Cloud blamed in fatal plane crash
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He hadn't ever flown the accident route before. The route he had flown early in the day was from Shobdon to Caernarfon.
I'm wondering....
Did the pilot perhaps not even think of following the coast? When you do your PPL, many instructors emphasise lines on maps and headings; track crawls and following line features are somewhat frowned upon. I agree it sounds crazy, but is it possible that the idea of following an unfamiliar coastline didn't even occur to him, if he'd never done it before? After all, he only had 116 hours. And with 12 done in the last 90 days, this could well be someone who learned to fly less than two years ago - an average 60 hours to PPL at an airfield well inland, then a year flying alone. And summer 2006 was unusually good, so he might not have been used to nasty weather in the montains, if he'd ever flown in them at all.
It makes as much sense as anything else in this sad episode. I intend to learn from it, and emphasise to my students that they can take any sensible route and plan it any sensible way, especially in bad weather. Though to be honest, in helicopters we do tend to do that anyway.
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I'm not so sure there is much of a mystery. From the report we suspect that the visibility was not much above 4km, that he might have been flying 300' lower than he thought and that they didn't fly the coast route as they said they would.
The crucial point for me is the visibility. 4km visibility, despite being above VMC minima, is bloody awful. In a Cessna there would only be about 80-90 seconds from visual of the hill/mountain to impact. Clearly it is conceivable that some workload issues and the attendant distractions would reduce this time to much less than not very much, conceivably not enough to avoid. Especially considering the potential altimeter error, it is highly likely that the minute required to climb the 500' needed to clear the hill would be insufficient. The runner does say that the engine pitch seemed to increase just before the accident.
The crucial point for me is the visibility. 4km visibility, despite being above VMC minima, is bloody awful. In a Cessna there would only be about 80-90 seconds from visual of the hill/mountain to impact. Clearly it is conceivable that some workload issues and the attendant distractions would reduce this time to much less than not very much, conceivably not enough to avoid. Especially considering the potential altimeter error, it is highly likely that the minute required to climb the 500' needed to clear the hill would be insufficient. The runner does say that the engine pitch seemed to increase just before the accident.
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Fuji, I know we are probably boring the pants off some people, but I think your going the wrong way with your understanding, I'm only saying this as I think you are as interested as I am regarding why this pilot made the decisions he did.
There are some on here who would say - oh well, another CFIT, stupid fella, all he had to do was stick to the basic mantras.
Of course whilst true, that achieves nothing.
A great deal can be learnt by trying to understand what happened and why it happened - what was going on in the mind of the pilot. From that understanding accidents of this type are less likely to occur in the future and (lest we also forget the basic mantras) we are also less likely ourselves to make the same mistakes.
Sure as the day is long despite the basic mantras accidents of this sort continue to happen but I think because of your interest in wanting to understand why you are far les likely for it to ever happen to you.
B twit - yes I agree a more complete understanding of the radar trace would be very interesting. I also wonder if the AAIB looked at the radar trace of the outbound flight to see which route the pilot had taken? I also meant to check what time of day it was - late afternoon I think - but I cant recall the time of year. Where was the sun and what impact might that have had on visibility?
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There are some on here who would say - oh well, another CFIT, stupid fella, all he had to do was stick to the basic mantras.
Of course whilst true, that achieves nothing.
A great deal can be learnt by trying to understand what happened and why it happened - what was going on in the mind of the pilot. From that understanding accidents of this type are less likely to occur in the future and (lest we also forget the basic mantras) we are also less likely ourselves to make the same mistakes.
Of course whilst true, that achieves nothing.
A great deal can be learnt by trying to understand what happened and why it happened - what was going on in the mind of the pilot. From that understanding accidents of this type are less likely to occur in the future and (lest we also forget the basic mantras) we are also less likely ourselves to make the same mistakes.
But on the other hand... Maybe that simplistic "stick with the basic mantras" view is indeed the most important and useful lesson to be learnt, not specifically from this accident, but from the sum total of hundreds of similar accidents that have happened to anything from low-hours PPLs to 20,000+ hour airliner captains?
All prompted by some very bad decisions, taken during circumstances that are conducive to bad decisions.
While there are of course many situations where there may be sufficiently safe (or even safer) to depart from the 'basic mantras', one's ability to pinpoint those situations the course of "tactical decision making", in the air or in a challenging situation just before a flight about to go sour, is seriously limited.
Or in other words: The closer one is to the plane, and especially while in the air, the more important it is to stick with 'rule based' decision making, and stay away from 'knowledge based' behavior, to the largest extent possible.
The realization that 'knowledge based' decision making is a remarkably error prone process, and best undertaken in the safety and stress free behavior of one's home, whereas tactical decision making should be 'rule based' whenever possible; that lesson I find even more useful than trying to understand how and why this particular pilot made his mistakes in this particular case.
I am particularly interested in this accident because I am planning to go to Caenarfon next year and am keen to learn any lessons I can.
I happened to have the above chart on the screen just now and Mrs p walked in. I explained what I was looking at and she immediately suggested that he was closely following the mountain line and, just where he crashed, that line turns Northwards. If he was looking more to the right, at the mountainside, he might not have seen the change in direction in the poor visibility until it was too late. The radar plot looks as if he turned left just before the crash.
Whether this is the correct explanation or not, the lesson for me is to keep well clear of mountains unless:
1. The visibility is good and likely to stay good. At the first sign of deterioration, turn away.
2. There is no chance of turbulence i.e wind very light. From my gliding days, a change in direction of a hillside is often a site of more severe turbulence.
I happened to have the above chart on the screen just now and Mrs p walked in. I explained what I was looking at and she immediately suggested that he was closely following the mountain line and, just where he crashed, that line turns Northwards. If he was looking more to the right, at the mountainside, he might not have seen the change in direction in the poor visibility until it was too late. The radar plot looks as if he turned left just before the crash.
Whether this is the correct explanation or not, the lesson for me is to keep well clear of mountains unless:
1. The visibility is good and likely to stay good. At the first sign of deterioration, turn away.
2. There is no chance of turbulence i.e wind very light. From my gliding days, a change in direction of a hillside is often a site of more severe turbulence.
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It suggests they did know the coastal route existed, as they arrived by it?
As per my previous post, I agree with Pulse1 that the visibility is probably the core part of the gotcha. I am surprised to read another previous post suggesting that 4km vis would not have posed any issues though
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would be fascinated to know if radar tracks always look jagged like this due to accuracy of the fix
No, they are supposed to be pretty good. I've seen some and they were straight. Also, if under IFR under a "radar heading" I deviate say 10 degrees from my track (due to the autopilot taking a few tens of seconds to stabilise after a track intercept) ATC are onto me within seconds.
However, radar does not have the absolute position accuracy people think it has. At say 30nm, there can be a 2nm error in azimuth. Less so on the distance to the head. Your GPS is 100x more accurate than ATC radar when it comes to your position. I've been told on a few occassions that I was close to /in some airspace but clearly I wasn't, and confirmed it at the time with a DME reading.
No, they are supposed to be pretty good. I've seen some and they were straight. Also, if under IFR under a "radar heading" I deviate say 10 degrees from my track (due to the autopilot taking a few tens of seconds to stabilise after a track intercept) ATC are onto me within seconds.
However, radar does not have the absolute position accuracy people think it has. At say 30nm, there can be a 2nm error in azimuth. Less so on the distance to the head. Your GPS is 100x more accurate than ATC radar when it comes to your position. I've been told on a few occassions that I was close to /in some airspace but clearly I wasn't, and confirmed it at the time with a DME reading.
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The radar plot is a general guide to the progress of the aircraft.
The first thing one has to remember is that the radar only sees the aircraft once every 4 seconds if an approach radar (15 RPM) and once every 6 seconds for enroute (if I remember correctly) (10 RPM).
The second is that when the return comes back to the radar a bit of electronics decides the exact position of the aircraft and this combined with the accuracy of the radar, reflections from mountains etc can mean that the position plotted hops from side to side of the actual track of the aircraft.
Remember also that the radar provides an indication of track, if the wind speed changes by some 10Kt and heading remains constant then crusiing at 90Kt, there will be a noticeable change in drift.
Thus it would be more helpful to plot the actual radar returns (or responses if SSR was used) and leave the blanks between just that - blank.
Now I don't know a low time VFR pilot that can hold a heading perfectly for any length of time. Even if you glued the heading on the DI to the lubber line, the heading would drift due to the precession of the gyro.
So all we can take from the radar trace is that the pilot paralled track until after passing overhead Caernarfon where it appears a track correction was made until the aircraft regained planned track and then the TMG followed the planned track.
---------------
I wish UK flight instructors would learn that planning to use the coast or another obvious line feature as a handrail during visual navigation is not track crawling. I wish that they would also teach that with such an obvious handrail present, provided one remains on the correct side, one can ignore obstacles on the other side and thus plan a lower minimum level to fly at.
If the pilot recorded their minimum level as 4900 and their planned level as 1800 then where in the training system did they learn that it was OK to fly underground?
4900 - 300 for unknown obstacle = 4600 which is 1000ft above the highest terrain on the chart.
4600 - 500 = 4100 puts the flight potentially operating at the minimum level which is the absolute legal limit according to ICAO and most other countries. In the UK, there is no such limit but if 500ft above terrain and passing over a 4ft 0ins person, the low flying rules are breached by 4ft.
4100 - 500 = 3600 which is potentially ground level.
Planning to fly at half the height of the terrain is criminal............but is it the pilot or the training that is at fault?
The whole idea of calling it a minimum is that it is a minimum. How you calculate the minimum or the margins used do not change the fact the the chosen minimum is the minimum.
One also wonders what factor the incorrect fear of infringing a MATZ that sometimes is seen in the UK forced the pilot to keep as far as possible from the Valley MATZ. Was this a factor which detered the pilot from simply flying north after take-off until the coast was reached?
Regards,
DFC
The first thing one has to remember is that the radar only sees the aircraft once every 4 seconds if an approach radar (15 RPM) and once every 6 seconds for enroute (if I remember correctly) (10 RPM).
The second is that when the return comes back to the radar a bit of electronics decides the exact position of the aircraft and this combined with the accuracy of the radar, reflections from mountains etc can mean that the position plotted hops from side to side of the actual track of the aircraft.
Remember also that the radar provides an indication of track, if the wind speed changes by some 10Kt and heading remains constant then crusiing at 90Kt, there will be a noticeable change in drift.
Thus it would be more helpful to plot the actual radar returns (or responses if SSR was used) and leave the blanks between just that - blank.
Now I don't know a low time VFR pilot that can hold a heading perfectly for any length of time. Even if you glued the heading on the DI to the lubber line, the heading would drift due to the precession of the gyro.
So all we can take from the radar trace is that the pilot paralled track until after passing overhead Caernarfon where it appears a track correction was made until the aircraft regained planned track and then the TMG followed the planned track.
---------------
I wish UK flight instructors would learn that planning to use the coast or another obvious line feature as a handrail during visual navigation is not track crawling. I wish that they would also teach that with such an obvious handrail present, provided one remains on the correct side, one can ignore obstacles on the other side and thus plan a lower minimum level to fly at.
If the pilot recorded their minimum level as 4900 and their planned level as 1800 then where in the training system did they learn that it was OK to fly underground?
4900 - 300 for unknown obstacle = 4600 which is 1000ft above the highest terrain on the chart.
4600 - 500 = 4100 puts the flight potentially operating at the minimum level which is the absolute legal limit according to ICAO and most other countries. In the UK, there is no such limit but if 500ft above terrain and passing over a 4ft 0ins person, the low flying rules are breached by 4ft.
4100 - 500 = 3600 which is potentially ground level.
Planning to fly at half the height of the terrain is criminal............but is it the pilot or the training that is at fault?
The whole idea of calling it a minimum is that it is a minimum. How you calculate the minimum or the margins used do not change the fact the the chosen minimum is the minimum.
One also wonders what factor the incorrect fear of infringing a MATZ that sometimes is seen in the UK forced the pilot to keep as far as possible from the Valley MATZ. Was this a factor which detered the pilot from simply flying north after take-off until the coast was reached?
Regards,
DFC
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provided one remains on the correct side
Which way round the Isle of Wight (or any other island) do people fly then? The obvious desired direction is clockwise, a mile or so out over the sea, so that the passenger gets the view of the island's coast. This is of course against the rules.
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It is interesting to see that everyone lays the blaim completely with the pilot. Knowing more than some of you might I would suggest it may be educational to also look in the direction of the school he learnt to fly at, the instructors, the standards and the pilots flying order book.
Give some thought to if you owned a flying school or club would you mark this departure airfield as one that needed an instructor briefing before setting out?
Its no use describing a pilot as a low hour PPL after the accident, describe him as such before the flight and give him the support and help that should go with a tight professionally run operation.
Give some thought to if you owned a flying school or club would you mark this departure airfield as one that needed an instructor briefing before setting out?
Its no use describing a pilot as a low hour PPL after the accident, describe him as such before the flight and give him the support and help that should go with a tight professionally run operation.
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Knowing more than some of you might I would suggest it may be educational to also look in the direction of the school he learnt to fly at, the instructors, the standards and the pilots flying order book.
I couldn't agree more.
Some of the practices in PPL training are atrocious.
But nothing can be done about that. The best one can hope for is that people will be sufficiently intelligent to identify the problem areas (like the crappy fuel management practices that go on) and either do things differently, or chuck in flying altogether.
The vast majority do the latter, which is another reason why things carry on. Very few people get a chance to really test their training. If everybody with a PPL used it to fly regularly from A to B, there would be mayhem.
I couldn't agree more.
Some of the practices in PPL training are atrocious.
But nothing can be done about that. The best one can hope for is that people will be sufficiently intelligent to identify the problem areas (like the crappy fuel management practices that go on) and either do things differently, or chuck in flying altogether.
The vast majority do the latter, which is another reason why things carry on. Very few people get a chance to really test their training. If everybody with a PPL used it to fly regularly from A to B, there would be mayhem.
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I can't see anything in the report that could be attributed to training.
May I suggest, if you can still find a copy, "The Pilot in Command" by Martin Cass. It is about incomprehensible and inexplicable decisions by pilots who did know better. A horrible thing to say, but judging by my interpretation of the report, this sadly seems to be the case here too.
May I suggest, if you can still find a copy, "The Pilot in Command" by Martin Cass. It is about incomprehensible and inexplicable decisions by pilots who did know better. A horrible thing to say, but judging by my interpretation of the report, this sadly seems to be the case here too.
Give some thought to if you owned a flying school or club would you mark this departure airfield as one that needed an instructor briefing before setting out?
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Tony
Thanks but in nearly 20,000 hours of flying from Tipsy Nippers to the Airbus I have many of my own experiences to call upon rather than reading books, although I will at some stage look at this book as I think it is always important to keep an open mind. I would caution everybody to give some thought about that just because something is in print does not mean it is correct or even wise. As a researcher( in another area) I can assure you that the number of factual errors in books are quite alarming.
Bookworm
Thank you, The accident reports over the last 50 years show that virtually all fatal accidents occur with low hour pilot’s after they have signed the licence which slightly invalidates your argument.
Why do you think for instance this particular pilot never killed himself while he was training, here are some clues for you.
Supervision
Authorisation
Familiarity with the destination flown to.
If this doesn’t work for you could reflect on, ‘
‘ A rulebook is a guide to a wise man and a bible for a fool!
Thanks but in nearly 20,000 hours of flying from Tipsy Nippers to the Airbus I have many of my own experiences to call upon rather than reading books, although I will at some stage look at this book as I think it is always important to keep an open mind. I would caution everybody to give some thought about that just because something is in print does not mean it is correct or even wise. As a researcher( in another area) I can assure you that the number of factual errors in books are quite alarming.
Bookworm
Thank you, The accident reports over the last 50 years show that virtually all fatal accidents occur with low hour pilot’s after they have signed the licence which slightly invalidates your argument.
Why do you think for instance this particular pilot never killed himself while he was training, here are some clues for you.
Supervision
Authorisation
Familiarity with the destination flown to.
If this doesn’t work for you could reflect on, ‘
‘ A rulebook is a guide to a wise man and a bible for a fool!
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llanfairpg,
I fear you have the wrong end of the stick. I don't doubt your expertise I didn't intend for my post to suggest otherwise. I just don't see the connection at the moment. Mainly because, according to the report, the pilot seemed to exercise good judgement up until some point shortly after departure of the last flight.
Probably yes. But I'm not sure that is really the issue: a) I don't see the specific relevance of the club environment in relation to the accident and b) My earlier comment on judgement indicates this was not born from ignorance.
I fear you have the wrong end of the stick. I don't doubt your expertise I didn't intend for my post to suggest otherwise. I just don't see the connection at the moment. Mainly because, according to the report, the pilot seemed to exercise good judgement up until some point shortly after departure of the last flight.
Give some thought to if you owned a flying school or club would you mark this departure airfield as one that needed an instructor briefing before setting out?
Thank you, The accident reports over the last 50 years show that virtually all fatal accidents occur with low hour pilot’s after they have signed the licence ...
If you look at CAP667 covering fatal accidents from 1985-94, the average total hours of pilots involved in fatal GA accidents was 1843. 43% of them had more than 1000 hours. Without details of corresponding hours flown, it's impossible to say if recent PPLs are more or less likely to have a fatal accident. Interestingly, for CFIT, 50% had more than 1000 total hours.
If you look at the US equivalent, the 2006 Nall report, it shows 31% of fatal accident commanders as having less than 500 hours, 19% between 500 and 1000. It adds:
The first 500 hours of a pilot’s flying career
are the most critical, with 34.9 percent of the total and
30.7 percent of fatal accidents occurring within that
timeframe. It should be noted that pilots at this experience
level fly the vast majority of flying hours. As such,
these statistics may not reflect the true safety record of
less experienced pilots, but rather their increased
exposure.
But the accident stats are not really the point. Safety management in general aviation is not about minimizing accidents. That would be easy: ban everything that's not a multi-pilot and multi-engine turbine operation. Against accident rate, you have to balance the operational value and, for want of a better expression, the emotional value of flying. Part of that is about establishing a regulatory environment in which pilots can do what they want to do without nannying. If I hire out an aircraft to a qualified pilot, I don't expect to provide a risk management service for the renter, to tell him or her what is an acceptable level of risk, beyond what is important to me as the owner.
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Bookworm
There may even be a problem with that analysis.
The drop out put rate is very high, so the population of low hour pilots is far higher that high hour pilots.
If pilots only suffered fatal accidents evey time an engine stopped for example the number of fatal accidents would be higher in the first group just becasue the population is larger.
It would be interesting to plot the cases of CFIT against pilot hours excluding those with an IR.
There may even be a problem with that analysis.
The drop out put rate is very high, so the population of low hour pilots is far higher that high hour pilots.
If pilots only suffered fatal accidents evey time an engine stopped for example the number of fatal accidents would be higher in the first group just becasue the population is larger.
It would be interesting to plot the cases of CFIT against pilot hours excluding those with an IR.
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Thank you for your replys
Bookworm
My point is that there are more accidents when low hour pilots operate without appropriate guidance.
I believe there is a responsiblity when hiring an aircraft to a club member whether he is a 20,000 hour airline pilot or a student. I believe it to be part of a process which I call professional flying. If me, trying to act as a responsible professional pilot is nonsense to you I apologise.
To Gemma and Tony
First of all please read and understand what I said
It is interesting to see that everyone lays the blaim completely with the pilot. Knowing more than some of you might I would suggest it may be educational to also look in the direction of the school he learnt to fly at, the instructors, the standards and the pilots flying order book.
This is not pointing the finger of blame at the flying club and to suggest such would be defamation, please look again at the underlined text.
Consider that hiring an aircraft from this club would require authorisation. Authorisation, not from a cleaner but a qualfied and experienced pilot most likely a flying instructor. Ask yourselves how you define authorisation and what you would expect from the authoriser? If the pilot had written in Heathrow or Fair Isle would you have just expected a signature and a pat in the back too? Interestingly at the same club (many years ago)I saw the situation where a PPL wanted to go to a grass strip and when the CFI came to authorise it he refused saying, " you might get in with the Regent buy you will only get it out on a lorry!"
Here is another example that may encourage further discussion outside of the blinkered box many of you seem to be in but please remember we are all agreeing this accident was pilot error, its just that I like the phrase ERROR CHAIN better as it encourages less bias and therefore more proactive discussion.
Around 28 years ago I was at the club concerned in the bar having a discusion with someone I knew and liked very much. We were talking about flying in cloud. something this pilot did all the time as a PPL. He was very proud of the fact that he had never had a days instrument training in his life. I still remember his words well he said, " I am happy to sit in cloud all day".
The discussion went into all the training he should have had and the fact he should not be flying in cloud without proper training, I gave him a moderate bollicking I suppose. When I left the club bar and was oustide I put my ear to the door to listen to what he would say next and again I will never forget his words.
"You cannot tell these young instructors anything"
The next year he flew into the Snowdon range while flying from Birmingham to the IOM killing himself and 5 passengers. Ironically just a few miles away from the accident we are discussing
Bookworm
My point is that there are more accidents when low hour pilots operate without appropriate guidance.
I believe there is a responsiblity when hiring an aircraft to a club member whether he is a 20,000 hour airline pilot or a student. I believe it to be part of a process which I call professional flying. If me, trying to act as a responsible professional pilot is nonsense to you I apologise.
To Gemma and Tony
First of all please read and understand what I said
It is interesting to see that everyone lays the blaim completely with the pilot. Knowing more than some of you might I would suggest it may be educational to also look in the direction of the school he learnt to fly at, the instructors, the standards and the pilots flying order book.
This is not pointing the finger of blame at the flying club and to suggest such would be defamation, please look again at the underlined text.
Consider that hiring an aircraft from this club would require authorisation. Authorisation, not from a cleaner but a qualfied and experienced pilot most likely a flying instructor. Ask yourselves how you define authorisation and what you would expect from the authoriser? If the pilot had written in Heathrow or Fair Isle would you have just expected a signature and a pat in the back too? Interestingly at the same club (many years ago)I saw the situation where a PPL wanted to go to a grass strip and when the CFI came to authorise it he refused saying, " you might get in with the Regent buy you will only get it out on a lorry!"
Here is another example that may encourage further discussion outside of the blinkered box many of you seem to be in but please remember we are all agreeing this accident was pilot error, its just that I like the phrase ERROR CHAIN better as it encourages less bias and therefore more proactive discussion.
Around 28 years ago I was at the club concerned in the bar having a discusion with someone I knew and liked very much. We were talking about flying in cloud. something this pilot did all the time as a PPL. He was very proud of the fact that he had never had a days instrument training in his life. I still remember his words well he said, " I am happy to sit in cloud all day".
The discussion went into all the training he should have had and the fact he should not be flying in cloud without proper training, I gave him a moderate bollicking I suppose. When I left the club bar and was oustide I put my ear to the door to listen to what he would say next and again I will never forget his words.
"You cannot tell these young instructors anything"
The next year he flew into the Snowdon range while flying from Birmingham to the IOM killing himself and 5 passengers. Ironically just a few miles away from the accident we are discussing
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The drop out put rate is very high, so the population of low hour pilots is far higher that high hour pilots.
Very good point Fuji - however we don't know whether the large majority that give up early (say, within 100hrs or the first 2 years) have actually been anywhere. It's very possible that most of them have done only short local trips on nice days.
I think the whole "pilot experience v. getting killed in a CFIT" picture is complicated.
A CFIT is a very elementary error if flying under IFR.
There are no doubt a few cases where an IFR pilot relied on some piece of technological data for terrain clearance and it turned out to have been wrong - there is a bunch of suspected cases in the USA, connected with a particular piece of avionics displaying terrain data from a particular vendor (who incidentally is well aware of it) which has been unmasked as being wrong by anything up to a few thousand feet, and some unexplained deaths correlate with the usage of it. There is a flight planning program from the same vendor with similar crap terrain data. Admittedly only a fool would fly IFR using such references but "you and I know that" and a pilot would normally assume the data in front of him is correct.
But most IFR CFITs will be very simple errors.
Some will be due to loss of SA when following an IAP of various levels of complexity and I suppose this could happen to any of us. Many airline crews have done it too. This is why I have GPWS.
But this accident was supposedly under VFR. The CAA chart is not defective in that area so I think it must have been an unplanned VMC to IMC transition together with loss of navigation. If he didn't have a GPS, he would have been stuffed in IMC at those low levels among the terrain.
Very good point Fuji - however we don't know whether the large majority that give up early (say, within 100hrs or the first 2 years) have actually been anywhere. It's very possible that most of them have done only short local trips on nice days.
I think the whole "pilot experience v. getting killed in a CFIT" picture is complicated.
A CFIT is a very elementary error if flying under IFR.
There are no doubt a few cases where an IFR pilot relied on some piece of technological data for terrain clearance and it turned out to have been wrong - there is a bunch of suspected cases in the USA, connected with a particular piece of avionics displaying terrain data from a particular vendor (who incidentally is well aware of it) which has been unmasked as being wrong by anything up to a few thousand feet, and some unexplained deaths correlate with the usage of it. There is a flight planning program from the same vendor with similar crap terrain data. Admittedly only a fool would fly IFR using such references but "you and I know that" and a pilot would normally assume the data in front of him is correct.
But most IFR CFITs will be very simple errors.
Some will be due to loss of SA when following an IAP of various levels of complexity and I suppose this could happen to any of us. Many airline crews have done it too. This is why I have GPWS.
But this accident was supposedly under VFR. The CAA chart is not defective in that area so I think it must have been an unplanned VMC to IMC transition together with loss of navigation. If he didn't have a GPS, he would have been stuffed in IMC at those low levels among the terrain.