Blackpool 3/2/07
Joined: Oct 1999
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From: Ireland
Years ago as a young inexperienced pilot with about the same hours as Andrew Walker. I found myself in a situation which could easily have ended the same way.
I flew to an airfield and found the weather deteriorating. It was unforecast cloud down to 200 feet. I made the decision to stay on the ground. I was alone so no pressure from accompanying pilots. But what followed surprised and dismayed me. Well, the phone lines ran red hot with the CFI demanding to know why I didn't fly out. Then I had the owner call me. The airport manage even got in on the act and suggested I could go. The pressure was intense but luckily for me there was no reassuring 'experienced pilot' to encourage me to fly. Besides the nearby mountain being encased in cloud and my utter lack of instrument time made the decision easy.
In the end they needed the aircraft back so another was despatched, flown by an experienced airline pilot accompanied by another private pilot. He flew out to sea descended to 200 feet before they broke cloud and got in. When they arrived I was treated with utter contempt by the two other pilots. I felt like s***. I was dumped in the back of my aircraft and we took off, entered cloud at 200 feet and didn't emerge until we hit 5000 feet.
Later I was hauled before the CFI accused (falsely) of continued flight into IMC and failing to check the weather and I was grounded. I felt I must be a terrible pilot.
Later of course, I realised I was the only one who had acted properly that day. The CFI and owner put pressure on an inexperienced pilot to fly into IMC. The 'rescue' pilot also flew illegally below an MDA and again into IMC on a VFR flight plan.
So I understand the pressure Andrew Walker was under. If I'd had some instrument time. I might well have taken off and I might well have got away with it or I might have ended up embedded in the side of a nearby hill or in a smoking hole after spinning out of cloud. Believe me I was sorely tempted to take off and take a chance. If another experienced pilot was with me. I undoubtedly would have taken off.
When you are a young low time pilot, you do defer to more experienced pilots expecially if they are sitting beside you. It's all very well saying he was PIC and therefore he must take responsibility for his actions. In a way he did. He died. But the accident sequence started when the CFI and three other pilots decided to fly in poor weather in an aircraft not equipped to do so and ask an inexperienced pilot lacking currency to fly the thing. So there's plenty of blame to share around.
So you can blame Andrew Walker and say he was PIC and must take responsibilty. In bald terms that's true. But this is a world of greys not black and white. On another day. They might all have got away with it. But the luck runs out eventually.
I flew to an airfield and found the weather deteriorating. It was unforecast cloud down to 200 feet. I made the decision to stay on the ground. I was alone so no pressure from accompanying pilots. But what followed surprised and dismayed me. Well, the phone lines ran red hot with the CFI demanding to know why I didn't fly out. Then I had the owner call me. The airport manage even got in on the act and suggested I could go. The pressure was intense but luckily for me there was no reassuring 'experienced pilot' to encourage me to fly. Besides the nearby mountain being encased in cloud and my utter lack of instrument time made the decision easy.
In the end they needed the aircraft back so another was despatched, flown by an experienced airline pilot accompanied by another private pilot. He flew out to sea descended to 200 feet before they broke cloud and got in. When they arrived I was treated with utter contempt by the two other pilots. I felt like s***. I was dumped in the back of my aircraft and we took off, entered cloud at 200 feet and didn't emerge until we hit 5000 feet.
Later I was hauled before the CFI accused (falsely) of continued flight into IMC and failing to check the weather and I was grounded. I felt I must be a terrible pilot.
Later of course, I realised I was the only one who had acted properly that day. The CFI and owner put pressure on an inexperienced pilot to fly into IMC. The 'rescue' pilot also flew illegally below an MDA and again into IMC on a VFR flight plan.
So I understand the pressure Andrew Walker was under. If I'd had some instrument time. I might well have taken off and I might well have got away with it or I might have ended up embedded in the side of a nearby hill or in a smoking hole after spinning out of cloud. Believe me I was sorely tempted to take off and take a chance. If another experienced pilot was with me. I undoubtedly would have taken off.
When you are a young low time pilot, you do defer to more experienced pilots expecially if they are sitting beside you. It's all very well saying he was PIC and therefore he must take responsibility for his actions. In a way he did. He died. But the accident sequence started when the CFI and three other pilots decided to fly in poor weather in an aircraft not equipped to do so and ask an inexperienced pilot lacking currency to fly the thing. So there's plenty of blame to share around.
So you can blame Andrew Walker and say he was PIC and must take responsibilty. In bald terms that's true. But this is a world of greys not black and white. On another day. They might all have got away with it. But the luck runs out eventually.
Joined: Nov 2000
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From: UK
Bose,
You have made your point many times. I don’t think I hear many people arguing with you on the technical or legal side. Someone in that aircraft was P1 of some fashion. They made terrible mistakes. They paid for them. That is not in question.
I can only try to express what others have said about the outfit and the CFI that let that first leg depart. There are questions that have either not been answered, regarding, at least moral culpability, at worst operational legality of the training organisation or have been kept from the investigations report.
I will totally agree that P1 is responsible and that should remain so, but I do have issues about that first flight, its subsequent impact on the return and the seemingly non-existent actions against the operators of the aircraft.
LF
You have made your point many times. I don’t think I hear many people arguing with you on the technical or legal side. Someone in that aircraft was P1 of some fashion. They made terrible mistakes. They paid for them. That is not in question.
I can only try to express what others have said about the outfit and the CFI that let that first leg depart. There are questions that have either not been answered, regarding, at least moral culpability, at worst operational legality of the training organisation or have been kept from the investigations report.
I will totally agree that P1 is responsible and that should remain so, but I do have issues about that first flight, its subsequent impact on the return and the seemingly non-existent actions against the operators of the aircraft.
LF
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From: Europe
Can't speak for the ATC on duty at Blackpool at the time, but generally ATC are not policeman, and are limited in what they can do to restrict flight.
They may have information on the Flight Rules being followed, or might not especially if no Flight Plan is filed and the aircraft 'freecalls'. With no Controlled Airspace at Blackpool, the pilot has more leeway in deciding which rules to fly under.
A pure PPL holder can of course fly under IFR outside CAS if they so wish, the rules are not dependent on IMC or VMC conditions. Only the pilot knows his qualifications and the aircraft equipment fit. Only the pilot knows if he is legal to make an approach. Only the pilot knows the actual VMC/IMC conditions he is currently flying through.ATC do not and have no remit to question the pilot.
There are of course 'aerodrome operating minima' rules in the ANO. In ANO terms, there is a limitation on visual range. If the RVR is below that specified for the airfield, then the pilot cannot descend below a height of 1000'. Minimum descent altitudes (which are relevant to the cloudbase) are also part of the ANO article, and appear in the published Instrument Approach plate. The pilot must not descend below these published heights (or altitudes) unless the visual reference altitude is obtained. Whilst ATC can certainly advise that the first minima is not being met (RVR), they have no way of making any judgement on the second, even if the reported cloudbase is below the published minima. Only the pilot in the air can see the visual reference ... or can't.
The ANO also states that
Yet another failing of the PIC on this fatal flight, whichever pilot that might have been.
Some posts talk of the ''crew'' failing, assuming that it was a multi crew operation, but this cannot be the position legally. The PA28 is a single crew aircraft. There is no P2 and thus no P2 responsibility. Whilst the 2nd person on board might have been assisting with tasks and helping with any decision making processes, in law they had no crew responsibilities. That is solely down to the designated P1.
Thanks for your story Corsair. Lots of good human factors issues in there and I am glad you made the sensible and correct decision.
They may have information on the Flight Rules being followed, or might not especially if no Flight Plan is filed and the aircraft 'freecalls'. With no Controlled Airspace at Blackpool, the pilot has more leeway in deciding which rules to fly under.
A pure PPL holder can of course fly under IFR outside CAS if they so wish, the rules are not dependent on IMC or VMC conditions. Only the pilot knows his qualifications and the aircraft equipment fit. Only the pilot knows if he is legal to make an approach. Only the pilot knows the actual VMC/IMC conditions he is currently flying through.ATC do not and have no remit to question the pilot.
There are of course 'aerodrome operating minima' rules in the ANO. In ANO terms, there is a limitation on visual range. If the RVR is below that specified for the airfield, then the pilot cannot descend below a height of 1000'. Minimum descent altitudes (which are relevant to the cloudbase) are also part of the ANO article, and appear in the published Instrument Approach plate. The pilot must not descend below these published heights (or altitudes) unless the visual reference altitude is obtained. Whilst ATC can certainly advise that the first minima is not being met (RVR), they have no way of making any judgement on the second, even if the reported cloudbase is below the published minima. Only the pilot in the air can see the visual reference ... or can't.
The ANO also states that
A flight shall not be continued towards the aerodrome of intended landing unless the latest available information indicates that conditions at that aerodrome, or at least one alternate aerodrome, will, at the estimated time of arrival, be at or above the specified aerodrome operating minima.
Some posts talk of the ''crew'' failing, assuming that it was a multi crew operation, but this cannot be the position legally. The PA28 is a single crew aircraft. There is no P2 and thus no P2 responsibility. Whilst the 2nd person on board might have been assisting with tasks and helping with any decision making processes, in law they had no crew responsibilities. That is solely down to the designated P1.
Thanks for your story Corsair. Lots of good human factors issues in there and I am glad you made the sensible and correct decision.
Joined: Jan 2006
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From: An island somewhere
Andrew Walker should have clearly established the operating status of the other guy if he believed the flight to be Instructional
However, the background to this flight is surely vital in understanding Mr Walker's mindset. Two key factors:
1) Andrew Walker had planned with the club to undertake refresher training that day.
2) The particular flight was initiated at the request of the club CFI after, we are told, he had been informed by Andrew Walker that he lacked the legally required currency to carry passengers and was therefore unable to act as PIC.
In those circumstances, I wonder how many pilots (especially those with only 110 hours spread over twelve years), would have queried whether the pilot arranged by the CFI to accompany him was legally qualified to, and intent on, carrying out an instructional flight? And how many would have simply made the reasonable assumption that they were?
Based only on the information available to us in the AAIB report, I'm near certain camp I would have been in.
Last edited by Islander2; 21st April 2008 at 13:00.
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From: UK,Twighlight Zone
I have used the term crew to refer to the fact that their were two qualified pilots onboard and therefore there should have been twice the capacity to make good calls. As it turns out it was twice the capacity to make bad calls.
Long final, I have had to make the point several times because we seem to be drifting towards a witch hunt towards holding the CFI/School responsible because they encouraged the flight. There is also a lot of vitrolic and emotion surrounding the allegedly dodgy antics of this organisation and their are people trying to push the responsibility from the 'crew' to other people when to my mind the crew were responsible for their own actions.
I am therefore trying to separate the emotion and bad blood from what should be a sober learning experience for us all.
So what have I learnt from the death of fellow aviators?
Legality - Always ensure that I am fully legal and current for the flight in question.
Peer Pressure - I am pilot in command, my decision is full and final. If that means I end up in a hotel stranded then so be it, it is the nature of private aviation.
Aircraft suitability - Is the aircraft suitable for the planned mission? If not then as pilot in command I will refuse the flight regardless of how many more experienced people tell me it will be fine.
Command decisions - Did I preflight plan correctly? Is the weather suitable for the planned nature of the flight. Do I have sufficient fuel for destination and diversion? Have I carried out a proper weight and balance.
I am not interested in the rest of the blackpool politics that seem to surround this because I am not looking to transfer blame through emotional involvement.
Long final, I have had to make the point several times because we seem to be drifting towards a witch hunt towards holding the CFI/School responsible because they encouraged the flight. There is also a lot of vitrolic and emotion surrounding the allegedly dodgy antics of this organisation and their are people trying to push the responsibility from the 'crew' to other people when to my mind the crew were responsible for their own actions.
I am therefore trying to separate the emotion and bad blood from what should be a sober learning experience for us all.
So what have I learnt from the death of fellow aviators?
Legality - Always ensure that I am fully legal and current for the flight in question.
Peer Pressure - I am pilot in command, my decision is full and final. If that means I end up in a hotel stranded then so be it, it is the nature of private aviation.
Aircraft suitability - Is the aircraft suitable for the planned mission? If not then as pilot in command I will refuse the flight regardless of how many more experienced people tell me it will be fine.
Command decisions - Did I preflight plan correctly? Is the weather suitable for the planned nature of the flight. Do I have sufficient fuel for destination and diversion? Have I carried out a proper weight and balance.
I am not interested in the rest of the blackpool politics that seem to surround this because I am not looking to transfer blame through emotional involvement.
Joined: Jan 2008
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From: London
Corsair
Very impressive.
The difference between you and the Blackpool pilot is that you resisted. Of course peer pressure is hard to resist. Thats why we must all, as pilots, be aware of this pressure and teach ourselves to resist it when our little angel tells us to do so.
It keeps coming back to the same issue. Being PIC is more than flying an aeroplane. It also means understanding what PIC means.
I am sure many pilots who have read this thread will have thought hard about this and i hope we all will continue to do so, so that hopefully we can be Corsairs and not Blackpool statistics.
Perhaps we should all also wonder what will happen if, god forbid, something happens to US. Do we want our relatives to involve others in case the AAIB reports it as being our fault? How do we as pilots stand versus the no cure no pay lawyers? Can we legally prevent anything should we so wish in our wills?
I for one would not like anyone else to be sued for my death unless the AAIB found i had no part in my demise.
just trying to break the taboo.......
Very impressive.
The difference between you and the Blackpool pilot is that you resisted. Of course peer pressure is hard to resist. Thats why we must all, as pilots, be aware of this pressure and teach ourselves to resist it when our little angel tells us to do so.
It keeps coming back to the same issue. Being PIC is more than flying an aeroplane. It also means understanding what PIC means.
I am sure many pilots who have read this thread will have thought hard about this and i hope we all will continue to do so, so that hopefully we can be Corsairs and not Blackpool statistics.
Perhaps we should all also wonder what will happen if, god forbid, something happens to US. Do we want our relatives to involve others in case the AAIB reports it as being our fault? How do we as pilots stand versus the no cure no pay lawyers? Can we legally prevent anything should we so wish in our wills?
I for one would not like anyone else to be sued for my death unless the AAIB found i had no part in my demise.
just trying to break the taboo.......
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From: Richard Burtonville, South Wales.
I've followed the thread as it has developed, and am full of sympathy for those who have had loss.
It seems to me that captaincy is the underdeveloped skill in this (and perhaps in GA?) episode.
I once witnessed (as a lowly sergeant crewman) a freshly minted Flying Officer Puma pilot refuse to take off in the face of serious pressure from an Air Commodore. The weather was poor. The FO reminded the Air Comm that he was the aircraft captain; and that he would wait an hour before making a decision. The other guy was livid- but here's the thing- he stopped pushing.
The green suited sky God thing wears thin in the RAF sometimes, but one thing that was up front in big letters was 'YOU ARE THE CAPTAIN, NO-ONE OVERRULES YOU'.
That didn't always stop idiots pressing on and killing themselves, but it always gave the aircraft commander a legal position from which to say 'No!'.
That might be the lesson worth learning here- whilst noting that most student pilots see air law as a chore. This bit is important.
CG
It seems to me that captaincy is the underdeveloped skill in this (and perhaps in GA?) episode.
I once witnessed (as a lowly sergeant crewman) a freshly minted Flying Officer Puma pilot refuse to take off in the face of serious pressure from an Air Commodore. The weather was poor. The FO reminded the Air Comm that he was the aircraft captain; and that he would wait an hour before making a decision. The other guy was livid- but here's the thing- he stopped pushing.
The green suited sky God thing wears thin in the RAF sometimes, but one thing that was up front in big letters was 'YOU ARE THE CAPTAIN, NO-ONE OVERRULES YOU'.
That didn't always stop idiots pressing on and killing themselves, but it always gave the aircraft commander a legal position from which to say 'No!'.
That might be the lesson worth learning here- whilst noting that most student pilots see air law as a chore. This bit is important.
CG
Joined: May 2006
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From: North West
The further lessons to be learned do indeed concern the elephant in the room. The FTO is no more. But the head elephant lives on.
Several have commented on the FTO aspect.
The "de facto" CFI moved quickly to place this flight outside of the remit of his FTO. If he hadn't it would have placed the flight squarely under the rules of the flying order book, which sets out clear limitations for flight and places responsibilities on post holders. The aaib comments that the aircraft only had a private cat cofA, another reason why it couldn't be operated by an FTO. The paperwork for the aircraft was missing when the aaib went looking - maintainence books, tech logs etc..
An incident at Blackpool just a few weeks ago involved an aircraft taxying with some force into a fuel bowser. Look out for it in the GASIL MOR summary in coming months. A simple and stupid mistake by the PIC - yes. No prizes for guessing who handed the keys to them. This incident is now been investigated in depth by the CAA, again there are conflicting reports of who was in the aircraft, who was manipulating the controls and who was PIC. This time no one was hurt , but history is free to repeat itself..
Several have commented on the FTO aspect.
The "de facto" CFI moved quickly to place this flight outside of the remit of his FTO. If he hadn't it would have placed the flight squarely under the rules of the flying order book, which sets out clear limitations for flight and places responsibilities on post holders. The aaib comments that the aircraft only had a private cat cofA, another reason why it couldn't be operated by an FTO. The paperwork for the aircraft was missing when the aaib went looking - maintainence books, tech logs etc..
An incident at Blackpool just a few weeks ago involved an aircraft taxying with some force into a fuel bowser. Look out for it in the GASIL MOR summary in coming months. A simple and stupid mistake by the PIC - yes. No prizes for guessing who handed the keys to them. This incident is now been investigated in depth by the CAA, again there are conflicting reports of who was in the aircraft, who was manipulating the controls and who was PIC. This time no one was hurt , but history is free to repeat itself..
Joined: Feb 2008
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From: Manchester
An incident at Blackpool just a few weeks ago involved an aircraft taxying with some force into a fuel bowser. Look out for it in the GASIL MOR summary in coming months. A simple and stupid mistake by the PIC - yes. No prizes for guessing who handed the keys to them. This incident is now been investigated in depth by the CAA, again there are conflicting reports of who was in the aircraft, who was manipulating the controls and who was PIC. This time no one was hurt , but history is free to repeat itself..
As for the CFI that handed them the keys (to his aeroplane I might add), IMO no one at Blackpool has tried harder, a combination of terrible luck and severely bad judgement will and has been his undoing.
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From: Surrey
One assumes, though it is not clear, that the flight departed IFR. Or atleast the ATC believed it was IFR.
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Seconded very good post and unfotunatly not unique.
Its funny though isn't it. All these GA CFI guru's on flying tend to stay being big fish in puddles. And the guy's that move on generally realise quite quickly that thier respect for said guru was sadly miss placed.
Its funny though isn't it. All these GA CFI guru's on flying tend to stay being big fish in puddles. And the guy's that move on generally realise quite quickly that thier respect for said guru was sadly miss placed.
Joined: Jan 2008
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From: London
so Horebox, surely the CFI must be prosecuted for handing the keys to his own plane to somebody who drives it into a bowser!
Come on guys! Lets separate bad luck from wilfull illegal activities.
The guy has a bad name, perhaps rightly so. I dont know him.
Perhaps the CFI was not smart enough to make his business work in the decent way and thats why he bent the rules.
Perhaps he bent the rules wilfully out of bad character.
Perhaps he was in the s**t to his neck or perhaps he just didn t care or perhaps, just perhaps he did tell the pilot of the fatal flight that he would be P1 and it was his call.... How do we know?
All we know is on the second flight that day 2 pilots died from fuel exhaustion/nil visibility/wrong altimeter setting. One of those was PIC. The AAIB claims it was Mr Walker.
That flight should never have taken off
The previous flight should never have taken off either, but thats an entirely different story
Till he has been prosecuted he is not guilty.
Come on guys! Lets separate bad luck from wilfull illegal activities.
The guy has a bad name, perhaps rightly so. I dont know him.
Perhaps the CFI was not smart enough to make his business work in the decent way and thats why he bent the rules.
Perhaps he bent the rules wilfully out of bad character.
Perhaps he was in the s**t to his neck or perhaps he just didn t care or perhaps, just perhaps he did tell the pilot of the fatal flight that he would be P1 and it was his call.... How do we know?
All we know is on the second flight that day 2 pilots died from fuel exhaustion/nil visibility/wrong altimeter setting. One of those was PIC. The AAIB claims it was Mr Walker.
That flight should never have taken off
The previous flight should never have taken off either, but thats an entirely different story
Till he has been prosecuted he is not guilty.
Joined: Nov 2000
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From: UK
Bose,
I would agree splitting the subject, and indeed there is a thread on the instructor’s forum now. My fear would be the characters involved are still around, still unchanged in their practices and methods. A ‘witch hunt’, depending on your personal definition, would not correctly describe what most of the informed Blackpool people are involved in pursuing.
LF
I would agree splitting the subject, and indeed there is a thread on the instructor’s forum now. My fear would be the characters involved are still around, still unchanged in their practices and methods. A ‘witch hunt’, depending on your personal definition, would not correctly describe what most of the informed Blackpool people are involved in pursuing.
LF
Joined: Jan 2006
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From: An island somewhere
All we know is on the second flight that day 2 pilots died from fuel exhaustion/nil visibility/wrong altimeter setting. One of those was PIC. The AAIB claims it was Mr Walker.
They say it's because: a) he was paying for the flight; b) he was seated in the left seat; and c) he was almost certainly handling the controls throughout the flight.
They give no other evidence to support their conclusion and, since the issue of who was pilot-in-command gets its own section in their report, it would be surprising if there were other considerations they had withheld.
Somebody needs to point out to them that those three conditions also apply in almost all cases to a PU/T.
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From: Ireland
Don't give me too much credit. I do believe that if another 'experienced' pilot was with me. I might well have deferred to him. I was lucky in one sense that the pressures such as they were. were at the end of a phone. Plus I was an avid reader of FLYING magazine's aftermath articles so was well scared of thought of CFIT! Nevertheless at one point I sat in the left seat with the key in my hand ready to go.
If you look at with a critical eye, in fact I eventually did get in the back of the aircraft knowing full well conditions were IMC and the flight was illegal, admittedly with highly experienced pilot. But was sufficiently cowed by then that the possibility of catching the train home never entered my head.
So my sympathies are with Andrew in this case. All the other individuals involved knew better. For all we know, he did too but I know what I was like at that level of experience. In exactly the same situation that would have been me.
If you look at with a critical eye, in fact I eventually did get in the back of the aircraft knowing full well conditions were IMC and the flight was illegal, admittedly with highly experienced pilot. But was sufficiently cowed by then that the possibility of catching the train home never entered my head.
So my sympathies are with Andrew in this case. All the other individuals involved knew better. For all we know, he did too but I know what I was like at that level of experience. In exactly the same situation that would have been me.
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From: An island somewhere
perhaps, just perhaps he did tell the pilot of the fatal flight that he would be P1 and it was his call.
Last edited by Islander2; 21st April 2008 at 11:49.
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From: UK,Twighlight Zone
So from Islanders point, Andrew Walker could have assumed that the outbound flight was an Instructional flight as it had the CFI in the RHS, presumably this could explain how a departure into 200ft took place.
This still does not explain the accident flight which was the return flight. We have to be careful to make sure that we are discussing the accident flight and not the out bound flight.
Andrew Walker could have refused that flight but instead he took the left hand seat, did not refuel and the 2 crew set off in an aircraft that did not have the correct equipment or the fuel for the trip. That was clearly a planning issue and showed poor airmanship on the part of both of the pilots on board. He would have known his passenger was no longer an Instructor so he knew that hew was still one landing short of legal yet they still took off.
This still does not explain the accident flight which was the return flight. We have to be careful to make sure that we are discussing the accident flight and not the out bound flight.
Andrew Walker could have refused that flight but instead he took the left hand seat, did not refuel and the 2 crew set off in an aircraft that did not have the correct equipment or the fuel for the trip. That was clearly a planning issue and showed poor airmanship on the part of both of the pilots on board. He would have known his passenger was no longer an Instructor so he knew that hew was still one landing short of legal yet they still took off.