hollo

There are lots of posts saying something along these lines, and others saying that extending CAS around all the airports with instrument approach would eat up large quantities of class G airspace.

Where there is an ILS in class G it is marked on the chart. If I am flying near one I am certain not to cross it at a height which would put me on the glide path. Would it not be possible to give an implicit extension to the ATZ along the ILS glide path to make avoiding this area required rather than just sensible? It would only need to be 500ft above/below the 3 degree glide path, and a short distance to either side, and would take little airspace. I guess most pilots avoid this piece of airspace anyway.

I'm not suggesting this would have been helpful in this sad accident, just responding to the issue raised above.

ComJam

NigelonDraft

Thanks, that's the most sensible post on the subject so far.



It's impossible to be 100% safe when flying outside of CAS (or within it to be honest).

Inkjet: I understand your point but...i spend most of my working day hand flying ILS calibrations without the autopilot in, without the flight-director and in VFR conditions. That's exactly what (i understand) the 402 was doing.

Ultimately, when calibrating we're flying visual approaches (with all that it entails) and NOT flying a precision instrument approach. We can't fly precision instrument approaches when the engineers are deliberately mis-aligning the LOC or GS in order to check the Alarms etc etc.

So, in this case, you'll find that both aircraft were (in all probability) flying visual approaches and the supposed protection of flying an ILS was not required.

Whether traffic information was passed by ATC to the 2 aircraft involved remains to be seen.

In the end it's a horrific accident that comes down to "see and be seen" not working. Only TCAS and transponding aircraft might have saved the situation.

22/04

Well

I woud hope that any glider pilot/ PPL would realise that an approach to any airfield with potential instrument approaches in Class G is to be treated with the utmost respect.

Situational awareness hasn't ben mentioned but is key here. If both pilots were taliking or even monitoring CVT then they should have been in a see and avoid or (the Rand pilot) does not cross the approach.

I have to admit there are many private pilots who do not fully understand this or get into overload so readily that they can't practise it.

Corsairoz

Of course, condolences to all those involved and affected.

With all this discussion on the methodology and statistics of a good lookout, has anyone thought of the relevance of the time and the weather?

Assuming the 402 was on a straight in approach to runway 23, and assuming the KR2 was in a left hand circuit, with the time at 1138 would the KR2 not be directly into the sun from the 402 cockpit as it approached to turn onto finals?

Idle musings, probably assuming too much

NorthSouth

ComJam:I don't think you can say that either because you don't know what ATC instructions either aircraft had received. One might have been told "cleared low approach and go around" while the other was told to orbit on base (or whatever). ATC instructions are a vital part of the picture so until we know what those were you can't say it was a failure of see and avoid. Anyone who's flown at Coventry will know that instructions to aircraft in the circuit are many and varied because of the diverse mix of VFR and IFR traffic.
NS

ComJam

NorthSouth, in common with most airfields in the UK the users are many and varied, there are many ATC instructions involved and there's a mix of IFR and VFR.

However, if the aircraft is VFR the responsibility for not ramming another aircraft rests with the the Captain regardless of ATC instructions. That goes for both aircraft involved.

We will not know what the ATC instructions were, what traffic information was passed or what each aircraft was actually doing until the AAIB complete their report.

I am absolutely NOT trying to blame anyone, it's a terrible accident that I feel close to and one that I hope we can all learn from.

Clutter & Gain

A very sad incident and my condolences for all involved.
There are too many unknowns about the incident, most mentioned already, for any wise man to make any assumptions.

However, what is worrying when these incidents happen is the lack of understanding or misunderstanding of rules, airspace, responsibilities, flight rules and separation standards made by people posting their comments.

Pilots - I urge you to visit your local control tower, especially if they operate inside Class G airspace with radar. If this is not possible try and phone the SATCO or another ATCO at the unit for a briefing on local operating procedures and equipment available to them. Please brush up on relevant sections, discussed on this forum, from the AIP.
ATCOs - If you havn't flown in a light A/C before please try and arrange it. It will show you how much harder it is to spot the A/C you should be following compared to the moving picture we have on the radar/ATM. I think it will make for a more understanding controller.

CRX
Generally right, but as for the extra separation for the B737 if he was IFR doesn't really apply (except for vortex if a/c following). The Aerodrome (or Approach) controller is responsible for providing advice and instructions if needed for the safe integration of VFR flights against aircraft making instrument approaches irrespective of their flight rules, so the actions in most cases would be the same as there are no separation standards applicable in either case.

G-EMMA
You seem to have been taught well but it is only recommended that pilots call ATC when flying close to an airfield with IAPs. There are a small minority of pilots who are more than happy to fly through final approach between 2 and 8 miles that do not want to talk to ATC, I dare say keeping a good lookout. So I would say that most, if not all, ATCOs at the airports you mentioned would love some protected airspace, if not CAS something similiar to a MATZ would be ideal and surely would keep everyone happy.

I hope my first ramblings are received in the spirit they are intended.
Will stop now... fingers struggling to keep up with little brain.

VP959

Having refreshed my ancient knowledge of the ANO, and leaving aside the practicalities of keeping a good lookout when flying a non-coupled ILS approach, I am still surprised that there is a view that ATC can, or should, provide anything other than advice to any aircraft flying in class G.

I wholeheartedly agree that it would be reasonable for a pilot to expect some form of protection when flying an instrument approach into a big airport, but as I read the ANO no such protection actually exists in law in this case - just like anyone else in that bit of airspace (notwithstanding the priority given by Rule 17) the pilot has to use see and avoid as his/her primary means of avoiding a collision.

Clearly this is unrealistic, which highlights again how iffy this whole concept is. Add in the liklihood that many private flyers will assume (perhaps wrongly) that any aircraft making an approach in class G, better than VMC minima, will be flying under VFR and there is an even greater liklihood of a problem (give way rules etc, where you shouldn't give way if you have the right of way unless a collision is likely - to give way when you shouldn't can increase the collision risk).

All very sad, but we can, perhaps, hope that this dreadful accident highlights what I think is a serious issue that needs to be addressed to prevent further deaths.

VP

IO540

I think they key here is that the Cessna, ILS or not, was on a VFR flight as far as ATC were concerned.

An inbound 737 would have been IFR all the way down to the runway and would have received IFR separation (from participating traffic only, obviously, this being Class G).

criss

Separation in class G??

mm_flynn

Clearly there are many facts not yet available in this particular case, but the general case of mixing IFR and VFR traffic seems to have generated a lot of confusion.

As I understand the ICAO rules -only in Class B and C are VFR and IFR actually separated. In all other classes IFR flights either get traffic information on VFR or nothing.

In most countries, on a VMC day there will be VFR and IFR traffic both using an airport and most countries don't have the VFR traffic orbit for 5 minutes while an IFR approach happens, they slot the traffic together efficiently - just like what probably was happening in Coventry - why it didn't work and what should be done about it awaits the AAIB report.

However, it is concerning that such a volume of people are operating IFR, apparently unaware that the cacooned world of low level Class A and Class D operated like Class B that is the South of England is the exception rather than the norm. In particular, the expectation that being 'IFR' in Class G gives some sort of protected airspace. Although sometimes it feels like we have four types of flight rules (VFR, VFR in IMC, IFR non-airways, IFR airways) - There really are only two and IFR coming off an airway (or cleared on an ILS) may get a different default service from ATC, but to my knowledge it isn't a different set of rules to other IFR flying.

As I understand it in France, Benelux, Germany, Australia, USA, South Africa, etc. VFR traffic can and do operate into most airports and in 'airways airspace' up to roughly 18000 feet intermixed with IFR traffic.

The UK is however clearly unique in the world in having such large amounts of heavily trafficked Class G AND allowing flight in this airspace in IMC without participating in any separation or information service AND providing a Class G separation to participating IFR traffic from SOME other IFR and VFR traffic. To that extent, I think there are some real questions about airspace design and separation service. HOWEVER, this doesn't seem to be relevant to a situation where (on current information) both aircraft were in contact with ATC and both were approaching to land, the conditions were VMC - this could equally have happened in Class D airspace (operated to ICAO standards), and it could have happened regardless of which flight rules the 402 was following (clearly if the 402 was receiving a RAS service he would be separated from everything - but once again a UK unique service)

IO540

Fair enough, what I meant is that traffic in the circuit would have received polite requests to do such and such.

There are many grey areas in this stuff.

Obviously a 737 cannot fit into a visual circuit with five C152s going round in it - it cannot fly slowly enough. Something has to give. Like I say, grey areas.

Well said, mm_flynn. The UK is indeed much busier with VFR GA than anywhere else I have been in Europe. I would say of the order of 5-10 times more than France, for example.

criss

But its the problem of the operator that sends a 737 to a class G airport known for lots of VFR.

Judging from this thread, one source of the problem is lack of understanding of airspace classes.

I'm not sure whether UK has that much more VFR/GA traffic than Europe - rather it has much more uncontrolled airports used by IFR traffic.

dragqueen120

Zones and airspace, rules and regs dont physically stop aeroplanes, Just like red lights dont physically stop cars. Keep ya eye out people, where ever the fault lies the most important thing is to be aware and stay alive.

Thoughts go out to the famillies and friends this effects.

Kursaal Flyer

Air crash: Blackdown pilot among the dead - Leamington Spa Today - Back to Home Page

Condolences to all concerned.

slip and turn

It is heartening to see thoughts rapidly crystallising in this thread now. I think there has always been a somewhat undefined problem with airspace and approaches like this - witness the few feathers on the VFR chart - they are only there surely to indicate a hazard, but what exactly? I don't know when they were first introduced but they've been on the half mill for at least twenty years to my knowledge. Generally each one is quite different. Pilots have generally needed to go to a particular aerodrome with a feather and talk to locals to see what it really might mean.

However, the hazard also varies with each one according to particular aerodrome use from day to day. For some years in the last twenty I can even imagine that one or two of these aerodromes have been so quiet that local flyers barely give the feathers a second thought. But UK wide I guess we are busier than ever at the moment. Incidentally, slightly countering IO540's experience, many UK PPLs will be familiar with sometimes very busy airfields sur le continent not dissimilar to this, so although we obviously have much higher population density, it may not simply be a UK problem.

As to the hazard itself, traffic density coupled with effectiveness of radar oversight is key, of course, as is the knock on effect of interventions in neighbouring airspace use and design.

I am sure all those mourning the loss of the five at Coventry (and I am sure there are many near and far) will be pleased to see that in the space of just a couple of days the informal analysis (like this thread) is already helping thousands of flyers re-evaluate and sharpen up pending official AAIB conclusions.

Ultimately I am sure it will boil down to 'just one of those things but it was the third that tipped the scale' but irrespective of the exact cause of this accident, safety around aerodromes will already be improved by awareness generated here.

The variation in existing understanding may surprise some, but focussed learning or re-learning of the MO of other flyers and of what improves the odds of avoiding future upset in local areas or elsewhere is a valuable lesson for all.

It remains to be seen what, if any, firm changes may be required after AAIB reports in due course.

DX Wombat

volrider, you and your fellow workers have my total admiration for what you do. I am a retired nurse so have a reasonable idea of what you probably face when you arrive at such a scene especially when it involves people you know. What we see in A&E Departments is bad enough. Thank you for what you do, I'm sure the families and friends involved appreciate it.

olster

Condolences to all involved in this tragic and awful accident;also justifiable praise and admiration to all rescue services who arrive on the scene.As a pilot for the obvious 737 operator in and out of CVT I have been dreading this news for a long time.

I am a keen supporter of general aviation and currently fly privately as well as professionally but whatever the 'rights and wrongs' this is an accident that should never have been allowed to happen.There is a similar setup at DSA and the mix of IFR and VFR traffic is potentially catastrophic. I would have no interest in speculation as to how the system broke down but I would suspect that frequent users of CVT airspace certainly would not have predicted this but would have feared an event such as this or indeed one involving a 737.

The current system is at fault and there are many potential solutions not least mandatory TCAS for all aircraft.Very sad for all involved.

S-Works

I see 3/4 of the Cessna crew have now been identified and the pilot of the SE. Do we know who the 4th person from the Cessna is yet.

I knew the pilot of the Cessna Sophie, a fine pilot and and pleasant person and knew James in passing from WW.

I understand that the training Capt from RV was onboard so I assume it that was the other female. The lady who flies/flew the DC3 for Atlantic?

A very sad loss.

mm_flynn

Why IFR/VFR? Why TCAS? There are plenty of places that manage the mix at much higher levels of traffic density. In this case it doesn't even appear anyone was IFR - it is a problem that could happen anywhere - other than an airport that allows only radar vectored ILSs.

Something clearly has gone badly wrong and as an industry we need to understand and respond. But even with TCAS and Mode S and IFR only operations and two person crews and positive radar control we have unfortunately demonstrated twice in recent years you can still crash aircraft into each other. Once the facts are available, then solutions can be proposed.