Cloud blamed in fatal plane crash

[Contacttower]

I think there is moe to this than some suggest.

There almost always is isn't there?

Thats for the post Fuji, I can't seem to get onto the AAIB website at the moment .

[IO540]

- head down tracking a GPS (I'm running for cover)
- head down tracking a chart (I'm running the other way for cover)
- looking the wrong way

None of those possibilities would make you fly into terrain, at ~ 100kt. At 700kt perhaps.

The maximum head down time due to a GPS is of the order of some seconds.

Maybe much longer with a chart, but somebody with no autopilot (is that a correct assumption in this case?) would instinctively know that he can't do that for very long.

Unless the terrain is a canyon, or something bizzare was going on in the cockpit, the answer must be that he was in IMC at the time.

[englishal]

Fuji,

It would probably be safe to assume though that had it been a gin clear day that this accident would not have happened? So the weather "contiributed" and the pilot may have been flying outside of his experience envelope.

People don't just fly into a mountain in crystal clear vis unless they have a serious problem somewhere else.....

[QDMQDMQDM]

[QUOTE]What can we learn from it? Not a lot, in my opinion. Accidents happen! QUOTE]

I disagree.

We can learn that it is a poor idea to track high ground at just below the cloud base when low ground / the coast lies just a few miles away and parallel to your track. Cloud does not always sit evenly on mountains and you can find yourself in it in a trice if you're not careful. Mountain scud-running is best left to experienced pilots who know the particular mountains like the back of their hand and they are still taking a large calculated risk.

The big problem with being inexperienced is that you don't know when to be afraid and when not to be afraid. Until you know that, it is best to play things quite conservatively.

[Fuji Abound]

It would probably be safe to assume though that had it been a gin clear day that this accident would not have happened?

Yes, you would have thought so.

However I would also have thought the the eye witness account from the fell runner provides unusually accurate information on the weather at the time (unusually accurate because it is rare to have some one so close to the accidetn site).

I have looked on the map and clearly she was very close to the accident site. The reports tells us she also heard the aircraft. She was apparently at 1,700 feet amsl which I would have thought could be reasonably accurately checked and reported the cloudbase at 2,000 feet. Once again I would guess this was a pretty reliable estimate. She does say she could "just" see the other side of the valley - which I had missed earlier so the viz was around 4K or 6,000 metres and had "dropped significantly" over the preceding two hours. Her report might be very significant. Another aircraft at around the same time reported the mountains of Snowdonia were obscured by cloud. This you would expect but it is indicative that the vis from the Menai Straits was pretty good.

Conflictingly the report also says the surface viz at the time of the accident was "estimated to be 15 to 20km". This seems very much at odds with the report from the Fell walker.

If the pilot was at 2,000 amsl just below the base with 4k of vis he had a reasonable chance of seeing the cloud clad peak and no obvious reason to enter it, unless he was so close to the base that the viz was much worse than had he given himself a few hundred feet better seperation.

Personally I dont think he flew the direct route on the way out, I think he went further north, which would have avoided all the high ground. Why did he not do so on the way back. After all it only represented a very small deviation from track. In fact from his last radar position to the accidetn site he gradually drifted south of track. Was there some feature of the terrain that might have been involved or was it more simply an error in navigation - the amount by which he was south of track was enough to have put him over much lower ground had he been north of track to the same degree.

I can fully understand pilots flying up a dead end valley, I can understand pilots entering IMC and some time a little after losign control or impacting, I can understand pilots trying to didge peaks in mountaineous terrain with no obvious escape route but none of these seem to fit. Something more fundamental seems to have taken place?

[Wrong Stuff]

Originally Posted by IO540

Unless the terrain is a canyon, or something bizzare was going on in the cockpit, the answer must be that he was in IMC at the time.

I'd agree that's by far the most likely reason. There is also the less likely possibility that he flew into a downdraft which he couldn't outclimb. Of course, if he was already close to the ground to keep below the cloud, that would have exacerbated the problem.

[QDMQDMQDM]

Quote:
The big problem with being inexperienced is that you don't know when to be afraid and when not to be afraid. Until you know that, it is best to play things quite conservatively.

This is a contradictory statement.

Not at all! It applies just as much in medicine, my other interest. When you are inexperienced, you simply do not know when you have to take extra care and when it is permissible to take shortcuts. This is patently obvious and could be used as the definition of 'experience'.

I think if you studied the AAIB report perhaps you may not be of that opinion. Using remarks like "mountain scud running" suggest he was in a valley, whereas in this case to get out any trouble he merely had to decend to his left and he'd be over the sea. Nowhere does the report imply he was in IMC. The flight should have been simple, and the kind of flight you or I would make without a fraction of his planning, and without hesitation. I don't think I'm being wreckless in forming the opinion that I can learn nothing from this accident - except not to fly. Why he flew inot the mountain is a mystery.

I would call skirting mountains just underneath the cloud base in questionable vis 'scud running'. Just because the report doesn't say he was in IMC doesn't mean he wasn't. It's very easy to do. Choosing the route he took was not the most sensible option. More sensible would have been to choose the absolutely safe route, which he knew was safe. I think we can learn that.

[Fuji Abound]

Out of interest I have just had a look at Google Earth. I think there might be a reasonably obvious valley in the topography leading towards the accident site with high ground at the end. I wonder if I am in the right place.

If you look at Google earth it is interesting that the photo was taken on a day with the cloud stacking in from the north exactly as might be expected with the wind at 330.

If I am in the correct place this would have meant the lower cloud might have been to the north of track along the windward side of the northern valley. The valley was therefore tempting when in fact a very short diversion north from Bethesda would have taken the aircraft away from the funnel into the valley and along the northern edge of the higher ground.

Perhaps it was a case of the pilot being deceived into funneling up the valley and the cloud spilling over towards the top of the valley as the ground rose when if only he had gone a few miles further north at Bethesda the flight might have been conducted in complete safety.

Interesting if I have the topography correct.

I am more convinced now that the pilot might have made a major error of judgement when he reached Bethesda and that is really what ultimately lead to the impact. I still believe based on all the met evidence and the low ground just to the north his decision to go was not at all unreasonable.

Given that I dont think he went that route on the way there I still wonder why he went up that valley if that was really the case. It looks like he must have flown over Bethesda, whereas his track line should have placed Bethesda to his south - and up until then he had been doing a pretty good job of following the track line.
I do know that low level mountain flying is a skill that requirees honing and as importantly an understanding of the effect topography has on the met. I have done a little in the Highlands and Wales at very low level which was most revealing.

[QDMQDMQDM]

If I am in the correct place this would have meant the lower cloud might have been to the north of track along the windward side of the northern valley. The valley was therefore tempting when in fact a very short diversion north from Bethesda would have taken the aircraft away from the funnel into the valley and along the northern edge of the higher ground.

Perhaps it was a case of the pilot being deceived into funneling up the valley and the cloud spilling over towards the top of the valley as the ground rose when if only he had gone a few miles further north at Bethesda the flight might have been conducted in complete safety.

Interesting if I have the topography correct.

I am more convinced now that the pilot might have made a major error of judgement when he reached Bethesda and that is really what ultimately lead to the impact. I still believe based on all the met evidence and the low ground just to the north his decision to go was not at all unreasonable.

Given that I dont think he went that route on the way there I still wonder why he went up that valley if that was really the case. It looks like he must have flown over Bethesda, whereas his track line should have placed Bethesda to his south - and up until then he had been doing a pretty good job of following the track line.

Perhaps we can agree, then, with the uncontroversial assertion that this accident suggests that mountain scud running may not be a good idea, especially for inexperienced pilots who do not know the terrain?

[172driver]

mistery

After having read most of the thread and all of the AAIB report, I remain puzzled: what possessed the man to fly through the mountains when low terrain and sea lay just a few miles off intended track ?? It cannot have been get-home-itis, as the safe track would have added only a few minutes to the flight. Frankly, this is a decision making process I simply don't get.

[Joshwilson10]

I think this is dragging on a bit! At the end of the day he could have turned back at any time, he should have been aware of the terrain and at least could have climbed to his sector msa...he messed up! Learn a lesson from him!

[Fuji Abound]

After having read most of the thread and all of the AAIB report, I remain puzzled: what possessed the man to fly through the mountains when low terrain and sea lay just a few miles off intended track ?? It cannot have been get-home-itis, as the safe track would have added only a few minutes to the flight. Frankly, this is a decision making process I simply don't get.

Eloquently put and that was exactly what troubled me.

It is very easy to dismiss any CFIT as oh well, he was scud running, poor planning etc. IMHO that teaches us absolutely nothing other than to repeat the bl**ding obvious. Of course sadly IF the evidence clearly points in that direction so be it. I dont think it does in this case and at least I have said why I have reached that conclusion. The danger is every case is so quickly dismissed in which case we might as well not bother to investigate any CFIT.

As for Fuji's last post, I think (and hope) he was exploring a hypothesis that cannot be proved.

Of course.

Moreover I could be wrong. I am no expert. Nor am I challenging in any way what the AAIB have said. They do a superb job. As I said at the outset they have to draw a line between evidence and conjecture. Sometimes I think we have far more to learn from analysing the events that may have lead to the accident - the holes that began to line up.

Also, I know from first hand experience how the family and friends react. No one wants to hear there Dad, son daughter whatever was negligent or stupid. Sometimes unfortunately the pilot was - but I dont think so in this case. I think he set off in weather that was good enough for the sector being flown given the escape routes he had. Personally if I had had to fly that route VFR in those conditions GIVEN the height of the terrain just to the north of my track line I would not have hesitated to have gone. The fact is I would have been further north and I think there is a reason why the pilot wasnt - I think it has to do with his being lulled into going up that valley.

[Whirlybird]

I've just read this whole thread and the AAIB report....been away for a couple of days. I know that area well; I learned to fly at Welshpool, and over the years visited Caernarfon several times in different aircraft by a variety of routes in varying weather conditions. I've also done a helicopter mountain flying course up there. A few thoughts come to mind....

1) Weather conditions can change incredibly fast in Snowdonia, and I don't think we can be sure what the weather was like just before the crash.

2) Effects of wind? The wind wasn't that strong apparently, but even so you can get some strange things happening when you're flying close to the hills. A friend of mine, who knows those mountains well and flies in them a lot, scared himself silly during one flight, due to unexpected wind conditions which he almost couldn't outfly...sorry, can't remember details.

3) The obvious route home would have been to follow the coast to Colwyn Bay. However, a familiar route can feel very safe, far safer than an unfamiliar one, especially to a relatively inexperienced pilot. Perhaps that's why he used his earlier route.

4) I flew into a teeny weeny cloud once in Snowdonia. Trying to do a 180 in cloud over mountains, with up and down draughts from those hills, is nothing at all like flying over flat ground with foggles on. I never did it again! But you don't know that till you've done it.

5) Some unlucky combination of all of the above.

I don't suppose anyone will ever really know what happened. Clearly, the pilot made a mistake. But it might well have been a very small mistake, allied to an awful lot of bad luck.

[DFC]

Shytorque,

It was not sent as an insult. It was simply saying that it came from the book of common sense and I hoped that you will someday look back on a flying history that would not be the case if a pilot CFIT'ed due to lack of common sense.

I dont care what your experience is - it is irelevant.

---------

Contacttower,

Yes it is very harsh. However what can we do to deter others from killing their freiends and families with aircraft. Everyone knows that an unqualified pilot entering IMC without suficient planning or terrain clearance is an acident about to happen and only chance will save them.

EnglishAl said

People don't just fly into a mountain in crystal clear vis unless they have a serious problem somewhere else.....

That is true and should apply to cloud also in the case of unqualified pilots and /or unequipped aircraft.

Question.......Would it be true to say that pilots with no instrument qualifications in aircraft equipped for IMC flight i.e. appropriate instruments are more likely to enter cloud (and become a statistic) than pilots with no instrument qualifications in aircraft with less instrument equipment eg simply ASI, Altimeter and ball such as a microlight?

In other words how do microlight pilots manage to keep clear of clouds better than pilots (of similar experience) flying better equipped aircraft?

Don't forget that microlight pilots do not have any instrument training during the PPL course.

-------

The JAA PPL sylabus requires the pilot to be able to establish the aircraft in S+L flight on instruments, complete a level 180 degree turn and then maintain straight and level flight.

There is no climbing or descending involved because it is expected that the pilot will be at a safe level entering IMC and have entered from an area of VMC to which they wish to return.

Simply put if below the safe level enroute and enter IMC your screMed.

The pilot may have planned a safe level on a PLOG but they could have not bothered if they are going to continue to fly when the weather prevents them from maintaining that minimum planned level.

Unfortunately, many training organisations teach pilots to plan a safe level but say it is normal to fly below that level......well perhaps this pilot was flying normally (according to whoever trained them)?

Regards,

DFC

[QDMQDMQDM]

In other words how do microlight pilots manage to keep clear of clouds better than pilots (of similar experience) flying better equipped aircraft?

Because they fly far more slowly.

[Chuck Ellsworth]

The JAA PPL sylabus requires the pilot to be able to establish the aircraft in S+L flight on instruments, complete a level 180 degree turn and then maintain straight and level flight.

Have the loss of control accidents in IMC gone down since that became part of the training?
Or is a little bit of knowledge / skill seducing these pilots into something they can't handle?

[Contacttower]

Or is a little bit of knowledge / skill seducing these pilots into something they can't handle?

Someone with a PPL(H) can surely correct me on this but I seem to remember reading in Today's Pilot a while ago about helicopters in IMC...it would appear that the little bit covered in the PPL course was indeed creating a 'moral hazard' effect. Can someone verify that this resulted in the IMC training being cut from the helicopter PPL?

[Contacttower]

I wanted to say the same thing but expected a flaming.

An awful lot of flying would be cancelled in this country if the 'add one thousand to the box' height was also stuck to. Most instructors do indeed seem happy to ignore it in the predominantly flat UK when flying VFR.

I've found that doing a '5/10nm either side of track plus 1000ft' is actually more practical...partly because it actually makes you look at your track more closely and also because in some countries (like South Africa where I am at the moment) you get silly figures that a light single would actually struggle to reach if you add 1000ft to the box figure.

[Chuck Ellsworth]

In Canada the requirement for the PPL is 5 hours training on instruments.

Is 5 hours enough to ensure a PPL can keep the thing under control in cloud if they may never have flown in cloud...hell a lot of the instructors have never been in cloud.

Wearing a hood or foggles is not giving the true picture of flight in cloud....period...

How many PPL's take the minimum amount of training to fly on instruments and then never even practice it until the day they fly into cloud and crash?

I would suggest a little bit of knowledge and a marginal skills level on instruments is a recipe for disaster.

[Contacttower]

In Canada the requirement for the PPL is 5 hours training on instruments.

Chuck does Canada recognise actual IMC flying?