SLF avoid travel on 737 max
I suspect they were thinking they'd be building completely new designs every 10-15 years . That's the way it was until the 70's and then stretching came into fashion eg the DC-8 and people realised you didn't have to buy or build a risky new design. Not just passenger aircraft - the C-130 and of course the B-52 are even older than the 737 design
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I suspect they were thinking they'd be building completely new designs every 10-15 years . That's the way it was until the 70's and then stretching came into fashion eg the DC-8 and people realised you didn't have to buy or build a risky new design. Not just passenger aircraft - the C-130 and of course the B-52 are even older than the 737 design
Ryanair say they will not now see their new MAX's in service before OCT...
MOL said yesterday -
One of the world’s largest airlines, Ryanair has 135 of the planes on order, but none in service. O’Leary has previously said it would not take orders in July or August because it is the airline’s busiest time of the year.
“We were meant to have 58 planes by the summer,” O’Leary said in the interview, extracts from which were published on Friday. “That went down to 30, then 20, then 10 and the latest is maybe only five. It’s possible we’ll only get the first jets in October 2020.
FR have a 737 MAX 8-200 version unique to them.
Implications for TUI UK will be likely the same for them...Therefore I can see any return to service in the main for TUI would be for the following summer in 2021.
TUI would not need new MAX deliveries to be introduced during the winter 20-21 season.
They have 6 grounded in UK/EU plus a handful of brand new ones parked up at Boeing.
TUI also had a large MAX -10 order that was to start to be fulfilled for S20
MOL said yesterday -
One of the world’s largest airlines, Ryanair has 135 of the planes on order, but none in service. O’Leary has previously said it would not take orders in July or August because it is the airline’s busiest time of the year.
“We were meant to have 58 planes by the summer,” O’Leary said in the interview, extracts from which were published on Friday. “That went down to 30, then 20, then 10 and the latest is maybe only five. It’s possible we’ll only get the first jets in October 2020.
FR have a 737 MAX 8-200 version unique to them.
Implications for TUI UK will be likely the same for them...Therefore I can see any return to service in the main for TUI would be for the following summer in 2021.
TUI would not need new MAX deliveries to be introduced during the winter 20-21 season.
They have 6 grounded in UK/EU plus a handful of brand new ones parked up at Boeing.
TUI also had a large MAX -10 order that was to start to be fulfilled for S20
Last edited by rog747; 4th Jan 2020 at 05:43.
I would venture a guess that by just booking your flight from A to B at will and at the time of your choice, you will avoid future travel on 737 max.
True. Every new aeroplane that after a couple of years in service crashes twice, killing 300+ or so pax and crew should be subjected to the same scrutiny as MAX is.
I guesstimate we won't see any MAX in-service accident ever again, let alone flight control system related one, so there won't be any need for serving the humble pie.
That's not the way I see it; methinks it is pretty stable but not quite in accordance with regulations NG vs. even more unstable MAX. I'll return to that in a moment.
I beg to differ. The way I see it, Boeing mgmt were very aware what could had gone wrong immediately the Lion Air speared in and had their fears confirmed by the Ethiopian tragedy. While their actions looks unreasonable in isolation, I find them quite rational for someone who is clutching at the straws. They seem to be very aware that under the current regulations the MAX is uncertifiable without MCAS and if it were admitted what MCAS actually is, it would be very doubtful that grandfather rights are still applicable. What they are doing all this time is treading the water while hoping geared fans will turn out to be dissapointing and the world returns to CFM-56 (scrapping the 320NEO in process) or every aviation authority relaxes the certification standards while applying them retroactively to existing designs such as MAX. Of course Washington would like Boeing to survive as the damage from its demise could be so bad to steer the USA into recession, not to mention extreme damage to aerospace industry and the national pride, but the horrible prospect of letting the Boeing die commercial death might be the cheapest option on the table.
Sorry for going overly techy, hopefully someone would be able to translate it into more understandable jargon if needed.
So what are those MCAS and STS? One would expect that something that has "system" in its acronym to be a system. Not quite so. First, the FAA convened the Joint Authorities Technical Review of 737 MAX flight controls. In its final submittal, it was quite careful not to offend the host so its relevant finding was a bit spiced with doubt:
However, Indonesian accident investigation board, in association with the NTSB, was not mincing words when describing STS/MCAS in its final PQ-LQP crash report:
Wow. STS and MCAS are merely software. Worse, they are there to augment the flight, which is fancy phrase for protecting the aeroplane from going into the parts of the flight envelope from which recovery is difficult or impossible. It could be all good, except the pilots of B737s were not even being told they are flying the flight augmentation devices equipped aeroplanes. At least pilots flying FBW Airbi, 310s or F100s are informed about their control laws, their failures and reversions. Also, the SAS hasn't been introduced on MAX or NG, it is with us since 737-300, nowadays called "classic".
Now, there is nothing inherently wrong with putting the stability augmentation and stall prevention systems in the aeroplanes lacking lawfully prescribed natural stability as long as the risk of failure modes is properly assessed and flightcrews informed what their aeroplane is supposed to do and what to do when it doesn't. Both were sadly lacking in MAX case and I suspect failing to declare STS as stability augmentation system paved the way to MCAS disaster and might imply that FAA was complicit in Boeing (mis)naming games since mid 1980s (it could also explain some of the distrust other aviation authorities displayed towards FAA when requiring separate independent MAX recertifications). If it's indeed so, then the bankruptcy and the liquidation of Boeing Co would neatly sweep the issue under the rug with the whole 737 program dead and any certifying issues rendered irrelevant, especially as the NGs have been proven to be safe in operation. Space, military aircraft and widebodies could be picked up and continued by other aerospace companies.
Exactly. That's the way it goes with any aircraft and I don't think MAX would be an exception if it ever flies again (small chance).
So, folks, are you offended with the doom & gloom of my post? Do you think I'm Putinist trollbot bent on soiling the reputation of the best narrowbody in the world? Your previous experiences might indeed steer you in that direction. I hate to go autobiographical on the PPRuNe, yet I feel compelled to admit that I really enjoy flying the 738, as I have indeed enjoyed last six years of playing with her NWS tiller. I love working for my current company, especially after some quite unsavoury experiences with the previous one, but as it bet its future entirely on MAX, I'm not totally confident I'll be able to enjoy flying here in the years to come. I learnt to fly 320 a dozen years ago, I can re-learn it again and with 4000 MRJT command hours under the belt, out of total slightly above 10k, I don't think that I'll have problem finding non-type rated captain (or in emergency; F/O) job even in the world that has about thousand less 180seaters than planned and that burned through the remaining hours of low MSN ACMI 320s and 738s during summer 2019 like crazy but I would rather prefer that I won't need to.
However, my feelings towards the 737 or Boeing Co can absolutely make no difference on the outcome of MAX catastrophe. I am afraid that too many pilots and too many passengers will be chasing not enough of their respective seats, pushing the pay and commuting opportunities down. May FSM help us all.
The more you read (including the statements and actions of B.) the more you realise that they STILL have not got the point. The Board should have resigned en masse, months ago. The company will survive because Washington DC neeeds it to survive but few of the parties at the top have yet realised that (almost certainly) the only way to regain confidence is to pay the compensation, scrap the MAX and start again.
Sorry for going overly techy, hopefully someone would be able to translate it into more understandable jargon if needed.
So what are those MCAS and STS? One would expect that something that has "system" in its acronym to be a system. Not quite so. First, the FAA convened the Joint Authorities Technical Review of 737 MAX flight controls. In its final submittal, it was quite careful not to offend the host so its relevant finding was a bit spiced with doubt:
Finding F3.5-C: The JATR team considers that the STS/MCAS and EFS
functions could be considered as stall identification systems or stall protection
systems, depending on the natural (unaugmented) stall characteristics of the
aircraft. From its data review, the JATR team was unable to completely rule out
the possibility that these augmentation systems function as a stall protection
system.
functions could be considered as stall identification systems or stall protection
systems, depending on the natural (unaugmented) stall characteristics of the
aircraft. From its data review, the JATR team was unable to completely rule out
the possibility that these augmentation systems function as a stall protection
system.
Similar to the Speed Trim Function, the MCAS function is also a flight control law contained within each of the two FCCs.
Now, there is nothing inherently wrong with putting the stability augmentation and stall prevention systems in the aeroplanes lacking lawfully prescribed natural stability as long as the risk of failure modes is properly assessed and flightcrews informed what their aeroplane is supposed to do and what to do when it doesn't. Both were sadly lacking in MAX case and I suspect failing to declare STS as stability augmentation system paved the way to MCAS disaster and might imply that FAA was complicit in Boeing (mis)naming games since mid 1980s (it could also explain some of the distrust other aviation authorities displayed towards FAA when requiring separate independent MAX recertifications). If it's indeed so, then the bankruptcy and the liquidation of Boeing Co would neatly sweep the issue under the rug with the whole 737 program dead and any certifying issues rendered irrelevant, especially as the NGs have been proven to be safe in operation. Space, military aircraft and widebodies could be picked up and continued by other aerospace companies.
So, folks, are you offended with the doom & gloom of my post? Do you think I'm Putinist trollbot bent on soiling the reputation of the best narrowbody in the world? Your previous experiences might indeed steer you in that direction. I hate to go autobiographical on the PPRuNe, yet I feel compelled to admit that I really enjoy flying the 738, as I have indeed enjoyed last six years of playing with her NWS tiller. I love working for my current company, especially after some quite unsavoury experiences with the previous one, but as it bet its future entirely on MAX, I'm not totally confident I'll be able to enjoy flying here in the years to come. I learnt to fly 320 a dozen years ago, I can re-learn it again and with 4000 MRJT command hours under the belt, out of total slightly above 10k, I don't think that I'll have problem finding non-type rated captain (or in emergency; F/O) job even in the world that has about thousand less 180seaters than planned and that burned through the remaining hours of low MSN ACMI 320s and 738s during summer 2019 like crazy but I would rather prefer that I won't need to.
However, my feelings towards the 737 or Boeing Co can absolutely make no difference on the outcome of MAX catastrophe. I am afraid that too many pilots and too many passengers will be chasing not enough of their respective seats, pushing the pay and commuting opportunities down. May FSM help us all.
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I would venture a guess that by just booking your flight from A to B at will and at the time of your choice, you will avoid future travel on 737 max.
True. Every new aeroplane that after a couple of years in service crashes twice, killing 300+ or so pax and crew should be subjected to the same scrutiny as MAX is.
I guesstimate we won't see any MAX in-service accident ever again, let alone flight control system related one, so there won't be any need for serving the humble pie.
That's not the way I see it; methinks it is pretty stable but not quite in accordance with regulations NG vs. even more unstable MAX. I'll return to that in a moment.
I beg to differ. The way I see it, Boeing mgmt were very aware what could had gone wrong immediately the Lion Air speared in and had their fears confirmed by the Ethiopian tragedy. While their actions looks unreasonable in isolation, I find them quite rational for someone who is clutching at the straws. They seem to be very aware that under the current regulations the MAX is uncertifiable without MCAS and if it were admitted what MCAS actually is, it would be very doubtful that grandfather rights are still applicable. What they are doing all this time is treading the water while hoping geared fans will turn out to be dissapointing and the world returns to CFM-56 (scrapping the 320NEO in process) or every aviation authority relaxes the certification standards while applying them retroactively to existing designs such as MAX. Of course Washington would like Boeing to survive as the damage from its demise could be so bad to steer the USA into recession, not to mention extreme damage to aerospace industry and the national pride, but the horrible prospect of letting the Boeing die commercial death might be the cheapest option on the table.
Sorry for going overly techy, hopefully someone would be able to translate it into more understandable jargon if needed.
So what are those MCAS and STS? One would expect that something that has "system" in its acronym to be a system. Not quite so. First, the FAA convened the Joint Authorities Technical Review of 737 MAX flight controls. In its final submittal, it was quite careful not to offend the host so its relevant finding was a bit spiced with doubt:
However, Indonesian accident investigation board, in association with the NTSB, was not mincing words when describing STS/MCAS in its final PQ-LQP crash report:
Wow. STS and MCAS are merely software. Worse, they are there to augment the flight, which is fancy phrase for protecting the aeroplane from going into the parts of the flight envelope from which recovery is difficult or impossible. It could be all good, except the pilots of B737s were not even being told they are flying the flight augmentation devices equipped aeroplanes. At least pilots flying FBW Airbi, 310s or F100s are informed about their control laws, their failures and reversions. Also, the SAS hasn't been introduced on MAX or NG, it is with us since 737-300, nowadays called "classic".
Now, there is nothing inherently wrong with putting the stability augmentation and stall prevention systems in the aeroplanes lacking lawfully prescribed natural stability as long as the risk of failure modes is properly assessed and flightcrews informed what their aeroplane is supposed to do and what to do when it doesn't. Both were sadly lacking in MAX case and I suspect failing to declare STS as stability augmentation system paved the way to MCAS disaster and might imply that FAA was complicit in Boeing (mis)naming games since mid 1980s (it could also explain some of the distrust other aviation authorities displayed towards FAA when requiring separate independent MAX recertifications). If it's indeed so, then the bankruptcy and the liquidation of Boeing Co would neatly sweep the issue under the rug with the whole 737 program dead and any certifying issues rendered irrelevant, especially as the NGs have been proven to be safe in operation. Space, military aircraft and widebodies could be picked up and continued by other aerospace companies.
Exactly. That's the way it goes with any aircraft and I don't think MAX would be an exception if it ever flies again (small chance).
So, folks, are you offended with the doom & gloom of my post? Do you think I'm Putinist trollbot bent on soiling the reputation of the best narrowbody in the world? Your previous experiences might indeed steer you in that direction. I hate to go autobiographical on the PPRuNe, yet I feel compelled to admit that I really enjoy flying the 738, as I have indeed enjoyed last six years of playing with her NWS tiller. I love working for my current company, especially after some quite unsavoury experiences with the previous one, but as it bet its future entirely on MAX, I'm not totally confident I'll be able to enjoy flying here in the years to come. I learnt to fly 320 a dozen years ago, I can re-learn it again and with 4000 MRJT command hours under the belt, out of total slightly above 10k, I don't think that I'll have problem finding non-type rated captain (or in emergency; F/O) job even in the world that has about thousand less 180seaters than planned and that burned through the remaining hours of low MSN ACMI 320s and 738s during summer 2019 like crazy but I would rather prefer that I won't need to.
However, my feelings towards the 737 or Boeing Co can absolutely make no difference on the outcome of MAX catastrophe. I am afraid that too many pilots and too many passengers will be chasing not enough of their respective seats, pushing the pay and commuting opportunities down. May FSM help us all.
True. Every new aeroplane that after a couple of years in service crashes twice, killing 300+ or so pax and crew should be subjected to the same scrutiny as MAX is.
I guesstimate we won't see any MAX in-service accident ever again, let alone flight control system related one, so there won't be any need for serving the humble pie.
That's not the way I see it; methinks it is pretty stable but not quite in accordance with regulations NG vs. even more unstable MAX. I'll return to that in a moment.
I beg to differ. The way I see it, Boeing mgmt were very aware what could had gone wrong immediately the Lion Air speared in and had their fears confirmed by the Ethiopian tragedy. While their actions looks unreasonable in isolation, I find them quite rational for someone who is clutching at the straws. They seem to be very aware that under the current regulations the MAX is uncertifiable without MCAS and if it were admitted what MCAS actually is, it would be very doubtful that grandfather rights are still applicable. What they are doing all this time is treading the water while hoping geared fans will turn out to be dissapointing and the world returns to CFM-56 (scrapping the 320NEO in process) or every aviation authority relaxes the certification standards while applying them retroactively to existing designs such as MAX. Of course Washington would like Boeing to survive as the damage from its demise could be so bad to steer the USA into recession, not to mention extreme damage to aerospace industry and the national pride, but the horrible prospect of letting the Boeing die commercial death might be the cheapest option on the table.
Sorry for going overly techy, hopefully someone would be able to translate it into more understandable jargon if needed.
So what are those MCAS and STS? One would expect that something that has "system" in its acronym to be a system. Not quite so. First, the FAA convened the Joint Authorities Technical Review of 737 MAX flight controls. In its final submittal, it was quite careful not to offend the host so its relevant finding was a bit spiced with doubt:
However, Indonesian accident investigation board, in association with the NTSB, was not mincing words when describing STS/MCAS in its final PQ-LQP crash report:
Wow. STS and MCAS are merely software. Worse, they are there to augment the flight, which is fancy phrase for protecting the aeroplane from going into the parts of the flight envelope from which recovery is difficult or impossible. It could be all good, except the pilots of B737s were not even being told they are flying the flight augmentation devices equipped aeroplanes. At least pilots flying FBW Airbi, 310s or F100s are informed about their control laws, their failures and reversions. Also, the SAS hasn't been introduced on MAX or NG, it is with us since 737-300, nowadays called "classic".
Now, there is nothing inherently wrong with putting the stability augmentation and stall prevention systems in the aeroplanes lacking lawfully prescribed natural stability as long as the risk of failure modes is properly assessed and flightcrews informed what their aeroplane is supposed to do and what to do when it doesn't. Both were sadly lacking in MAX case and I suspect failing to declare STS as stability augmentation system paved the way to MCAS disaster and might imply that FAA was complicit in Boeing (mis)naming games since mid 1980s (it could also explain some of the distrust other aviation authorities displayed towards FAA when requiring separate independent MAX recertifications). If it's indeed so, then the bankruptcy and the liquidation of Boeing Co would neatly sweep the issue under the rug with the whole 737 program dead and any certifying issues rendered irrelevant, especially as the NGs have been proven to be safe in operation. Space, military aircraft and widebodies could be picked up and continued by other aerospace companies.
Exactly. That's the way it goes with any aircraft and I don't think MAX would be an exception if it ever flies again (small chance).
So, folks, are you offended with the doom & gloom of my post? Do you think I'm Putinist trollbot bent on soiling the reputation of the best narrowbody in the world? Your previous experiences might indeed steer you in that direction. I hate to go autobiographical on the PPRuNe, yet I feel compelled to admit that I really enjoy flying the 738, as I have indeed enjoyed last six years of playing with her NWS tiller. I love working for my current company, especially after some quite unsavoury experiences with the previous one, but as it bet its future entirely on MAX, I'm not totally confident I'll be able to enjoy flying here in the years to come. I learnt to fly 320 a dozen years ago, I can re-learn it again and with 4000 MRJT command hours under the belt, out of total slightly above 10k, I don't think that I'll have problem finding non-type rated captain (or in emergency; F/O) job even in the world that has about thousand less 180seaters than planned and that burned through the remaining hours of low MSN ACMI 320s and 738s during summer 2019 like crazy but I would rather prefer that I won't need to.
However, my feelings towards the 737 or Boeing Co can absolutely make no difference on the outcome of MAX catastrophe. I am afraid that too many pilots and too many passengers will be chasing not enough of their respective seats, pushing the pay and commuting opportunities down. May FSM help us all.
I'd suggest that perhaps what they are labelling to be the 'A220' to be the best current narrow body, by all accounts it is loved by passengers, crews and operators alike, apparently very fuel efficient, 'best' isn't decided upon which has sold more simply because they have never changed the name of series after series after series of different aircraft!
I wonder if the 400+ MAX airframes can be remanufactured as NGs with the older engines?
If not, its either A) scrap them?
or
B) re certify them as B797s, if MCAS can be approved?
or
C) get the FAA to sign it off as just another B737, and get a Mega PR exercise to tell everyone how wonderful the MAX really is?
or
D) get Boeing to leave the narrowbody market to Airbus for a few years, and design a real "clean sheet" aircraft to replace the MAX ASAP?
If not, its either A) scrap them?
or
B) re certify them as B797s, if MCAS can be approved?
or
C) get the FAA to sign it off as just another B737, and get a Mega PR exercise to tell everyone how wonderful the MAX really is?
or
D) get Boeing to leave the narrowbody market to Airbus for a few years, and design a real "clean sheet" aircraft to replace the MAX ASAP?
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New Details on Boeing Emails
Hey I'm not sure if this is the right place to post, but there has just been a release of redacted Boeing emails, that at first glance look pretty incriminating. See cnn, or the verge, or npr. Perhaps time for a new thread?
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One unnamed employee wrote in an exchange of instant messages in April 2017: "This airplane is designed by clowns who in turn are supervised by monkeys."
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This entire Max debacle has become a case study of what happens when self regulation runs amok. Very sobering when every day you see news of the same 'profit at any cost' thinking taking place in multiple large industries, happily enabled by government partners.
Paxing All Over The World
One of the constants in humans is that: When a disaster happens, it is soon discovered that responsible people within the organisation had been warning of this exact event - and were ignored due to money and politics. {internal politics and/or govt politics}
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But also, quite often with no disaster, malcontents and neer-do-wells are discovered within the organization sabotaging the company on a daily basis. It is often very difficult rooting these people out.
Who said it's the best narrow body in the world, previous generations of B737 might have sold more because they haven't changed the '737' label for 53 years but how can the current 737 be the best narrow body when it is responsible for killing so many people and is grounded woirldwide?
Probably.
It can't. It doesn't comply with overridability required of anti-stall devices such as stickpushers. Removing it and installing proper stickpusher would probably render grandfather certification rights nil and void and make MAX uncertifiable.
I don't think the US govt would let Boeing go bust.................
Technically, it should be possible. However, convincing the airlines and engine manufacturers to make step back when the world has decided the geared fan is the way to go might be difficult to impossible.
and has problems all of it's own - as does every modern jet engine - they've pushed the envelope to the limit TBH
