Derfred

How many missed approaches, diversions, holding patterns, second/third approaches have you ever flown in a large RPT jet? Have you any idea of the fuel used? The aircraft I operate can be expected to use an additional 1500 kg of jet fuel for a single missed approach in 'visual conditions', or approximately 3500 kg in 'instrument conditions' (in cloud). When wind-shear and/or turbulence from inappropriate airport infrastructure results in an inability to land or even attempt a 'safe' landing, its usually multiple aircraft that are affected. Do the math. At some airports, this phenomena is likely to be costing Australian airlines hundreds of thousands of dollars every year.

Thunderbird Five
Watching that Senate Hearing was interesting. I thought that we had enough problems with our own CAA and EASA here in UK/Europe.
Watching those top CASA guys perform, showing a complete lack of knowledge, and avoiding the questions with mumbling, verbal verbiage.
My commiserations, as it appears you too are saddled with incompetent bureaucrats in your aviation regulators!!

Dial up the other parts of those senate hearings. Eye popping viewing.

Twin engine aircraft are certified to be able to climb away within a splay in the event of an engine failure, and that is generally considered an acceptable level of safety

A necessary, qualifying, observation, if I may.

This statement applies to heavy aircraft ie, the typical airliner. As we come down the size scale, certification reality reduces aircraft capability requirements. Indeed, otherwise we wouldn't have any small aircraft due to the prohibitive cost of ownership. For the low weight end of the spectrum, the requirements are a bit scant ..

The B200 is a capable and very nice aeroplane but its capabilities should not be confused with those of the higher certification standard.

Consistent with its light aircraft roots, there still is a small performance grey area during the final stages of takeoff should an engine fail. The recent mishap aircraft, I suggest, was very much involved with trying to traverse this particular grey area.

lurker999

The DFO could've been full of unsuspecting members of the public, shopping less than 60 minutes later..

The 'shoppers' wouldn't think for a second that, although shopping less than 250m from the runway centreline of a busy regional airport, they were at any greater risk of being involved in a tragic aviation accident, or losing their own life.

The risk of implication in an aviation accident is far higher 'on-airport' (any airport) when compared to alternatives such as Chadstone, Docklands or the CBD for example.

The 'layman' among us rightfully assume that Governments (Local/State and Commonwealth) have adequately risk managed these type of events. So why is a large shopping centre (DFO or otherwise) located immediately adjacent to the Obstacle Free Zone of Runway 17, just underneath the inner transitional surface (OLS) and within the confines of the airport?..

Why are so many Australian airports prioritising profit/income maximisation at the expense of public safety and aviation amenity and continually getting away with it? What is the primary role of an airport?

John Tullamarine
The B200 is a capable and very nice aeroplane but its capabilities should not be confused with those of the higher certification standard.

Not true John Boy. There are operators in Australia operating the B200 on an STC to operate 1000 pounds heavier than normal 12500lb, thus putting it in CAO 20.7.1B territory. So it must meet 20.7.1b up to 13,500lb. Sure, its not going to get 6 or 7% on one engine like a jet, but it DOES meet the requitements and when handled correctly (which sim training should ensure) it WILL fly away nicely.


Consistent with its light aircraft roots, there still is a small performance grey area during the final stages of takeoff should an engine fail. The recent mishap aircraft, I suggest, was very much involved with trying to traverse this particular grey area.

I don't believe in this grey area. The "traversing of the grey area", as you call it, is done by using full rudder, lots of aileron, conducting the memory items and FLYING THE AIRCRAFT - not by punching out useless mayday calls.

Crushable material in the over-run zone
 

If I'm stating the obvious, Centaurus, it's because you seemed somewhat oblivious to it. CASA Manual of Standards Part 139 - Aerodromes is crystal clear when it comes to the purpose of the Runway End Safety Area.
So, while your focus might be on high speed emergency stops that is most assuredly not the whole discussion.

You are advocating a solution that augments one of the the stated purposes of the RESA while simultaneously prejudicing the other, and prejudicing it in a manner that would endanger lives. And if you want to have a look at materiality, the ATSB has handled more accident investigations relating to undershoots than overruns.

And just by the bye, Derfred, the major cause of undershoots is weather; variable and gusting winds and windshear, in particular. Near as I can tell very few airports are exempt from those conditions.

Absolutely true, JT. I lost a good friend and three generations of his family in a Beech Baron incident many moons ago. Short story, he intended to fly the entire trip gear down due to an issue they had encountered in New England. He informed ATC, all OK. On climbout he had an engine failure which NTSB eventually attributed to a piston deformation in the manufacturing process which would not likely have been discovered in normal maintenance. Informed ATC he was heading back to airport, what could they say? With one engine, and gear down, plus making a turn -- crashed and burned in the woods some ways from the aerodrome. NTSB said while piston failure was root cause, "probable" cause was the pilot's error as he turned around with gear down and didn't aviate first to gain altitude before working things out. It'll be 15 years this years this summer and still gives me the creeps.

JT - Yes but the performance grey area you refer to is not so small in some of the crappy piston twins flying around currently.


Trevor - I can't comment on the handling/performance of a B200 as I haven't had the pleasure of flying one unfortunately. But I think you're being a bit harsh by inferring that this crash was caused by the pilot mishandling the engine failure. The poor guy hasn't even been buried yet. Lets wait for the official report before apportioning blame shall we..? There could have been other issues/problems we're not aware of.

I met up with a guy today who recalled an IR renewal I did with him at Mangalore in a Metro 11. This a/c would have similar OEI performance characteristics to the B200. After a simulated EF seconds after airborne he remembered having full aileron and rudder with the a/c going nowhere except downhill towards ground effect. Performance figures that are quoted by the theorists belie the reality of flying this category of aeroplane. When an engine fails below Vyse there must be enough airspace to accelerate level or descend to accelerate to Vyse and then have obstacle clearance for SE climb out. If these conditions don't exist then the only option left is to land more or less straight ahead. That is the reality after T&C hundreds of pilots on turboprops below auw of 12500 lbs.

Long time no read lamax! I was trained on twins by a certain Dutchman who you would know who would only conduct engine cuts at 400'.He had been scared into early grey hair by too many people who mishandled the plane when the EF was initiated at liftoff. His life saving advice was that the drills had to be practiced until they were instinctive. You put 20 pilots in the simulator and give them the scenario that this pilot faced and I don't think there would be much difference to the final outcome.

Not true John Boy

Afraid we shall have to continue to disagree, then.

So it must meet 20.7.1b up to 13,500lb.

I would need to review the STC paperwork in the AFM FMS to form a view. However, a couple of points ..

(a) the original US TC doesn't claim other than FAR23 .. unless I have missed something in a read through ..

(b) citing 20.7.1b is all fine and beaut .. but it is an operational requirements document, not the certification animal. Looking at (a) and (b), and noting that I haven't had the luxury of a looksee through the STC paperwork, perhaps you can detail the manner in which the performance has been improved to meet your claims ? Not saying it hasn't .. just that I am curious.

Certainly, the OEM POH gives various OEI climb gradient capabilities (including to FAR25) but there is a big leap from the typical GA grey area below Vyse and related configuration - caveat, my file POH doesn't include the present mishap aircraft so I am taking a bit of a leap in faith here, I guess.

Sure, its not going to get 6 or 7% on one engine like a jet

There would be many heavy jet pilots who would like to strap that sort of aircraft to their tails .... now, how about with a commercial payload ?

but it DOES meet the requitements and when handled correctly (which sim training should ensure) it WILL fly away nicely.

Caveat - my comment doesn't apply to the present mishap but should be viewed as generic.

(a) simulators are only as good as the model fidelity and the data which goes into the programming .. ergo.. perhaps ...

(b) are you suggesting that this capability covers a critical failure on the ground ? ie that the aircraft might emulate/comply with FAR25 requirements ? If so, at what sort of weights ? I am only too happy to be surprised ...

I don't believe in this grey area

How remarkable. I certainly do for this class of aircraft and smaller ...

Yes but the performance grey area you refer to is not so small in some of the crappy piston twins flying around currently.

Which is why I cited the current FAR23 requirement. The average piston twin at commercial weights and a failure below Vyse (with the associated configuration) and a couple of hundred feet under your belt .. probably isn't going anywhere in a hurry .. other than down.

My position in that class with a critically low/slow failure was always to plan on closing the throttles and crashing the best I could more or less straight ahead .. generally, one is better off crashing at low speed right way up rather than at higher speed and upside down.

Certainly, that was the essence of my pre-takeoff briefing on GA I/F renewals. I note that neither ATOs nor DCA examiners were ever game to put my very definite implied threat to the test by simulating a low height failure ... not to mention that they would have feared gross physical assault after the event ..

I would commend Max's observations in post #494 ... for those who don't know who he is .. the post represents the voice of a LOT of experience.

Which is why I cited the current FAR23 requirement. The average piston twin at commercial weights and a failure below Vyse (with the associated configuration) and a couple of hundred feet under your belt .. probably isn't going anywhere in a hurry .. other than down.


Exactly my point (which I didn't express very well). Under these circumstances its pretty much the luck of the draw. I did my initial twin training at YMMB. If you were 'lucky' enough to have it happen to you taking off on RWY 35, you have a nice golf course straight ahead. If it happens on RWY 17, well, you're pretty much screwed.


I think lamax is on the money. .. the post represents the voice of a LOT of experience. And the voice of reason I'd say.

IFEZ - Yes I take your point reference condemning anyone before a full report. BUT there are some known facts already in the mix. Things such as lack of simulator training, gear still down, an ill timed mayday call. All circumstantial of course, but I know of a number of people who have said not surprised.


JT - Our B200s are full reisbeck modded and we are required to meet 20.7.1b every day. We are meeting the criteria, though on hot days with heavy loads we are weight limited to meet the legalities. You are correct ref it being an op document rather than a certification, but does that make any difference practically when looking at required gradients and going to the manuals to ensure we are compliant? And face it, in an accident scenario, the cert standards et al, can go jump, as long as the perf manual gave me a gradient and it met what I needed, then I should have been competent to do it. ref 6 or 7% on jets - I did 12 years on airline jets, 744, 330, 320, but the bulk of my jet time is bizjets. And of course they do perform brilliantly on one off the ground. 6 or 7% makes life very easy in the sim.

and we are required to meet 20.7.1b every day

Your post appears to imply that your aircraft only looks at established gradients rather than the full Part 25 thing . two very different animals. I would still be interested in having a look at the POH FMS.

And face it, in an accident scenario, the cert standards et al, can go jump, as long as the perf manual gave me a gradient and it met what I needed

Well, no.

The certification documentation, being the basis for the TC, is the source material for the operational numbers. Alternatively, the STC workup may have done the donkey work again for the new requirements.

I guess so long as the pilot is compliant with the Ops Manual, and the operator has taken advantage of CAR(1988) 139(3) - ie the pilot has never seen the AFM, he/she probably is going to have a reasonable time of things.

However, if the ops data doesn't fit the AFM then others may have their delicates out in the cold breezes.

John, from the Raisbeck supplement re FAR 25.Following on from previous discussion I note now they say when practising Vmca a minimum of 5,000 ft and the 5° bank.

Thanks for that .. the doc suggests that R has redone the donkey work. Will look forward to a read of the POH FMS when, and if, the opportunity might arise.

Just as many as everyone else, I guess.

How many missed approaches, diversions, holding patterns, second/third approaches have I flown in a large RPT jet due to mechanical turbulence caused by non-aviation infrastructure?

None.

That's why I asked you for statistics, which you have not provided.

trevor

Please go to your Raisbeck Manual and plug some numbers. Can you please tell us the TODR of a B200 operated to FAR 25 performance? Strart with ISA and MTOW and also let us know the final climb gradient.
Then cross reference that with the RDS for EN 17.

Comp stall, as I'm not familiar and maybe you are- what and where is the obstacle that gives the 5-something % gradient for that runway?

Also, please correct me if I am wrong, but wouldn't it be operating under CAO 20.7.4 and as such, would it or would it not be required to meet that 5-something % obstacle gradient?
My recollection of T/O weight requirements under 20.7.4 is that it must be able to make 6% normal ops and 1% with prop feathered and gear & flap up. Quite different to 20.7.1B.

what and where is the obstacle that gives the 5-something % gradient for that runway?

One would need to check with the airport or the relevant surveyor to identify the specific obstruction. However, a quick looksee at the RDS data indicates that it is likely to be the boundary fence or associated lights. Simple matter to run the trig to get an approximate distance from end TODA .. but probably not necessary in this case.

wouldn't it be operating under CAO 20.7.4

Probably

would it or would it not be required to meet that 5-something % obstacle gradient?

Not at all. It is most likely that one of the earlier STODA figures would be used or, if one is a bit clever, run the sums and use an intermediate distance/gradient if the calculations are reasonably defining. In this case I would anticipate that the STODAs cross at the one critical obstacle.

A case of matching weight limitations for TODR against climb gradient capability. One would need to check the POH figures to make a more definite assessment. Not that it makes for much value as the reconfiguration puts it out of reach unless the runway has lots of spare distance ... In practical terms, a FAR23 twin doesn't have much OEI value until it is somewhat above the aerodrome and other obstacle levels ie for the typical GA aerodrome the pilot should be in silent prayer that nothing quits in the first how ever many hundred feet of climb .. Hence the oft-referred to "grey" area of the takeoff.

under 20.7.4 is that it must be able to make 6% normal ops

Correct. If that is a limit for the particular model, there will be a climb weight limit chart of some sort in the POH data.

and 1% with prop feathered and gear & flap up.

Actually, better than that .. the 1% for charter is determined at 5000 ft ISA. The gotcha, in practical terms, is the distance taken to effect the configuration and speed changes .. for the typical runway it doesn't work out and we just go on the AEO case with the OEI looking from sometime after the initial takeoff.

The OEM accel-go data, where provided, usually is sufficiently alarming ... if we were concerned about an early failure, we would go back to the office for a coffee instead of going flying.

Quite different to 20.7.1B.

Significantly so

Trev,
Supplementary question. Sorry.
Please advise amended Raisebeck take off reference speeds or balanced field length V1 if Raisebeck provide it.

Thanks John.


Ok here's a couple of very basic numbers. A quick look so I'm not saying it's 100% accurate.

We don't know whether he took of flapless or with flap, so this has nothing to do in relation to the accident aircraft.


Let's assume flap is used for takeoff. Raisbeck FAR 25 info.
20 degree day, 500 elevation, nil slope and wind, 50ft obstacle height, MTOW.

TODR 2600ft (790m).
Net climb gradient, inop feathered, gear up, flaps t/o: 3.6%
Balanced field (obst height 35ft), 3850-4250ft (1170-1290m) [depends on your brake/tyre combination].
V1 Vr 99, V2 100, V50 105.


Accelerate go, to 35ft, non FAR25 info.
Max weight, flap up, nil wind and slope, 500 elevation, 20 degrees- 3800ft (1160m).

For the questions above, I will see what I can dig out of the books. To say i'm no expert would be being honest. I must admit ignorance but can I have explained why FAR 25 is relevant in a VH registered aircraft, operating on an increased weight STC operating to 20.7.1b - I have published gradients to meet - the Raisebeck supplements give me the numbers and gradients I will achive. If they achieve the requirements of CAO 20.7.1B, AND they meet the runway gradient requirements, what is the issue when I lose an engine and fly away achieving the gradients offered in the manual.


I for one always love talking performance, and always love to learn more. So hopefully I will gain some good stuff out of it. But will it change my next 13,000lb takeoff when I need a gradient off 17 of 3.93% and the performance manual says I will get 4.72%.

Accelerate go, to 35ft, non FAR25 info. Max weight, flap up, nil wind and slope, 500 elevation, 20 degrees- 3800ft (1160m).

(a) I would have expected non FAR25 (ie FAR23) to be for 50 ft ?

(b) let me guess .. that distance is R mod data ?

(c) by comparison, for the standard OEM manual (for the earlier serials), accel-go at 12500lb and the same other details, ... gives a bit under 7000 ft. Climb gradient at 121kt is around 4.5% or a bit better. It's that speed thing that causes the problem ...

Interesting, is it not ?

why FAR 25 is relevant in a VH registered aircraft, operating on an increased weight STC operating to 20.7.1b

A bit of history is useful.

In the beginning (when the world was without form), the US did some sensible things such as have regs for certification and operations. DCA (the original precursor of CASA) came up with a rather strange amalgam of certification documents which either were stand alone or drew on the overseas (US or Brit) standards but with local tinkering at the edges which drove many in the local Industry to distraction. These, progressively and now, totally, have been consigned to the WPB-round. Ron Yates (ref The Yates' Report) had a bit to do with starting up some enthusiasm for getting this process finalised.

Operational documents, such as 20.7.1b, written by folks who didn't understand the certification documents, came up with a strange array of requirements which sometimes, but not always, mirrored the certification requirements. A far better approach would have been just to state .. observe the certification requirements. Great stuff for young engineers on both sides of the table who had to try and work it all out. I can't complain .. it made me a few dollars over the years ...

Back to the story ...

Courtesy of one of the posters, whom I know well but wasn't aware that he had changed his username, I now have a copy of the R STC .. will take some time to digest the rather large document. I am presuming that R has redone the basic performance work to be compliant with parts of Part 25. The FMS doesn't appear, explicitly, to state the certification basis (as is the usual case) so one would need to look at the STC package and associated certification data to form an opinion on that one. Depending on the detail in the FMS, it may/may not be open to claim compliance with all of 20.7.1b unless further data be sought.

For some years now, Australia has adopted the country of origin NAA approved AFM/POH as the book .. did I mention Ron Yates ? .. that's why FAR25 be relevant. The R STC has been signed off by an FAA delegate .. or so the front page states .. and it, thus, forms part of the FAA approved AFM/POH so that ties the two together.

Now, the loss of the various local certification documents resulted in the 20.7 docs having to relate to the foreign requirements .. otherwise we would have been in some sort of totally confused limbo. If you download 20.7.1b (makes it easier to search) and look for "flight manual", you will find a reference or two to "foreign flight manual" and lots of references to "flight manual". Now, I am a tad out of touch with the day to day activities in respect of flight manual approvals but, if I am correct, Australia no longer issues flight manuals for overseas sourced aircraft, requiring the owner to use the relevant foreign flight manual.

So, providing that the foreign STC does, in fact, meet the requirements of 20.7.1b, all should be fine and beaut. Just how do you know that it does .. when the foreign documents are based on the foreign design standards ? It may well do so .. but one ought not just to presume such is the case.

operating on an increased weight STC operating to 20.7.1b

Be careful .. the STC probably knows naught about 20.7.1b. At the end of the day, Australia is a bit of a backwater so far as the US Industry is concerned. Rather, it is the operator's responsibility to show that there is a compliance at audit. This is why I referred earlier to CAR(1988) 139(3) .. if your aeroplane doesn't carry the POH then you (as a pilot) are pretty well covered if you abide by the operator's Operations Manual. The problem then reverts to where it should lie .. with the operator/owner.

If it sounds like I am making a mountain out of a molehill .. I'm not ... it will be very interesting if and when a major prang leads to a Royal Commission and the lawyers really get stuck into all this stuff.

Sorry John, "R mod data" I'm not sure what you mean by that.

I've got no data handy for, and never flown, a non-Raisbeck B200 so can't really comment there. I'll believe your figures. Goes to show a King Air with the Raisbeck goodies are better :ok:

As for that 35ft, well, can't tell you much more other than that's what it says on the chart, and it wasn't in the section with FAR25 info. Unless certification criteria changed at some stage? :confused:

My Raisbeck HDG accel go at MTOW ISA shows about 6800' field length.

R mod data

Sorry, my apologies ... shouldn't use shorthand without defining it .. Raisbeck modification.

Goes to show a King Air with the Raisbeck goodies are better

I have only a minor familiarity with KingAir Raisbeck stuff, being the 350 strakes and locker mods .. and they appear to be good value.

As for that 35ft

Don't worry about it for the moment .. only a sideshow issue. I'll have a read of the FMS and see what I can make of things.

I think you'll find that virtually every airport in the world has an airport terminal teaming with innocent civilians (completely unaware of the great risk of tragic aviation accident) within 250m of the runway centreline.

John, "R mod..." Yes I get you now. Somewhat obvious in hindsight :ugh:
And yes the numbers I got were from the Raisbeck manual.

From reading your posts you've got a very good understanding on all the certification criteria etc, much more so than me, so unfortunately I won't be able to get too in-depth in conversation with you there.

Don't worry Ramrod, youre not Robinson Carusoe there.


Thanks John T. Fabulous info and history there. Particulalrly of major interest is where you say does 20.7.1b meet the requirements of the FAR. It really is incredible stuff what you are saying.


I guess I still fly knowing that with an engine out, and because of appropriate sim training, I can fly away knowing I can meet the gradients and get to a safety height. You may be interested to know that up to about 13000lb the performance requirements out of YMEN are met fairly comfortably - but above 13,000, they drop off dramatically and we are limited to 08/26 and often having to use STODAs to get the gradient requirements.

Posted for those who want to crunch numbers. (Raisbeck modded aircraft, which a B200 pilot who has looked at a photo of the aircraft is fairly sure is so equipped). Then again, the aircraft may, or may not, have had the 1,000 gross weight increase. So many unknowns, which the report will reveal.

Temp at the time was 18° and pressure altitude 42 feet.

An airport terminal, which is legitimate aviation infrastructure is understandable. A shopping centre or DFO is a totally different proposition.

You're either very lucky..or naive as to the contributing factors resulting in some of your missed approaches etc.

I watched the second film in the links below over 30 years ago during a flying safety officers’ course. Some days you just shouldn’t get out of bed and go to work. Although the accident captured in these YouTube videos was caused by a flap failure on final at Heathrow (details in the Wikipedia link) the situation became much the same, asymmetric out of control at low height and in this case, irrecoverable once it got going. There are numerous other cases of really bad outcomes where all you can do is feel sorry for the guys and gals involved eg a wing breaking off in turbulence due to metal fatigue, an uncontained fire on the flightdeck, maintenance not done properly, etc. In hindsight and we do have the benefit of hindsight when reflecting on the Essendon accident (it’s not an incident) whereas the PIC last week had just seconds before everything turned pear-shaped, when normal flight is impossible, pulling back both throttles to idle and crashing ahead roughly wings level with the gear up in the best place available is all you can do. You have to be ready for that every day or, don’t go flying! Once when double asymmetric just after gear retraction hot and heavy I had to dive below runway level into a valley to get to engine out climb speed. Yep, I never briefed that one nor practised it in the sim! Recovered in ground effect manoeuvring to avoid two towns. Saw something similar at the movies years later. That’s why the guys on the 380 out of Singapore earned their superannuation that day. Sometimes, anything can happen. Maybe the owners of those offices beside runway 35 at Canberra should reflect on that in their spare time.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WzPTg86r9aw

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bLZYR2d-WO4

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1968_Heathrow_BKS_Air_Transport_Airspeed_Ambassador_crash

29 years in heavy jets, none for me either, done a few missed approaches for other reasons.
Maybe I am just naive too. ;)

Join the naive club, Tank.

As I've said, I'd rather have airports retain their Commonwealth land, but if DFO's are what it takes to prevent airports like Essendon from closing altogether, then so be it.

In fact I would have to say that pretty much all man-made threshold turbulence I've experienced at Australian airports has been caused by aviation infrastructure.

For example:
Sydney 16R in a SW wind - international terminal and freight terminal.
Canberra 35 in a NW wind - big hangar (often a warning on the ATIS).
Brisbane 01 in a NE wind - big hangar.

These situations make me work slightly harder but have never caused me or any others I know a missed approach or any other type of delay or diversion. Just life as a pilot...

Edit: Datum, our conflict is a little off topic with respect to this accident, which had nothing to do with man-made turbulence caused by non-aviation infrastructure. In the interest of keeping the thread on topic, I will move on and will not comment further on the subject.

Acrux326
Very interesting. Thank you for your comments.

Whilst not commenting on this accident, I once had an asymetric flap extension (in a Baron). An experienced pilot and I were flying the aircraft and we both struggled to land the aircraft safely. The difference in the flap extension when we measured it, was less than 5 cm. We did not have long to react and we were two up on final. We landed safely and going around was not an option.

Current sim training requirements?
 

Sorry if this has been mentioned previously, but what are the current simulator training requirements, if any, for B200 operators if operating charter only?

I know that after the Air North Braz crash, mandatory simulator training and checking (2 sessions of each within 12 months) was introduced for aircraft such as King Airs, Metros, Brazs etc, if a suitable sim was present within Australia. Unfortunately the way the CAO was applied, was I my opinion, poorly done.

Some quick background.

Now it's been almost 2 years since I've been closely involved with this so it may have changed, but this CAO only applied to operators that had a CAR 217 check and training system in place. My previous company operated B200s charter only, but required a C&T system as they also conducted single engine turbine ASETPA and RPT ops. As such all our King Air pilots had to use the sim in Mel. The frustrating thing from the companies perspective was other operators we were directly competing with regarding B200 ops were also charter only, but had no C&T system, and therefore no sim training or checking requirements.

The obvious training advantages aside, this was a completely ridiculous setup that imposed additional requirements on operators with qualified instructors and approved training systems, whilst not applying any to operators that had minimal systems in place at all.

Has this changed with the new part 61, 141/142 rules or is this still the case?

Secondly, I don't know to much about operators down south, but did this operator conduct ongoing sim training, and were they required too?

If this has already been asked and answered than I apologise.

gretzky99

From my understanding the operator you refer to simply hired aircraft from owners. It was a one pilot operation. The flight in question type of operation was Private according to the flight plan.