I'v got an hour or two driving the old Beech truck and seeing as every time/off wasn't considering a balanced field length there was no reason to remove ones's hands off the two gas levers (until gear/flap ret) and one always watched the torque guages in yr scan. I'm of the opinion that on this accident old Max (whom I'd known for many years) didn't get a roll back of a donk due gas lever creep. I wish I knew what happened, we all do but will never truly know -(

In ten years of flying Kingairs, from some of the oldest in Oz to others straight out of the factory, I never experienced power lever migration.

Those same aircraft 601 mentioned had the occasional rollback as engineers often released the pressure on the friction nuts during ground runs. If missed in the preflight you soon noticed and made the necessary corrections. Some pilots also had a habit of loosening them after shutdown, don’t know why.

Probably following the advice of long-suffering engineers who had to maintain the system.

Lead Balloon,

Yes mate there is something in the setup that will always bias the rollback to the Left engine.

Groggy

Mach,

You are correct in that it happens as the hand is moved to the gear lever. It happens in a second and then its the shock factor that gets people. Some, as you surmise, calmly put their hand back on the power levers and correct the situation. Others firmly grip the yoke trying to understand what happens. I have seen it in play I can assure you that it is easily rectified, IF and that's a big IF, you put your right hand back on the power levers.

Groggy

Interesting, grog. What is the cause of the bias toward left PLM over right?

I note that the rudder trim system maintenance manual pages you posted seem to me to show an autopilot servo in the system. However, the ATSB report says:Am I misreading the maintenance manual pages or are they for a model different to ZCR?

ATSB’s detailed examination of the actuator concludes:So ATSB discounts the suggestion that the cable broke and was pulled through the actuator due to forces during the crash.

If yaw to the left occurred simultaneous with initiation of gear retraction, it could support the power lever migration theory.
However, the aircraft was veering left from the moment it became airborne and the gear was not selected up. Unless the pilot was in the habit of taking his hand off the power levers at V1 (as some do), this theory is less probable than the mis-set trim cause quoted by the ATSB.
Was the pilot trained to take hand off throttles at V1? Perhaps when he had to go back for re-education after his earlier incident, someone indoctrinated him in this change to usual light twin practice. Some CASA 'experts' may even insist on this - does anyone have any experience of this?
As Capt Ramrod says, there is no need to do that. However, some would have been trained to remove hand at V1, but one would hope that any training in that concept would also have been quite rigorous about use of checklists, including setting throttle friction.

Can we get away from referring to "V1" in this series of KingAir.

Sure there are performance tables for Part 25 style operations but this particular Kingair was a Part 23 aeroplane.

In Part 23 aeroplanes, I would raise the gear when the remaining runway was insufficient for me to close both throttles and land while looking to achieve and maintain the Blue Line ASAP.. Part 25 gear was called for when a positive climb was established.

I used to have some very long conversations with Examiners asking for V1, V2 etc while conducting my IR renewals in Barons etc.

There is a big difference between "V1" in a Part 25 aeroplane and "Decision Speed" in a part 23 aeroplane.

601 you are, of course technically correct. I did consider writing ‘Vr’ instead of ‘V1’ but then I thought some smartarse would tell me that the usual practice is to remove hand from throttles at V1.
The problem arises because pilots who have not done simulator but only trained in the aircraft at light weights often think that it is flyable after an engine failure at 94-95 knots, which is the Beech quoted speed, depending on flap. Hence the perception that it is a V1. 95 knots is approximately 5 knots below Vs at gross weight flap zero, so by any measure it can’t be a Vr. And it’s not a Takeoff Safety Speed either. Whoever certified the Beech King Air 200 should have put a big disclaimer at the front of the Flight Manual section on takeoff performance.
Elsewhere on Pprune there has been considerable discussion on this, with certain aces claiming a failure at 95 knots can be taken into the air.
In the hands of a truly expert pilot, current in simulator, it probably can, though 1st & 2nd segment climb can not be achieved without some fudging, ie flying in ground effect for a while.

Lead,
The Trim system in the B200 is totally manual via cable in all three axis. The servo you see is most likely Yaw damper.
Groggy

Tom Clements view on Take off data for the B200
 

Hi,

For those of you talking about the take off data and V speeds this article is well worth reading. Its by Tom Clements a very respected King Air expert in the USA.

Groggy

I can't read that yet, but have done much reading of similar stuff, I am sure.
Flight Safety International was (maybe still is?) the training outfit in the USA that Beech used for initial King Air training. Also I think CASA recognise their training. If you can download from www.pilot18.com an original manual issued by FSI, as wrong as the term may be, on about pages 347 & 348 you will find very clear reference to a 'V1/Vr' of 94 or 95 knots. Hence we have generations of pilots brought up with misconceptions of this aircraft's capabilities. The same manual is reproduced at www.data.tmorris.net

However, in the case of the accident under discussion, the pilot did not rotate until about 111 knots. This would be a nice, manageable number to deal with an engine failure, so maybe he was familiar with its limitations at the lower speeds. Unfortunately, the greater speed would have made it even more difficult to deal with a full left rudder trim application.

Thanks again, Groggy

It’s weird that they plonked an “autopilot servo” in the diagram of a system that does not connect to the auto pilot. Maybe it’s to assist in identifying the physical locations of some of the actual system components?

I’d like to do an experiment on a serviceable aircraft with a properly tensioned rudder trim control cable: Find out how easy would it be for the cable to fall off, and what happens if the cable falls off, one of the pulleys at FS 104 or CSS 437. I’d also like to see how close the cable runs to other moving components.

Quote:

---

However, some would have been trained to remove hand at V1,

---

Can anyone tell me when this hand off the throttles at V1 technique originated? I suspect it was an Old Wives Tale that has got legs over time. When I learned to fly it was considered poor airmanship to take your hand off the throttles whenever hand flying any aircraft - single or multi-engine. It was when I first flew the Fokker F28 during my type rating with Ansett WA that I was rapped over the knuckles for daring to have one hand on the thrust levers during VR and early climb.

When I had the temerity to ask my instructor why did I need to remove my hand of the throttles at V1 I was told it was an airline SOP. "But why?" I asked. I was told it was a psychological thing to prevent the pilot from closing the throttles in fright if an engine failed after lift-off. That was when I realised it was just another OWT. Yet another explanation given to me by an airline check captain was that a one handed rotation (with one hand on the throttles) could cause one wing to lower at VR becuse of the unequal pull on one side of the control wheel as the pilot pulled back on the wheel. I thought he was pulling my leg unil I realised he was serious.

Later I checked the flight crew training manual for the Boeing 737. Nowhere did it recommend the pilot take his hand from the thrust levers at V1 during takeoff. I can only assume that what was once some management pilot's personal opinion has spread around the aviation world like a pandemic and has become yet another of those Old Wives tales that permeate the flying game. In time Old Wives Tales transmogrify into Aviation Lore and bcome God's gospel truth

Sheppey, both reasons you heard for this practice do sound like a load of old bollocks. Back in the day when this became SOP it is unlikely that psychology had found its way into the airline world.
More likely It originated with really heavy unpowered flight controls in large transport aircraft. The flight engineer would set power, then the captain would hold the top of the levers in preparation for a reject if necessary. At V1 the captain would need both hands to haul the heavy beast into the air, but the engineer would still have the throttles. Then the engineer went the way of the dodo, and the surviving dinosaurs retained the practice.
But if it’s SOP, woe betide the pilot who challenges it, or worse, disregards it. Always remember that he who pays the piper calls the tune.

Mach

Perhaps the gear failed to retract?

If the pilot was fumbling, trying to manually move the J-Hook out of the way, and had a power lever migration he would have been in a world of hurt.

Except it is unlikely he would have been fiddling with the gear or the J hook as he rotated, yet that is when the yaw commenced.
I don't discount that power lever migration could have contributed to the accident, simply that the evidence of the trim as reported by the ATSB points to that being the primary cause.

I know this is a thread about a King Air, but may I momentarily diverge from the topic.

I don’t know how that procedure came about, but in today’s modern aircraft where this technique is primarily employed, the aircraft likely all have auto-throttle/thrust anyway, so what good is leaving your hand there beyond the point at which you can abort anyway?

Airmanship is also knowing the correct techniques/procedures relevant to your aircraft. You’re not (or at least hugely unlikely) going to get the thrust levers running back on you in an Airbus for example, the moment you take your hand off them.

For Groggy, I note the ATSB report says this about flight carried out in a Level D simulator for a similar model aircraft:

Quote:

---

The pilot who performed the flight commented that:

---

The unambiguous implication of that outcome (assuming it substantially replicated the performance of ZCR) is that it is not physically possible for the aircraft to fly away ‘like a homesick angel’, if the rudder trim is set to full deflection (or at least full nose left deflection), unless the pilot is an “exceptional human”.

Have you any first-hand experience, either in the simulator or the aircraft, of flight with the rudder trim set to full nose left deflection and both engines delivering maximum thrust?

So it takes you around half a second to place your hands back on them, but it also enforces that point that you’re not going to attempt an RTO beyond V1.

Modern Airbus aircraft the thrust levers don’t move anyway, so it brings it back to the point that airmanship is about knowing your aircraft, and having your hands there in a modern Airbus aircraft is pointless.

Leadie

Yes. Have done it many times in the sim at 12,500. Sure, we knew it was coming, but with a failed engine, it still climbs away nicely. 2 engines, no problems at all. Not talking about good technique versus bad, just saying it can perform to ensure you should live

Thanks TTL.

But just to be clear, have you ever (in the Sim or otherwise), slowed down to below 140kts, set the rudder trim to full nose left then (preferably with the undercarriage down) selected full thrust on both engines to see what happens as the aircraft accelerates through 140kts?

Can anyone tell me when this hand off the throttles at V1 technique originated?

The procedure helps prevent aborts such as this when an aircraft is still capable of flying -

"www.japantimes.co.jp/news/1997/11/20/national/garuda-crash-blamed-on-pilot-misjudgment/"

Kitchen there's already heaps of stuff on the origins, beliefs and arguments both for & against as it pertains to the King Air and other aircraft types - right here on this thread in the last few posts.
Also there are other threads on when aborting above V1 may have actually saved lives (like when the aircraft proved to be unflyable or suffered an uncontained fire). This in no way is endorsing aborts above V1 as a matter of course, and is not criticizing those unfortunate crews who took an unflyable situation into the air and lost it.
Read and ye shall find...

British HS 748 abort seconds after lift off due severe engine fire
https://assets.publishing.service.go...001_G-OJEM.pdf

As we all know the V1 speed is the go no-go speed (although there is debate over that as well but that's another
story) but that speed is for that A/C on that day at that airfield for that Rwy & WX conditions, nothing precludes a command decision to abort after it if the commander considers it unsafe to continue! The commander may have but just a few seconds to decide after V1 but it better be right especially in today's litigations world & bean counters out for a head on a plate if you cock it up!

Mach E. A. and Machtuk - interesting. I'll see how I go on my next sim when I abort after V1 for a fire warning or engine failure.

I seriously doubt, a few seconds after V1, that you have the slightest idea that a fire is uncontrollable/uncontained. That usually comes after you've completed the drills - and that doesn't happen soon after V1. In a B737, the second shot (if needed) isn't fired until 30 seconds after the first and after that is when you discover if the fire is controlled or not. Bit late to abort then!!!!!

Re the HS748: although the CAA thought the decision "sensible" they also commented "that there was no reason to abort the takeoff" (para 2.1.1) Had they continued and completed the drills correctly (including the LP cock), there is every chance the fire would have been extinguished notwithstanding the issue with the number 2 shot for that engine. The crew denied themselves the opportunity to carry out the drills in a timely manner. As it was, it was a happy ending but with a hull loss. It could have been worse - they had good fortune on their side.

I think one needs not to take comments out of context.

Mach E Avelli (who has more runs on the career board than a very great many of the rest of us, and is a nice bloke to boot) observed (like when the aircraft proved to be unflyable or suffered an uncontained fire). This in no way is endorsing aborts above V1 as a matter of course. This does sort of suggest that there was no thought on his part that such non-standard decision processes should, in any way, be cavalier. That is to say, such decisions must represent an in extremis situation where the commander is convinced (rightly or wrongly) that he/she has no alternative at the time.

I think we all (should) accept that there is a world of difference between the second or two available to the commander on the day and the week or 20 available to the Monday morning quarterbackers to ponder the situation. We accept that the commander wears the consequences of his/her decision. Sully, Haynes, et al get adulating pats on the back, others get whipped mercilessly - just the nature of the Industry and sitting in the LHS. Often, manifestly "good show" efforts attract brickbats, eg



Another very pertinent example is the DC8/B727 mishap at Sydney, many years ago (Investigation: 197101202 - DC8-63 Aircraft CF-CPQ and Boeing 727 Aircraft VH-TJA at Sydney (Kingsford- Smith) Airport NSW, 29 January 1971 (atsb.gov.au)). Those of us with a performance background would have been aware of the stopping capability of the Boeing - most non-engineering pilots, on the other hand, would opt for the continued takeoff. For the TAA crew, it was manifestly unfortunate in the subsequent litigation that intra-cockpit comms went out over the VHF. Even with an extensive performance engineering background, I can recall (still very clearly) one of my early F27 flights (probably Devonport/Wynyard around 45 years ago) at critical weight. As V1 approached, the runway head was disappearing under the cutoff angle. I pondered the reject case for a second or two at the time ....

Fortunately, for the great majority of us, we are never put to the nitty gritty of character building testing on the line ... fortunately.

No one has suggested that a take-off should be aborted above V1 for a simple failure or fire warning! Doing so on a simulator detail could be career limiting, and rightly so.
But, consider the Concorde crash. ATC told the pilots that fire was visible while the aircraft was still on the ground, though beyond V1. The pilots did what they thought was right in continuing the take-off. But with 20:20 hindsight that accident may have been survivable if they had attempted to stop.
Here's another one. A HS 748 at Sumburgh in the Shetlands (I was there flying DC3s at the time). Due to a failure in the system the control gust lock engaged and the aircraft went off the end into the sea. Had they realised the controls were jammed and aborted while still on the ground, though above V1, they may well have stopped on the hard surface, but even so, the over run into the sea was a better outcome than if they had tried to fly away.
A colleague had a major electrical fire in the cockpit of a Convair. They were in the cruise at the time and eventually dealt with it, but it must have been frightening. There was another cockpit fire in a Beech Baron many years ago in W.A.. After the cabin extinguisher only did part of the job they finished it off with beer!
Something like that happening at or slightly beyond V1 would, in my opinion justify an abort. Not all fires are accompanied by a bell or red light. Also when an aircraft is relatively light, or the runway well in excess of requirements, V1 may not be a stop-limited speed,
Back to the King Air, Even though Vr was 94 knots, and even though actual rotate was some 15 knots above that speed (for whatever reason we will never know) the aircraft probably could have been stopped from the greater Vr within the confines of the airfield. Again, I emphasise that I am not criticizing the pilot for continuing, as he clearly did not know that his aircraft was unflyable.

The B200 Simulator at the Ansett Sim Centre, was the cause of much embarrassment, red faces, cursing, WTF moments, when doing engine failures.

kitchen bench, to be fair the report states at 2.1.2 that he made the reject decision based on his fear of the aircraft's structural integrity. What may have given him that impression the report doesn't elucidate, although the report tells of a previous catastrophic accident due to a similar failure, was this in the Captains mind? The report also states that it was not possible to categorically state the outcome had they continued with a circuit, it does comment that significant structural fire damage could have resulted. Place your bets, red or black, abort or go. Everyone walked away, job done.

Remember a DC-9 that aborted on the eastern runway Hobart, nose hanging over the strip end but nose wheel still on the tarmac, had to be pushed back in order to turn it around. Friend safely aborted a RAAF C-130 in Darwin above refusal speed (V1) after multiple bird strikes, his thinking I assume may have been a lesson from the fatal Electra crash (Eastern Air Lines Flight 375) in the USA that was brought down by starlings they had hit six seconds after lift off, initially No 1 autofeathered, No 2 flamed out, partial power loss on No 4.

I think most here understand what Mach E.A. & I where getting at, after V1 it's unknown territory as far as stopping goes but often better to crash slowly than at a much higher speed.

Some years ago I was departing DN Rwy 29 in a small corporate job, balanced field length was Calc on an intersection dep we elected to go full length due the Twr saying there where multiple birds over the last half of the Rwy, Twr boys got the safety officer to shoot the sh1it out of them then we where cleared to go. As you can guess the bloody birds headed down towards us, I/we belted a few inc one smack bang on my windscreen (CM1) just as the F/O yelled V1 birds! I rejected now officially above V1, stood on the brakes, max Rev, pulled up with half the Rwy left, glad we took full length, glad I pulled the pin regardless of V1! I considered the dangers greater airborne than on the deck from possible distorted view due blood and guts, engine issues, U/C and brake issues, I was used to birds, U/S'ed an Airbus in CS one night, bloody buggers!

Quote:

---

I assume may have been a lesson from the fatal Electra crash (Eastern Air Lines Flight 375) in the USA that was brought down by starlings they had hit six seconds after lift off, initially No 1 autofeathered, No 2 flamed out, partial power loss on No 4.

---

About to depart from RAAF base Edinburgh in a RAAF Viscount to Canberra. No passengers so quite light. Lined up and saw dozens of sea gulls snacking on thousands of tiny worms on the runway about 200 metres in front of us. There had been rain earlier. Asked ATC to have fire crew hose the birds and worms from the runway which they did.

When the fire crew said birds had dispersed we elected to depart. Within seconds before Vr a whole bunch of birds arose from the grass adjacent to the runway and smacked into the aircraft. Edinburgh runway was very long with a ton of room to stop because we were light. Aborted the takeoff run and taxied back to the tarmac for maintenance inspection which showed multi bird strikes on fuselage, wings and tail. No damage evident. Maintenance then inspected the engines and did run up's and everything normal.

Meanwhile the fire crew found over twenty dead birds scattered on the runway. Once they were picked up we departed wuth no futher problems. We were fortunate there was plenty of excess runway which meant an abort at VR would have been comfortable. Immediate selection of ground fine prop pitch was very effective for deceleration and we did not need manual braking and still had runway to spare. I was aware of the fatal Electra crash in USA where multiple bird strikes after lift off caused engine failures. This may have unconsciously influenced my decision to abort at high speed, but it was not the thing that comes to mind in such a situation. The long runway made it a no-brainer.

Quote:

---

The B200 Simulator at the Ansett Sim Centre, was the cause of much embarrassment, red faces, cursing, WTF moments, when doing engine failures.

---

I believe that simulator is Category B meaning fidelity only guaranteed when airborne. Anything that happens on the runway (crosswinds for example or situations such as continue or reject while on the runway, including landing roll) fidelity is not guaranteed and it would be unfair to criticise a handling pilot under training when performing a manoeuvre which involves runway operations such as aborts. That is why for licencing for type rating, flight in the real aircraft is a CASA requirement. If in doubt about runway ops fidelity write it up in the defect report.

https://cimg9.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune....32ff7a83f2.jpg
Concorde pilot John Hutchinson tells the story that an Air France 747 carrying President Chirac was holding off the side of the runway, the 747 Captain told the story that the Concorde sailed over the top of them with an estimated twenty feet of clearance, had they attempted to stop perhaps we would have seen a Tenerife rerun. The above photo was taken from the 747.

The V1 go case is for an engine failure or any other alert generated by the aircraft warning system. It does not include structural failure/damage or impact by an external source. In the case you have described on a 3,000 mtr runway is in my opinion the right decision. In the case of a shorter takeoff closer to balanced field length, I probably would go, then return to land and hope I made the right decision. The rejected takeoff at V1 remains the most poorly executed pilot manoeuvre.

Sorry, but I would disagree with the last. No statistical data to support my assertion (only personal observation) but I'd have to vote for the All Engines Operating go-around (not Missed Approach) in day VMC. Usually a different outcome when anticipated and briefed, but not everyone has that as SOP.

The above usually results in extra paperwork out of places like KVNY or KTEB.