fact is he was already 150 feet below the DH and not visual when I decided I had had enough. Now whether he liked it or not forcing the go around was safe; even if I had misread the DH it didnt endanger the flight and having re-establsihed in the hold there was plenty of time to debate. The fact that I hadnt and he wanted to establish his own DH was another debate in itself but whether he liked it or not I wasnt going to descend 150 feet below the DH again with the hills behind the approach. My point is right or wrong it was better to debrief on a dangerous situation after the event rather than allow events to unfold with disasterous consequences.
Bose
I dont understand your argument. It is unusual for you to take a view that is so out of keeping with most others and I am intrigued why?
Fuji opined he'd be more concerned about the aeroplane because he could take over if necessary.
I dont think in regard to this thread the grounds are that much different between any "multi crew" enviroment be it two PPLs flying together in a SEP (not multi crew in the legal sense) or two commercial pilots flying together in a jet. SNS3Guppy made a good point in noting that in the true multi crew enviroment procedures are in place to deal with just such circumstances; the same procedures would serve two PPLs equally as well.
I suspect some of the reservations expressed on this thread stem from overbearing instructors who want to take control at every opportunity or reservations about why the chap in the right seat should "be better" than me - the flying pilot. I think this can be dangerous.
I related an example where the pilot "refused" to execute a go around despite having descended below DH and not establishing visual. It turns out he thought he would very soon become visual based on the ATIS and could safely conclude the flight. Presumably that is exactly what he would have attempted had he been on his own. The fact is he was already 150 feet below the DH and not visual when I decided I had had enough. Now whether he liked it or not forcing the go around was safe; even if I had misread the DH it didnt endanger the flight and having re-establsihed in the hold there was plenty of time to debate. The fact that I hadnt and he wanted to establish his own DH was another debate in itself but whether he liked it or not I wasnt going to descend 150 feet below the DH again with the hills behind the approach. My point is right or wrong it was better to debrief on a dangerous situation after the event rather than allow events to unfold with disasterous consequences.
Bose
I dont understand your argument. It is unusual for you to take a view that is so out of keeping with most others and I am intrigued why?
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Just to add to Guppys excellent response Pilots who fly single pilot are far more at risk of an accident than with a proper crew situation.
Some of the Citations I fly can be flown SP in some parts of the world and in certain operations.
Statistically the accident rate in those SP jets increases dramatically when flown SP (Single Pilot)
Starting with a PPL most low time PPLs will take family and friends for short hops in good weather and low winds. They fly well within their limits.
As they become more experienced they broaden their horizons and fly further afield. Often on pure costs these become shared flights so you end up with two PPLs flying leg about. Now you have a crew albeit not a trained crew.
In leaisure flying there are pilots and there are pilots some are pilots of the "right stuff" who are very competant can keep up with the game others are not so competant but are perfectly safe when in the right conditions.
The more further afield we go the less likely that weather will be constant throughout the trip.
When a pilot becomes overloaded his performance will start to decrease.
I remember an IMCR PPL who had gone out of his comfort zone on a single pilot flight in bad weather. He landed safely but was so stressed out he could not remember his own name and walked about like a vacant zombie when he exited the aircraft on landing and that was an example of overloading.
We all have different brains and different abilities to take in visual information as well as multi tasking as well as different abilities to deal with fear.
On airline selections candidates are put through multiple tests to check those abilities.
Not so in the PPL leaisure flying world. We are a very mixed bunch some are more able some less.
I liked Guppies reference to incapacitation. Obviously if the PIC drops dead at the controls he is incapacitated and another pilot in the right seat will have to fly.
For me incapacitation means that for whatever reason a pilot is unable to handle a situation as it should be handled. Whether that means he does not have the natural skills or abilities to handle certain weather or wind conditions or he has stressed himself out so much that his clear thinking brain has ceased to function then in my book he is incapacitated.
In that situation it is quite right for another pilot to intervene. Hopefully another pilot will have taken away many of the chores which will stop this pilot becoming overlaoded and as such will not have to interfere with the aircraft handling but not always!!!
So its really about flying within your personal limits whether new PPL experienced PPL ATP or whatever single pilot or crew.
It is when we go out of our limits that problems arise..
Fuji just read your piece which is slightly different as it appears that here you are dealing with a bravado risk taker pilot willing to go below minima and you over ruling his decision. You were quite right to do so! He may have been an excellent handling pilot but over cocky and overconfident which is a different problem again to the ones we have discussed.
Pace
Just to add to Guppys excellent response Pilots who fly single pilot are far more at risk of an accident than with a proper crew situation.
Some of the Citations I fly can be flown SP in some parts of the world and in certain operations.
Statistically the accident rate in those SP jets increases dramatically when flown SP (Single Pilot)
Starting with a PPL most low time PPLs will take family and friends for short hops in good weather and low winds. They fly well within their limits.
As they become more experienced they broaden their horizons and fly further afield. Often on pure costs these become shared flights so you end up with two PPLs flying leg about. Now you have a crew albeit not a trained crew.
In leaisure flying there are pilots and there are pilots some are pilots of the "right stuff" who are very competant can keep up with the game others are not so competant but are perfectly safe when in the right conditions.
The more further afield we go the less likely that weather will be constant throughout the trip.
When a pilot becomes overloaded his performance will start to decrease.
I remember an IMCR PPL who had gone out of his comfort zone on a single pilot flight in bad weather. He landed safely but was so stressed out he could not remember his own name and walked about like a vacant zombie when he exited the aircraft on landing and that was an example of overloading.
We all have different brains and different abilities to take in visual information as well as multi tasking as well as different abilities to deal with fear.
On airline selections candidates are put through multiple tests to check those abilities.
Not so in the PPL leaisure flying world. We are a very mixed bunch some are more able some less.
I liked Guppies reference to incapacitation. Obviously if the PIC drops dead at the controls he is incapacitated and another pilot in the right seat will have to fly.
For me incapacitation means that for whatever reason a pilot is unable to handle a situation as it should be handled. Whether that means he does not have the natural skills or abilities to handle certain weather or wind conditions or he has stressed himself out so much that his clear thinking brain has ceased to function then in my book he is incapacitated.
In that situation it is quite right for another pilot to intervene. Hopefully another pilot will have taken away many of the chores which will stop this pilot becoming overlaoded and as such will not have to interfere with the aircraft handling but not always!!!
So its really about flying within your personal limits whether new PPL experienced PPL ATP or whatever single pilot or crew.
It is when we go out of our limits that problems arise..
Fuji just read your piece which is slightly different as it appears that here you are dealing with a bravado risk taker pilot willing to go below minima and you over ruling his decision. You were quite right to do so! He may have been an excellent handling pilot but over cocky and overconfident which is a different problem again to the ones we have discussed.
Pace
Last edited by Pace; 20th Jan 2011 at 12:22.
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Yes a slight different situation.
I guess there are various reasons why pilots might place themselves in a dangerous situations - these include bravado, inexperience, being overloaded, tired, and even convinced they know best.
I was once flying with a chap who was reasonably solid. We did a complicated bit of nav through a few bits of very busy controlled airspace. For the final leg he managed to fly in totally the opposite direction. While there was no need to intervene on the controls of course I would never have believed had I not seen it with my own eyes how totally convinced he was that there was nothing wrong and how easily he would have bust Stansted class D. The chap was just totally overloaded and ended up really flustered. In just such circumstances had we been in IMC I dont doubt he could have very easily lost control as well.
On that particular pin at times I guess we have all danced (and may yet dance again) and for that reason I will never complain when the chap next to me gives the controls a wake up nudge if I am doing something stupid.
Yes a slight different situation.
I guess there are various reasons why pilots might place themselves in a dangerous situations - these include bravado, inexperience, being overloaded, tired, and even convinced they know best.
I was once flying with a chap who was reasonably solid. We did a complicated bit of nav through a few bits of very busy controlled airspace. For the final leg he managed to fly in totally the opposite direction. While there was no need to intervene on the controls of course I would never have believed had I not seen it with my own eyes how totally convinced he was that there was nothing wrong and how easily he would have bust Stansted class D. The chap was just totally overloaded and ended up really flustered. In just such circumstances had we been in IMC I dont doubt he could have very easily lost control as well.
On that particular pin at times I guess we have all danced (and may yet dance again) and for that reason I will never complain when the chap next to me gives the controls a wake up nudge if I am doing something stupid.
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Ever had someone attempt to shut down the wrong engine in flight, before? I have had that several times. If one is paying attention and guarding the engine controls, one can prevent fast hands from making light work.
It is intervening in someone else's actions with regard to the airplane, but it's some necessary intervening unless one intends to drastically alter one's plans.
I once watched an individual shut down both engines in a Twin Commanche as he prepared to land; he thought he had hold of both throttles, instead had both propeller levers, and feathered both engines simultaneously. That's not easy to do.
More than once, others have watched a pilot leave the gear up as he approaced to land, and said nothing. Famous comments like "I thought he was flying." or "he seemed to know what he was doing" sometimes trail in such disasters.
Many years ago, a freefall cameraman managed to get out the door on a jump while wearing his camera gear and no parachute. How many people on that airplane had an opportunity to observe him not wearing his gear? Nobody stopped him, nobody intervened. Perhaps in the final analysis we believe we all have the right to our own stupidity, but in the end, nobody pays alone for their own sins. Nothing we do affects us in a vacuum. Every action we take ripples and impacts other people, whether it's the family for whom we provide, grieving parents, or the schoolhouse full of little children upon which we inadvertently "land" in the haste to exercise our god-given right to be stupid.
Someone nearby, anyone, might just have the courage to intervene...
It is intervening in someone else's actions with regard to the airplane, but it's some necessary intervening unless one intends to drastically alter one's plans.
I once watched an individual shut down both engines in a Twin Commanche as he prepared to land; he thought he had hold of both throttles, instead had both propeller levers, and feathered both engines simultaneously. That's not easy to do.
More than once, others have watched a pilot leave the gear up as he approaced to land, and said nothing. Famous comments like "I thought he was flying." or "he seemed to know what he was doing" sometimes trail in such disasters.
Many years ago, a freefall cameraman managed to get out the door on a jump while wearing his camera gear and no parachute. How many people on that airplane had an opportunity to observe him not wearing his gear? Nobody stopped him, nobody intervened. Perhaps in the final analysis we believe we all have the right to our own stupidity, but in the end, nobody pays alone for their own sins. Nothing we do affects us in a vacuum. Every action we take ripples and impacts other people, whether it's the family for whom we provide, grieving parents, or the schoolhouse full of little children upon which we inadvertently "land" in the haste to exercise our god-given right to be stupid.
Someone nearby, anyone, might just have the courage to intervene...
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Starting with a PPL most low time PPLs will take family and friends for short hops in good weather and low winds. They fly well within their limits.
As they become more experienced they broaden their horizons and fly further afield. Often on pure costs these become shared flights so you end up with two PPLs flying leg about. Now you have a crew albeit not a trained crew.
As they become more experienced they broaden their horizons and fly further afield. Often on pure costs these become shared flights so you end up with two PPLs flying leg about. Now you have a crew albeit not a trained crew.
Whenever I fly with a pilot friend, we always brief:
a) the route: routing, navaids, alternates, cruising alt, controlling agencies, etc. This way, both pilots are mentally engaged and on the same page.
b) roles in the cockpit: IOW - who flies, who monitors, when. Also, if one of us is less familiar with a given a/c, who has control when or at what point it is transferred (see also my earlier post re this).
I've never done a MCC or any other CRM course, neither have the friends I fly with. It does, however, help to try to approximate a multi-crew environment, even in private flying.
When flying with non-pilot pax, I try to engage them and help with lookout, hold the charts, etc. Most people enjoy being 'part of it' rather than ballast.
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I've taken control a couple of times during landing. It was instinctive, the chap let his airspeed decay far too low (despite me shouting airspeed at him when I noticed) and we started to sink like a stone with no attempt at a flare and I felt it was going to end badly. So I instinctively grabbed the stick and hauled back which managed to cushion the blow somewhat and save the nose wheel I reckon.
I must add that I knew the other pilot was less experienced and I was flying with him as safety pilot as he felt uncurrent.
I must add that I knew the other pilot was less experienced and I was flying with him as safety pilot as he felt uncurrent.
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Bose
I dont understand your argument. It is unusual for you to take a view that is so out of keeping with most others and I am intrigued why?
I dont understand your argument. It is unusual for you to take a view that is so out of keeping with most others and I am intrigued why?
As far a passenger flying in a GA aircraft, where on earth do people get off thinking they have the experience and skill just to jump in and take over at there whim?
Put it another way Fuji, I take you for a flight in the Dornier, you don't like the look of my flying and feel that you need to 'wrest' control from me. Please explain exactly how you plan on putting down several tonnes of turboprop on your own?
As an Instructor I am used to intervening when students make mistakes, but that is because a 'contract' exists between student and Instructor as to the nature of the flight and the Instructors right to intervene at anytime and if necessary take control of the aircraft. The Instructor bears the responsibility of ensuring they are familiar with the aircraft and capable of taking control and safely returning to the runway as required.
As a passenger, I am just that a passenger and as such I would be very wary of thinking I had the right to hijack an aircraft in flight because I did not like the way it was being flown. Once you have taken command you become responsible for the safety of the flight.
I also happen to think that the currency and testing requirements are up to the job and outside of a teaching environment generally give people enough credit to trust they are up to the job. If you suspect they are not, then don't go flying with them.....
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Interesting thoughts here with respect to formal two crew flying environments. Those such operations are nearly always beyond the scope of private flying, the certainly do merit consideration by private pilots. My two crew flying of the early 80's was unfortunately rather informal, and as it was corporate, not airlines, it probably predated the adoption of those good practices into most two crew operations. Happily, I expect that this co-ordinated approach would be much more the norm now. From time to time, test flying I do, pairs me with a second pilot who does, and requires that I do things properly, and I respect that. It is excellent discipline!
As I read here the very correct references to "challange and response", I am reminded that that is where I have got it wrong in the various events where I felt I had to take over. I did not (out of a sense of courtesy) challenge, and I should have - much earlier. I just quietly waited to see if things got better, assuming the other pilot would see what I was seeing, without my prompting. Sometimes yes, sometimes no - then suddenly I have no time to ease things to be better, I just have to jump right in and take over. Not so good. Ideas in this thread have promoted a better way of thinking for me - thanks!
During my receiving advanced helicopter training, I was always concious of my "getting close to the edge" (toe ins in confined areas seemed the most tense), as I would notice my mentor pilot's hands go from being folded across his chest, to resting on his knees, to finally being poised right in the position to grab the controls instantly. He actually apologized for doing this, but told me there was no room for me to make a mistake, and his having time to reach across quickly enough to fix it. Pilot briefing - perfectly fine! "that's why I'm flying with you" I told him. I knew I was getting really good training!
Most of my episodes of suddenly realizing that I'd better do something quick to save the day, occurred while I was flying as a mentor pilot, to a lesser experienced pilot on an advanced single propeller aircraft. Being young and poor, I would be in awe of these doctor lawyer types who could afford a brand new Cessna 185 or 206 amphibian. It just seemed natural, that if they could afford the plane, they could fly it. Who am I to interfere? Well, the insurance companies were requiring that a pilot like me (still only a modest PPL though - no sky god) "do 10 hours" with these pilots. I began to understand why. Being able to afford it, has nothing to do with being able to fly it well!
In one case, a pilot new owner of a Bellanca Viking was my charge. After 17 hours of flying it, and it being long past the planned time for him to take it home, I told him that I would not be able to recommend him to be insured yet. He was polite to me, but took it anyway. He made it as far as I know, but I worried.
Reading Guppy's event with the "helper" pilot in the 207, yeah, that guy would be incurring my wrath very quickly, and probably be promptly taken home.
As I read here the very correct references to "challange and response", I am reminded that that is where I have got it wrong in the various events where I felt I had to take over. I did not (out of a sense of courtesy) challenge, and I should have - much earlier. I just quietly waited to see if things got better, assuming the other pilot would see what I was seeing, without my prompting. Sometimes yes, sometimes no - then suddenly I have no time to ease things to be better, I just have to jump right in and take over. Not so good. Ideas in this thread have promoted a better way of thinking for me - thanks!
During my receiving advanced helicopter training, I was always concious of my "getting close to the edge" (toe ins in confined areas seemed the most tense), as I would notice my mentor pilot's hands go from being folded across his chest, to resting on his knees, to finally being poised right in the position to grab the controls instantly. He actually apologized for doing this, but told me there was no room for me to make a mistake, and his having time to reach across quickly enough to fix it. Pilot briefing - perfectly fine! "that's why I'm flying with you" I told him. I knew I was getting really good training!
Most of my episodes of suddenly realizing that I'd better do something quick to save the day, occurred while I was flying as a mentor pilot, to a lesser experienced pilot on an advanced single propeller aircraft. Being young and poor, I would be in awe of these doctor lawyer types who could afford a brand new Cessna 185 or 206 amphibian. It just seemed natural, that if they could afford the plane, they could fly it. Who am I to interfere? Well, the insurance companies were requiring that a pilot like me (still only a modest PPL though - no sky god) "do 10 hours" with these pilots. I began to understand why. Being able to afford it, has nothing to do with being able to fly it well!
In one case, a pilot new owner of a Bellanca Viking was my charge. After 17 hours of flying it, and it being long past the planned time for him to take it home, I told him that I would not be able to recommend him to be insured yet. He was polite to me, but took it anyway. He made it as far as I know, but I worried.
Reading Guppy's event with the "helper" pilot in the 207, yeah, that guy would be incurring my wrath very quickly, and probably be promptly taken home.
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I think "whim" is far too cavalier and I dont think anyone has suggested it would be appropriate in those circumstances. However I guess one man's whim isnt anothers.
However to deal with specifics - there have been some good examples given. What would you do? Pick a few.
For example the pilot descends below the DH and keeps going? You have asked him to go around - but he doesnt. Do you allow him to keep going down?
As a complete aside as it happens I have landed many tons of jet so I'd give it a go BUT of course I would not want to. I do know if you kept on descending below the DH the point would come that I would do something about it but I'd be happy to hand the controls back to you once you had sorted yourself out or demonstrated you had a very good reason for flying us into a hill side.
However to deal with specifics - there have been some good examples given. What would you do? Pick a few.
For example the pilot descends below the DH and keeps going? You have asked him to go around - but he doesnt. Do you allow him to keep going down?
Put it another way Fuji, I take you for a flight in the Dornier, you don't like the look of my flying and feel that you need to 'wrest' control from me. Please explain exactly how you plan on putting down several tonnes of turboprop on your own?
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It does, however, help to try to approximate a multi-crew environment, even in private flying.
During our PPL training we've had at least 45 hours of training all geared towards Single Pilot operations. We're trained to handle everything on our own, from the moment we start flying solo.
To properly perform in a Multi-crew environment requires an extensive training course which, as I understand, not just touches on the issue of transferring control and separation of duties/responsibilities, but also talks extensively about human psychology.
To start operating in a quasi-MCC mode without this extensive training, but with just a briefing on the route you're going to fly sounds very dangerous. The big trap of course is that the "designated" PIC (the one who signs for the aircraft, or however that's arranged) is the less experienced one, and flies the aircraft into a situation beyond his capabilities, in the hope/assumptioin that the "experienced" passenger will take over. Who is then confronted with a situation that he probably would have averted long ago.
So I'd rather fly a 100% single pilot operation than a half-baked MCC one. If I have an experienced pilot with me, I may give him a few tasks to perform, like flying the aircraft for a bit, or tuning the radios, but I'm not going to defer any responsibility to him, or in another way implicitly rely on his skills to bring the flight to a successful conclusion.
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As a complete aside as it happens I have landed many tons of jet so I'd give it a go BUT of course I would not want to. I do know if you kept on descending below the DH the point would come that I would do something about it but I'd be happy to hand the controls back to you once you had sorted yourself out or demonstrated you had a very good reason for flying us into a hill side.
So you were in such danger that you wrested control from me and then think that for some reason I am going to have sorted myself out enough to land the thing? How does that work then?
As far answering the scenarios I have seen so far on this thread, I have seen old timers stories of the horrors of the multicrew cockpit in the frozen to death days and a couple of PPL anecdotes. Multicrew stories from old timers are just that, stories. If you can show me occurrences from this century that warrant the discussion then fair enough. The only one I can think of was some arab first officer who sat frozen praying to allah and had to be removed from the flight deck. The multicrew environment is so well trained and regulated these days that if you so much as fart out of place the company will pick it up and wash it through the safety management system.
I would like to think that those of us flying Single Crew Commercialy are also trained and regulated to the same level of professionalism of a multi crew aircraft. Again the extremely low accident rate would bare this out.
So moving onto the flyers in there spam cans. If you take the Instructing scenario out of this the only stories on here are anecdotal from people who think they knew better than the pilot in command and either intervened in a small way by calling out with advice or felt the urge to offer an element of physical assistance. But in the examples quoted by Pace for example, how was he to know that in the split second he took control the pilot was not going to go around and have another go. What would have happened if despite his 3000hrs on Senecas he had binned it? I would bet the guy in the LHS would have said that he had it under control and Pace intervened without authority. That would make for an interesting insurance claim and AIB report!!
What I was trying to point out with the quote if the dictionary terms is there is a difference between offering assistance and even being given control as a result of the offer and seizing or wresting control from the lawful commander.......
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If you can show me occurrences from this century that warrant the discussion then fair enough.
Turkish Airlines Flight 1951 - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
In addition to the (training) captain and first officer, there was another (trainee) pilot on board.
To this day nobody (including the official investigation) has been able to answer the question why none of the three on the flight deck noticed that the flight director/autopilot, based on wrong information from the RadAlt, let the speed decay to well below Vref and eventually to Vs, while they were still miles short of the threshold and 1000' above.
Curiously, the CVR recording has never been released in full (as far as I know) and the investigation report only lists those snippets of conversation of the last five minutes of flight time that it deems important. But these are only the routine callouts and R/T conversations. I still wonder what went on in that cockpit that's not being reported.
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So in fact it looked like nobody wrested control and saved the day in that example backbacker...... back to my original point methinks.
My question was around specific incidents on a modern airliner in recent times where control has been wrested from commander in order to save the aircraft and lives of the passengers.
My question was around specific incidents on a modern airliner in recent times where control has been wrested from commander in order to save the aircraft and lives of the passengers.
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So you would have a go at landing it? And if you get it wrong?
So you were in such danger that you wrested control from me and then think that for some reason I am going to have sorted myself out enough to land the thing? How does that work then?
who think they knew better than the pilot in command
Join Date: Jan 2001
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Bose written on I phone. I am sure you are the type of pilot who would never need taking over but I am amazed that other than with students you have never as a very experienced pilot had to do so with a lesser pilot.
Btw I would be happy to land your Dornier
As for the Seneca porpoise you obviously have never experienced it. The worst thing you can do is stamp on the brakes as the bucking gets worse and self perpetuating until the nose collapses. That pilot did exactly that frozen at the controls a passenger to an out of control aircraft.
There is only one way out and I have no hesitation in taking control and saving the aircraft.
As for commercial ops there are scores of examples the Ryanair 737 details I posted here.
Pace
Btw I would be happy to land your Dornier
As for the Seneca porpoise you obviously have never experienced it. The worst thing you can do is stamp on the brakes as the bucking gets worse and self perpetuating until the nose collapses. That pilot did exactly that frozen at the controls a passenger to an out of control aircraft.
There is only one way out and I have no hesitation in taking control and saving the aircraft.
As for commercial ops there are scores of examples the Ryanair 737 details I posted here.
Pace