Cirrus down Gundaroo, 06/10/23
This study has been around since 1999 and is a properly researched paper rather than opinions.
StallSpinEvaluation.PDF (richstowell.com)
One fact that emerges clearly in this study is this: “One feature that stands out in all except one of the 39 stall/spin accidents examined is that knowing how to recover from the stall or spin was of no benefit to the pilots in these circumstances. They stalled at altitudes so low that once the stall developed, a serious accident was in progress. Safety will be advanced therefore by preventing stalls and spins.”
It is well worth a read.
StallSpinEvaluation.PDF (richstowell.com)
One fact that emerges clearly in this study is this: “One feature that stands out in all except one of the 39 stall/spin accidents examined is that knowing how to recover from the stall or spin was of no benefit to the pilots in these circumstances. They stalled at altitudes so low that once the stall developed, a serious accident was in progress. Safety will be advanced therefore by preventing stalls and spins.”
It is well worth a read.
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Perhaps because there is nothing to discuss, a Jabiru bit the dust is all that is known thus far, nothing to conjecture upon, ran out of fuel, structural failure, engine failure, medical event? Don't know Merv nor ever heard of him, but RIP to a good man from what has been said..
12 pages of speculation and analysis for this accident. Yet the Jabiru at Stanthorpe on the 19th gets zero interest.
This study has been around since 1999 and is a properly researched paper rather than opinions.
StallSpinEvaluation.PDF (richstowell.com)
One fact that emerges clearly in this study is this: “One feature that stands out in all except one of the 39 stall/spin accidents examined is that knowing how to recover from the stall or spin was of no benefit to the pilots in these circumstances. They stalled at altitudes so low that once the stall developed, a serious accident was in progress. Safety will be advanced therefore by preventing stalls and spins.”
It is well worth a read.
StallSpinEvaluation.PDF (richstowell.com)
One fact that emerges clearly in this study is this: “One feature that stands out in all except one of the 39 stall/spin accidents examined is that knowing how to recover from the stall or spin was of no benefit to the pilots in these circumstances. They stalled at altitudes so low that once the stall developed, a serious accident was in progress. Safety will be advanced therefore by preventing stalls and spins.”
It is well worth a read.
Whilst I don't disagree with the stats in this post (and, in fact, find it a really interesting read), I can't help but think experiencing a spin and recovery is still a great experience to have in your bank of aviation know-how. Perhaps it'll make you even better at spin-avoidance.
I'm of the opinion that some aerobatic/spin exposure is important to lessen the "startle effect" of even relatively benign Unusual Attitudes/Aircraft Upsets. The more training and experience, the better.
I can't help but think experiencing a spin and recovery is still a great experience to have in your bank of aviation know-how. Perhaps it'll make you even better at spin-avoidance.
I did spins when I did my tailwheel endorsement, because the aircraft was coincidentally a Decathlon and the instructor had an aerobtics rating.
I immediately learned that there was no way I would have recovered from a spin merely through the explanation given during my PPL. Very glad I did the real thing.
I immediately learned that there was no way I would have recovered from a spin merely through the explanation given during my PPL. Very glad I did the real thing.
Thousands of pilots have been through entire careers without spin training and survived. Spin avoidance is far more important than recovery as some types will not recover, or recovery takes so much altitude that you just don't have. The point being, don't go anywhere near stall/spin entry conditions especially when low. The stats are just not there to back up that spin recovery training will make that much of a dent in accident statistics, in Australia anyway. If you then mandate spinning, inevitably aircraft will be lost practicing in 'failed to recover' scenarios. I've heard enough "there I was" stories where a C152 Aerobat or the like has not wanted to come out of a spin and recovery effected at tree top height, after using power, rocking and so on. It would not have taken much for those stories to become accidents and ATSB entries.
Not all spins are base to final. If you're in a spin at 5000 agl despite having taken spin avoidance training,who you gonna call if you didn't have to take spin recovery training to get the license.
My point was not that spin recovery was not useful, in fact I'd recommend it for instructors, however like any advanced training the more it happens the more likely crashes occur from miss handling. As the data suggests actual spin training has negligible effect on spin related accidents as they tend to occur too low to recover from and spin entry at altitude which results in ground impact is very rare. So you then have to think of the crossover in that if you mandate spin training for all candidates you will have less competent providers forced to do it, and training accidents will occur.
Last edited by 43Inches; 29th Oct 2023 at 00:33.
My point was not that spin recovery was not useful, in fact I'd recommend it for instructors, however like any advanced training the more it happens the more likely crashes occur from miss handling. As the data suggests actual spin training has negligible effect on spin related accidents as they tend to occur too low to recover from and spin entry at altitude which results in ground impact is very rare. So you then have to think of the crossover in that if you mandate spin training for all candidates you will have less competent providers forced to do it, and training accidents will occur.
"...if you mandate spin training for all candidates you will have less competent providers forced to do it, and training accidents will occur." Absolutely correct. I would suggest that can be remedied by a requirement of more competent instructors. And perhaps a recurring requirement for demonstrated spin recovery, although that may be an administrative goat shag. I've probably done about 300 spin recoveries, or supervised someone else both entering the incipient stage and recovering on command. I can't say I enjoyed any of them. At some point, I did become fairly competent in the process. But, no denying things can go south.
Until I saw this thread, I hadn't known that spin recovery was no longer required.
. . .
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12 pages of speculation and analysis for this accident. Yet the Jabiru at Stanthorpe on the 19th gets zero interest.
Stall and Spin Evaluation by Rich Stowell, great books, great vids, go to OSH and to his presentations, even better when it's a Q&A and discussion.
Thousands of pilots have been through entire careers without spin training and survived. Spin avoidance is far more important than recovery as some types will not recover, or recovery takes so much altitude that you just don't have. The point being, don't go anywhere near stall/spin entry conditions especially when low. The stats are just not there to back up that spin recovery training will make that much of a dent in accident statistics, in Australia anyway. If you then mandate spinning, inevitably aircraft will be lost practicing in 'failed to recover' scenarios. I've heard enough "there I was" stories where a C152 Aerobat or the like has not wanted to come out of a spin and recovery effected at tree top height, after using power, rocking and so on. It would not have taken much for those stories to become accidents and ATSB entries.
I've spun Aerobats many times, including multi-rotation spins, and don't recall any reluctance to recover from them!
When undertaking basic IR training in NZ I had an instructor who thought it was funny to have me under the hood on partial panel and then spin the Traumahawk and say, "You have control"!
Back onto this sad accident.
Any further information as to what actually happened?
Any further information as to what actually happened?
Interesting!
I've spun Aerobats many times, including multi-rotation spins, and don't recall any reluctance to recover from them!
When undertaking basic IR training in NZ I had an instructor who thought it was funny to have me under the hood on partial panel and then spin the Traumahawk and say, "You have control"!
I've spun Aerobats many times, including multi-rotation spins, and don't recall any reluctance to recover from them!
When undertaking basic IR training in NZ I had an instructor who thought it was funny to have me under the hood on partial panel and then spin the Traumahawk and say, "You have control"!
Last edited by 43Inches; 29th Oct 2023 at 22:27.
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As the first demonstrator pilot of the first Cessna 150( not C152) Aerobatic aircraft introduced in Australia, I can assure you it recovered totally conventionally from a fully developed spin. I did dozens of them in Aerobatic demonstrations at air shows in South East Queensland. Control column fully forward and opposite rudder and that was it. Of course one had to be trained in these manoeuvres, and I was a recipient of this training from an expert in his field from the RAAF.
Even in the PPL syllabus of the day, incipient spin recovery training was mandatory.
Even in the PPL syllabus of the day, incipient spin recovery training was mandatory.
As you say, training is required. Just saying column fully forward and opposite rudder, is very generalised. It doesn’t include the checklist items of throttle to idle, ailerons neutral, rudder full opposite and then forward elevator (as per the manual). Training with a competent instructor will explain exactly why all those four steps are needed and the difference between an incipient, fully developed spin, and a spiral dive ( and discuss inverted spins).
it’s a bit like saying Instrument Flying is just staring at the Artificial Horizon most of the time….
it’s a bit like saying Instrument Flying is just staring at the Artificial Horizon most of the time….
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At least two questions arise from reading the preliminary ATSB report:
(1) Ground witnesses reported hearing rough running or surging of the engine earlier in its flight and one of the witnesses of the descent heard engine running rough then 'stop' prior to the accident. So was there already an engine problem unrelated to icing or are such reports consistent with an engine affected by, and injesting, ice?
(2) Report notes the parachute system needs to be deployed before aircraft departs controlled flight. This seems to be a catch 22. Most pilots would presumably be reluctant to deploy a chute in the early stages of control problems developing as they would be conscious it means the aircraft will likely be damaged beyond economic repair when it hits the ground, even at the reduced rate of decent under a parachute. They would be attempting to recover control. So what is the window of opportunity to properly deploy the chute?
(1) Ground witnesses reported hearing rough running or surging of the engine earlier in its flight and one of the witnesses of the descent heard engine running rough then 'stop' prior to the accident. So was there already an engine problem unrelated to icing or are such reports consistent with an engine affected by, and injesting, ice?
(2) Report notes the parachute system needs to be deployed before aircraft departs controlled flight. This seems to be a catch 22. Most pilots would presumably be reluctant to deploy a chute in the early stages of control problems developing as they would be conscious it means the aircraft will likely be damaged beyond economic repair when it hits the ground, even at the reduced rate of decent under a parachute. They would be attempting to recover control. So what is the window of opportunity to properly deploy the chute?
I also thought the rough running was interesting.
I found when flying the Cirrus that backfiring is difficult to hear, especially with noise cancelling headsets. How do I know this? If you reduce the throttle too quickly, for example on final, the continental will tend to backfire… perhaps not on all of them, however it was an observation of mine.
Makes me wonder if the pilot understandably didn’t hear the backfiring, power was reducing, along with speed and it all came unstuck.
I’m also surprised that a witness kept listening to an aircraft approaching 10,000ft to the point that they noticed that the engine stopped.
I found when flying the Cirrus that backfiring is difficult to hear, especially with noise cancelling headsets. How do I know this? If you reduce the throttle too quickly, for example on final, the continental will tend to backfire… perhaps not on all of them, however it was an observation of mine.
Makes me wonder if the pilot understandably didn’t hear the backfiring, power was reducing, along with speed and it all came unstuck.
I’m also surprised that a witness kept listening to an aircraft approaching 10,000ft to the point that they noticed that the engine stopped.
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