Cirrus down Gundaroo, 06/10/23
A pdf copy of the whole NTSB investigation report is available here.
If the base of the IMC had been granite rather than clear air in that incident, the Monday Morning Quarterbacks would be asking why the pilot didn’t transmit a mayday and pull the chute.
That's interesting LB, your linked accident had not had the below SB performed.
On February 25, 2002, Cirrus Design Corporation issued Service Bulletin (SB) 22-95-01. The SB was also the subject of FAA Airworthiness Directive (AD) 2002-05-05, which became effective on March 19, 2002. The service bulletin and subsequent AD, entailed the installation of a cable clamp external to the rocket cone adapter which would provide positive retention of the activation cable housing. On February 28, 2002, Cirrus Design Corporation issued SB 20-95-02, after it was discovered that some production airplanes may exhibit a condition where the pull force required to activate the CAPS system may by greater than desired. The SB entailed the installation of a clamp to positively restrain the cable housing at the CAPS Handle Adapter, loosen and straighten the activation cable above the headliner, and to remove an Adel clamp securing the activation cable adjacent to the rocket cone adapter.
MSF was serial number 0153, so that SB would have presumably applied to MSF.
Both had the same year of manufacture I believe, being 2002.
I'm not suggesting that the SB wasn't performed on MSF, but it does show that this part of the aircraft build was clearly not foolproof from the start. Too bad when you tried to use it back in 2002.
DF.
That's interesting LB, your linked accident had not had the below SB performed.
The US crash was SR22 serial number 1140.
MSF was serial number 0153, so that SB would have presumably applied to MSF.
Both had the same year of manufacture I believe, being 2002.
I'm not suggesting that the SB wasn't performed on MSF, but it does show that this part of the aircraft build was clearly not foolproof from the start. Too bad when you tried to use it back in 2002.
The US crash was SR22 serial number 1140.
MSF was serial number 0153, so that SB would have presumably applied to MSF.
Both had the same year of manufacture I believe, being 2002.
I'm not suggesting that the SB wasn't performed on MSF, but it does show that this part of the aircraft build was clearly not foolproof from the start. Too bad when you tried to use it back in 2002.
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My husband had a coronary in November last year & was gone in an instant.
The widow maker brand of heart attack is instant. There's no pulling over to the side of the road, there's no pulling of the CAPS.
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Originally Posted by cncpc
With respect, it is different on the ground. There is a period before incapacitation in which you know something isn't right and can pull over.
With respect, it is different on the ground. There is a period before incapacitation in which you know something isn't right and can pull over.
A pdf copy of the whole NTSB investigation report is available here.
If the base of the IMC had been granite rather than clear air in that incident, the Monday Morning Quarterbacks would be asking why the pilot didn’t transmit a mayday and pull the chute.
I did. As usual, you evade the key point.
Cirrus Spin Characteristics - Literature
From Rich Stowell's book Stall/Spin Awareness, chapter 18 (re Cirrus and similar)
Paraphrasing further from that chapter 18: while standard certification requirements of single engine airplanes require spin certification and demonstrated spin recoverability from early stages of spin, these requirements were waved for the Cirrus and instead the Cirrus was certified based on the availability of the parachute system, allowing it an "Equivalent Level of Safety (ELOS") rather than fulfilling the standard certification requirements.
From the information up-thread is appears a spin was entered (by whatever cause), the parachute was not pulled (for whatever cause or reason), and the resulting traces sadly appear consistant with a continued unrecovered spin.
Quoted information is from 2007 and new insights may have been gained since, if so it would be interesting to know of. Other than that probably little more to expect until the report comes out.
The Cirrus is not approved for spins, and has not been tested or certified for spin recovery characteristics. The only approved and demonstrated method of spin recovery is activation of the Cirrus Airframe Parachute System (CAPS). [..]
While the stall characteristics of the SR20 make accidental entry into a spin extremely unlikely, it is possible.
While the stall characteristics of the SR20 make accidental entry into a spin extremely unlikely, it is possible.
From the information up-thread is appears a spin was entered (by whatever cause), the parachute was not pulled (for whatever cause or reason), and the resulting traces sadly appear consistant with a continued unrecovered spin.
Quoted information is from 2007 and new insights may have been gained since, if so it would be interesting to know of. Other than that probably little more to expect until the report comes out.
If you're referring to me, you should make that clear. However I will assume you are. You have made multiple claims - that the pilot pulled and it wrapped itself around the plane, tearing off the aerial. That he pulled and it failed to deploy. In both instances, you believed that "aviate, navigate and communicate" should happen in that order. Well, would it surprise you to know that once you've pulled that red handle, you can no longer do the first two so what exactly are you going to do, especially at 9500 feet with a long way to descend?
You also claimed in that incident that you posted about that, had there been cumulo-granite within the clouds, Monday Morning Quarterbacks would have been asking why didn't he communicate, why didn't he pull. Strange that, because he DID communicate.... he told the controller he had pulled his chute.... which was clearly stated in the report you linked.....
As for evading the key points, you have yet to tell me what could cause such a severe upset to cause a current and experienced IFR rated pilot to need to pull the chute whilst in an upset.... You seem to want to fantasise about scenarios which could, with maybe a one in a billion chance, occur. I prefer to look at reality, at what is most likely to have happened.
I must say that I am intrigued with the trim runaway idea, hadn't considered that scenario - because then without correct action, the pilot stalls not because of ice but because of an errant system, and then is too busy attempting to recover to communicate. That could easily cause him to be so focussed on resolving the issue, he doesn't communicate. I can see how that could occur, especially in IMC, further complicated by a child distracting the pilot. During my ownership of the Cirrus, my CSIP actually tried to simulate runaway trim by running the trim nose up - I don't know whether a runaway trim would run at the same speed as the CSIP dialling in nose up trim from his side yoke, but it was relatively benign, as long as you caught it quickly.
Obviously, it was a bit of a faff, applying nose down inputs whilst looking down to my right, looking to select the correct CB to pull. I can imagine in IMC, with the plane shaking, finding the correct one is going to be a little more difficult than me practicing on a CAVOK day.....especially as I was forewarned at the start of the flight that the CSIP "might" choose to dial in some trim to simulate runaway trim and see how I would cope.....
How fast a pilot would recognise a runaway trim also depends whether the pilot was in IMC or VMC but also if the pilot flew with the side yoke in his hand - I always had my left arm resting on the arm rest, my hand lightly gripping the yoke because the ergonomics allowed me to do so - the Cirrus is supremely comfortable to fly that way. I know when flying other aircraft such as C172, some pilots, in cruise, on autopilot, let go of the yoke. The advantage of holding the yoke lightly in the Cirrus is that if an uncommanded trim occurs, then you feel it acting against you - when nose up trim is applied, the yoke moves, powered by the motor, you feel the pressure, you can see the yoke moving.
So without finding parts of the aircraft elsewhere which departed in flight, I now see two possible scenarios - a trim runaway - and here I'm hoping that the remains of the aircraft will allow the investigators to determine the position of the elevator trim - or severe icing / stall with an unresponsive pilot. Obviously there could be others, I hope for the family's sake that they can find the reason.....
You also claimed in that incident that you posted about that, had there been cumulo-granite within the clouds, Monday Morning Quarterbacks would have been asking why didn't he communicate, why didn't he pull. Strange that, because he DID communicate.... he told the controller he had pulled his chute.... which was clearly stated in the report you linked.....
As for evading the key points, you have yet to tell me what could cause such a severe upset to cause a current and experienced IFR rated pilot to need to pull the chute whilst in an upset.... You seem to want to fantasise about scenarios which could, with maybe a one in a billion chance, occur. I prefer to look at reality, at what is most likely to have happened.
I must say that I am intrigued with the trim runaway idea, hadn't considered that scenario - because then without correct action, the pilot stalls not because of ice but because of an errant system, and then is too busy attempting to recover to communicate. That could easily cause him to be so focussed on resolving the issue, he doesn't communicate. I can see how that could occur, especially in IMC, further complicated by a child distracting the pilot. During my ownership of the Cirrus, my CSIP actually tried to simulate runaway trim by running the trim nose up - I don't know whether a runaway trim would run at the same speed as the CSIP dialling in nose up trim from his side yoke, but it was relatively benign, as long as you caught it quickly.
Obviously, it was a bit of a faff, applying nose down inputs whilst looking down to my right, looking to select the correct CB to pull. I can imagine in IMC, with the plane shaking, finding the correct one is going to be a little more difficult than me practicing on a CAVOK day.....especially as I was forewarned at the start of the flight that the CSIP "might" choose to dial in some trim to simulate runaway trim and see how I would cope.....
How fast a pilot would recognise a runaway trim also depends whether the pilot was in IMC or VMC but also if the pilot flew with the side yoke in his hand - I always had my left arm resting on the arm rest, my hand lightly gripping the yoke because the ergonomics allowed me to do so - the Cirrus is supremely comfortable to fly that way. I know when flying other aircraft such as C172, some pilots, in cruise, on autopilot, let go of the yoke. The advantage of holding the yoke lightly in the Cirrus is that if an uncommanded trim occurs, then you feel it acting against you - when nose up trim is applied, the yoke moves, powered by the motor, you feel the pressure, you can see the yoke moving.
So without finding parts of the aircraft elsewhere which departed in flight, I now see two possible scenarios - a trim runaway - and here I'm hoping that the remains of the aircraft will allow the investigators to determine the position of the elevator trim - or severe icing / stall with an unresponsive pilot. Obviously there could be others, I hope for the family's sake that they can find the reason.....
From Rich Stowell's book Stall/Spin Awareness, chapter 18 (re Cirrus and similar)
Paraphrasing further from that chapter 18: while standard certification requirements of single engine airplanes require spin certification and demonstrated spin recoverability from early stages of spin, these requirements were waved for the Cirrus and instead the Cirrus was certified based on the availability of the parachute system, allowing it an "Equivalent Level of Safety (ELOS") rather than fulfilling the standard certification requirements.
From the information up-thread is appears a spin was entered (by whatever cause), the parachute was not pulled (for whatever cause or reason), and the resulting traces sadly appear consistant with a continued unrecovered spin.
Quoted information is from 2007 and new insights may have been gained since, if so it would be interesting to know of. Other than that probably little more to expect until the report comes out.
Paraphrasing further from that chapter 18: while standard certification requirements of single engine airplanes require spin certification and demonstrated spin recoverability from early stages of spin, these requirements were waved for the Cirrus and instead the Cirrus was certified based on the availability of the parachute system, allowing it an "Equivalent Level of Safety (ELOS") rather than fulfilling the standard certification requirements.
From the information up-thread is appears a spin was entered (by whatever cause), the parachute was not pulled (for whatever cause or reason), and the resulting traces sadly appear consistant with a continued unrecovered spin.
Quoted information is from 2007 and new insights may have been gained since, if so it would be interesting to know of. Other than that probably little more to expect until the report comes out.
Spin Behavior
i. Test Matrix. A limited investigation of the SR20 spin behavior has been completed and results are contained in Cirrus Design reports 12419, title, and 15568, title. The incipient spin and recovery characteristics were examined during more than 60 total spin entries covering the following configurations.
Configuration(1)
Clean-Power Off ..........Takeoff-Power Off............. Landing-Power Off.............. Clean-Power On
Level Entry
1 Left & 1 Right.............. 1 Left & 1 Right................ 1 Left & 1 Right..................... 1 Left & 1 Right
C.G
Fwd(2), Mid, Aft................Fwd.................................... Fwd...................................... Fwd(2)
(1)All spins conducted at gross weight.
(2)Also evaluated accelerated entries, 30 degree banked turn entries, and effects of ailerons against the spin direction.
- Results. The aircraft recovered within one turn in all cases examined. Recovery controls were to reduce power, neutralize ailerons, apply full rudder opposite to spin, and to apply immediate full forward (nose down) pitch control. Altitude loss from spin entry to recovery ranged from 1,200 – 1,800 feet. Detail results can be found in the above referenced reports.
- Comments. No spin matrix less than that prescribed in AC23-8A or AC23-15, can determine that all configurations are recoverable. It must be assumed that the SR20 has some unrecoverable characteristics. In the SR20 proper execution of recovery control movements is necessary to affect recovery, and aircraft may become unrecoverable with incorrect control inputs. These spins enabled Cirrus to gain additional understanding of both the stall departure characteristics of the airplane and the necessary spin recovery techniques.
Last edited by FullMetalJackass; 10th Oct 2023 at 18:32. Reason: formatting
I will try to make it simpler for you, FMJ:
The absence of a deployed chute is not conclusive of an absence of attempts to deploy it. There are documented instances of pilots attempting to deploy the chute but it failing to deploy properly or at all.
(Equally, the presence of a deployed chute is not conclusive of the presence of attempts to deploy it. There are documented instances of the chute deploying without human intervention.)
The absence of a deployed chute is not conclusive of an absence of attempts to deploy it. There are documented instances of pilots attempting to deploy the chute but it failing to deploy properly or at all.
(Equally, the presence of a deployed chute is not conclusive of the presence of attempts to deploy it. There are documented instances of the chute deploying without human intervention.)
I just came back to look at where this thread was going, and I see that now the argument has come from my rather innocuous statement that people in a vehicle who are experiencing an incapacitating event can simply pull over. It beggars belief that someone could launch a denial post about that obviously true statement. Behind that is the presumption that a heart attack is an off on switch for the body to end life instantly, rending all other systems inoperative in a split second. It isn't.
https://my.clevelandclinic.org/healt...cardiac-arrest
FAA accepted the Chute as an alternative means of compliance, but EASA didn't. In total, the SR20 was stalled / spun 61 times before it was certified by EASA in 2004 - extract see below:
Spin Behavior
i. Test Matrix. A limited investigation of the SR20 spin behavior has been completed and results are contained in Cirrus Design reports 12419, title, and 15568, title. The incipient spin and recovery characteristics were examined during more than 60 total spin entries covering the following configurations.
Configuration(1)
Clean-Power Off ..........Takeoff-Power Off............. Landing-Power Off.............. Clean-Power On
Level Entry
1 Left & 1 Right.............. 1 Left & 1 Right................ 1 Left & 1 Right..................... 1 Left & 1 Right
C.G
Fwd(2), Mid, Aft................Fwd.................................... Fwd...................................... Fwd(2)
(1)All spins conducted at gross weight.
(2)Also evaluated accelerated entries, 30 degree banked turn entries, and effects of ailerons against the spin direction.
Spin Behavior
i. Test Matrix. A limited investigation of the SR20 spin behavior has been completed and results are contained in Cirrus Design reports 12419, title, and 15568, title. The incipient spin and recovery characteristics were examined during more than 60 total spin entries covering the following configurations.
Configuration(1)
Clean-Power Off ..........Takeoff-Power Off............. Landing-Power Off.............. Clean-Power On
Level Entry
1 Left & 1 Right.............. 1 Left & 1 Right................ 1 Left & 1 Right..................... 1 Left & 1 Right
C.G
Fwd(2), Mid, Aft................Fwd.................................... Fwd...................................... Fwd(2)
(1)All spins conducted at gross weight.
(2)Also evaluated accelerated entries, 30 degree banked turn entries, and effects of ailerons against the spin direction.
- Results. The aircraft recovered within one turn in all cases examined. Recovery controls were to reduce power, neutralize ailerons, apply full rudder opposite to spin, and to apply immediate full forward (nose down) pitch control. Altitude loss from spin entry to recovery ranged from 1,200 – 1,800 feet. Detail results can be found in the above referenced reports.
- Comments. No spin matrix less than that prescribed in AC23-8A or AC23-15, can determine that all configurations are recoverable. It must be assumed that the SR20 has some unrecoverable characteristics. In the SR20 proper execution of recovery control movements is necessary to affect recovery, and aircraft may become unrecoverable with incorrect control inputs. These spins enabled Cirrus to gain additional understanding of both the stall departure characteristics of the airplane and the necessary spin recovery techniques.
The "widow maker" brand of heart attack is not the only type of heart attack, or the only type of incapacitation. Stroke is a higher risk as it does almost immediately reduce the effectiveness of thinking and motor activity.
I just came back to look at where this thread was going, and I see that now the argument has come from my rather innocuous statement that people in a vehicle who are experiencing an incapacitating event can simply pull over. It beggars belief that someone could launch a denial post about that obviously true statement. Behind that is the presumption that a heart attack is an off on switch for the body to end life instantly, rending all other systems inoperative in a split second. It isn't.
https://my.clevelandclinic.org/healt...cardiac-arrest
I just came back to look at where this thread was going, and I see that now the argument has come from my rather innocuous statement that people in a vehicle who are experiencing an incapacitating event can simply pull over. It beggars belief that someone could launch a denial post about that obviously true statement. Behind that is the presumption that a heart attack is an off on switch for the body to end life instantly, rending all other systems inoperative in a split second. It isn't.
https://my.clevelandclinic.org/healt...cardiac-arrest
DF.
Around 40-50% of heart attacks are fatal. In your husband's case it was sadly short and sharp, hence the widow-maker term. That must have been truly terrible for you.
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Anyway, I just wanted to respectfully add that there can evidently be varying degrees of effects from a heart attack, but it wouldn't take much to loose the ball in a plane, or car for that matter.
My condolences also to the family affected by this awful crash.
The "widow maker" brand of heart attack is not the only type of heart attack, or the only type of incapacitation. Stroke is a higher risk as it does almost immediately reduce the effectiveness of thinking and motor activity.
I just came back to look at where this thread was going, and I see that now the argument has come from my rather innocuous statement that people in a vehicle who are experiencing an incapacitating event can simply pull over. It beggars belief that someone could launch a denial post about that obviously true statement. Behind that is the presumption that a heart attack is an off on switch for the body to end life instantly, rending all other systems inoperative in a split second. It isn't.
https://my.clevelandclinic.org/healt...cardiac-arrest
I just came back to look at where this thread was going, and I see that now the argument has come from my rather innocuous statement that people in a vehicle who are experiencing an incapacitating event can simply pull over. It beggars belief that someone could launch a denial post about that obviously true statement. Behind that is the presumption that a heart attack is an off on switch for the body to end life instantly, rending all other systems inoperative in a split second. It isn't.
https://my.clevelandclinic.org/healt...cardiac-arrest
This was a Truck driver who suffered a medical episode, I guess you can say he did pull over...
Luck played a major part that no one was killed, imagine if anyone was in the bus shelter. Also pretty normal that during a road vehicle incapacitation the car/truck tends to go straight ahead more or less with little swerving. Which is the same for aircraft in most cases unless you are very poorly trimmed as in general most normal category aircraft are designed with positive stability to more or less keep it upright unless you give it reason not to be.
Around 40-50% of heart attacks are fatal. In your husband's case it was sadly short and sharp, hence the widow-maker term. That must have been truly terrible for you.
Last edited by 43Inches; 11th Oct 2023 at 09:49.