Of course I support transponders.

But I don’t support replacing the obvious need for class D at a place like Ballina with a world unique transponder mandate.

It’s a classic example of the airlines pushing the cost of safety upgrades to anyone other than themselves.

Do you agree that a tower should have gone in at Ballina before the $13 m fire station?

Oh come on Dick, you can't be serious.

Yes or at the same time in a co-located facility like BRM.

An airport like Ballina, like Port Macquarie, like Yulara, like Gladstone, like Dubbo, like Mildura should be able to establish a service such as a Certified Air/Ground Radio Operator or a Control Tower based on a commercial or operational decision. Above that there should be clear guidelines issued by CASA that mandate when a service must be provided, based on such factors as risk, traffic mix.

Pinky. It looks as if you are flying without ADSB.

Why would you be doing that? Surely safety would be improved if your aircraft came up on the ATCs ADSB display.

Deja vu, all over over over over again.

Please, Pinky1987, explain to me how the average VFR pilot can practicably “avoid IFR routes and IAPs”.

Start by explaining how the average VFR pilot will know where the waypoints in an IAP are.

Then explain how a VFR pilot can fly from A to B, if there is an IFR route from A to B.

Fantasy world.

Mmmm. About to install.

What is the estimated cost of one with ADSB in or haven’t you got a quote yet?

So what is your estimate for the ADSB out including installation and certification?

I like the way you think that you’re safe and snuggy with your ADSB-out. The Mangalore aircraft were both fitted with ADSB-out and they still collided.

ADSB-in on a display may have helped them where ATC weren’t able to.

Did anyone here participate in the ASA web 'discussions' on plan B? I understand that some got a bit heated???

Pinky, I think I like you. :ok:

Pinky,
In terms of cost effectiveness, you do realise, do you, that there has never been an accident on an Australian airfield, in the history of Australian aviation, where the presence or absence of an on-airport fire service has made any difference to the outcome.
A classical example of economic waste, when the real risk, as opposed to perceptions of risk, (or mindless following of ICAO, where it is NOT required we follow) are used in decision making.
Tootle pip!!

Geoff,
Having done it countless times, that sound pretty right -- it's only in Australia that some pilots get themselves in a knot about the nominal class of airspace,
If you work for Qantas longhaul, or any other international airline, you will be in anything from A to G ., all part of a day's work.
Tootle pip!!
PS: And having flown somewhat smaller aircraft under and around in the LA basin, for more years than I care to remember.

How could you ever prove that?

For example, a 737 lands at YMML with brakes on fire. The on-site fire team puts out the fire and everyone safely escapes.

Do you have a crystal ball to tell us what would have happened if they didn’t use the foam or whatever?

Sorry but the batteries are flat in my crystal ball however I well recall the resident volleyball team at Tulla spraying water on the hot brakes of an A300 and then ducking for cover as those brakes explosively shattered. Clever, not!

CC

Quote:

---

I check the ERC and DAP I mark this on my visual charts and keep the hell away from the initial fix and RNAV approach. Once in the cruise I am not worried about the IFR route as I fly VFR level and the high performers are in the high teens or class A by then.

---

So you cruise at VFR levels rather than IFR levels, when flying VFR. Pure genius. Someone should make that a rule.

And you and your instructor should lobby CASA and RAAus to add plotting IAP waypoints on visual charts to the RPC/PPL syllabus. Maybe just add them to the visual charts in the first place?

Would the RPC/PPL holders have to review and understand RNAV-related NOTAMS to make sure the plotted IAP waypoint information is accurate?

Do you think heavy metal pilots do or should believe a VFR pilot’s assertion as to his or her location with respect to an IAP waypoint, absent third party or TSO equipment confirmation?

Quote:

---

AIP already has info on avoiding published IAP and routes where possible.

---

I’m aware of this, from ENR 1.1, which is about ops in Class E:Are you able to quote anything about avoiding IAP waypoints in G?

Squawk7700,
Prove what???
I am quoting the actual record, for aviation in Australia so far, from Year dot to the present day.
Yes, we have had brake fires --- and other airfield fires, but the ARFFS didn't make any difference to death or injury, did they,
The record is clear and unambiguous, in the history of Australian aviation, there has NOT been a survivable accident on an Australian airfield, where ARFFS made any difference to the human outcome.
The whole point of rational risk management is that human life is NOT "priceless" (the AU covid reaction is a stark example of the costs/risks being ignore, including deaths from other consequently untreated medical conditions, and we will be counting the costs for years) and back in the last century, airport fire services NOT required by ICAO were pulled from Australian airfields, saving many millions of pounds/dollars over the subsequent years.
As I said in the pervious post, and I have said many time over the years, ARFFS is a classical example of economic waste ---- and give a thought to why design criteria has evacuation time requirements ---- without external assistance.
Tootle pip!!

Bloggsie,
Sorry, only just picked this one up.

Not a common occurrence, I grant you, but it has happened, with totally unexpected diversions to places where the tower (if there was one) was closed at the time of arrival --- the last one I did, the S/O got a very quick education on the way you can vary approach lights intensity from the flightdeck in FAAland.

There are no shortages of "approved" diversion airfields where the tower (if there is one) is not H24, in US.

In one memorable case, a method of refueling with an engine running was worked out with Boeing over the phone, as no GPU, so an engine had to be kept running for a cross-bleed start, the phone being a payphone at the aerodrome gate --- before mobiles, of course.

But back to Class E, the simple fact, demonstrated over so many years (60 or more?) is that the US/ICAO system works, and all the "perceived" problems here, particularly from a cohort of the AFAP, are just that, perceptions of a problem. But, as one of your former Technical Directors so often demanded, "perceptions of an air safety problem" must be treated as "real" , even if no data exists.

Tootle pip!!

PS: US is not the only country that had HCPT aircraft in E and G.

After 25 pages of posts on this subject can we get back to a very simple proposition indeed:

The function of ATC is to prevent collisions between aircraft.
Aircraft in VMC are (usually) able to see and avoid other aircraft, particularly if given relevant traffic.
Aircraft in IMC can NOT self separate under most circumstances even if they are given traffic.

Mangalore was a prime demonstration of this truth.
The aircraft were given traffic.
An aircraft on an instrument approach is legally required to fly the approach as published (or to go around, climbing but not deviating from the lateral confines of the published approach).
An aircraft on an IFR departure, particularly a training one is firstly required to have a pre-determined safe route to reach LSALT so is at least to some degree and maybe wholly constrained against lateral manoeuvering.
And is likely dealing with a simulated engine failure or such since that is what IFR training is all about.

Intelligent people responsible for safe aircraft operations in developed countries have determined that ATC must provide separation for all aircraft operating in IMC since they can not always do it themselves.
Airservices fails to grasp this simple concept.

This may be in part because Airservices no longer employ qualified, current IFR pilots who can tell the ATC staff what is required.
CASA, and OAR, as I have previously demonstrated are not compliant with their legal requirements.

I support the implementation of the US system of airspace classification and usage.... all of it.... the way they do it in the USA, not some local invention by those who do not know how to do it right.
Some folk on here like Dick, Geoff Fairless and LeadSled have the picture, fortunately.
Further, I have demonstrated why it is less costly (less workload) for ATC to provide separation than to provide traffic.

Why is the history of aviation in this country such that safety improvements only occur when there are enough dead bodies to cause an outcry?

Except that you've demonstrated nothing about the cost, only assumptions.