I would venture a guess that by just booking your flight from A to B at will and at the time of your choice, you will avoid future travel on 737 max.
True. Every new aeroplane that after a couple of years in service crashes twice, killing 300+ or so pax and crew should be subjected to the same scrutiny as MAX is.
I guesstimate we won't see any MAX in-service accident ever again, let alone flight control system related one, so there won't be any need for serving the humble pie.
That's not the way I see it; methinks it is pretty stable but not quite in accordance with regulations NG vs. even more unstable MAX. I'll return to that in a moment.
I beg to differ. The way I see it, Boeing mgmt were very aware what could had gone wrong immediately the Lion Air speared in and had their fears confirmed by the Ethiopian tragedy. While their actions looks unreasonable in isolation, I find them quite rational for someone who is clutching at the straws. They seem to be very aware that under the current regulations the MAX is uncertifiable without MCAS and if it were admitted what MCAS actually is, it would be very doubtful that grandfather rights are still applicable. What they are doing all this time is treading the water while hoping geared fans will turn out to be dissapointing and the world returns to CFM-56 (scrapping the 320NEO in process) or every aviation authority relaxes the certification standards while applying them retroactively to existing designs such as MAX. Of course Washington would like Boeing to survive as the damage from its demise could be so bad to steer the USA into recession, not to mention extreme damage to aerospace industry and the national pride, but the horrible prospect of letting the Boeing die commercial death might be the cheapest option on the table.
Sorry for going overly techy, hopefully someone would be able to translate it into more understandable jargon if needed.
So what are those MCAS and STS? One would expect that something that has "system" in its acronym to be a system. Not quite so. First, the FAA convened the Joint Authorities Technical Review of 737 MAX flight controls. In
its final submittal, it was quite careful not to offend the host so its relevant finding was a bit spiced with doubt:
However, Indonesian accident investigation board, in association with the NTSB, was not mincing words when describing STS/MCAS in its
final PQ-LQP crash report:
Wow. STS and MCAS are merely software. Worse, they are there to augment the flight, which is fancy phrase for protecting the aeroplane from going into the parts of the flight envelope from which recovery is difficult or impossible. It could be all good, except the pilots of B737s were not even being told they are flying the flight augmentation devices equipped aeroplanes. At least pilots flying FBW Airbi, 310s or F100s are informed about their control laws, their failures and reversions. Also, the SAS hasn't been introduced on MAX or NG, it is with us since 737-300, nowadays called "classic".
Now, there is nothing inherently wrong with putting the stability augmentation and stall prevention systems in the aeroplanes lacking lawfully prescribed natural stability as long as the risk of failure modes is properly assessed and flightcrews informed what their aeroplane is supposed to do and what to do when it doesn't. Both were sadly lacking in MAX case and I suspect failing to declare STS as stability augmentation system paved the way to MCAS disaster and might imply that FAA was complicit in Boeing (mis)naming games since mid 1980s (it could also explain some of the distrust other aviation authorities displayed towards FAA when requiring separate independent MAX recertifications). If it's indeed so, then the bankruptcy and the liquidation of Boeing Co would neatly sweep the issue under the rug with the whole 737 program dead and any certifying issues rendered irrelevant, especially as the NGs have been proven to be safe in operation. Space, military aircraft and widebodies could be picked up and continued by other aerospace companies.
Exactly. That's the way it goes with any aircraft and I don't think MAX would be an exception if it ever flies again (small chance).
So, folks, are you offended with the doom & gloom of my post? Do you think I'm Putinist trollbot bent on soiling the reputation of the best narrowbody in the world? Your previous experiences might indeed steer you in that direction. I hate to go autobiographical on the PPRuNe, yet I feel compelled to admit that I really enjoy flying the 738, as I have indeed enjoyed last six years of playing with her NWS tiller. I love working for my current company, especially after some quite unsavoury experiences with the previous one, but as it bet its future entirely on MAX, I'm not totally confident I'll be able to enjoy flying here in the years to come. I learnt to fly 320 a dozen years ago, I can re-learn it again and with 4000 MRJT command hours under the belt, out of total slightly above 10k, I don't think that I'll have problem finding non-type rated captain (or in emergency; F/O) job even in the world that has about thousand less 180seaters than planned and that burned through the remaining hours of low MSN ACMI 320s and 738s during summer 2019 like crazy but I would rather prefer that I won't need to.
However, my feelings towards the 737 or Boeing Co can absolutely make no difference on the outcome of MAX catastrophe. I am afraid that too many pilots and too many passengers will be chasing not enough of their respective seats, pushing the pay and commuting opportunities down. May FSM help us all.