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Cloud blamed in fatal plane crash

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Old 28th Nov 2007, 21:24
  #61 (permalink)  
 
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Chuck does Canada recognise actual IMC flying?

In what context?

I am not a certified flight instructor in Canada and do not really know what they may or may not recognize.

( Judging by the apparent IQ of some of our Transport Canada Inspectors they might have trouble trying to figure out how to pour piss out of a rubber boot.)
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Old 28th Nov 2007, 21:42
  #62 (permalink)  

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Can someone verify that this resulted in the IMC training being cut from the helicopter PPL?
No, it hasn't been cut. But many people think it should.
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Old 28th Nov 2007, 23:05
  #63 (permalink)  

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DFC, I can't understand your rather wooly reply. Are you claiming I lack common sense? I don't need patronising simply because I "dared" to question something you posted, as if it were a mandatory requirement. I'm looking back on a history of some thirty years flying for a living, much of it in poor weather below MSA and another five years of other aviation before that, so I do already understand the causes of CFIT to some extent.

The term "must", in CAA talk, means "mandatory", i.e. a legal requirement. You obviously apply weather limits well in advance of the legal requirements to your own VFR flights; your choice, and I can only say good for you.

However, it is important that folk don't read a post such as yours and think this pilot breached legal requirements in a major way by not applying "your" personal cautious VFR limits.
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Old 29th Nov 2007, 07:29
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I think most light GA CFITs don't make sense.

There was that Seneca (discussed here c. Feb 07) which piled into the Vercours mountains s. of Lyon killing 3 including a 7 year old child. What a total waste. That one didn't make sense either - except it is known the pilot didn't have oxygen so cut off all his escape options (other than a 180) even before he departed, and looking at the TAFs/METARs it must be assumed he didn't get the weather either. That flight could not have been made, without oxygen, over that terrain, in that weather. I have spoken to a number of people who knew him personally, as a pilot. But he was a high-hour IR pilot - does this make sense??
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Old 29th Nov 2007, 07:45
  #65 (permalink)  

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I can think of a a possible reason why the pilot took that route. Flying round that coast can be a bit of a palaver. You have high cliffs at one point, and you sometimes need to be either well above them or quite a bit out to sea to avoid turbulence. If you cut across to Colwyn Bay, it's shorter, and in halfway decent weather you're so near the coast that you always have an escape route.

They had already left Caernarfon and returned and refuelled. They now faced a long detour home. And the weather wasn't that bad. Maybe cutting off that corner and saving a little time just seemed like a sensible thing to do, and the pilot figured he'd head for the coast if the weather worsened. I've done that in those mountains, and it usually works. But this time, it didn't.

It doesn't look sensible to us now. But hindsight is always an exact science.
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Old 29th Nov 2007, 07:53
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I think we are discussing the wrong thing here. While IMC certainly was the killer, the underlying cause was the decision making process that led this poor chap into the mountains in the first place.

On the face of it, this is puzzling: low terrain and indeed the sea lay just off the track this pilot chose to fly. So why did he elect to plough on into the clouds and then into a mountainside?

The only explanation (if indeed there is one), I can come up with is that the guy got so totally fixated on a pre-planned route that he did not even entertain any deviation from it.

Experience comes into play here. He was a rather low-hour pilot and probably spent quite some time planning this flight. We know he got all the relevant briefings, even made the correct decision to abandon his first attempt. He then had the luxury of a 'scout' (the a/c that flew the Menai Straights route), yet didn't heed any of the information available to him. Why? Could it be that he felt too insecure to deviate from his planned route which was marked up on his chart? Perhaps he felt it would take too much time to plan the new route? I am not familiar with the area, but following the coastline should have been a piece of cake in terms of navigation.

Still baffled......
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Old 29th Nov 2007, 11:13
  #67 (permalink)  
 
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This gives you an idea of the topography of the area. We know the aircraft was either a little north or south of Bathesda.



Something like this might have been what the pilot could see looking forward along his track line as he approached Bathesda perhaps 15 minutes or so before the accident.



.. .. .. and this is what he might have seen looking north out of his left hand window.

Visualising the topography I am now more convinced that it was as he approached Bathesda the "mistakes" were made.

It seems to me there were some attractive valleys ahead which almost certainly would have been clear of cloud - and one in particluar stands out.
I am not certain exactly where the accident site was on this map but none of the valleys are particularly attractive once you get to the top of them (with possibly one exception if you really knew the area well.)

At Bathesda the more northern route was still clearly visible and the pilot may well have been able to see the sea in the distance. However it is also interesting as he passed Bathesda the ground would have risen steeply to his north and the ridge may well have been covered in cloud. His only escape was now a 180 turn and route back to Bathesda and turn north.

However you can clearly see in the first image how the cloud would have accumulated on the prevailing northern escarpment (with the wind from the north) so that the further towards Bathesda the aircraft went the less attractive turning north might have seemed.

Last edited by Fuji Abound; 29th Nov 2007 at 11:55.
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Old 29th Nov 2007, 12:05
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FA,
You have done some terrific analysis, but you are failing to see the wood for the trees. The message from this accident is very clear and very valuable: don't press on in dodgy weather towards and through mountains. Even if it looks like it might be OK, it also might not and unless you are an experienced mountain pilot who knows these particular mountains very well then the Plan B which you think you can depend on may not turn out so dependable after all.

We can speculate and speculate as to why he chose this route, but the fact remains that it was a very basic error. Any mountain pilot (any pilot!) will tell you that pressing on into unknown mountains in uncertain weather at low level is a very silly thing to do. End of story. How much analysis do you need to do here?!

QDM
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Old 29th Nov 2007, 12:20
  #69 (permalink)  

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I know quite a few people who've nearly come to grief in those mountains. I was one of them - as a very, very new PPL(A) I flew over the tops from Welshpool to Caernarfon, scared myself trying to fly through a teeny weeny cloud on the way back, did a 180 and began the long trek round the North coast, eventually getting home safely. A friend mentioned in an earlier post who knows Snowdonia well hit unexpected turbulence which he almost couldn't outclimb. Another low hours pilot friend tried to follow a valley, and the cloud got thicker and thicker and lower and lower...he made it, luckily.

If you learn to fly in the South you treat mountains with the respect they deserve. If you fly out of Caernarfon, Welshpool, Shobdon and similar airfields....you learn to fly in mountains very early on. Except...you don't, not really! You get used to flying in lowish hills in good weather. You understand a bit about winds in mountains, and where to aim for in the event of engine failure. But you don't really know what you don't know...and realise just how much that encompasses. Mountain flying is a very definite skill.

In the case of me and the friends mentioned, we thought we knew the mountains and how to fly in them. We were over-confident, basically.

If G-EMMA had been caught out in bad weather at Caernarfon, she'd have followed the coast. So would I - I've scared myself too often, and I might have more hours these days, but I don't take risks now I know the extent of the risks. But a lowish hours pilot who feels comfortable in those fairly familiar hills????

We'll never know, but over-confidence COULD have been what did it.
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Old 29th Nov 2007, 12:54
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You have done some terrific analysis, but you are failing to see the wood for the trees. The message from this accident is very clear and very valuable: don't press on in dodgy weather towards and through mountains. Even if it looks like it might be OK, it also might not and unless you are an experienced mountain pilot who knows these particular mountains very well then the Plan B which you think you can depend on may not turn out so dependable after all.
I do hope I am not!

I wanted to understand better why this pilot did what he did and where it all went wrong.

I dont agree it was a case of pressing on in dodgy weather - that is far two simple - although that was obviously what ultimately lead to the accident.

I think the weather in which he departed was more than good enough for the sector proposed - although perhaps not for his level of experience.

What I couldnt understand is why he pressed on at Bathesda over the mountains when he could so easily have turned north without adding hardly any time to his journey. Pilots usually make those sort of decisions for a reason and particularly one who had already demonstrated he was prepared to turn back as he did earlier in the day. Remember he wasnt in a rush it would seem, he was prepared to turn back, he had flown the same route earlier that day and I am sure he knew he could track along the coast over low ground and in reasonable weather.

I could be wrong, but I now think he saw a clear route through the valley - maybe the same way as he had come. That was poor judgement but at least I can understand why he did it.

That is a subtely different message becasue it illustrates how easy it is even when there is a very simple alternative for pilots to be attracted into flying up a valley.

I suspect this pilot really believed that he could continue up one of the valleys shown in the graphic and over, otherwise I dont think he would have done so. Had the valleys not been there, or had they presented in a different way, I believe he would have "diverted" to the north.

.. .. .. so in short there are lots of message in aviation that are clear and most pilots could resite them till the cows come home, but accidents like this continue to happen. Understanding why the pilot decided to ignore something he knew well I think is equally as important. For me at least this accident illustrates just how enticing on that day flying up the valley must have seemed and that in spite of your message how many other pilots might have been tempted, unless they had read this thread.
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Old 29th Nov 2007, 13:03
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Anyone know what the QNH was at the time of the crash (actual, not regional) ?

FF
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Old 29th Nov 2007, 13:47
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I could be wrong, but I now think he saw a clear route through the valley - maybe the same way as he had come. That was poor judgement but at least I can understand why he did it.

That is a subtely different message becasue it illustrates how easy it is even when there is a very simple alternative for pilots to be attracted into flying up a valley.

I suspect this pilot really believed that he could continue up one of the valleys shown in the graphic and over, otherwise I dont think he would have done so. Had the valleys not been there, or had they presented in a different way, I believe he would have "diverted" to the north.
This thread has gone on far too long, but you keep missing a very important point that should be noted. It is not easy and should not be easy to be enticed into flying up a valley towards high ground in poor weather, even if it looks like you might be able to squeak through. You shouldn't go up any valley, especially in uncertain weather and wind conditions, without at least 1,000 feet in hand at the start to clear the saddle at the top and a clear plan of escape if it doesn't work out.

He made a very basic error in flying towards high ground in dodgy weather and you are complicating things too much. This is an easy and useful lesson to learn from this accident.

Beware paralysis by analysis.
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Old 29th Nov 2007, 14:23
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He made a very basic error in flying towards high ground in dodgy weather and you are complicating things too much. This is an easy and useful lesson to learn from this accident.
It has gone on faaaar to long, so this is my last on the matter.

However, I can assure you I have got to grips with your comment. I dont know why you feel the need to keep repeating yourself.

If you cant understand the difference between someone making "a very basic error" and wanting to understand why (particularly given the less than usual circumstances) we best leave it at that.

Clearly the correct anaylsis is: "the accident was caused by controlled flight in terrain, a factor was the pilot made a basic error".

RIP
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Old 29th Nov 2007, 14:27
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My point is there is no point trying to understand too deeply 'why'.

Agree -- finished now.
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Old 29th Nov 2007, 21:05
  #75 (permalink)  
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Shy Torque,

As a recent recruit to the aviation industry, you may learn in time that not everything you must do to be safe is written down.

Simply read the highlighted words to find the legal backing for the word must.

Regards,

DFC
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Old 29th Nov 2007, 21:45
  #76 (permalink)  

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DFC, Thanks for confirming my suspicion that you are merely a poor wind-up merchant. Fly IFR limits on all VFR flights? Some of us would get no work done. I suggest you stick to your Flight Simulator gaming console.

Noted: Just ignore all after the word DFC from now on.
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Old 30th Nov 2007, 13:24
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After having read most of the thread and all of the AAIB report, I remain puzzled: what possessed the man to fly through the mountains when low terrain and sea lay just a few miles off intended track ??
The anti-GPS lobby should have a field day with this. The pilot followed the direct-to track right into the side of a mountain. It's proof that pilots get fixated on the magenta line and fail to do proper flight planning...

Just one flaw in the theory, of course: the pilot had no GPS.
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Old 30th Nov 2007, 15:31
  #78 (permalink)  
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Fly IFR limits on all VFR flights
I never said that.

Regards,

DFC
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Old 30th Nov 2007, 15:45
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The AAIB report didn't say whether he had a GPS or not (from which Fuji inferred he didn't).
Only as a point of order - I also said that they usually try to recover the route flown if there was a GPS and will comment (if there was one) that they couldnt.

Agreed it was by inference only though.
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Old 1st Dec 2007, 06:31
  #80 (permalink)  
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If the black line is the radar track, the pilot was doing some huge heading changes, up to 90 degrees, which don't seem to be supported by any terrain requirements. Were they taking pictures?

The AAIB don't miss a trick with a GPS found in the wreckage. If they didn't mention it, one can assume it wasn't there.
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