Lead,
It takes a long time, relatively, for a King Air to reach 140 KIAS after lift off if flown properly regards speeds. I train my guys to climb at max rate, about 125 kts, until through lowest safe however in visual conditions the subject pilot may have done it differently. I would expect you would be approaching 400 ft before reaching 140 kts in a normal situation. Getting back to gear retraction I want to reiterate the power lever snaps back very quickly and the pilot may never get to actually place his hand on the gear lever before grabbing the yoke with both hands in an effort to control a wildly yawing aircraft.

Groggy

Centaurus, you misunderstood my point and that was that B200 sim caught a lot of people out with assymetric handling.

A lot of the aces found out the B200 sim like the real aeroplane, was a handfull to fly in assymetric configuration, nothing like a Seminole or Seneca.

Wichita B200 Accident report
 

I was thinking this report about a B200 accident in Wichita back in 2014 read very similarly to the Essendon accident. While there is no probable cause, attached to this report, a simple Google search seems to point towards Power Lever Migration.

Groggy

They are quite different. In the case of Tenerife the KLM pilots could not see anything and the runway was occupied. In the Concorde accident they were visual, and the aircraft from which the photo was taken was holding clear of the runway. If that photo was taken from the 747 it suggests the estimate of 20 feet to be an exaggeration - understandable with something so frightening unfolding in front of you!. At the time of the photo the Concorde crew still appeared to have directional control, though it was lost shortly after, as controls were destroyed rapidly by the fire. The aircraft is still within the confines of the airfield and apparently still over the runway (the markings are blurry in the photo). By the time the photo was taken it was well and truly committed to continue.
The other great difference between the two accidents, is that in the case of Tenerife, the KLM Captain did everything wrong, while the Air France Concorde Captain did everything right. A translation from the French says that the words "too late" were heard, suggesting a reference perhaps in response to the Engineer's call of "stop" at some 35 knots above V1; but maybe it came later and meant they knew their fate was sealed.
From the multiple 'Maydays' heard by ATC, the King Air pilot obviously knew his fate was sealed almost the moment the wheels left the ground, probably before any attempt to retract the gear was made. Whether he did right or wrong is open to conjecture and no doubt will play out in lawsuits for some time to come.

In that case the B200 must be a real bastard in assymetric conditions, as the Seneca 1 could prove to be a bit interesting!:}

Pinky, I think that the old B200 simulator is probably worse than the real aeroplane in that it is very sensitive to pitch control. More than two degrees either way and a positive climb speed can't be achieved if the failure is simulated at Vr. Later King Airs with Raisebeck mods seem to be more tolerant in pitch, but still require precise lateral control, though no more than most twins which have so much power to weight.
However, despite being only level B that sim remains a useful training tool and could well be used for any light twin training to teach the fundamentals in a safe environment.

That old Sim wasn't the easiest contraption to drive but it did/does the job. You simply had to be a good driver to handle it within the testing parameters. We used to even experiment after a Sim check. Full flap, one engine, off Syd 34L from a standing start, could get it airborne, just -) Sometimes we used to swap roles, the examiner would jump in the drivers seat and we/I would fail things at the control panel revenge is sweet-)

Sorry for my propensity for persistence, but I’m not sure my question was answered. I’ll ask it again, but generally:

Mach, the Tenerife comment was purely in reference to a collision between the aircraft, no more. The Concorde pilot telling the near miss story was asked by John, "Surely you mean 20 metres?", No he replied "20 feet", 16:50 on the video.


With reference to a possible abort the official report says,Between a rock and a hard place it would seem, the first sign of trouble was 6.4 seconds after V1 at 188 kt CAS.

V1: 150 kt
VR: 199 kt
V2: 220 kt

The left wheel truck took out a runway light and burn marks on the grass show deviation well to the left.

https://cimg6.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune....38e82c9316.png
A closer shot from the 747, photo is full frame and not cropped.

https://cimg1.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune....dc2a4493aa.jpg

How persistent do you want to be LB?

I tend to get more persistent when I can't get straight answers to fairly simple questions. The ATSB, having produced various works of fiction for various reasons for a substantial period, means I am presumptively dubious about the content.

In the case of ZCR, the mystery of why the rudder trim was where it was post-impact may be a mystery forever. But the question whether an aircraft of this kind is 'handleable' by an ordinary pilot, with full nose left rudder trim and the engines delivering full power after accelerating through 140kts, is binary.

If the ATSB probably got it right, I should concede that.

https://www.avweb.com/aviation-news/...ing-air-crash/

Lots of similarities.

How so?

Where is taking off with rudder trim incorrectly set mentioned in the NTSB report?

Throttle 'roll back' sounds familiar though..

Misset rudder trim, wrong rudder pedal = same result

Plenty of people suggested this was a factor at Essendon.

The outcome of the US one makes the Essendon ATSB thesis sound even more likely. Sounds like their roll rate was way more uncontrollable than Essendon one and much more sudden, whereas Essendon appears to have gotten more uncontrolled as speed built up.

No finding of mis-set rudder trim in the NTSB report is construed by you guys as being support for the ATSB finding of mis-set rudder trim?

You guys should join the ATSB. Heavens knows they need necromancers.

You are of course correct LB. Other than the similarity of 2 KingAirs being flown by pilots not following checklists and then mishandling the controls that resulted in a fatal crash into a building within minutes of the thrust levers being advanced, the two accidents are as similar as the Challenger and the Hindenburg.

Correct. The latter ended things far more quickly than the former, or so it would appear.

Here is a hypothetical.

KADS crash: diverging left very shortly after liftoff.
YMEN crash: very similar.

KADS crash: report states the pilot likely pressed the wrong rudder pedal initially (left one) exacerbating the roll/yaw.
YMEN crash: report states the rudder trim was found to be deflected full left (but couldn’t determine when that was done).

Could the incorrect left rudder application like at KADS and the left rudder trim at YMEN be “similar”?

Stick with me here.


A reduction (by a certain amount) of power on the left engine, for whatever reason be it failure or migration of the power lever, will result in the rudder boost activation. The pilot will feel this in the pedals- application of right rudder to counter the yaw: left pedal moves aft and right pedal moves forward.

There might be the possibility that in the KADS crash the pilot applied left pedal because they felt the pedals move in such a way and it was an attempt to get them back to central and feel “normal”- the report does say that the input was apparently corrected.
Could it have been possible that in the YMEN crash that there was a reduction in left power for some reason, activation of the rudder boost, the pilot felt similar movement in the pedal and incorrectly wound in left rudder instead?


I fully understand that this is hypothetical. And we will never know the full reason as to “why” in the YMEN crash. I also accept that the rudder trim could have been full left right from the beginning, but we don’t have the conclusive proof.

But without that conclusive proof I think we need to consider these sorts possibilities and have these discussions to try and avoid these sorts of things in the future. I’ve lost count of how many King Airs have speared in to the left shortly after liftoff....


One of the biggest take-aways from both of these accidents is the importance of the proper use of checklists though.

Checklist correct use - I know a 350 operator of 26 years who are still arguing about this

The only similarity I see with those two accidents is the left deviation of horizontal tracking. The KADS crash the Kingair is quite clearly banking over to inverted in the pictures available, highlighting an uncontrolled yaw/roll. The YMEN accident the aircraft is maintained wings level showing a significant amount of control prior to impact. I would assume, that if the pilot at YMEN had full right aileron but also left rudder, which would be a coordination exercise in itself, the aircraft would have similarly lost lateral control as well and rolled. This would be only be worsened by actual power loss on the left side, which would have made an uncontrolled roll inevitable, which did not happen.

In answer to the question, the higher the airspeed the greater the rudder load, Whether it be one engine at flight idle or full opposite rudder trim at takeoff power and 140 knots will require full opposite rudder, in my opinion holding that load on one leg without full rudder trim in the correct sense would cause muscle fatigue and failure in about 30 seconds. For a V1 cut excercise, 95kts, requires full opposite rudder, without rudder trim, I doubt your leg would make it to 140kts.

Thanks Xeptu.

Your welcome. Be aware there will be differences of opinion. I'm a 20.7.1b person and use claytons for takeoff performance procedure and terrain clearance departure procedures. Those that have had no exposure or knowledge of that will have a different technique more akin to the normal cat procedures, yes I know those terms have changed, I'm old.
Unless you are briefed by those in the know while climbing to 400ft at V2, it takes quite a few times to get your head around "it's ok you can relax your leg now the rudder pedal will stay there. it buffets a bit and it's a weird un-natural feeling. Rudder boost in all cases is nothing more than a stand on this one.

Coronial investigation in this accident is finally underway.

https://www.abc.net.au/news/2021-09-...ring/100480126

Not sure if you’ll be able to read this behind the paywall:

https://www.theage.com.au/national/v...16-p5dojv.html

Seems the airport owner allegedly didn’t follow guidelines when building a shopping centre next to the runway. Who would have thought?

Quote:

---

The ATSB investigation details a 2003 email it uncovered, in which an Essendon Airport management officer advised that CASA had agreed verbally to the airport applying a strip width of 180 metres rather than 300 metres.

---

This is another example of CASA apparently ‘disowning’ responsibility for its own officer’s inconvenient actions.

It appears that the only way in which to have confidence that anything written by any CASA officer is CASA’s position is to write to the CEO and seek confirmation that the CEO acknowledges and accepts that what the CASA officer said is CASA’s position.

The airport owner (and CASA, if implicated) will argue that the buildings had no influence on the outcome of the King Air crash. In this particular case they would be right, but it was sheer luck that no one was there on the ground to get hurt.
If a heavier bizjet plows into the shopping centre and kills a dozen or two seeking some retail therapy, Essendon Airport will close overnight. It will briefly open for ferry flight take-offs only. CASA will claim to have eliminated the risk.
The developers will circle like sharks, hangars will become trendy apartments, and the runways will make very convenient parking areas for new high rise buildings.
How to destroy valuable aviation infrastructure 101.

There are two sets of rules. One for some and one for the others. In regard to Essendon it would appear that the development extended far beyond the original boundary from the runway.
By the time anyone realised what was going on it was too late to pull the concrete up.
R

I completely agree there, the horse has already bolted. Any push to remedy the boundaries will result in no change to the shops and more restrictions on Aviation, and push Essendon closer to a shut down date. Australian politicians will never push back on developers, the pollis involved might 'take one for the team' and resign or spend a few night in min security hotel or even just be told they have been bad and nothing else, like a recent 'very corrupt' but 'we won't do anything about it' ex NSW elected.